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Introduction 
 
A Crisis of Inequality 
 
 
Today we are not only living a financial crisis but a crisis in globalization.  The 
crisis started in the financial system but has spread to every aspect of the economy, 
creating socio-economic disequilibrium.  In order to save the financial system we 
have invested billions of dollars but the problem is not to save only the financial 
system by restoring credit, but to sort out the huge structural economic problems 
which are at the origin of the crisis.  In my view, the growing inequality worldwide is at 
the heart of the problem.  This is the most important dilemma we must face; to 
restore a system that recompenses the rich, or transform the system using a model 
of integration to eventually increase overall equality.   
If national income had been distributed more fairly, with lower profits and 
higher salaries, the economy would have been more stable and more durable. If the 
wealth that was speculated had been distributed, in the form of lower prices and 
higher salaries, we would have been able to avoid, or at least minimize, the current 
crisis. 
It was along these same lines that M. S. Eccles, President of the US Federal 
Reserve from 1934-1948, identified the causes of the crisis in 1929 and the great 
depression which followed. One could say the same of the present crisis; that it is 
due to the unsound distribution of income, to the growth of inequality in developed 
countries and to the supremacy of financial speculation over the real economy.  
The crisis which we are suffering, global and systemic, is to a great extent the 
crisis of a model based on the growth of inequality. Too much profit and too many 
extravagant salaries for some and a mass capital which feeds the speculation of the 
stock market, each time leveraging more risk. Salaries which are too low and poverty 
among the middle class has driven credit consumption to the exploding point of debt; 
thus credit is no longer a socially extended and economically solvent request used 
for investment into new fields of real production.  
All of the data reflects that since the beginning of the 80’s, there has been a 
slump in the distribution of income and an increase in profit margins. Those countries 
with the most developed social systems are the best positioned to withstand the 
crisis, whereas the USA, with a meager social security system and where the 
superior decil has exceeded the 27% to 55% of the income, is doing worse. We 
should not forget that this crisis is from the outset very much an American tale. At the 
beginning of the 70’s, the director of General Motors, a company of reference at that 
time, earned 88 times more than the average salary of his employees. The Director 
of the company of today's reference, the distribution chain Wal-Mart, earns 1,300 
times more than the average salary.  
The emergence of exporter economies has created a wider working market 
with a global excess of labour, an increase in competition in the property market, a 
better profitability demand of capital under the threat of off-shoring, and a strong 
downward pressure on wages. 
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In this way, the compromise between the capital and labour constructed in the 
post-war period was broken. The evolution of real salaries was disconnected from 
the productivity generating a real-wage deflation. This transformation in the 
distribution of income implied a change in the macroeconomic growth adjustment. 
Consumption moved away from income, turning to credit which became the stimulus 
of demand. Companies, in order to increase value for their shareholders, substituted 
capital with debt each time they had not launched strong enough corporate 
transactions which would normally give a guarantee of the same value as when they 
bought them. In Spain, we know a lot about this. Some of our main business figures 
have generated fortunes and others have been left, or will be left with nothing. 
The result has been a spectacular increase in private debt, both for families 
and companies, and a fall in the rate of savings. In Spain especially, non-financial 
companies and family debt in 2006 was at 188% of the gross domestic product, a 
rate only equivalent to that of the UK, but 50% higher than Germany and France. 
One must say to be fair that the American growth model, based on credit-financed 
consumption, and the speculative bubble in the real-estate sector, has had two good 
replicas in Europe, Spain and the UK. While we were all extremely pleased with the 
reduction of the deficit and public debt, the private sector was accumulating a 
mountain of financial debt with external savings. 
The crisis which provoked a trend of increasing debt was promoted by the 
Central Bank, and especially the Federal Reserve, lowering interest rates and in turn 
further increasing debt. The financial innovation allowed the banks to transfer risk 
and as a result, value it with less severity, freeing up capital in order to extend more 
credit. 
Now the excess of debt must be reduced and the recession is fed by the 
interaction between the fall of income and credit. Only the State can make the vital 
changes needed to maintain activity and bring about the new financial regulations 
necessary to avoid further excesses.  This is where we are now. 
However, this will not alone be sufficient to generate stable growth. If the debt 
is no longer able to bring about growth by way of credit consumption, it will be 
necessary to increase wages in line with productivity.  This is a necessary 
requirement for the success of any recovery plan including recovery for the financial 
systems.   
 
What's next: a tentative exploration on what should be done? 
It follows that growing inequality has become the cornerstone of the current crisis. 
This problem affects other socio-economic spheres such as economic migration, 
human-trafficking and informal economy that result in a steady deterioration of 
working conditions worldwide. This explains why in the emerging economies of the 
world, more GDP does not necessarily mean more or better jobs, nor a steady 
improved in social cohesion.   
The "winners" in globalization are devoting only a very small share of their 
increased GDP to social security and cross-national differences in social expenditure 
are huge.  The ever-growing informal economies in developing countries means less 
state investment in infrastructure and thus little progress in overall development.  In 
fact, there is a steadily growing gap between the emerging middle-class and the 
poor.  Given the capital accumulation over the past several decades, the developed 
economies of the world have done relatively little to contribute to development 
worldwide.  Free trade has been one of the great achievements of the 20th century 
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but if we look further, we can see that despite some benefits, there have also been 
devastating effects from trade imbalances throughout the world. 
The following publication is a collection of diverse and progressive voices 
(academics, politicians, NGO´s, and civil society leaders) who speak out for a new 
globalization.  One in which not only the developed economies of the world, but also 
the least developed will benefit from trade, capital flows,  innovation, and all the 
potential that globalization has to offer.   
There will be much discussion about the Decent Work Agenda and how the 
current growth model has negatively impacted the labour market by experts and 
leaders in the field such as: Juan Somavia (President of the International Labour 
Organisation), Guy Ryder (President of the International Trade Union Confederation), 
Conny Reuter (Secretary General of SOLIDAR), and Larry Cohen et al (President of 
Communication Workers of American Union).  We will also look at social policy and 
social cohesion in depth with Javier Ramos (policy advisor to the GPF); and Joan 
Benach (EMCONET) et al will discuss employment and health inequalities. This will 
help us to see the consequences that this liberal system has left on the welfare state 
and particularly on those most vulnerable.  
During this crisis in globalization, among the most vulnerable in developing 
economies are women and immigrants; themes to be treated by Professor Jayati 
Ghosh and Professor Praven Jha, (both from JNU, New Delhi.)  Greed and a 
deficient understanding of our inter-dependence are at the root of the lack of 
commitment among rich economies to contribute their share fare to developing 
nations. Nancy Birdsall (President of the Centre for Global Development) as well as I 
myself, will explain that it is not only a responsibility, but in the best interests of 
developed economies to invest in developing nations so that underdeveloped 
economies are not continually the losers in globalization.  And Aminata Traoré 
(Forum pour l´autre Mali) will discuss Europe’s role in partnership with the developing 
countries in Africa.  We will also explore the themes of tax havens with Marta Ruiz 
Carnés (Policy Advisor, EURODAD) and see why they are so detrimental to the 
development agenda.  Finally we will look at progress that has been made on the 
development agenda, particularly in the area of micro-credit, to be discussed by João 
Joaquim Del Melo Neto Segundo (Director of Instituto Palmas, Brazil.) 
Despite all the 'glories' of globalization, the current liberal policies have 
provoked an unprecedented world-wide financial crisis.  Professor Rodriguez (Deusto 
University, Bilbao), and Professor Patnaik (JNU, New Delhi) will examine in depth the 
processes that have brought us to the brink!  Pervenche Berès (Chairwomen of the 
committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs in the European Parliament) will 
examine the history behind the financial rules and regulations that have driven the 
global economy and make a case for Europe to take the lead in reforming the 
system.   
We will examine the forces behind this liberalization such as unbridled 
capitalism, speculation, fiscal policies, and fiscal paradises.  These ‘paradises’ are 
also having a profound effect on the global economy.  They allow the rich to hoard 
their gains rather then reinvest in productivity, and deprive states (especially 
emerging economies) of much needed tax revenues to reinvest into infrastructures 
and local economies. Christian Chavagneux et al, (Deputy Editor of Economique 
Alternatives, Paris) will discuss the tax havens and their role in the breakdown of the 
economy. The liberalization of the financial markets has actually produced greater 
volatility in the economic cycles, instead of stimulating more investment into new 
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infrastructure and productivity which would stabilize the world economy over the 
long-term.   
Trade liberalization has also transformed the global economy but has it 
increased capital accumulation and job creation, or just served to relocate investment 
and jobs?  Pascal Lamy (Director General of the World Trade Organisation) will 
explain the sometimes hidden drawbacks to this liberalization and propose 
alternative ideas so that trade can become beneficial to all stakeholders. 
Although we have reaped many benefits from industrialization, we have also 
reaped the tremendous global challenge of climate change.  Emissions of 
greenhouse gases are producing ever-increasing global annual temperatures 
resulting in dramatic climate change.  We are only beginning to understand the wide-
ranging effects of climate change on food production, migration, ecology, 
manufacturing, and in a multitude of other domains.   
The more we grasp the extent of these effects, the more we comprehend how 
these changes are they are not only destroying our planet, but are collectively 
devastating the global economy and prosperity.   The extensive reach of this problem 
will be explored by advocates in the field like Mr. Navraj Ghaleigh, (Professor of 
Public Law and Environment, Edinburgh) and Ms. Cristina Narbona (Spanish 
Ambassador to the OCDE and former Spanish Minister of Environment).  They will 
discuss how climate change implies growing risks for the global economy, and 
especially for the most vulnerable on our planet, but they will also present potential 
solutions and progress that can be made towards a greener globalization. 
Though globalization has produced much capital accumulation, it is still in the 
hands of a few powerful economies, and controlled by even fewer states.  Instead of 
increasing democracy world-wide, many of the current global processes have 
increased inequality, trade imbalances, and poverty, and thus hindered the growth of 
democracy.  In the final chapters of this book, different experts will examine possible 
ways to democratize global processes, such as Professor Avritzer (Federal 
University of Minas Gerais, Brazil) who will discuss participatory budgeting, and 
Fernando Mendez (Director of the e-Democracy- Center in Zurich) who will explain 
the possibilities that e-democracy offers to a new model of globalization.  Zita 
Schellekens (IUSY, PVDA) will discuss the role of youth in democratic processes and 
Mr. Martin Schulz (President of the Socialist Group in the European Parliament) will 
discuss why the EU must take the lead in pushing a progressive agenda to bring 
about a more democratic globalization.  
Looking at the fore mentioned subjects, it is clearly evident that despite much 
growth, the liberal model of globalization benefits only a portion of people; however 
the burdens of growth are spread out among the most vulnerable economies and 
peoples of the world.  In this book we propose to offer new insights and reflections on 
globalization that will transform our thinking and hopefully inspire many to combat the 
oppressive liberal policies of the past few decades. Together progressive voices 
worldwide can bring solutions and breathe new hope into global processes; in search 
of a new globalization…....... 
 
 
 
 
Josep Borrell Fontelles 
Chairman of the Global Progressive Forum 
Member of the European Parliament and Chairman of the Development Committee 
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i. Aid and Development for a New Globalization 
By Josep Borrell Fontelles1 
 
 
As President of the Development Committee in the European Parliament, I have had 
the opportunity to observe first hand just how awful the world we live in has become.  
Current inequalities have widened the North-South gap, tensions have worsened in a 
more and more interdependent world, and climate change has become a real threat 
that can no longer be ignored.  
The year 2008 witnessed the re-emergence of famine as a consequence of a 
boost in agricultural products that proved to be stronger and quicker than petroleum.  
Afterwards, a brutal slowdown in the worldwide economy started, leading to the 
present global crisis.  Once again, the developing countries will be the most 
vulnerable as they suffer the consequences of the decrease in their exports, in their 
emigrants' remittances and in international development aid. 
One should start by analysing the evolution and the actual perspective of the 
Official Development Aid.  After a protracted decline during the 1990s, funding for 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) has grown steadily over the last decade. The 
share of ODA directed to low-income countries has been above 60% since the 
1970s, and reached about 67% over the 2001-2005 period.  Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
share of total ODA has been growing for almost half a century, from a little more than 
20% in the 1960s to over a third of total ODA today.  The share of the social sectors 
in total sector allocable ODA to low-income countries has also grown, from 29% in 
the early 1990s to 52% in 2000-2004. However this increase of ODA is deceiving 
because much of it has been due to debt relief, and to a lesser extent to emergency 
assistance and administrative costs of donors.   
Donors promised to increase funding by some $50 billion a year by 2010 
compared with 2004, but OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development) studies of their budget allocations found a shortfall of some $30 billion 
and the Development Co-operation Report calls on donors to boost their forward 
spending plans.  Actually aid is expected to decrease in 51 countries in between 
2005 and 2010, mainly in Africa and Asia. Four of these 51 states are in situations of 
conflict or fragility, thus programmed decreases could radically impede their 
recovery. 
The manner in which aid is given and spent is as critical as is the amount.  
Developing countries also have their own role to play in ODA.  For instance, they 
could increase their revenues sharply by strengthening their tax systems ensuring 
that those who are able to pay do so, plugging the drains of tax evasion and 
avoidance, and battling corruption.  When receiving countries have better means, 
both economically and in infrastructure, they can better prepare and coordinate 
forecast projects and thus greatly increase the effectiveness of any aid given. 
                                                 
1 Mr. Josep Borrel Fontelles,  Member of the European Parliament and Chairman of the Development 
Committee 
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AID and MDGS (millennium development goals) 
The global poverty reduction impact of aid varies with its allocation across countries.  
This affects donors’ allocation criteria: should they go for maximum global poverty 
reduction or should they aim at reaching the MDGs in each country? Should aid 
compensate disadvantaged countries and try to create equal opportunities for all? 
These alternatives have a substantial impact in terms of foregone global poverty 
reduction. 
Unless the sector targeting of aid becomes more focused on MDG needs, 
even much larger amounts of aid may not be enough.  Various developing countries, 
particularly those in Sub-Saharan Africa, will in all likelihood miss not only the most 
prominent MDG of halving absolute poverty by the year 2015, but also the more 
specific targets, like those related to health and education.  Rich Western nations are 
urged to stick with the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) despite the 
turbulence in the global economy. A report released prior to the meeting of the UN 
MDGs in New York in September 2008, found that development aid needed to 
increase by $18 billion per year between 2008 and 2010 to meet the Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) pledge by developed countries towards fulfilling the 
goals.  
The global financial crisis needs to be addressed independently of matters 
relating to aid towards MDG commitments.  It is all too easy for rich countries that 
have been hard hit by the financial crisis, to shy away from earlier ODA commitments 
or justify the unfeasibility of increased ODA spending.  However, what these 
countries often refuse to acknowledge is that while their country may be experiencing 
higher levels of unemployment or foreclosures, in many developing countries the 
crisis is translated into even wider-spread poverty and mass-starvation.  Thus, during 
this time of economic upheaval it is vital that each individual country carry out their 
own responsibility to deliver on the goals. 
 
1. Financing for development 
As the rich world struggles to deal with its financial crisis, the commitment made at 
the Gleneagles G8 Summit in 2005 to deliver $130 billion in official development 
assistance by 2010 seems less and less likely to be met. Even before the crisis there 
were questions as to how these commitments would be implemented.  In the last few 
years aid numbers have been inflated by large debt relief programs, which do not 
involve cash transfers, but merely write-offs of often worthless debt.  But most debt 
has now been forgiven and the aid numbers are slipping again.   
The question is how can the current level of ODA be optimized?  What 
possibilities are there to improve financing for development?  We need not only to 
mobilize more ODA, but also to make sure that this is spent wisely on those types of 
infrastructure, services and social protection that provide the maximum benefit for the 
world’s most vulnerable people. Consequently, we should focus much discussion on 
aid effectiveness, as we did in the Accra Conference in September 2008.  All the 
more so, given that the outcome of Doha proved to be less then successful. 
For sometime now the effectiveness debate has been narrowly focused on 
growth, the new obsession among some bilateral donors, but the time has come to 
move forward and focus on its impact on poverty.  This is especially so for chronically 
poor people, many of whom get left behind by growth, even if aid does help to raise 
the recipient countries´ growth rate.  
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We also need to move the debate on innovative sources of finance into the 
fast lane. It has puttered along since Monterrey despite the best efforts of the Action 
Against Hunger and Poverty Initiative of Brazil, France, Chile and Spain that was 
launched at the UN in 2004.  Since there are such vast and diverse proposals on 
innovative finance, the best way to accelerate progress would be to focus for the 
moment on just one or two of these proposals.  
The nexus between finance and climate change is one obvious focal point. At 
the just-concluded UN MDG summit, the EU, Mexico, Norway, and Switzerland were 
among those states pushing on the climate change issue.  In particular, carbon 
taxation has come to the forefront. According to a Swiss Government proposal, a $2 
per ton levy on carbon dioxide would raise around $48 billion per year.  This is a 
brilliant way to raise funds using the riches and waste of the developed world to 
finance desperately needed aid in the developing countries, while at the same time 
promoting cleaner air, and a better environment from which all global citizens can 
benefit. 
 
Aid effectiveness, fragmentation and emerging donors 
The global aid architecture has become increasingly complex, with the growing 
importance of non-DAC and other “emerging” donors as well as with a high degree of 
aid proliferation and ODA fragmentation. New donors bring with them more 
resources to help developing countries reach the Millennium Development Goals, but 
also new challenges for coordination and standardization, in particular as limited data 
is available regarding aid volumes and terms.  The impact of the proliferation of aid 
channels can be seen from the perspective of both donors and recipients. 
From the donors’ viewpoint, earmarking, in addition to complicating budgetary 
management, may lead to a misalignment between donors’ and recipient countries’ 
priorities. By constraining recipients’ flexibility in allocating resources, earmarking 
may contribute to under-funding of other investments which are more important for 
economic growth and poverty reduction, while funding certain projects that are much 
less cost-effective. 
From the recipients’ viewpoint, the growing importance of sector/thematic 
international organizations and private donors further increases the complexity of the 
aid architecture. The problem is particularly pronounced in the health sector, where 
the effectiveness of increased ODA will rest on finding an appropriate balance 
between providing resources for disease and intervention-specific health programs, 
and for strengthening health systems. 
The Paris Declaration signed in March 2005 following a 2nd High Level Forum, 
is a sign of progress, albeit uneven across countries and donors.  This international 
agreement of over one hundred ministers, heads of agencies and other senior 
officials, committed their countries and organizations to increase efforts in 
harmonisation, alignment and management of aid for results, with a set of 
monitorable actions and indicators.   The declaration lays down a practical, action-
orientated roadmap to improve the quality of aid and its impact on development.  The 
56 partnership commitments are organized around the five key principles: ownership, 
alignment, harmonisation, managing for results, and mutual accountability. 
Despite the proposals made, some international actors seem to see the Paris 
agenda as an end in itself, rather than one of a number of means to improve aid 
quality.   Another problem is that the ODA is gradually being overtaken by other 
financial flows, particularly the sudden growth in philanthropic funds but also by new 
forms of private sector financing, foreign direct investment and remittance income.   
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There are now about 225 bilateral and 242 multilateral agencies funding over 35,000 
activities each year. For 24 countries there are 15 or more donors that combined 
provide less than 10% of that country’s total aid.   
The transaction costs, both for donors and recipients, are massive and could 
easily be reduced if donors’ efforts were more coherent, co-ordinated and focussed.  
The fragmentation of aid flows among official aid donors has been widely commented 
on. There are more than 60,000 publicly funded aid projects currently underway, of 
which more than 85% are smaller than $1 million. Thirty thousand new projects are 
started per year. 
It is important to note that twenty years ago 22 members of the OECD/DAC 
accounted for 95% of total aid to developing countries. Today, aid to developing 
countries is delivered via more than 150 multilateral agencies, 33 bilateral members 
of the OECD/DAC, at least 10 non-DAC governments and a growing number of 
global Vertical Funds. Furthermore, the number of donors per country has multiplied 
threefold in two decades. Some developing countries have more than 700 active 
(sometimes very small) projects and receive more than 400 missions a year, each 
with its own specific requirements.  With these statistics it is hard to deny that a 
solution to aid effectiveness is crucial!! 
In September 2008, a 3rd High Level Forum in Accra was held.   With over 
1700 participants the Accra Forum was an unprecedented alliance of development 
partners, including developing and donor countries, emerging economies, UN and 
multilateral institutions, global funds and civil society organisations.  One of the goals 
was to take stock of the Paris Declaration targets two years before the 2010 due date 
and to set priorities that would accelerate those goals.  Among the topics discussed 
was the still high transaction costs associated with aid, in particular, inordinate 
numbers of donor missions and reports make it difficult for country authorities to 
focus on delivering better results.   
The lack of predictability of aid flows also makes it difficult for countries to plan.  A 
survey showed that in 2007, only 46% of aid flows were disbursed according to 
schedule.  The outcome of the 2008 Forum is the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA).  
Built on solid evidence, it lays the foundations for a reinforced approach to achieving 
the MDGs by 2015.   The bottom line is that governments must allocate the human, 
financial, technological and natural resources available to them in a way that will truly 
make a difference in people’s lives. 
  
2. Financial crisis and developing countries 
Following the financial crisis that broke out in the US and other Western economies 
in late 2008, there arises a serious concern about its impact on the developing 
countries.  Almost daily the world media reports scenarios of gloom and doom, with 
many predicting a deep global recession not seen since the 1930’s.   
Remember that during this financial crisis, developing countries are also 
experiencing drastic decreases in their tax and GDP revenue, but to compound their 
problem, they are also confronting large decreases in their revenue from foreign aid, 
on which they are dependent to fund their very infrastructure.  This makes developing 
countries extremely vulnerable during such a crisis, as their infrastructure may 
partially or completely collapse leaving them unable to meet even the most basis 
needs of their populations.  Therefore, the crisis accentuates the urgent need for 
Western economies to accelerate financial development in poorer countries 
regardless of financial and political difficulties.  This can be done by strengthening 
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domestic financial systems and mobilizing domestic resources, as well as reforming 
the international financial system.  
Europe plays a key role in the development architecture. Not only should 
Europe maintain its development activities, but it should transform them into an 
engine for growth. By investing in the less-developed neighbouring regions, Europe 
could achieve several important objectives.  It could narrow the gaps that threaten 
regional stability (fragile states), and gain the international influence that it has long 
deserved, while at the same time contributing to the search for an adequate 
economic response to face the current crisis. 
 
The importance of allocating aid to fragile states 
State fragility has serious repercussions for national and international security and 
prosperity. Many fragile states are ravaged by conflict and have become “failed” 
states. Some have only recently emerged from devastating civil wars and still remain 
fragile.  The World Bank created the LICUS Initiative (Low Income Countries Under 
Stress) for countries where traditional aid approaches have failed, but continued 
foreign aid is desperately need.  Among some of the most fragile states LICUS 
classes Afghanistan, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Comoros, Haiti, Liberia, 
Somalia, Sudan, and Tajikistan. 
Fragile states have weak state policies and institutions, and have a high risk of 
conflict and political instability, many in the midst of civil conflicts.  These states can 
fail in three ways: by causing negative spill-overs for citizens of neighbouring 
countries, by failing to provide basic security for their own citizens, and by failing to 
create and maintain an environment for the progressive and sustainable reduction of 
poverty.  One can argue that in any of these three aspects of failure, fragile states 
can amass and impose costs which, if large enough, may justify international 
intervention.   
Some authors calculate that the combined total cost of failed states (using the 
World Bank’s classification of LICUS) is around US$276 billion annually, which is 
more than twice what international aid flows would be if the OECD countries actually 
reach the UN target of giving 0.7% of their GDP in aid.  This suggests that there are 
significant financial and political benefits in finding solutions for the dilemmas of 
fragile states.  In addressing these dilemmas specific to fragile states, LICUS tries to 
build state capacity and accountability, while stressing the importance of peace, 
security and development linkages.  Further priorities include donor harmonization, a 
need for a strong and flexible institutional response, and field presence so that there 
is monitoring for abuses as well as productivity.   
 
3. Climate change and development 
There are two key dimensions to the climate change challenge: mitigation and 
adaptation to its irreversible effects. If we do not act against climate change urgently, 
advancing development and reducing poverty will become much more difficult and 
could even face reversals. 
Poor and vulnerable developing countries will continue to be hit the hardest as 
they do not have the means to adapt, and their lives depend very much on real 
basics like food and drinking water.  In short, climate change will undo global efforts 
to eradicate poverty and hunger.  We should be reminded that the least developed 
countries are not responsible for the climate change we are facing today, albeit they 
will suffer its worst effects. The question of "climate justice" must therefore be at the 
forefront of the human development agenda. 
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4. A new vision for a development agenda 
It is time for a new vision of social justice, which extends beyond simple measures 
against poverty.  Of course there must be recognition that delivering a ‘social 
minimum’ is a priority, whether in the form of humanitarian aid or social protection.  
But far beyond the minimum, we need to bring to the development agenda a vision 
that includes social policy and infrastructure for developing countries.  These 
countries need to be empowered to begin to develop their own infrastructures that 
will be capable of sustaining their domestic social welfare system long-term. 
It is clear that due to the different factors and new global challenges discussed 
earlier in this chapter, (climate change, the financial crisis, debt relief, etc.) the 
current levels of ODA are far from sufficient to meet the UN´s MDG´s.  The effort to 
increase aid must continue on all fronts. 
The impact of globalization has transformed the concept of growth in real 
terms.  We have seen that growth does not necessarily translate into poverty 
reduction or development.  On the contrary, today in emerging economies growth 
often means an increase in migration, pollution, and an increase in the informal 
economy, which in turn produces increased inequality and poverty.  The approach 
that has been used for years in the development community needs to be re-
evaluated.  As a global community we must recognize these changes and begin to 
adapt our development and growth agenda accordingly so that growth is 
accompanied by the necessary elements to truly increase equality and reduce 
poverty in developing economies.  
Globalization also means that there are more streams of development funding 
aid available from more countries and organizations then at any time in the past.  
However, it also means that governments must collaborate more effectively than they 
currently do, so that the multiplied aid flows are not slowed down or even lost in 
endless bureaucracy.  So much time and money is wasted because of a lack of 
coordination both among donor countries, and among receiving countries and 
projects.  And more importantly, the UN agencies and other development umbrella 
organizations must be reformed and find ways to simplify and multi-lateralize aid so 
that donor countries and organizations can more easily channel development funding 
to the needs at hand.   
Improved harmonization means an increase in the effectiveness per dollar, 
and also has the potential to reduce the enormous costs associated with transferring 
funds to developing countries. When this begins to happen, (ie:similar projects that 
are in the same sector in the same country are coordinated) then the maximum 
amount of aid can reach the neediest areas and be the most effective.  Only then can 
we truly start to see an acceleration of progress towards the MDG´s. 
Part of the reforms needed among institutions include an increase and 
coordination of the controls and assessments of development projects.  There should 
always be independent evaluations so that development partners are held mutually 
accountable.  This is crucial so that precious aid is not wasted on fraud and abuses, 
but can reach the targeted sectors without delays.  I believe that the EU is an 
essential pillar of the new development architecture and should play a crucial role in 
the process of assessment and accountability.  
On the other hand, it is easy to appreciate some weariness of the European 
public opinion about the problems related to global development, which seem to be 
never-ending. The lack of confidence concerning aid effectiveness increases in view 
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of the depressing scene represented by the real-estate patrimony that some African 
Chiefs of State possess in former metropolis. 
Furthermore, the current crisis sparks off defensive reactions against 
emigration, considered once as a part of the solution but nowadays as an important 
part of the problem. However, Europeans as well as the citizens of most developed 
countries should bear in mind and accept that not only is our future intimately tied to 
that of developing countries, but also that we will be unable to raise walls high 
enough to protect our isle of relative prosperity from an ocean of absolute misery. 
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ii. The European Union and Globalisation – 
 A Progressive Agenda for the Future 
By Martin Schulz2 
 
 
Europe can look back at an unprecedented success story. After centuries 
suffering under a precarious balance of power, devastating conflicts and the 
catastrophe of the two World Wars, a new era dawned with the foundation of the 
European Coal and Steel Community. The idea of creating peace, stability and 
prosperity through regional integration has become a reality. The absence of war, 
together with Europe's open borders, has made one of humankind's oldest dreams 
come true. With member countries transferring a very few sovereign rights from the 
nation state to a supra-national institution a spiral of integration was set into motion. 
From the Schuman Plan in 1950, to the 1957 Treaty of Rome that paved the way for 
the common market, to the Monetary Union, a breath-taking level of integration has 
been reached. Starting with six founding members, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, 
the Netherlands and Luxemburg, over time the Union has grown to 27. Peace, 
freedom, democracy and prosperity were extended to Spain, Portugal and Greece at 
the end of their dictatorships. Eastern enlargement put an end to the artificial 
separation of the continent by the iron curtain, and has contributed substantially to 
the peaceful transformation of these countries, thereby contributing to the security 
and stability of Europe as a whole. A war between EU member countries is 
unthinkable today.  
The common market is a daily reality for half a billion people. The Economic 
and Monetary Union has created prosperity, growth and employment. But the EU is 
also a political and social project. For decades the people of Europe supported the 
integration process. They wanted the EU because it brought peace to a war-torn 
continent and because the EU was a driving force for social progress. The people of 
Europe still want the EU, but they no longer support it without reservation. European 
citizens are formulating new demands and they are stipulating conditions for their 
support which must now be included in the political process. They want a social 
Europe that creates jobs. They want a Europe that protects them against the risks 
and challenges thrown up by globalisation. They want a Europe that tackles climate 
change and one that can manage the economic crisis. They want a Europe that 
makes life better.  
If Europe wants to be an exciting project again, it needs to demonstrate its 
ability to solve problems that are important for its citizens. The legitimacy of the EU 
does not only come out of its past achievements - its raison d'être needs to grow 
from a future-oriented need. The EU must develop a new vision for the 21st century, 
a vision with a cohesive force to revitalise the integration process. It is time to go 
back to the drawing board and rethink the possibilities for future development and 
action. What can and must the EU contribute for coping with the global challenges of 
the 21st century? 
                                                 
2 Mr. Martin Schulz,  MEP, president of the Socialist Group in the European Parliament 
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Globalisation has become the basis of life and politics in the 21st century. 
Interdependence between economies and societies is growing, distances are 
shrinking, and borders are increasingly becoming open for people, money and ideas. 
New communications technology has created a world more interconnected than ever 
before. Decreasing transport costs, new information technologies and new forms of 
organising production are resulting in a global fusion of markets for goods, capital 
and labour. The growing inter-dependence of the world has ambivalent effects. 
Globalisation generates both positive and negative dependencies, and it gives birth 
to winners and losers. Globalisation creates global change and risk, but also huge 
opportunities. It means that a growing number of people gain access to mobility, 
education and knowledge. If wisely managed, the productivity of the world economy 
could generate more and better jobs and eradicate poverty. Global wealth is 
increasing, but it is unevenly distributed. Many countries and people do not share in 
the benefits. While highly industrialised nations and emerging countries are the 
winners with globalisation, many developing countries are losers. 40% of the world's 
population lives in poverty. One billion people must survive on less than one dollar 
per day. Economic and social marginalisation, environmental pollution and increasing 
scarcity of resources are negative side-effects of globalisation.  
Globalisation is without doubt controversial. Some claim that globalisation 
leads to more efficient economies and gains in prosperity for all. Others argue that 
growing interdependence diminishes the capacity of states to act and increases 
social inequality. The buzzword globalisation evokes the fear of “social dumping” and 
job loss, but also holds the promise of a better life for many. It is undisputable that 
the globalisation of the world can neither be stopped nor reversed. Whether 
globalisation turns out to be a blessing or a curse is largely a question of governance. 
The openness and integration of the global economy raises questions of social 
justice that need to be addressed urgently. The challenge for politics in the 21st 
century is to make globalisation fair, just and sustainable. 
The European Union has a key role to play in coping with the challenges of 
globalisation. In many ways, the EU is the most appropriate answer to globalisation. 
Today's problems ignore national boundaries. Globalisation gives rise to 
transnational sets of problems, necessitating cross-border governance as no country 
can solve these problems by simply acting alone. The zero-sum game played by 
nation-states in the 19th century is no longer valid in an age where globalisation has 
changed the rules of the game. In many respects economic globalisation has 
outpaced political globalisation. Economic globalisation has made the world more 
integrated and interdependent and it has opened up many issue areas that need 
cooperative action and the setting of rules. Earlier threats and risks were local and 
the state could offer protection. Today’s dangers are often global and more imminent. 
Policy issues traditionally falling into nation-state responsibilities can today only be 
addressed in cooperation with other states. Neither the hole in the ozone layer, nor 
marine pollution, nor international terrorism can be solved single-handed. Only 
recently, the world experienced forceful reminders of shared vulnerabilities and 
global responsibilities. The first global food crisis demonstrated the complexity and 
interconnectedness of today’s world. The spring 2007 “Tortilla Revolt” in Mexico 
signalled a world-wide famine and a full-blown wave of protests. From Cameroon to 
Haiti, from Egypt to Bangladesh, soaring food prices have made corn and rice 
unaffordable for the poor, pushing them into taking to the barricades. The world is not 
facing a temporary bottleneck, but a global, fundamental food crisis. Its causes are 
multi-faceted and intertwined, making the crisis even more difficult to resolve. The 
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world population is growing, while the amount of arable land is shrinking. Because of 
changing eating habits more and more forests are being turned into pastures that 
yield fewer calories per acre than arable lands. Climate change is causing bad 
harvests and the loss of arable land, as a result of droughts, floods and erosion. 
Millions of people displaced by civil wars need food that they are unable to produce 
by themselves. Speculators are driving up the prices of food and fuels. By betting 
cynically on soaring prices they seek profit in the hunger of others. 
The “silent Tsunami”, as the food crisis was christened by some observers, 
does not respect state boundaries, but hits all countries indiscriminately. The after-
effects of the crises will be felt for a long time. UN Secretary-General Bang Ki-Moon 
has warned that the current crisis, if not handled properly, could result in a cascade 
of related crises, a multi-dimensional problem affecting trade, economic growth, 
social progress and political security. The fight against poverty is in danger of being 
thrown back years. The soaring food prices may at first sight seem to have local 
causes and local impact, but they are the result of multi-layered causes on the global 
level and have worldwide repercussions.   
Thinking in a global dimension has become a prerequisite for finding solutions. 
Re-thinking governance and including new levels of governance expands the room 
for manoeuvre. Growing interdependence between societies and states does not 
only create new categories of problems, it offers the solution, too. Nation states 
simply might not be the best vehicles for mitigating global change. The EU is much 
better equipped for finding solutions and implementing concrete measures in 
cooperation with other major players.  At a time when the world is struggling to cope 
with the financial crisis and climate change, Europeans need a strong and social 
Europe more than ever. Transferring a very few sovereign rights from the nation-
state level to the European level boosts collective sovereignty - and increases the 
capacity of everyone to act. As the world's largest economic bloc and trading partner, 
the EU is a global player by definition. When it comes to fighting climate change, 
setting up new rules and supervision for the global financial markets, re-launching the 
economy, reforming the United Nations, eradicating poverty and fostering 
multilateralism, the EU can and must deliver. A large majority of EU citizens support 
the development of a stronger external policy dimension. They have realised a 
simple truth, if Europe acts in unison and speaks with one voice all member states 
regain political power to shape the world. Europe faces the task of developing a true 
external dimension to match its internal peace project; a Europe with a global vision 
that gives a lead, but one that also lives up to its responsibilities. Managing 
globalisation to the benefit of everyone must be the cornerstone of a progressive 
agenda for the EU. 
 
Leading the economic recovery and tightening control of financial markets 
The worst credit crunch since the 1930s has plunged the global economy into a crisis 
that is hitting people hard. In times of economic recession, rising unemployment, high 
food and fuel costs, the EU faces a two-fold task-  tightening the control of financial 
markets and leading the economic recovery by promoting jobs and growth.  
Blind faith in the market has led the world into its deepest recession for 80 
years. The spectacular failure of the financial markets brought Europe and the world 
to the brink of economic catastrophe. The financial sector was only one heartbeat 
away from meltdown, when governments around the globe issued rescue plans and 
economic packages and central banks coordinated their monetary policies. We now 
know that the market is sometimes the problem, and politics the solution.  
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When Wall Street went bust and threatened to drag the world’s financial 
markets down, the ideology of 'turbo-capitalism' filed for bankruptcy, too. The market, 
claimed the High Priests of deregulation, regulates itself and does so more efficiently 
without state intervention. The near-collapse of the financial system has exposed 
self-regulation by the financial industry as illusory. In the brave new world of the 
market-radicals everyone wins eventually, or so unapologetic profiteers have claimed 
for years, because money is supposed to "trickle down" and help make everyone 
better-off in the long term. The reality, however, looks a lot different. The income gap 
has grown ever wider, and real earnings are in decline. While the poor became 
poorer, the rich became richer. Economic progress has become an end in itself 
instead of serving people’s interests. Now the house has burned down and it needs 
rebuilding. The world would be ill-advised to follow the advice of some financial 
experts, who now warn of “over-regulation”. Embracing self-regulation of the financial 
players would be akin to enrolling the arsonists in the fire brigade. The tremendous 
market failure was not only caused by the greed of speculators, however. A self-
destructive dynamic inherent in capitalism drives it towards destroying its own 
foundations. In order to function well a market needs a regulatory framework. Taming 
the unleashed market forces of turbo-capitalism places too great a demand on the 
capacity of individual states. The financial crisis has laid bare the fact that the 
globalised economy needs a global political response.  
The November 15th G-20 Summit in Washington, on the international 
response to the global financial and economic crisis, acknowledged the need for a 
global response and the fact that the world is entering a multi-polar stage. The era of 
the G-7 meetings has clearly come to an end. The G-20 meeting was a first step 
towards a New World Economic Order. The growing importance of the emerging 
countries was finally recognised by including them in the decision-making process. 
For an effective response all the world's major players needed to participate. As the 
mirror of an increasingly multi-polar world, the G-20 will be the forum in which future 
solutions to global problems will be found.  
The summit’s action plan was a first step towards a new global financial 
architecture. In order to prevent any repeat of the crisis, the financial market requires 
new global rules that produce more transparency, clearer rules, better supervision 
and greater stability. Effective order in the financial markets is inconceivable without 
institutions that work. One recommendation therefore is to turn the International 
Monetary Fund into an early-warning system. The Socialist Group in the European 
Parliament has long led demands to put financial markets on firmer foundations. 
Regulation need to be extended to all financial players, including rigorous capital 
requirements and limits on excessive borrowing and bad loans to prevent excessive 
risk taking and debt. Top executive pay and bonuses must be limited and de-linked 
from short-term profits. At the current time, perverse incentives exist to realise profits 
regardless of long-term effects. Detrimental short-selling and 'betting' on food prices 
should be outlawed. Rating Agencies must be subjected to closer supervision and 
better regulations, consulting and assessment must be de-coupled. It is intolerable 
that up to now Rating Agencies have been evaluating financial products that they 
have produced themselves. Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds must be 
monitored and regulated more effectively. The disclosure of asset and regulatory 
structures must become obligatory, excess debt financing limited, and requirements 
to inform investors about risks restrictions on investments need to be stricter. Tax 
havens have to be closed down and we must put an end to tax avoidance schemes 
to ensure that all actors in the market pay their fair share of taxes. Governments now 
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face the task not only of mending regulations, but reforming international economic 
institutions and fashioning a new global economic order in line with the principles of 
the social market economy. If European states speak with one voice and act in 
concert, they have the chance to mould the future global economic order according 
to European ideas. 
European cooperation is the key to fighting the recession effectively, because 
no national economy is capable of dealing with the effects of the financial crisis on its 
own. The real scandal in this crisis is that as the recession is now hitting home, it is 
felt hardest by the most vulnerable people - the EU has the duty to protect them. 
Besides providing support for member states experiencing financial difficulties, 
Europe has a vital role to play in raising and channelling capital for example through 
Eurobonds. Alongside closer coordination in the Eurogroup, a European initiative on 
jobs and small and medium-sized enterprises is required. Europe is the world leader 
in eco-technology.  A package of smart green investments could create 10 million 
new jobs by 2020, at the same time putting Europe back to work and meeting its 
climate and energy goals.  
 
A new social Europe 
Existing inequalities, economic globalisation and the recession together place new 
pressures on people. Increased competitive pressures on the social systems 
threaten to damage the social cohesion of European societies. The pressure on 
salaries goes hand in hand with blackmail by international companies threatening to 
relocate to low-wage countries. In face of the highly mobile global economy nation-
states have lost their capacity to act alone and to adequately protect social rights and 
collective goods. While capital, riding on the wave of globalisation, has swept away 
borders and has become 'Europeanised' in the common market, the welfare state 
has remained trapped within national boundaries and is now threatened by a 'race-to-
the-bottom'. The old balance between capital and labour is now at risk in the internal 
market. Even though the EU does possess a social dimension, it is currently 
underdeveloped. For decades the EU success model was the combination of 
economic progress with social progress. Then the governing conservative-liberal 
majority in Europe decided to focus on the removal of trade barriers while neglecting 
the social dimension of Europe. Deregulators claimed that economic growth can only 
be achieved through pressing salary costs and lowering environmental and social 
standards. The opposite is true, economic growth cannot be an end in itself, it is 
worth nothing, if it does not benefit the people. After all, it is the knowledge and 
creativity of people that creates competitiveness.  
Now it is time to correct the existing imbalance - it is time for a new social 
Europe that places people, and not the market, at its centre. The European Union 
must develop a veritable Social Union to complement the existing Economic and 
Monetary Union. A European Social Progress pact could propose goals and 
standards for national, social, health and education policy while respecting national 
social models. The recent European Court judgements -the Viking, Laval and 
Rueffert decisions- are worrying signals. The EU's Posting of Workers Directive is 
clearly in need of review. The rights of workers to collective bargaining and collective 
agreements across borders must be strengthened, as well as workers' rights to 
information and consultation. Participation in economic decision-making processes 
by employees at the European level is a key for the future. To achieve this goal, 
workers’ rights need to be anchored more firmly in the European Company Statute 
and in European Works Councils. Additionally, a social progress clause needs to be 
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included in every piece of European legislation, and a social and environmental 
impact assessments needs to be taken into account in developing European 
legislation. If Europe again shows its social face, it will surely regain the trust and the 
support of its citizens.33 
 
Climate change 
The financial and economic crisis is threatening to eclipse the danger of climate 
change. Some conservatives argue that the fight against climate change needs to 
wait until the recession is over. The reverse is true: recession is the world's most 
immediate challenge, but by far the biggest challenge of coming years is climate 
change. The only hope of avoiding catastrophe is a rapid shift towards a low 
emissions, low energy economy. 
A two degree change in temperature will be the tipping point. If, and only if, the 
rise in temperature by the end of the 21st century does not exceed two degrees, only 
then will humanity still be able to adapt to the effects of climate change. This is the 
conclusion of the fourth assessment report of the International Panel on Climate 
Change from 2007. If the international community does not act now, the 
consequences of unchecked global warming would be catastrophic- rising sea levels, 
water shortages caused by periods of drought, melting glaciers, and the desolation 
and desertification of land. Climate change would affect the lives of millions of people 
throughout the world, their food production, access to water and health. All countries 
will be affected by climate change, but some of the poorest people will suffer most. 
Hunger and thirst would drive more and more people from their homes. Ecological 
collapse could lead to social breakdown; extreme weather could lead to political 
crisis. The threat of violent conflicts, mass migration and regional destabilisation loom 
over increasingly scarce resources. Climate policy is security policy!  Even the UN 
Security Council has come to understand that. Climate policy, however, is also 
economic policy. The Stern report, commissioned by the UK government, clearly 
shows that just one per cent of global GNP would be enough to cut CO2 emissions - 
the follow-up cost of unchecked climate change could range between 5% and 20% of 
global GNP. The costs of inaction easily outweigh the costs resulting from the fight 
against global warming. The bad news is that, if we do nothing, we are careering 
towards global disaster. The good news is that we can overcome the greatest 
challenge the world faces - if we act now.  
Reversing climate change requires global cooperation and a real commitment 
by the international community to cut CO2 emissions by half by 2050 compared to 
1990 levels. Highly industrialised nations carry a special responsibility in the fight 
against global warming, as they are still the main producers of CO2 emissions. The 
USA alone are responsible for one quarter of the world’s CO2 emissions, but to date 
they have not signed the Kyoto Protocol. While Barack Obama has promised a U-
turn in climate policy, the booming Chinese economy has drawn level with the USA 
on CO2 emissions. The poorest of the poor are currently afflicted most by the first 
effects of climate change.  Bangladesh is increasingly haunted by storms and 
flooding, if sea level rises further, one third of Bangladesh might be lost to the sea. 
Without doubt, highly developed countries are called upon to assist developing 
countries in complying with climate goals as well as in mitigating the effects of 
climate change. The EU must shoulder the responsibility of taking measures against 
climate change within its own borders as well as leading the world by example.  
Transforming Europe into the world leader in the fight against climate change 
will require both developing new efficient technologies that reduce Europe’s 
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dependence on fossil energy, and also taking a lead in the negotiations for a global 
agreement on the post -Kyoto period after 2012. Europe has long advocated an 
active climate policy and binding emission targets. The EU has signed both the 1992 
Rio de Janeiro UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol. In the run up to the Kyoto negotiations, the EU member states signed a 
Burden Sharing Agreement, the first ever fixing of climate policy targets that have an 
impact on energy and traffic policy. In 2007, EU leaders agreed to limit greenhouse 
gas emissions and increase the proportion of renewable energy. The “energy and 
climate package”  better known as the ”20-20-20” agreement showed the way 
forward by adopting ambitious goals. The EU has committed itself to increasing the 
percentage of renewable energy from 5% to 20% by 2020, and also to become 20% 
more energy efficient than it is today. In order to reach these goals, Europe has 
invested in research and development activities focusing on environmental 
technologies, new energy sources, and the implementation of research undertakings. 
The EU will also reduce CO2 emissions by 20% compared to levels in 1990, and it 
will take on extra responsibility by increasing the amount of emissions from 20% to 
30% - if other countries join in the framework of a global treaty for the post-Kyoto 
period 2012. The EU accepts a shared distribution of responsibility, within its territory 
richer countries shoulder greater burdens than poorer countries. “Climate justice” 
must be the model for a global agreement, especially as it follows the UN principle of 
common but differentiated responsibility. So Europe should increase its assistance to 
developing countries to fight climate change as well as adapt to it. Massive 
technology transfers could ensure that developing countries are able to fight poverty 
and develop economically – without disastrous effects on the environment. The 
Copenhagen Conference in December 2009 will set the course for the fight against 
climate change for years to come. Europe must take the lead in setting global climate 
policy goals and getting all major players on board. 
Climate policy is the Siamese twin of energy policy. It is difficult to resolve one 
without tackling the other. Energy consumption is growing and, with it, the 
dependence on oil and gas, largely imported from non-EU countries. By 2030, 70% 
of all energy consumed in Europe will have to be met with imports, one serious 
prognosis claims. Reducing energy dependence therefore must be a priority for 
Europe. Security of supply, diversification of supply routes and diversification of 
energy sources should be the three pillars of a coherent EU energy policy. Rising 
energy prices are not only a geo-strategic issue, but they are also a socio-political 
issue. Soaring electricity prices and heating costs quickly wipe out the budgets of low 
income households. Energy poverty has become a threatening prospect for many 
Europeans. The key to reversing global warming and cutting energy costs lies in 
finding environmentally friendly and energy-efficient solutions. Investing in research, 
development, and innovation, and adjusting from an industrial fossil fuel-based 
economy to a sustainable society is the road we must take.  
 
Eradicating poverty 
Over the past two decades most of the world enjoyed unheard levels of growth, 
prosperity and low inflation. The economies of 124 countries expanded by 4% or 
more in 2007. Still, 80% of world populations live in developing countries. And one in 
five people live in extreme poverty and have to cope with less than one dollar per 
day. As a result of the credit crunch, the ILO estimates that 150 million jobs will 
disappear this year throughout the developing world. Much needed capital is flooding 
out of developing countries in search of safe havens. With its annual 6 billion Euros, 
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the EU is the world’s biggest donor of development aid. In addition, it has signed 
agreements with the 49 poorest countries concerning duty-free access to the EU 
market for 'Everything But Arms' (EBA). Yet there is no hope of achieving the 
Millennium Development Goals, that the EU member states signed in 2000 which 
agreed to eight goals, ranging from halving extreme poverty to halting the spread of 
HIV/AIDS and providing universal primary education, if global finance and trade 
return to 'business as usual' after the crises. In the short-term, we must see to it that 
the IMF makes enough credit available for the developing and emerging countries. In 
the long run, the underlying rules of global finance must be changed to ensure a 
more accountable, stable and fairer global financial governance. The Doha trade 
round of trade negotiations must be concluded swiftly and in a development-friendly 
way. Although the EU has reduced its production subsidies and export subsidies, the 
EU agriculture policy, widely perceived as protectionism, is a shame. It inflicts grave 
damage on the credibility of the EU as a player living up to its global responsibility. 
The Socialist Group supports the “20-20” initiative. 20% of EU development aid 
should be directed towards social aid, especially health and education programs. 
Eradicating extreme poverty continues to be one of the main challenges and requires 
the combined effort of everyone to form a more effective global partnership.  
 
Nuclear disarmament 
Two decades after the end of the Cold War, there are still 27,000 nuclear warheads, 
making the proliferation of nuclear weapons one of the biggest threats to international 
peace and security. There is even the danger of a new arms race, if nuclear weapons 
are developed outside the recognised nuclear-weapons states. Also, terrorists could 
gain access to nuclear devices.  Existing monitoring and inspection mechanisms do 
not guarantee adequate security. Every nuclear facility that is not properly safe-
guarded brings with it a potential security loophole.  
A radical shift away from Cold War deterrence thinking towards a new 
consensus on banning nuclear weapons and placing fissile material under 
multilateral control is needed. The Coal and Steel Community, the bedrock on which 
the EU was founded, was based on a simple calculation. Two strategic industries, 
coal and steel, were placed under collective supervision to generate trust between 
former enemies. A lack of trust between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states is 
one of the biggest problems of the existing non-proliferation regime. Placing the 
nuclear production cycle under multilateral controls thus might make supervision 
more effective and build confidence. The task waiting at the upcoming review 
conference of the non-proliferation treaty in 2010 is to develop a constructive 
timetable and practical measures to reduce the number of nuclear weapons, tighten 
control over the peaceful use of nuclear energy and counteract the threat from 
nuclear terrorism. Multilateralism and international treaties bring greater security. A 
world without nuclear weapons is a safer world for all. 
A project of regional integration that is as ambitious and successful as is the 
European Union exists nowhere else in the world. With 27 member states, half a 
billion inhabitants and a quarter of world's GDP, the EU is a global player by 
definition. Being an economic superpower comes with a responsibility for peace and 
stability in the world. It is time to give the successful 'within-Europe' peace model a 
true external dimension. Democracy, dialogue and diplomacy, cooperation and 
consensus – these values are at the heart of the European model for peace and 
must guide its external relations. 
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The EU has an important contribution to make to solving global problems and 
boosting global governance. First, the European methods of integration are the best 
strategies for solving transnational problems in a globalised world. The most 
important ones are the pooling of sovereignty, the continuous development of 
common interests, solidarity, and governing beyond nation-states, the setting of 
legally binding rules for cooperation, economic interdependence and an effective 
multilateralism. Peace, security, democracy and prosperity are served most 
effectively and at the lowest cost by pooling sovereignty and by international 
cooperation. Secondly, the EU is perceived as a benevolent player in world affairs. A 
large majority of people would like the EU to play a more important and active role on 
the world stage. No other player receives higher approval rates. The EU is not only 
perceived as a genuine broker between conflicting interests, for example in the 
Middle East, but also as a problem-solver as in the case of climate change. Europe’s 
capacity to act globally is based not on military power, but on its economic, cultural 
and political attractiveness - as a soft power the EU possesses moral capital and 
enjoys trust.  
In a world that is becoming increasingly multi-polar, the development of a 
cooperative global-governance architecture built on a fair and rule-based 
multilateralism is a necessity. Nevertheless it requires great political effort to bring it 
about, but no one is more likely to play a major role as the protagonist of 
multilateralism than the EU. At a time when the election of Barack Obama as the 
44th US President raises hopes that the era of US unilateralism will be closed for 
good, climate change and the financial crisis have demonstrated clearly that global 
cooperation is the key for solving global problems, a window of opportunity exists to 
strengthen and reform multilateralism. The EU now has the great opportunity to 
fashion the processes of globalisation. The EU must now translate its great potential 
into a capacity to act effectively.  
At the beginning of the 21st century, the European Union faces new global 
challenges. Looking inward, it must strengthen its social dimension and conclude the 
reform process. Facing outward the EU must act in unison and speak with one voice. 
The EU must deliver when it comes to tightening control of the financial markets and 
re-launching the economy, the fight against climate change and the reform of 
international organisations, dealing with international terrorism, eradicating hunger 
and poverty in the world. 
Sixty years after its foundation, the EU again stands at a cross-road. Euro-
sceptics claim that the EU is opening the gates to unrestrained market forces. 
Economic nationalists make people believe that the nation-state is an effective 
protecting power against the negative side-effects of globalisation. By conjuring up 
nostalgia for the lost idyll of the protectionist nation-state, politicians may win 
elections. But they severely hurt the interests and the well-being of future generations 
by suggesting that 19th century ideologies can provide answers for the challenges of 
the 21st century. The retreat of politics behind state borders is neither desirable nor 
practicable. Slowly giving up integration leads us down the blind alley of a 
fragmented and powerless Europe. Will the people of Europe accept the destruction 
of the best tool they hold in hands for coping with the global challenges in the 21st 
century? Or will we develop a new vision for Europe and provide the EU with a 
progressive agenda and the means to face up to the tasks ahead? In the 20th 
century, Europeans needed Europe to overcome the past; at the beginning of the 
21st century we need a progressive Europe to manage globalisation for the benefit of 
everyone. 
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iii. Global Greed Paves the Way for a Better Globalisation? 
by Poul Nyrup Rasmussen3 
 
 
For years progressives have been making the case that the actual neoliberal 
globalisation is not a law of nature. There is a way for a better globalisation; for a 
better managed globalisation. We have made the speeches, worn the badges, gone 
to the events, and sometimes wondered if we were making any headway.  
While many indicators of global well being are getting worse rather than better, 
progressives have been labelled ‘anti-globalisation’ by conservatives. It’s a lie! We 
are the keenest and most natural globalizers.  We celebrate the breaking down of the 
walls that divide us. National, cultural and religious barriers are not for us. We believe 
passionately in respect for diversity, in the benefits of sharing ideas, of working 
together for common goals. Don’t believe the free market fundamentalists: we are for 
economic globalisation, not in order to spread inequality and exploitation but to bring 
decent work and an end to poverty. We know that the market is a good servant but a 
bad master. 
We face the deepest economic crisis in 80 years. And it is in the midst of crisis 
that the value of democratic government, the value of progressive new policy, is 
tested. We must act together to safeguard jobs and prosperity! Get it right, and they 
can build not just an economic recovery but also a better, more stable economic 
governance, a healthier democracy and a more progressive society. 
Now after years of frustration there exists a real opportunity to press home the 
case for a better globalisation. There is a willingness to rethink that we must seize. 
There is a unique chance to engage in a new and fresh dialogue on the sort of 
globalisation we should pursue. We must create momentum, otherwise our moment 
will pass and it will be our children or grandchildren who will make the breakthrough. 
It is not poverty or AIDS or climate change that has created that momentum, 
as many might have predicted, but the failure of our banks. It is the greed of 
international financiers that has demonstrated beyond serious debate to all decision-
makers that deregulated globalisation has not worked. The previously unheard of 
phrase “a new global financial architecture” is on the lips of all politicians, those on 
the right as well as on the left.  It is time for us to move. 
 
Warning number one.  
We do want a new global financial architecture but beware it will take years to agree  
and there are those who make the case for it precisely because they believe it will 
never happen or who use it as a bad excuse not to do anything at the regional level, 
for example in the European Union. There are enough political leaders who realise it 
is needed, and who know it has to be done with fast-growing economies in the east 
and the south on board, to make it happen. But it is not enough on its own. 
We also need the largest economies like the US, the EU and Japan to give 
momentum to global reform by bringing in their own financial regulation.  There are 
internal battles going on, but my assessment is  that we will see new regulation on 
both sides of the Atlantic, in the US and the EU. If the Democrats can win elections in 
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Japan we may also see new financial regulation in the Far East. It calls for a new 
global politic, one of coordinated actions with complementary but different legislation 
in the biggest economies; moving in the same direction and converging in the years 
ahead. And the new G20-Summit must be enforced to be the dynamic decision 
centre for a new global regulation of financial markets. 
We must unite all progressive forces to create new global regulation of 
financial markets. Regulation of the greediness, the permanent tendency of using 
excessive debt, the lack of transparency and responsibility, and the abuse of 
dominant positions.  We must never again risk meeting a financial credit bubble and 
crisis of the present kind which is destroying millions of jobs, people's savings and 
good companies. 
 
What sort of regulation are we talking about? I think progressives could unite around 
9 pillars of reform for the global financial markets: 
 
1. Legislation covering all financial players including investment banks, prime 
brokers,  private equity, hedge funds and anyone else who has been exempt 
from the rules of transparency and disclosure that have applied to everyone 
else. As this ‘alternative’ sector accounts for a very sizeable chunk of all new 
debt, they clearly need to be brought inside the tent if new debt crises are to 
be avoided.  
2. Transparency and disclosure of debts, amounts and sources of funds, 
identification of large shareholders, executive pay and bonuses for ALL 
investment products. 
3. Compulsory ‘capital requirements’ for ALL financial players, like those that 
already apply to banks and insurance companies. It means that to reduce 
extreme risk taking and excessive debt, all financial players need to have and 
to keep a certain amount of capital. To end the systematic risks and herd-
behaviour, the capital requirements must be anti-cyclical: stronger build-up in 
good times and move flexibility in bad times. 
4. Rules to prevent excessive borrowing including excessive debt caused by 
‘leveraged buy outs’ and to protect viable companies from too much capital 
being paid out to shareholders or to service debt. 
5. Greediness must be effectively kept down. Limits on pay and remuneration 
and mechanisms to ensure that earnings reflect losses as well as profits. 
6. New rules to prevent conflicts of interest. 
7. Protecting workers interests such as ensuring that employees are informed 
and consulted during all takeovers including leveraged buy outs and by 
obliging pension funds to inform employees how their pensions are invested. 
8. End off-shore tax havens. It has been calculated that tax revenues lost 
through companies and individuals registering in tax havens could completely 
pay for the Millennium Development Goals to be implemented! 
9. A new enforced IMF and financial stability forum to ensure early warning in 
case of bubbles and effective monitoring and supervision of the financial 
markets. 
 
This is what we must argue for. It has to come out of the closet where we keep 
obscure, technical demands and into the light of day. It is here we can begin to forge 
a better globalisation. It's time for action now. The G20 Summit in April must take 
action. 
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Many, but not all of these proposals are contained in a report I steered through 
the European Parliament last September which was adopted with the support of 
conservatives and liberals who, until the financial crisis struck, argued that the market 
was already more than adequately regulated. Like in all times of change, things are 
moving fast and the facts are on our side. I cannot forget that just a year ago the 
conservatives and liberals were against any form of regulation "of the free market". 
 
Warning number two.  
While we fight to put in place a new global financial architecture, we must be equally 
engaged in the fight against a global depression. A new global financial architecture 
built on the foundations of mass unemployment is hardly an enticing prospect. If 
unemployment means misery for millions in our European welfare states, and worse 
in the US, what will it mean for Chinese workers whose goods are not longer being 
bought in the west, or for African agricultural labours who are having extreme 
difficulty coping with the ever fiercer global economic competition. 
The US and China are trying to make serious investments in stimulating 
economic growth. At the time of writing, European efforts look inadequate. As the 
crisis worsens I believe we will have to demand new measures. The right is reluctant; 
they argue that increasing public debt is no way to deal with a crisis caused by debt. 
We must argue that public finances will get better if people are working, but with 
millions unemployed public finances will get worse. Business as usual is not an 
option. Extraordinary measures are needed for very tough times ahead. The demand 
made by the PES at the end of 2008 that Europe should not allow employment levels 
to decrease, should remain our objective even as unemployment is predicted to 
increase dramatically. Already we see the dangers of social and political unrest,(at 
the time of writing), strikes in the UK and France, and riots in Greece and the Baltic 
States. 
We progressives must take action in the format of a New Global Deal - a New 
Recovery Plan. Worldwide, it is the most vulnerable who bare the brunt of the 
financial crisis. The ILO has estimated that 150 million jobs will disappear next year 
throughout the developing world, as a result of the rich world's credit crunch. Much 
needed capital is flooding out of less developed countries as the financial institutions 
search for save havens for their money. 
Europe rightly prides itself on being by far the world’s biggest aid donor. Yet 
we have no hope of achieving the Millennium Development Goals until the underlying 
rules of the global finance and trade systems are re-established on a more stable 
and progressive basis. 
The lessons from the financial meltdown are clear; coordinated European 
action succeeded where national effort has failed. In the real economy too, 
coordinated action at both a European and at a global level, will be far more powerful 
than purely national solutions. We join the call for a new Bretton Woods to create a 
new, more accountable, more stable and fairer global financial governance. 
In the short term, the G20 recovery plan must ensure that the IMF, together 
with central banks and governments in the developed world and in the cash-rich 
SWF's, makes enough credit available to developing emerging countries to fight off 
recession. And the Doha trade round must be brought swiftly to a successful and 
development-friendly conclusion.  
Recession is the world's most immediate challenge, but by far the biggest 
challenge of the coming years is climate change. Our only hope of avoiding eco-
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catastrophe is to shift rapidly towards low-emissions, low-energy economy, but until 
now the scale of investments needed has been daunting. 
Europe is a world leader in rapidly growing sectors such as eco-technology, 
environmental goods and renewable power generation technology. European social 
democrats have set out an action programme to create 10 million new jobs by 2020 
through green growth. But to achieve these goals and meet Europe's climate change 
commitments will require massive investment. We call on Europe's leaders to rise to 
this challenge, with a package of smart green investment that puts Europe back to 
work and brings us closer to meeting our climate and energy goals. 
We must turn the rhetoric for investment in green growth into reality. There is 
broad consensus on the urgency for the battle against climate change, and broad 
understanding that replacing our dependency on imported fossil fuels with more 
locally produced renewable energies would also increase the security of our energy 
supplies. Now we must generate real determination to act decisively on the growing 
understanding that investing in renewable energies and actions to reduce energy 
waste has the potential to create millions of much needed jobs. There will be those 
who claim we cannot afford during a recession to finance the fight against climate 
change. But this is a false argument. The costs for people, societies and for the 
planet of not doing anything serious are vast and irreversible. We cannot afford not to 
act; furthermore we cannot afford to miss the opportunity to create millions of new 
jobs in doing so. 
This leads also to the opportunity for a new and stronger global climate deal to 
replace the Kyoto Negotiations for a new deal open in Copenhagen later this year. 
With leadership from the EU and US we can hope for an ambitious deal that sets 
tougher limits on emissions, that puts in place new actions such as a global 
emissions trading system, and that encourages and helps developing countries to 
contribute to saving our climate. 
We must not neglect decent work, basic workers rights and social and 
environmental standards when we talk about world trade. ‘Fair trade’ is a progressive 
idea that we strongly support. The economic recession should not be a reason for a 
race to the bottom; social rights and environmental protection should not be the 
victims of the current crisis. On the contrary, respect of ILO Core Labour Standards 
and respect of bio-diversity and environment must be integrated in a progressive 
strategy to re-launch the economy.  
We must not forget the UN Millennium Development Goals, and the fight 
against AIDS and other infectious diseases, poverty, maternal mortality to lift millions 
of people out of poverty. We fear that 2015’s objectives will not be fulfilled. The EU 
and the US, together with other industrialised countries, must respect their 
commitments.   
The current crisis demonstrates that the market alone can’t solve the problem. 
It also demonstrates that codes of conduct or self-regulation are not enough. What is 
necessary now is to strengthen the international institutions for better cooperation 
between states and state institutions. Only with better global governance will we be 
able to face the current crises: economic, financial, climate change, the food crisis, 
etc...  New tools to promote general interest and public goods are necessary in the 
framework of the multilateral system.   
The time is right politically and economically for a big shift towards managing 
globalisation in a better and fairer way. Politically right because the 
Reaganite/Thatcherite idea that government is bad, markets are good is dead. 
Politically right because President War Against Terror and President Tax Cuts for the 
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Rich has been replaced by President Hope. Belief in the ability to achieve change, 
captured in that brilliant slogan ‘Yes we can’, is essential if we are to tackle the 
challenges facing us. For many the election of Barack Obama is in itself proof that 
change is possible. Our joy at the election of an African-American President is 
combined with the knowledge that his politics are far more progressive than those of 
President Bush. He knows there is far more to global politics than the war against 
terror. He has witnessed, and participated in, the very personal struggles of those 
trying to create a future for themselves and their families in developing nations such 
as Kenya and Indonesia, as well as in the poorer suburbs of Chicago. Economically 
right because the questions being asked about unregulated global capitalism in the 
context of the financial and economic crisis need to be answered. 
We have already shown that the crisis in the international financial markets 
and the deep recession we are in also creates the biggest opportunity for years to 
make a decisive change in the way globalisation is managed. We have argued that 
one of the keys to getting out of the recession is to invest in ‘green growth’. But most 
of all we must remember that the keys to managing globalisation better are two-fold.  
Combining the fight against global unemployment with the fight against climate 
change, and implementing new regulation for the international financial markets are 
the keys to opening the door to a better future.   
The failure of the markets, worshipping, "greed is good" philosophy of the last 
30 years, must finally lead to fundamental self-examination by both economists and 
politicians. Economists have to rediscover a wider vision of how their profession can 
contribute to building a better society. And politicians must learn to think long and 
hard before contracting out their responsibilities to the magic of the market. That's 
where our Progressive New Global Deal for this planet comes in. 
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iv. Building an Architecture for a Fair Globalization 
By Juan Somavia4 
 
 
In the midst of the worst financial and economic crisis since the Second World 
War, a global framework for managing globalization is urgently warranted.   
As forecasts get gloomier the media report daily on massive job losses, rising 
unemployment, underemployment and foreclosures, the insecurity of individuals, 
families and communities is increasing at great speed.  Too many feel left out and left 
behind.  
The crisis we are facing today is the consequence of the absence of fair rules 
governing globalization. We must not forget that before this financial crisis there was 
already a major socioeconomic crisis among large segments of the world’s 
population, in both developing and developed economies, with massive poverty, 
under-employment, growing inequality and difficult social conditions. 
The benefits of globalization have not been widely or fairly shared and the 
backlash was emerging. For many, this was globalization without a moral compass; a 
model that was morally unacceptable and politically unsustainable.  There was a 
growing sense that globalization had become unfair and unbalanced.  No one 
seemed to be in charge. This became even more evident when the financial crisis 
erupted. 
The imbalance is reflected, for example, in the decline in the share of wages in 
Gross Domestic Product almost everywhere. In many countries consumption had 
been stimulated by increasing personal debt. Now governments are desperately 
trying to stimulate consumption when in fact if higher productivity had been 
transferred into higher wages, demand would also be higher today.  
Everything we know about past economic crises, from the Great Depression to the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997, indicates that the social impact will be deep and long 
lasting: job losses; declining incomes, wages and purchasing power; effects on social 
spending; houses lost; deferred new investment; a decline in international trade.  In 
sum, progress already made in reducing poverty will now suffer a setback and the 
middle classes worldwide will be weakened.  
The highest price will be paid by the weakest and most vulnerable segments 
of society. There is fear that the economic recession will turn into a social recession. 
Social tensions are indeed brewing and people ask why hitherto unimaginable sums 
of money suddenly appear to bail out banks when so little has been available to 
confront the problems of poverty, unemployment and the lack of access to social 
protection. What has happened to commitments ensuring minimum social justice and 
fairness in the rules of the game? 
 
Global Jobs Crisis 
Finance is at the origin of the present crisis, but at its root, this is a crisis of a certain 
model of globalization. The market was overvalued; regulation and government were 
undervalued and the dignity of work and protection of the environment were 
devalued. There were warnings that the injustice of globalization would endanger 
further integration of the world economy. Indeed, the recommendations of the World 
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Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization (WCDSG) called for a more 
balanced globalization and better regulation of the global economy, including the 
financial system.  The comprehensive recommendations of the Commission could 
serve as a useful blueprint for engaging in multilevel policy making that would ensure 
a better managed globalization aiming at full employment, decent work and social 
justice around the globe.  
For years now the ILO, anchored in the real economy, has been calling for a 
new model of globalization centred on decent work creation and a balance between 
government, markets and society. Not financial speculation. The ILO message is 
realistic, not exaggerated; different policies can change the future course of events.  
We are now facing a global jobs crisis. Governments are aware of this and are taking 
action. However, more decisive and coordinated international efforts are needed, 
particularly regarding job creation and social protection.   In November 2008, the ILO 
was one of the first international institutions to propose a global approach. The 
Officers of the ILO’s Governing Body (representing governments, employers and 
workers) highlighted six priority policy actions:  
 
• ensuring the flow of credit and stimulating demand;  
• extending social protection, training and retraining opportunities, and other 
employment policies, with particular focus on the vulnerable—young men and 
women, workers in insecure employment, and migrant workers;  
• supporting productive sustainable enterprises, particularly small enterprises and 
cooperatives;  
• employment-intensive investment and green jobs;  
• ensuring that fundamental principles and rights at work are not undermined and 
that respect for decent labour standards is promoted;  
• strong cooperation between the ILO and the multilateral system, and deepening 
social dialogue and tripartism;   
• maintaining and expanding development aid and investment flow to vulnerable 
countries 
 
With bold leadership, this crisis can and should be used as an opportunity to make 
the economy more socially and environmentally sustainable. The short-term 
responses to the crisis should therefore pave the way for a fairer and greener 
economic growth model, an inclusive globalization based on sustainable 
development and opportunities for all.  
The present crisis sheds a new light on global imbalances.  Imbalances between 
developing countries and the developed world, imbalances in the rapid growth of 
some of the emerging countries, imbalances in income distribution and poverty, 
imbalances in trade and payment between countries, imbalances in some 
accumulating unsustainable amounts of debts and others large amounts of reserves, 
nurturing also the striking imbalances in the financial sector. 
The biggest danger is finding only stopgap solutions to the immediate crises. We 
forget that this will only take us to where we were before; and where we were before 
was a globalization that did not deliver for many people, a globalization that might 
have reduced extreme poverty for some, but was clearly increasing inequality.  We 
need a new model of globalization with coherent policies to make sustainable 
development a reality in open economies and open societies, a model that advances 
human dignity, decent work, and respect for the environment as the pillars of a new 
global approach. This requires a fundamental global rethink. We do not yet have the 
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policy instruments and the institutions in place for a global response to a global crisis. 
We need to create them and we can.  
 
It is about the management of globalization not globalization per se 
As the WCSDG report states, the problems of globalization have not as much to do 
with globalization, but with “deficiencies in its governance” and this clearly puts the 
blame for suboptimal outcomes on the management and the managers of 
globalization.  
The easy answer of the neo-liberal period was that the “markets will fix it” and 
that a hands-off approach of small government would be the best way to unleash the 
forces that would bring prosperity to all through a trickle-down wealth effect.  
The ILO has always attached an important role to government, policies and 
governance believing that a visible hand was needed to turn globalization into a sort 
of “public good” bringing prosperity and decent jobs to as many as possible.  But to 
achieve this "public good" all must have the chance to participate in globalization and 
increasingly access its fruits5. The impact of markets and government action should 
be judged by effectiveness in relation to common goals, not on the basis of ideology.  
The ILO has persistently drawn attention to the injustice of the  present model of 
globalization and advocated that it should not be managed in such a way as to yield 
a maximum profit for a few, but rather in the spirit of economic and human 
development, jobs, income and social justice for as many as possible. In fact 
empirical research has proven that countries being excluded from the benefits of 
globalization are indeed the poorest in the world.6  
We have claimed that a decreasing labour share is a source of concern, as 
are rising inequalities with peak incomes making remarkable gains but the lower tiers 
of the income distribution and the middle classes falling backwards. The high 
numbers of unemployed, the large share of working poor and vulnerable workers add 
to the many imbalances of a poorly managed globalization.  
The WCSDG also claims that management starts at home, with national 
policies and a reinforced state being indeed at the core of the governance system, 
although one must acknowledge different national capacities in steering economies 
and societies around the world. But in the globalised economy7, national responses, 
whilst fundamental, are not sufficient as can clearly be seen in the present crisis. 
Therefore, any progressive agenda for managing global processes must seek a 
balance between the levels of governance and allocate proper responsibilities to 
each of these levels.  
It is clear that the multilateral level, as a provider of ideas, money and 
coordination, is an increasingly important player in the efforts to better manage 
globalization. Inter-regional levels, such as the European Union and 
intergovernmental groupings such as the G7/G8 /G20 or G77 also have an important 
role to play.  Ultimately one cannot lose sight of the G192, the process of finding 
solutions must be inclusive and the UN has a logical role to play.  
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6 Gosh, A. (2003) Jobs and incomes in a globalizing world, ILO, Geneva 
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of, for example, the crisis materializes through the stock markets but also spreads the uncertainty that 
comes with a crisis and influences people’s behaviour. 
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The length and depth of the crisis will also crucially be influenced by the extent and 
structure of the various stimuli packages adopted almost everywhere in the world, 
whose estimated effects have, for example, been integrated in the recent interim 
forecast of the European Commission.8   
Although some countries have the fiscal space to implement stimuli and/or bail 
out programmes, or are able to access resources otherwise, in many parts of the 
world stimuli appear to be unaffordable luxuries.  In some countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe or the Commonwealth of Independent States where the IMF acts as 
lender as a last resort, stimulus programmes cannot be enacted because credit 
conditionality encourages budget austerity.  This is one of the incoherencies in 
policies that needs to be discussed.  
In most of the packages, renewable energy, energy efficient houses and other 
“green” items are present but the main share is taken by tax cuts and spending on 
“traditional” infrastructure like road and bridges.  
It should be understood that social protection in addition to jobs and income, 
are key to economic stability and any discussion on the subject must take this into 
account. Policy coherence among all the players is imperative and evidently there is 
a coherence deficit concerning issues, actors, institutions and their cooperation with 
one another. 
 
Renewal through Decent Work 
It has been said that a crisis is a terrible thing to waste, and with effective leadership, 
this crisis provides societies with the chance for a long-awaited reform and renewal. 
Any progressive agenda must address the global and national imbalances including 
the big moral hazards that drive social unrest. 
It is therefore imperative that the positive consequences of bail-outs and 
stimuli also reach the broader public and do not just recreate the “status quo ante”, 
that is the financial instruments actors and behaviour that existed before the crisis. A 
continuation of unfair globalization would bring us back to the same problems, not to 
solutions. A reregulation is warranted, especially for, but not exclusively for the 
financial sector; and a reorientation of production towards “greener” products and 
towards a more sustainable growth path. 
While we do not know at the present juncture how long and deep the 
recession will be and we continue to see increasingly alarming forecasts, we can also 
acknowledge some positive, albeit timid developments.  The awareness of the need 
for quick and concerted action has increased as it has been evident that concerted 
action, for example in the European Union where an overwhelming part of trade is 
intra-EU, will increase the effects of a stimulus both for growth and jobs.  
Inward looking responses, whilst understandable as emotional reactions to the 
crisis, need to be avoided.  There must be effective ways of responding to populist 
reactions and promoting greater receptivity to the essence of globalization: global 
interdependence needs to be nurtured.  Coherence and cooperation between 
countries and interregional groupings also serve the purpose of minimizing 
protectionist reflexes that put the international interdependence of economies in 
jeopardy. 
In a few short years, Decent Work has advanced on a number of practical 
fronts.  There has been overwhelming support through regional and international 
commitments culminating in the 2005 UN World Summit; Decent Work is now part of 
                                                 
8 They have been estimated at three quarters of a point in GDP growth for 2009 and between a third of 
a point and a half of a point in 2010. 
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the Millennium Development Goals and we are now working to implement Decent 
Work country programs around the globe. 
This is all supplemented by further concrete action.  During the last ten years, 
for example, there has been a 50 percent increase in ratifications of the eight core 
ILO conventions dealing with child labour, forced labour, discrimination, freedom of 
association and collective bargaining.  We have seen rising donor support for our 
technical assistance programmes.  Decent Work goals are being factored into 
national planning and budget cycles of some countries.   
Social movements have helped carry the Decent Work Agenda forward.   
Indeed, a global movement for decent work is emerging.  This is essential.  We 
would not have a women’s movement, an environmental movement, or a human 
rights movement without civil society.  And we will not achieve decent work for all, the 
fundamental demand of people today, without that same kind of organisation, 
mobilisation, leadership and action.  This was certainly evident when the International 
Trade Union Confederation organised a World Day for Decent Work with events in 
over 100 countries on 7th October 2008. 
The values of the organization have therefore been largely endorsed by the 
national and international community, but what remains as an ongoing mission is to 
transform values into policies and actions on a global scale that matches the scale of 
the crisis of globalization. 
 
The contribution of the ILO to a progressive agenda for managing global 
processes: 
Decent work sets the overall framework and is a long-term development goal, both 
on the national and global level.9  The ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair 
Globalization (2008) expresses the “contemporary vision of the ILO’s mandate in the 
era of globalization” for establishing fairer globalization through the implementation of 
the Decent Work objectives; that is full employment, rights at work, social protection 
and social dialogue between the main stakeholders in the economy, and society as 
an important governance instrument. These four objectives are “inseparable, 
interrelated and mutually supportive” (ILO, 2008).  
After all, safer jobs are more productive jobs.  Child labour undermines long-
term economic performance.  Effective gender equality policies lead to more dynamic 
business growth.  A more secure population means a workforce more able and 
willing to adjust to economic change.  Decent incomes translate into solid 
consumption which, in turn, stimulates the demand that keeps investment going.  It 
all works together. Effectively, managing the Decent Work Agenda constitutes an 
important foundation of the overall efforts for managing globalization.  
 
Rights at work 
In times of bust and boom alike, workers rights are at the core of the ILO’s efforts for 
helping countries and the multilateral system to manage globalization fairly. The 
Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization reiterates the role of this central 
plank of decent work and the relevance of the ILO’s 1998 Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, which is an obligatory, though not 
sufficient, part of the social platform for globalization that the ILO proposes.  
The richness not only of the fundamental rights of workers, but also of the bulk 
of the ILO international labour standards and assorted recommendations in helping 
                                                 
9 It was recognized as a global goal by the UN World Summit of 2005. 
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countries to install the basic rules for managing their labour markets and basic safety 
nets in the spirit of fairness, cannot be overstated. Additionally, the inbuilt flexibility 
that these instruments have should be underlined.  
While introducing some legal minimum standards and accountability, 
conventions are not imposed on countries, but can only be adopted by democratic, 
participatory processes. They are the fruit of careful and conscious arbitrage 
involving member States at different levels of development with sound technical 
support covering different domains. Conventions make sense ethically, socially, 
economically and they are without doubt, a necessary part, and in the interest of the 
fair management of globalization. 
 
Employment at the Heart 
There cannot be rights at work without work. Placing employment at the heart of 
social and economic policies is essential. Indeed, while (self or dependent) 
employment is not the only means of providing income, it is undeniably the most 
important and  if work is decent, productive and freely chosen it gives people a 
gratifying and dignified way of participating in the economy and society. Working is 
the main way of belonging to society and unemployment is not only about losing 
income, but also about losing social networks. 
A strategic focus on the links between the macro and the micro economy, 
employment, a well functioning labour market, and a sound investment climate is key 
to developing a national employment strategy. Such a national strategy, coordinated 
with other strategies can be a crucial element of the management of globalization, 
both during times of growth and in times of recession. 
The question of how best to stabilise and balance economic stability with 
social objectives remains.10 Stabilisation “at all costs” can prove to be economically 
inefficient and socially inequitable as shown by the experiences with structural 
adjustment programmes in many countries, and even recent crisis related IMF 
financial packages. Fiscal space for critical public expenditures such as education 
and public health should be preserved, as poverty reduction strategies now clearly 
concur.  But also shorter term business cycle downturns may often warrant anti-
cyclical policies.  
Financial policies are another important area for economic growth. Money is 
the oil of the economic motor and growth anywhere requires that the money keeps 
flowing. It is imperative for finance to flow to productive investment. 
The smart regulation of global capital is essential for the management of 
globalization, the stabilisation of economic cycles, the achievement of the MDGs, and 
the realisation of decent work. In this field there is a need to look closely into the 
quality of financial institutions and the oversight mechanisms such as the Financial 
Stability Forum, the Bretton Woods Institutions and the credit rating agencies. 
Incentive and sanction schemes must be reformed. While this demands the work of 
many agencies, the connection of the financial system with the real economy also 
requires the inclusion of actors in the real economy, to make the system more 
coherent.  
Trade and FDI liberalisation can be an effective way of promoting competition 
in the national market and access to external markets, creating opportunities for 
business, increasing exports and imports, and promoting investment and job 
                                                 
10 See Muqtada, M. (2003), “Macroeconomic stability, growth and employment: Issues and 
Consideration beyond the Washington Consensus, Employment Paper 2003/48, Employment Sector, 
ILO, Geneva.  
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creation. However, the current crisis points to some of the problems inherent in the 
current trade liberalization and investment regimes; such as the volatility of foreign 
capital and the trend to prefer portfolio investments or mergers and acquisitions, to 
green field site investments, deemed to be superior in their employment creation 
capacity. 
The current crisis provides a chance for a renewal in industrial policies such 
as directing FDI in to the right channels, for example towards greener and more 
sustainable growth. Trade liberalisation requires consequent trade adjustment 
packages, comprising among other elements, effective active labour market policies 
for reallocating displaced workers in security.11 
National employment strategies must be concerned with the employment 
content of growth, which has been declining globally. Countries placing employment 
at the centre of their development strategies, and wanting to use the employment 
route to poverty reduction, have to allow for balancing policies and incentives across 
relevant sectors (labour-intensive vs. capital-intensive; formal vs. informal) so that the 
growth is as job-rich as possible in a context of accelerating technological change 
and productivity.  
 
Sustainable Enterprises and Skills 
Sustainable Enterprise Development is a significant source of new employment. The 
creation of new enterprises and the expansion of existing enterprises, most often 
small and medium-sized enterprises in the private sector, but also cooperatives and 
similar for profit or non-profit organizations, is of course fundamental as such 
enterprises employ a good fraction of the global workforce. Enterprise creation, 
innovation and business growth are an important part of employment policies that 
can address one of the endemic problems of developing countries: the lack of formal 
jobs available.  
Higher rates of enterprise creation are associated with higher levels of 
employment. Policies to promote entrepreneurship begin with the educational 
system, where young men and women are introduced to business and 
entrepreneurial culture so that they can consider self-employment as a career option.  
A central role for governments in promoting enterprise creation is to lower costs and 
minimize bureaucracy, facilitate access to markets and offer credit and management 
training so that businesses can provide productive employment. Investment fuels 
business growth and is fostered by macroeconomic stability, as well as by 
transparent, corruption-free government structures and clear property rights. The 
absence or inadequacy of institutions guaranteeing and enforcing such rights is a 
brake on the engine that drives employment growth.  
Enterprises and their workers will also be helped by a public sector that 
provides effective service and infrastructure.  This can also become an important 
source for employment as has been demonstrated in many countries. The present 
crisis hits big and small enterprises alike, but often the rule nowadays is, “too small to 
be saved”, even though SMEs are not at the source of present troubles. Restoring 
the credit flows to this productive segment of the economy is crucial. 
Education, skills and employability are also a key component of employment 
strategies. For the individual, education, skills and competencies define one’s 
capacity to make use of job and income opportunities, and to adapt to the changes in 
the labour market and organisation at work brought about by technology and 
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globalization. Investing in knowledge and portable vocational and “foundation” skills, 
is one of the most effective ways to enhance the employability of the poor so that 
they too might participate in growth and globalization.  
For companies and organisations, the skills of managers, workers and firm-
specific knowledge are key determinants of firm-level productivity. Workplace and 
organisational learning are essential in maintaining workers’ employability in 
knowledge economies and the firm’s capacity to absorb and master new 
technologies so that they can innovate and remain competitive.  
For economies, a skilled and knowledgeable workforce improves the 
investment climate, is a major determinant of sectoral and economy-wide productivity 
and, therefore, of economic growth and job creation potential. Improving the 
efficiency of training policies and training institutions, and supporting equal access to 
education, training and decent work opportunities, create a more employable 
workforce, which supports growth and competitiveness in open economies.  
These policy choices require large investments in human capital. The present 
stimulus packages recognise this and training has become one of the areas that is 
increasingly funded, also in connection with reduced working hours, the rationale 
being that it is better to train those who are redundant than those who are idle. Here 
the crisis provides at least a chance to marginally build up competencies that can 
later be used when the upswing occurs. 
The crisis shows that good labour market institutions and policies are 
tremendously important for the management of globalization and ensuring income 
and employment security to workers.12  While the crisis will create momentum for 
new regulations and policies, it is important to note that “flexi-curity”, which aims at 
providing labour market security by combining the employment security of an 
employment relationship13 with security “beyond” the firm, provided by the social 
protection system, remains important in “boom and bust”, with the security part being 
more important in “bust” times.  
Firms and the public sector, which are embedded in adequate safety nets, 
geared towards labour market integration, can also better adjust their workforce 
under conditions of social responsibility than firms located in countries without safety 
nets. In any case, an important condition for the success of such solutions to solve 
labour market problems is that a social safety net, comprising active and passive 
labour market policies and an effective employment service, exists. Indeed, such a 
safety net should not be considered as a temporary crisis solution, but as a 
permanent institution whose function is to provide labour market security in more 
open and thus more volatile labour markets.  
Designing and implementing effective flexibility-cum-security solutions, which 
combine employment security and social protection, imply that there must be 
negotiations between industry and the state. Effective tripartism can aid the 
acceptance of change, improve the design of regulations and policies, ensure 
financing and make such solutions sustainable even in times of political change.  
 
                                                 
12 The ILO has contributed substantially in the discussion on adjustment, flexibility and workers 
protection in the framework of globalized economies.  See Auer, P. and Cazes, S. (2003), 
Employment Stability in an Age of Flexibility, ILO Geneva; Cazes, S. and Nesporova A. (2003), Labour 
Markets in Transition: Balancing Flexibility and Security in Central and Eastern Europe, ILO, Geneva.  
13 Auer, P., Berg, J. and Coulibaly, I (2005): “Is a stable workforce good for productivity”, International 
Labour Review, Volume 144/3.  
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Social protection  
Social protection is another pillar of decent work and a critical factor in the 
management of change, as it can enhance the dynamism of the economy and the 
mobility of labour. Social protection encompasses policies that insure a series of 
risks, such as health, old age, maternity etc., but also those that insure against labour 
market risks, such as income loss for those who lose jobs or who are unable to enter 
the labour market.  Indeed, people who face loss of income by job loss and have no 
other protection for themselves and their families, join the ranks of the poor whenever 
a crisis hits. Social protection not only provides the basic means for social inclusion 
but also helps to stabilize the economy by providing income even during times of 
recessions.  
In the developed world, transition countries and parts of the developing world, 
social protection faces the problem of an ageing workforce, which increases the 
financial strain on welfare systems. In other parts of the world, one has to deal with 
large cohorts of unemployed and underemployed youth that may need additional 
help in order to become integrated in to the labour market. A general challenge is 
that less than 20% of the world’s population is properly covered by social protection, 
which limits, for example, the scope of labour market security along the flexibility and 
security nexus. This implies that in some policies there is a sequence: workers and 
their representatives are naturally reluctant to accept more flexibility in the labour 
markets if little else than the security of a job exists. Therefore the goal of creating a 
safety net should be a priority. 
For both social and economic reasons, many developing countries need to put 
in place an affordable social protection system. Although this will entail some costs, 
these costs will be repaid by increased worker’s welfare, better worker’s health and 
all the secondary benefits which will be seen in productivity. While there are 
questions about the initial financing of such a system, recent research of the ILO’s 
social protection sector has shown that these obstacles are not insurmountable.  
 
Social Dialogue 
Finally, social dialogue is the vital fourth pillar of decent work and crucial for the 
management of globalization. The social partners, i.e. representatives of workers and 
employers and their dialogue, sometimes bipartite, sometimes tripartite together with 
the government, are the key actors of the real economy. Social dialogue facilitates 
the development of consensus and implementation of policy at the global, national, 
regional and local levels. Social partners can exert direct influence on the 
governance of labour markets by engaging in collective bargaining, through 
participation in boards of labour market institutions like the public employment 
service, the unemployment benefit system or training boards, and social and 
economic councils.  
By promoting participation, representation and empowerment of individuals, 
the social partners, together with governments and parliaments and civil society can 
create the processes and institutions necessary to mobilise social actors, manage 
conflict, promote social inclusion, and ensure adhesion to and sustainability of the 
visions and programmes adopted. Concerted efforts to improve governance and 
social dialogue are thus an essential part of the growth, competitiveness and 
employment agendas of countries. 
35 
An important part of such governance processes at all levels (local, regional, 
national and global) is again policy coherence.14 While coherence does not mean that 
diverging interests become one, discussions, negotiations and mutual information 
sharing among stakeholders becomes an essential part of the development process.  
 
Architecture of Global Fairness 
The present crisis provides fertile ground for change. But it will not simply just 
happen.  It will take leadership, imagination, and difficult policy choices.  There is a 
small window of opportunity to lay the groundwork for a better management of 
globalization on many levels. The depth of the crisis and its clear causes in the poorly 
regulated financial sector was a wake-up call for many.  
Unfettered deregulation, unbound markets, global trade and investment 
interdependence can quickly transform a regional crisis into a worldwide crisis. 
Global governance has shifted with the new American administration, the IFIs, the 
European Union and new world powers, such as China and India, all calling for better 
regulation of the financial system, a stronger role for the state and for more resolute 
actions. All this has already been suggested by the World Commission on the Social 
Dimension of Globalization in 2004, but only recently has such advice become 
mainstream.  
Even if the exact contours of the agenda on new management of globalization 
are not yet clear, some of its substantive elements and procedures are becoming 
more apparent. While the re-regulation of financial markets is one, multilateralism 
and policy coherence are two others. Decent work, comprising employment, social 
protection, rights at work and the social dialogue, as an accepted global goal is a vital 
foundation.  
What is the right international forum for debating and negotiating the new 
management agenda for a fair globalization in a coherent manner? Is it the G 192, 
the General Assembly of the UN? Is it ECOSOC, the Economic and Social Council of 
the UN, the principal UN body for coordination, policy review, policy dialogue and 
recommendations on economic and social issues that have already endorsed decent 
work as a global goal?  
Or is it the G 20, which seems to take on growing importance as an arena 
uniting developed, emerging and developing countries on the subject of economic 
stabilisation? Which of these bodies will be relevant and open enough to include the 
social dimension? Which body will understand that the social dimension of 
globalization is also an economic dimension, and the two can longer be clearly 
separated? Or must there be a new form of global governance that shifts from an 
international community of governments to a global community of multiple actors 
including, but also going beyond governments: for a globalized economy, a global 
forum? 
Out of these different alternatives must emerge the design; a body compact 
enough to be effective, representative enough to be legitimate and transparent 
enough to be accountable.  I have no doubt this is possible. 
The Decent Work Agenda is a critical contribution to the common multilateral 
efforts to design the plan for a global architecture that creates balance in our 
societies and economies; an architecture of global fairness. 
 
 
                                                 
14 WCSDG op.cit. 
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v. Jobs: the missing link 
By Guy Ryder15 
 
 
Introduction 
The spectacular worsening of the financial crisis in late 2008 is now having a 
dramatic impact on the real economy. GDP is forecast to fall, growth will most likely 
be negative and unemployment has already surged in the major industrialised 
countries.   The crisis, as global leaders now recognise all too well, is spreading to 
emerging and developing economies. Already, several governments have had to 
request emergency loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as their 
financial sectors have become paralysed, capital flowed out of the country, 
currencies collapsed and economic growth came to a standstill.  The global economy 
is facing a very serious recession.  How protracted and deep this proves to be 
depends on how timely and well-focused government action is.  This systemic crisis 
comes on top of the unprecedented rise in food and commodity prices in 2007-2008 
and the resulting food crisis in developing countries.  It also occurs against the 
background of accelerating climate change which, without rapid action, will affect the 
poorest across the globe most severely, especially vulnerable groups including 
women.  
At the time of publication of this book in April 2009, G20 leaders are meeting in 
London to discuss a new financial and global architecture and to set forth a plan on 
how to cope with the ‘global recession’.  The trade union movement is presenting 
clear and long-term solutions to the global crisis to influence the discussions among 
heads of state and government in London, with a view to shaping a new era of 
globalisation that is environmentally sustainable, socially just and economically 
balanced.  This article sets out three goals: first, to explore the global economic 
crisis; second, to evaluate the regulatory deficit of the financial world and third, to 
suggest a progressive agenda that links job creation both to economic recovery and 
to meeting the challenges of climate change. 
 
1. The Deficit of the Financial Markets 
History has shown that crises of the present scale frequently lead to social and 
political instability with unpredictable and often tragic results. Working families have 
an enormous stake in the response to this crisis.  Already, for more than two decades 
social cohesion has been under stress as a result of growing inequalities in many, if 
not most countries.  Today, those who are losing homes, jobs and pensions as a 
result of the financial crisis, for which they bear no responsibility, are being called on 
as taxpayers to bail-out those who are responsible.  
The current economic crisis began in the US as a conjunction of a housing 
crisis, a credit market crisis and, increasingly, an employment crisis. Each of these 
crises was serious enough in itself, but their interaction makes for a particularly 
complex and dangerous dynamic in the real economy.  Housing prices have 
collapsed, foreclosures have surged and trillions of dollars have been drained from 
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household net worth.  Consumers are pulling back sharply as their wealth declines, 
slowing the economy and forcing employers to shed jobs and cut wages and 
benefits.  The continuing decline of housing prices also aggravates the credit crisis 
as the value of mortgage-backed assets continues to undermine the balance sheets 
of under-capitalised financial institutions.  Unless the decline in asset prices and 
employment is halted, the banking system will continue to haemorrhage.  This vicious 
circle is now repeating itself in other industrialised countries and in emerging 
economies originally thought to be immune.  
For two decades most governments, together with the International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) have promoted the lightly regulated ‘new financial architecture’ that 
has characterised the global financial markets responsible for this crisis.  
Governments have now been forced to intervene to save the banking system; the 
quid pro quo must be the reintroduction of proper regulation to the financial system.  
An agenda for re-regulation must cover: the public accountability of central banks; 
counter-cyclical asset requirements and public supervision for banks; the regulation 
of hedge funds and private equity; the reform and control of executive compensation 
and corporate profit distributions; the reform of the credit rating industry; the ending 
of offshore tax havens; taxation of international financial transactions; proper 
consumer protection against predatory lending and aggressive banking sales policy; 
and active housing and community-based financial service public policies.  The new 
system needs to reflect the requirements of all regulators: bank regulators, tax and 
competition authorities, and governance and consumer bodies in each country.  
There must be no more piecemeal approaches to reform.  
While the entry of governments into the financial markets to nationalise banks, 
guarantee deposits, buy up bad debts and recapitalise the banking systems across 
the US and Europe is necessary, it would be unacceptable for governments to simply 
nationalise the losses of financial capital and let financial institutions privatise the 
profits.  This most serious economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s 
must mark an end to an ideology of unfettered financial markets, where self-
regulation has been exposed as a fraud and greed has overridden rational judgement 
to the detriment of the real economy.  A national and global regulatory architecture 
needs to be built so that financial markets return to their primary function: to ensure 
stable and cost-effective financing of productive investment in the real economy. 
Beyond this, governments and international institutions must establish a new 
economic order that is economically efficient and socially just – a task as ambitious 
as that confronted by the meeting in Bretton Woods in 1944. 
To enable a new global process that is managed responsibly, a major 
recovery plan must be the first step towards global governance and secondly, we 
must ensure that a financial crisis on such a scale never happens again.  A recovery 
plan to stabilise global capital markets, move economies rapidly out of recession, 
stave off the risks of a global depression and get back on the track of creating decent 
work is being proposed by the trade union movement. The challenges in the coming 
time are numerous and if we do not embrace bold decisions that enable coordinated 
interest rate cuts or bring forward carbon-neutral infrastructure investment 
programmes that can stimulate demand growth in the short term and raise 
productivity growth in the medium term, we are sure to fail.  Now is the time to move 
forward with a “Green New Deal” to enable economic recovery and create decent, 
sustainable jobs through alternative energy development, energy saving and 
conservation.  
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The establishment of a new structure of economic governance for the global 
economy must go beyond financial markets or currency systems to tackle all the 
imbalances of growth and capital flows that contributed to the crisis.  Just as the 
post-World War II economic settlements included the strengthening of the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO), in parallel with the creation of the United 
Nations, the new post-crisis settlement must address international economic 
governance and its imbalances.  Governments must start work on the necessary 
structures.  But, this debate should not be held between bankers and finance ministry 
officials behind closed doors. Trade unions must have a seat at the table to ensure 
that a new governance system tackles the crisis of distributive justice that has 
blighted the global economy.  It must ensure more balanced growth in the global 
economy between regions, as well as within countries, between capital and labour, 
between high and low income earners, between rich and poor and between men and 
women.  
 
2. Reregulating Global Financial Markets 
A new process of regulation has to begin; the irresponsibility of promoting the causal 
factors that are responsible for this crisis - deregulation that favours excessive 
leverage of financial institutions including investment banks, hedge funds and private 
equity, and the ‘financial innovation’ of securitised credit risk transfers that exported 
bad debt under the guise of structured products – is now manifest for all to see.  The 
business of structured finance created the illusion of low risk, low-cost capital.  As the 
crisis revealed, risks were not spread but hidden.  Coupled with ‘pro-cyclical’ banking 
accounting rules and rigid capital requirements, the credit crunch that followed the 
collapse of the structure finance industry created a self-perpetuating, asset 
depressing process in the banking sector. 
The interventions made by central banks and governments in an attempt to 
restore confidence, stabilise credit markets and inject new capital are necessary to 
save the banking system.  The banking solvency crisis follows a decade of excessive 
‘shareholder value’ model of corporate governance and corporate short-termism.  
The money that was wasted in generous dividends, share buybacks and grotesquely 
large executive compensation packages in the past 2003-2006 ‘growth cycle’ is now 
badly needed as banks search for fresh money to recapitalise their balance sheets.  
While ordinary people across the planet risk losing their jobs and yet more small 
businesses face grim times, corporate bonuses in the US actually increased by 14 
percent overall in 2008, as top executives in finance and industry, many from 
companies heading for bankruptcy, rewarded themselves for abject failure and 
pushed the global economy further to the brink of recession.  As large parts of the 
financial system are being supported by the public taxpayer, trade unions insist that 
governments take equity stakes and act as activist investors in order to protect the 
public interest and ensure that taxpayers are eventually reimbursed.  Wall Street’s 
US$ 18 billion bonuses last year could have provided two years’ education for the 75 
million children around the world who have no school to go to.  It would certainly save 
millions of jobs if put in the pockets of the working people who really create wealth.  
International cooperation must go far beyond what is currently under 
consideration; it is not enough merely to review prudential rules for banks and 
‘encourage’ more transparency. Foreign investments and capital flows should be 
submitted to proper domestic regulation, including observance of internationally 
recognised governance and transparency standards. The national and global 
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regulatory architecture needs to be restored so that financial markets return to their 
primary function: to ensure stable and cost-effective financing of the real economy.  
 
On the road to recovery: Effective and Coherent Global Economic and 
Financial Governance 
World leaders must authorise work to begin on a blueprint for reregulated financial 
markets to ensure that central banks are publicly accountable for their actions and 
have the necessary mandate to deter and detect speculative financial bubbles.  We 
need active supervision, proper counter-cyclical asset requirements and accounting 
rules for banks and large financial conglomerates.  The financial system has been 
permeated by different forms of off-balance sheet transaction and this must come to 
a halt. 
Government leaders and central bankers must not repeat the calamities of the 
1930s, with efforts to balance budgets, cut wages and ‘beggar thy neighbour’ 
exchange rate and currency policies.  Instead the G20 leaders must put in place a 
coordinated recovery plan targeted at stimulating the real economy nationally and 
globally. 
The recovery packages should also be designed to redress the underlying 
fundamental economic imbalances that have produced the current crises.  These are 
notably the imbalance between the US and other parts of the global economy, the 
imbalance between finance and the real economy and the imbalance of bargaining 
power between workers and their employers. Those economies that have surpluses 
should redirect them to supporting domestic consumption and productive investment.  
Trade union rights should be fully respected and promoted so that workers can 
improve their living standards. 
A new approach to fiscal responsibility must accompany a global New Deal.  
The worst error in the current circumstances would be to cut public sector budgets 
further.  There must be a renewed commitment to the provision of publicly financed, 
quality public services. Rethinking the responsibilities of both the private and public 
sectors must include responsible resourcing of the public sector through fair taxation 
and a new commitment to efficiency and the ethical value of quality public services, 
in which the organisations representing public employees must be invited to play a 
key role.    
 
Financial Regulation for Stability and Growth 
Those who have been paying the highest price during the last twelve months, namely 
consumers and workers, must be protected against predatory lending and aggressive 
sales policies by banks. Ordinary people are losing their homes and their jobs due to 
the oligopolistic structure of the credit rating agency industry.  It is essential that 
credit risk transfers, derivatives and futures are regulated and that non-financial 
sustainability rating is developed.  By enhancing the social purpose of pension 
schemes to provide decent retirement in both pension funding and investment 
regulations, we can strengthen the social dimension of globalisation.  Indeed, an 
international regime for taxing financial transactions should be established and the 
proceeds from which could help support financial institutions that bear social 
objectives, such as pension funds. 
On the currently elusive financial market, a new set of clear ground rules is 
needed.  It must become a priority to regulate private investment firms such as hedge 
funds and private equity, for example by setting up a “task force” that can combat 
regulatory arbitrage within large financial groups and between jurisdictions.  By 
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adopting controls to limit speculative behaviour in commercial exchanges including 
commodities and energy markets, we can regulate the extent to which speculative 
trading is causing such massive price fluctuations as we witnessed on the agricultural 
commodities market in 2007-2008.   Action must be taken to address the tax and 
regulatory measures that have allowed market makers to take excessive risks. 
Further coordinated reductions in interest rates by central banks are needed in 
Europe and the US.  Fiscal stabilisers such as unemployment benefit schemes must 
be strengthened and supplemented by direct job creation schemes, where 
necessary.  Fiscal stimuli should target increases in aggregate demand of sufficient 
magnitude to revitalise the real economy: employment, wage and household 
disposable income growth.  Tax and expenditure measures must be targeted at low 
and middle income families who are suffering most in the current situation and who, 
having higher consumption rates, will feed this back into consumption, production 
and hence employment most rapidly. 
Corporate grand theft and short-termism should be curbed by strengthening 
governance and tax rules on executive compensation, board of directors’ 
responsibilities, risk management and distribution of corporate profits.  Strong action 
is also required to stem the loss of revenues to tax havens.  Tax payers cannot be 
expected to bail out failing financial institutions when the same institutions have used 
tax havens to avoid paying their fair share of tax.  All governments need to take the 
necessary steps to protect their revenue base and to offset expected substantial 
reductions in corporate tax receipts.  This will require strengthening the political 
support for the OECD’s work in this area.  
 
Sustainable Development Pathways for the World  
Governments in industrialised as well as developing countries must now begin to 
encourage and rebuild the institutions that help distribute income and wealth more 
fairly, as opposed to continuing to call for deregulation of labour markets and 
dismantling of workers’ protection. The crisis of distributive justice is more strongly 
apparent in non-OECD countries. Even before the food price crisis of 2007-2008 and 
the current financial crisis, the World Bank noted that in 46 developing countries out 
of 59 examined, inequality had increased over the previous decade.  The worsening 
economic situation, on top of the explosion in food prices over the past year, will 
further accentuate income inequality and add to the deficit of decent work across the 
developing world.   
While capital is leaving many developing countries that can ill afford the loss of 
investment, the problems are being compounded by the reduction of remittances by 
migrant workers, many of whom are also losing their jobs.  In developing and 
emerging countries, governments should counter economic slowdown through 
monetary policy, by supporting job creation programmes and extending or creating 
social safety nets.  The IFIs must not repeat the errors of the Asian financial crisis a 
decade ago by pressuring countries to increase interest rates, cutting back 
government spending and allowing widespread bank failures – the opposite of what 
industrialised countries are doing today. Instead developing countries should be 
encouraged to maintain levels of employment and offer government assistance to the 
most vulnerable sectors of the population.   
If we are to find a way out of this ‘great recession’, investment in labour market 
programmes is necessary.  To restore faith in the global governance system, 
recovery packages must encompass employment-intensive initiatives in addition to 
new financial regulatory measures. Without an extension of social safety nets to the 
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majority of developing-country workers, currently without protection and a 
coordinated effort to boost world economy by building up public services and 
infrastructure for sustainable growth, we will have no chance of achieving decent 
work and a fairer globalisation. 
Working towards universal social protection must become a primary challenge 
for world leaders in 2009. The food price crisis of 2007-2008 illustrated the urgent 
need for sustainable and just investments, both in agriculture and in the labour 
market - investments that can serve citizens, workers, unemployed and vulnerable 
women and men.  Investments in social security remain an effective tool in alleviating 
poverty, hunger and inequalities but those investments have not reached 80 percent 
of the world’s population, which is the percentage of people working and living 
without social security nets.  It can become a reality, even in the least developed 
countries, and especially in countries highly vulnerable to climate change, to finance 
minimal social transfers to combat poverty.  A social security package consisting of a 
modest pension, access to safe drinking water and child and health services can 
make the difference between succeeding or failing in eradicating extreme poverty by 
2015.  
Beyond infrastructure, this is also the time to invest in people – in their education 
and health, and in care for the very young and the aged.  18 million new teachers 
must be trained just to meet the goal of quality education for all primary age children 
by the year 2015.  Millions more teachers and instructors are needed for vocational 
education and training for skills that underpin the real economy and for retraining of 
working people as economies restructure.  Such long term and productivity 
enhancing investment in public infrastructure – schools, hospitals, clean water and 
sanitation as well as public transport and energy – will not only help national 
economies to avert or climb out of recession, but will lay the basis for millions to 
overcome poverty. 
 
3. A New Agenda of Economic and Environmental Reform  
As stated earlier in this article, now is the time to reshape the global financial and 
economic architecture through a new set of ‘Bretton Woods’ negotiations that go 
beyond the exchange rate regime created at Bretton Woods in 1944.  None of the 
existing institutions has the scope or the credibility to put in place such a structure.  
Governments must start the work, but the debate must not be held between bankers 
and finance ministry officials, behind closed doors. Trade unions represent the 
working families across the globe, those who are the victims of the current crisis, and 
must be present at the table as well.  
The institutional reforms must go beyond financial regulation and introduce 
economic management aimed at reducing the imbalances in the global economy.  
Emerging and developing country governments must be a central part of the new 
governance structure.  At the IFIs, a more fair and democratic governance structure 
should be put at the forefront of reforms.  In the case of the World Bank, whose 
mandate is focused on developing countries, there is a need for a deep and 
systematic reform which must result, at the very least, in parity of voting power 
between developing and industrialised countries.  Both IFIs must also put an end to 
the economic policy conditionality that has characterised their interventions in 
developing countries over the past three decades.  This has minimised rather than 
strengthened the application of fiduciary controls and respect for internationally 
agreed standards, including core labour standards.  The deregulation, liberalisation 
and privatisation conditionalities of the IFIs, in addition to interfering with countries’ 
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own policy choices, have frequently led to serious and damaging impacts.  This 
approach must be changed.  The normative standards of the ILO, and notably core 
labour standards and environmental standards, must underpin the new international 
governance system.  Governments must start work on the necessary structures and, 
in line with the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalisation adopted by 
the International Labour Conference in 2008, the ILO must be at the heart of the new 
architecture. 
Trade has the potential to boost economic growth, recovery and development, 
but only under the right conditions.  Restoring the public legitimacy of the world 
trading system and concluding the Doha Round requires simultaneous progress on 
the enforcement of the protection of fundamental workers’ rights through all 
international institutions, including the WTO, and on ensuring that developing 
countries are able to achieve economic recovery, employment and future industrial 
development.  
The changes that are necessary must benefit the people and our planet. 
Wage stagnation and the lack of purchasing power for working families are both a 
result of damaging policies and themselves a major factor behind the fall in 
household savings and the emergence of unsustainable debt that led to the 
mortgage crisis in many countries.  Financial deregulation allowed creditors to 
promote borrowing against home equity as a substitute for income. Financial bubbles 
in asset prices, stimulated by excessive leverage and lax rules, substituted for 
sustainable growth based on shared earnings.  There is a need for a new growth 
regime that – as was the case during the post-war period until the early 1980s – 
ensures balanced real wage growth in line with productivity increases.  Fair 
responsible and progressive taxation should neither facilitate the accrual of fortunes, 
nor provide incentives for the pursuit of speculation, but rather contribute to growth. 
The dual challenges of recession and climate change require leadership and 
ambition. The trade union movement sees jobs as the missing link between 
economic recovery and green solutions but in order to overcome the crisis of 
globalisation, we will have to restructure a new global governance system based on 
social justice, market regulation and green growth.  The crisis requires responses 
that are fully coordinated with initiatives to minimise climate change.  Only through a 
globally coordinated effort can climate change be mitigated and emission reduction 
targets achieved.  The world urgently needs to mobilise resources and technology to 
enable developing countries, in particular major emitters, to achieve green house gas 
emission reduction.  Clear targets on renewable energy, energy efficiency, clean coal 
technology and avoided deforestation must be agreed upon to provide access to 
decent livelihoods for the citizens of the world. 
It is paramount that the efforts to fight climate change build on synergies 
between poverty reduction strategies, job creation and new technologies.  A ‘just 
transition framework’ should be promoted to ensure fairness in the transition towards 
a low carbon economy.  By addressing worker displacement, migrations, 
unemployment in climate-sensitive sectors, along with the effects of adaptation and 
mitigation, a step closer towards the social dimension of climate change can be 
taken.  The just transition should be based on decent jobs and the greening of 
workplaces; it should be based on sustainable industrial development and an 
equitable share of the burden of responsibilities and gains.   We have to save jobs, 
not create more unemployment, by upgrading labour skills and retooling industry to 
create millions of new “green jobs” that can not only contribute to a reduction of the 
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environmental impact of enterprises and economic sectors but also lay the 
groundwork for stimulating the world economy.  
The opportunity should be taken to launch a “Green New Deal”, as called for 
by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the ILO, the ITUC and the 
International Organisation of Employers in the 2008 Green Jobs report.  This is the 
time to aid economic recovery through environmentally responsible investment 
designed to create jobs in the short-term, including for youth and women, and to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the medium term.  Measures to promote energy 
saving through retrofitting buildings will be particularly employment intensive, thus 
supporting the hard-hit construction industry.  Public investment in infrastructure, 
mass transportation, and alternative energy sources will stimulate green job creation.  
 
Conclusion 
The international trade union movement has repeatedly denounced the growing 
divergence between unregulated and unmanageable financial markets on the one 
hand, and the financing needs of the real economy to provide decent work on the 
other.  According to the OECD, the international financial architecture should be 
judged upon its capacity to “maintain financial stability by ensuring solvency of 
market participants”, to “protect investors” against failures and fraud, and “to ensure 
efficient and effective financial markets”. In past months it has become clear that the 
system has failed to deliver on all three objectives. 
The current economic crisis provides an opportunity to alter the failed policies 
that have brought about the current situation.  We need to seize this chance and 
adapt and change an international system devised in the 20th century to meet the 
needs of the 21st century.  By reforming the global system of governance, the rules 
of the game can be reversed to correct the imbalances in environment and finance 
that have brought us to our present situation.  
As I said at the beginning of this article, the decisions and the choices we 
make in the year of 2009 will be pivotal.  Without wide-ranging international 
cooperation among all parties involved, our prospects to restart the world economy at 
the same time as tackle climate change will have a greatly reduced chance of 
success.  We need to successfully address the challenge of combining institutional 
reform at the same time as sustainable job creation that will lead to higher 
productivity and thus stimulate carbon-neutral economic growth.  We all have a stake 
and a common responsibility in achieving this transformation successfully and in thus 
ensuring that the downward spiral is turned around as quickly as possible, and on a 
truly sustainable basis.   
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vi. Collective bargaining in the global economy 
By Larry Cohen16 and John Logan17 
 
 
Introduction: collective bargaining is essential 
In February 1938, the British economist John Maynard Keynes wrote to US President 
Franklin Roosevelt about the recession gripping the US economy. After discussing 
government employment as part of a stimulus package and financial reforms, Keynes 
stated: “I regard the growth of collective bargaining as essential”18  In fact, collective 
bargaining was already growing following the passage of America’s first statutory 
reform promoting collective bargaining, the 1935 National Labour Relations Act 
(NLRA), as nearly one million workers a year were gaining bargaining rights, and 
building unions that increased incomes and buying power. 
Seventy years later, bargaining coverage has expanded globally, but in the US 
it has declined to about 8 percent in the private sector, back to its pre-NLRA level, 
after peaking at 35 percent in the 1950s.  Yet Keynes’ argument concerning the need 
for bargaining is as true today as it was in the 1930s.  Bargaining coverage is directly 
correlated to critical living standards (health care, income equality, pensions and paid 
time off) while the growth of union membership has been directly related to the 
election of progressive governments in Latin America, Europe and North America. 
Despite the social and economic benefits accruing from it, almost without 
exception, global corporations oppose collective bargaining to the full extent 
permitted by national laws.  Even when national laws provide for workplace 
participation and codetermination, as in most of Continental Europe, this does not 
affect the behaviour of multinational corporations (MNCs) based in those countries 
when they operate in the US and much of the global South. Firms like Deutsche 
Telekom and BMW cooperate with unions in Germany, while engaging in aggressive 
anti-union campaigns in the US and elsewhere. These same firms oppose 
government regulation and public spending, and contend that they need unlimited 
flexibility to maximise profits, irrespective of the harmful social and economic impact 
of their actions on the majority of the world’s workforce.  
The consequences of management hostility to collective bargaining have been 
different in different countries.  The level of collective bargaining coverage in a nation 
largely reflects organised labour's political clout, which itself is the main factor in 
predicting union recognition rights and collective bargaining coverage.  In nations 
with high bargaining coverage and greater union influence on national labour policy, 
opposition to collective bargaining and its social and economic outcomes (social 
security, greater income inequality, and higher living standards) is more muted.   
In the midst of the biggest global recession since the 1930s, governments in 
wealthy nations have rushed to bail out the financial sector and its CEOs – the very 
actors who created much of the current crisis, while they have concurrently produced 
the greatest wealth gap in generations. But the same governments have ignored 
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18 John Maynard Keynes, Private Letter to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, February 1, 1938.  
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millions of workers around the world who lack bargaining coverage because they 
work in the informal economy, because they face hostile employers, because they 
are classified as independent contractors lacking bargaining rights, or because their 
former employers have relocated to countries where they can avoid bargaining 
altogether. 
This paper examines the global assault on collective bargaining and how to 
reverse it. The first section analyzes the systematic destruction of collective 
bargaining in the US and its consequences. Section two examines why, with the 
exception of Colombia, bargaining coverage is higher in every other democracy in 
the world than it is in the US. The final section explains why global unions and 
progressive lawmakers in other nations should support the Employee Free Choice 
Act – a landmark attempt to restore the freedom to choose a union and bargain 
collectively in the US.  
 
Section 1: The second worst democracy in the world for collective 
bargaining 
As a result of a sustained assault by hostile employers and right-wing governments, 
the US has experienced a precipitous decline in collective bargaining coverage, 
which now stands at about 13 percent of the non-agricultural workforce. Among 
countries recognised as democracies, only Colombia (not a nation with which the US 
normally invites comparisons) has a lower rate of bargaining coverage. The 
consequences of the erosion of collective bargaining are clear: among developed 
democracies, the US has the greatest levels of income inequality, economic 
insecurity, and annual working hours, while basic entitlements at work trail far behind 
those of other nations. The stagnation and fall in real wages for most US workers, 
itself partly a consequence of the decline in bargaining coverage, has contributed to 
the current economic crisis. The lessons the US experience holds for global unions 
and progressives are clear: if they seek to encourage collective bargaining, and avoid 
the consequences of its erosion borne by most US workers, they must push for the 
enactment of laws that ensure that workers who want bargaining can get it.  
 
“Representation gap” higher in US than in any other developed democracy 
Aggressive employer opposition and government hostility in the US has led to an 
enormous unfulfilled demand for recognition and bargaining. The “representation 
gap” (the gap between those who have bargaining and those who say they want it) is 
the highest among advanced Anglophone countries and probably the highest in the 
developed world. Approximately 50 percent of non-union workers say they want 
bargaining but cannot get it. Thus, if all of the workers who want bargaining rights 
were able to get them, collective bargaining coverage in 2005 would have been 
about 58 percent, instead of the actual figure of 13 percent.  The principal obstacle to 
eliminating this enormous representation gap is employer aggression. Over 50 
percent of US workers view employer opposition as a “major reason” for their inability 
to obtain recognition and bargaining at work (Freeman 2007).  
 
What happens when bargaining is destroyed? 
The destruction of collective bargaining has had a profound economic and social 
impact on the lives of US workers:  income inequality, economic insecurity, and 
annual working hours have increased, while basic entitlements at work trail far 
behind those found in other developed nations. The US has among the highest 
overall, child, and elderly poverty rates of all OECD nations. In 2000, 21.9 percent of 
46 
US children were living in poverty, compared with 2.8 percent in Finland and 2.4 
percent in Denmark.  Americans work longer hours than their European and 
Japanese counterparts. In 2006, the average American worked 1,804 hours, 
compared with 1,436 hours in Germany, 1,564 hours in France, and 1,669 hours in 
the UK. Even Japan, which for years topped OECD tables for annual working hours, 
has an average of only 1,784 hours (Economic Policy Institute, 2006-2007).  
The US is one of only a handful of nations that has no national provision for 
paid family leave. 170 countries offer some form of paid maternity leave; 98 of these 
countries provide at least 14 weeks paid maternity leave. Americans are entitled to 
up to 12 weeks unpaid leave under the 1993 Family and Medical Leave Act, but up to 
40 percent of workers are excluded from its provisions because of the size of their 
workplace, and even among those workers who do qualify, approximately 78 percent 
cannot afford to take unpaid leave. The only other developed democracy without paid 
maternity leave, Australia, is currently considering the introduction of this benefit.  
Countries such as Sweden, Denmark, Finland, France and Belgium, which all have 
high levels of bargaining coverage, provide generous entitlements for paid family 
leave. The US is also an exception among OECD countries in having no statutory 
minimum vacation for workers. Most European countries, in contrast, have four or 
five weeks statutory paid vacation. Stronger union movements in Europe have 
adopted the causes of shorter hours, paid family and vacation leave, universal health 
care and state pension provision, while high levels of collective bargaining coverage 
have kept down income inequality (Economic Policy Institute 2008-2009). Unless the 
current decline in collective bargaining coverage is reversed, this lack of workplace 
entitlements and growing income inequality in the US will only get worse.  
 
“Recapturing the middle-class society we’ve lost”  
The dramatic decline in US collective bargaining coverage since the 1970s, and 
resulting decline in real wages for most workers, has contributed to the current 
economic crisis. As a result of employer and government assaults on bargaining, the 
link between rising productivity and rising wages that existed for most of the post-war 
decades has been broken and real earnings have stagnated in recent years. 
Substantial gains in productivity have not been matched by gains in wages and 
productivity: median household income actually declined during the economic 
expansion of 2002-2007. While the end of the housing and stock market bubbles 
have contributed to the current economic crisis, those bubbles mostly masked the 
underlying crisis (declining real wages) by allowing working families to borrow against 
unsustainable rises in the value of their homes.  
But some Americans have done well in recent years. CEO pay has risen from 
approximately 25 times the rate of the average worker in 1973 to 250 times the rate 
in 2007 – many times higher than the CEO/average worker pay differential in 
Western Europe or Japan. The income of the top 1 percent grew an average of $1.3 
million per household between 1979 and 2006. The wealthiest Americans have not 
enjoyed such a large share of the total national income since the 1920s. Thus, those 
who actions have been most responsible for precipitating the current financial crisis 
have benefited most from the lopsided economy. Restoring the freedom to bargain 
collectively through the Employee Free Choice Act would ensure that the economy 
works for the vast majority of working Americans, not just for those at the top of the 
labour market. Collective bargaining boosts the wages of US workers -- especially 
those of women and minority workers – and those with bargaining coverage do 
significantly better than those without in employer-provided health and pension 
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benefits. Restoring worker freedoms will help create a recovery based on rising real 
wages (not on consumer debt, which makes working families vulnerable to 
foreclosure and bankruptcy) halt the erosion of employer-provided health and 
pension benefits, and promote growth in which the median income grows.  In the 
words of Nobel Prize winning economist Paul Krugman, enacting the Employee Free 
Choice Act would be “a huge step toward recapturing the middle-class society we’ve 
lost” (Krugman 2009).  
 
Section 2: How does the US compare to the rest of the world? 
First: the usual suspects. Collective bargaining coverage in every nation in 
continental Europe is several times higher than it is in the US. While union density 
has fallen in several European countries, collective bargaining coverage has 
remained high and relatively stable. Union density in Western Europe ranges from 
below 10 percent in France to almost 80 percent in Sweden, but collective bargaining 
coverage is over 80 percent in all but Germany, where it is over 60 percent. Several 
factors have contributed to a more supportive environment for collective bargaining: 
centralised labour market regulation, union involvement in unemployment insurance 
in certain countries, and union-friendly legal frameworks.  
In most of continental Europe, employer opposition to collective bargaining is 
not a major problem; thus, many countries do not have specific legislation addressing 
the issue. US-style systems of majority recognition do not exist in continental Europe. 
Statutory or constitutional provisions on freedom of association are interpreted in 
some countries as entailing bargaining rights, and national laws in certain countries 
contain a legal obligation to bargain. In Austria and Slovenia, for example, 
compulsory membership of employers' organisations results in almost 100 percent 
collective bargaining coverage. Even in those continental European countries in 
which multi-employer bargaining is voluntary, there is often strong state sponsorship 
for bargaining without statutory backing. Under mandatory extension laws, which 
extend collective agreements to cover non-union workers in Germany, France and 
Holland, bargaining coverage has remained high, even as union density has declined 
(Traxler 2002). But it is not simply the “usual suspects” that have bargaining 
coverage greater than the US. Even in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe 
(where unions are weaker and often operate under unfavourable macroeconomic 
conditions, especially skyrocketing unemployment) coverage is, on average, 
significantly higher than in the US (European Foundation for the Improvement of 
Living and Working Conditions, 2006, 2007).  
 
Collective bargaining coverage in Central and Eastern Europe 
Year 2006 Collective bargaining coverage (in %)  
Czech Republic 35 
Hungary 42 
Poland 35 
Slovakia 50 
Estonia 22 
Latvia 20 
Lithuania 15 
Slovenia 100 
EU-25 average 66 
 
48 
Europe is, of course, no paradise for workers. European unions are facing 
many of the same challenges as their US counterparts: heightened international 
competition and relocations to countries with cheaper labour costs and fewer legal 
protections, increasing employer demands for decentralisation in bargaining and 
company-specific flexibility, the challenge of maintaining stable organisations among 
low-paid, dispersed and transient service sector workers, and more hostile national 
governments. But aggressive US-style anti-union campaigns are still extremely rare. 
Few European employers campaign against bargaining coverage and threaten 
workers’ careers or predict job losses through relocation or closure if workers choose 
to bargain collectively. Organising in Europe typically means internal recruitment, as 
workers are already covered by a collective agreement. In the US, organising 
involves both an adversarial campaign for bargaining rights at a specific employer 
and a union membership campaign. This difference contributes greatly to the higher 
bargaining coverage in Europe, and explains why BWW and Mercedes-Benz 
workers, among others, have bargaining in Germany but not in South Carolina or 
Alabama.  
 
Collective bargaining in new democracies 
Recent developments in certain new democracies provide greater grounds for 
optimism. Despite inhospitable environments (unfavourable macroeconomic 
conditions, widespread privatisations, and enormous informal sectors) collective 
bargaining coverage has risen in several new democracies over the past few 
decades. In South Africa, for example, bargaining coverage has risen from around 10 
percent to over 40 percent since the 1980s. In Brazil, Argentina, Peru and Uruguay, 
left-of-centre governments have strengthened recognition and bargaining rights and 
coverage has risen. Bargaining coverage has also increased in Taiwan and Korea. 
Workers in these nations can gain bargaining coverage without having to endure 
employer-dominated representation elections and bargaining campaigns, as they 
must do in the US. While one should not minimise the obstacles faced by workers in 
these countries, their experience demonstrates that, even under adverse 
circumstances, bargaining decline is not inevitable, pressures associated with 
globalisation are not irresistible, and governmental policies do matter. Having trailed 
other OECD nations for years, US bargaining coverage has now also fallen below 
that found in several new democracies (Cook 2007, Holdt and Webster 2008, 
Kuruvilla 2002, Phelan, 2007). 
 
The worst democracy in the world for collective bargaining 
The US is not quite the worst democracy in the world when it comes to collective 
bargaining coverage. That dubious honour belongs to Colombia, the only nation in 
the world recognised as a democracy that has lower collective bargaining coverage 
than the US.  The explanation for this is clear. Since the 1980s, right-wing 
paramilitaries and their allies have assassinated 2,600 Colombian unionists.  This 
murder of trade unionists has been well documented, but less well-recognised, 
Colombian unions have been destroyed in the process (Gill 2005). Collective 
bargaining coverage has fallen to less than 1 percent of the country’s 18 million adult 
workers.  Adding to routine acts of terror committed against trade unionists, Colombia 
has among the most reactionary labour laws of any so-called democratic nation. Only 
2 million of the nation’s workers are classified as employees. The rest are 
“contractors” or work for “collectives” and are denied employee status and collective 
bargaining rights. The law classifies, for example, almost all Colombian journalists as 
49 
contractors who must sell advertising along with their stories and are often prime 
targets for right-wing death squads. The Global Union Federation, International 
Federation of Journalists, assists an organisation of Colombian journalists but none 
have employee status or collective bargaining rights.   
Nor are journalists an exception. Colombian telecom workers are routinely 
fired for anti-union purposes. Management recently fired nearly 10,000 workers at the 
nation’s main telecom company, which is now operated by Telefonica, the world’s 
fourth largest telecom corporation.  The Global Union Federation, UNI Telecom, has 
a global agreement with Telefonica, but this agreement, which has led to widespread 
bargaining elsewhere in South America, has achieved nothing in Colombia.  
Telefonica management used the firings to destroy the union and cut costs after 
taking over from a government-owned entity. As a result of these anti-union actions, 
no Colombian telecom workers currently have collective bargaining agreements. 
In common with other unions, Colombia’s once powerful public sector unions 
have been targeted by right-wing paramilitaries and have had many leaders 
assassinated. Like telecom unions, they have experienced mass privatisations and 
discrimination against union supporters.  In one case that provoked a global union 
campaign, management fired 51 municipal union leaders in the city of Cali. The 
workers are still waiting reinstatement, several years after the International Labour 
Organisation found that they had been illegally victimised for union activity 
These extreme anti-union actions have not occurred in a vacuum. US 
corporations, including many that are household names, have benefited from the 
destruction of collective bargaining and have frequently been accused of complicity in 
the violence against Colombian trade unionists (AFL-CIO 2008). Thus, when ranking 
the worst democracy in the world for collective bargaining coverage, Colombia beats 
the US. But the US is much closer to Colombia than it is to Europe.  
 
Global unions and the assault on collective bargaining 
Global unions have started to resist these attacks on collective bargaining 
(Bronfenbrenner 2007). Most global bargaining campaigns have focused on the 
behaviour of MNCs within a specific sector or industry because resources are 
concentrated in the sector-based Global Union Federations (GUF).  The 11 largest 
GUFs comprise the Council of Global Unions, which held its inaugural meeting in 
Brussels in January 2007.  National affiliates of global unions in several sectors 
(food, steel, mining, textiles, services, finance, and telecoms) have coordinated 
efforts to advance bargaining rights at specific MNCs. The International Union of 
Food Workers has coordinated action between its affiliates to reach a global 
agreement with Nestlé and other large food processors, while the International 
Metalworkers Federation has coordinated action between its affiliates at Ford and 
other auto companies for several decades (Croucher and Cotton 2009).  
Telecommunications unions have cooperated globally for more than half a 
century, mostly recently through UNI Telecom, even as the nature of the industry has 
transformed from traditional telephone services to high speed Internet with 
converged data, voice and video.  Telecom workers have been among the best-
organised workers in developed democracies for decades. Even in the face of 
intense international competition and the introduction of new technologies, telecom 
bargaining coverage remains well over 75 percent in OECD nations and in much of 
Latin America (Traxler 2006).  But telecom workers are facing serious threats. New 
actors have entered mobile communications, and have promoted deregulation or, in 
many cases, no regulation.  Several traditional telecom companies have eschewed 
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cooperation, believing that union avoidance will result in higher profits, particularly in 
their new ventures and global operations.  Vodafone, the world’s largest exclusively 
mobile company, resisted collective bargaining in its UK operations until early 2008, 
when engineers gained recognition over sustained management opposition.  The 
largest telecom company in the US, AT&T, has practiced neutrality and recognised 
unions on the basis of majority membership for more than a decade. In contrast, 
Verizon, the nation’s second largest firm, has opposed recognition and bargaining in 
new ventures and acquisitions. Likewise, Comcast, the largest cable TV and Internet 
provider, has fought recognition and bargaining, and has engaged in illegal anti-union 
activity. Thus, the telecom sector provides examples of both international union 
cooperation and transnational opposition to bargaining rights (Cohen and Early 
2000).  
 
Section 3: Why global unions and progressives should support the Employee 
Free Choice Act  
If US unions are unable to win labour law reform under the current Democratic 
Administration, they may not be in a position to do so again. When Congress last 
considered reform of the NLRA to strengthen recognition and bargaining rights in 
1977-1978, collective bargaining coverage in the US was around 23 percent, almost 
double its current level. Large regions of the country and large sectors of the 
economy already have virtually union-free private sectors. Without reform it will 
become progressively more difficult for even the most vigorous unions to organise 
the unorganised. And simply because bargaining coverage has declined at around 
0.5 percent per year for the past few decades, there is little reason to assume that it 
will continue to decline at this slow, steady pace. We may soon reach the point where 
US unions are so weak that decline becomes rapid and irreversible.  This would be a 
disaster not only for American workers, but also for workers around the world, who 
would be increasingly likely to encounter the same anti-union practices and the same 
anti-union firms as their US counterparts. No longer concerned about the “threat” of 
unionisation at home, US MNCs would be emboldened to export their union 
avoidance practices to their overseas operations. And non-US MNCs who could be 
guaranteed union-free operations in America may well be emboldened to resist 
unions in Europe, Latin America and Asia. But if US unions gain the enactment of the 
Employee Free Choice Act and reverse the employer offensive, this would benefit not 
only American workers, but also those in other democratic nations. If unions are to 
organise and bargain with MNCs and private equity firms on a global level, they must 
first reverse the trend towards a union-free environment in the US.  
 
Exporting the US model of union avoidance 
• Union avoidance consultants arrive in the UK 
Among developed democracies, the US is alone in having a sophisticated 
industry worth hundreds of millions of dollars per year devoted entirely to helping 
management undermine collective bargaining. But several US union avoidance 
firms have recently sought overseas markets for their expertise (Logan 2006). 
When Britain introduced its new recognition law in 1999, one union avoidance 
firm wrote: “65 years' US experience with union organisational experience 
provides valuable parallels from which UK employers can learn how to stay union-
free. It is clear from US experience that worthy UK employers… will be able to 
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defeat union organising efforts.”19  Former Trades Union Congress General 
Secretary and current European Trade Union Confederation General Secretary 
John Monks criticised the firm for promoting a “dubious approach” to bargaining 
that was “far more suited to the aggressive nature of US industrial relations.” But 
other consultant firms soon followed in its path. One large US union avoidance 
firm, The Burke Group (TBG), has established an international division that 
operates in Canada, Mexico, South America, UK, Belgium, France and Germany, 
telling clients that it enjoys an international reputation for “eliminating union 
incursions.”  In recent years, TBG has conducted several high-profile UK 
campaigns with devastating effect. When confronted by US union avoidance 
tactics, UK unions typically spend more time and resources on campaigns and 
are much less likely to win recognition. If this behaviour were to become the norm 
in the UK, as it has in the US, it would likely have disastrous consequences for 
British workers (Logan 2007).  
 
• US MNCs and union avoidance in Ireland 
The US model of union avoidance has also transformed collective bargaining in 
Ireland. Prior to the 1980s, most foreign MNCs followed the country’s dominant 
industrial relations model, accepting unions and collective bargaining. This 
situation started to change when US MNCs opened non-union plants in Ireland in 
the 1980s. Today, most US MNCs operating in Ireland pursue an aggressive 
union avoidance strategy. US-based firms are much less likely to recognise 
unions in new plants than are their Irish, UK or European counterparts, and have 
been at the vanguard of an aggressive union avoidance strategy among Ireland’s 
MNCs. One study of several hundred US MNCs concluded: “It would appear that 
the pattern of union avoidance which began in a small number of US subsidiaries 
in the 1980s has now become widely embedded in the MNC sector, to the extent 
that it greatly threatens union presence in this very significant area of the Irish 
private sector” (Gunnigle, Cummings, Morley 2007). Union density in Ireland has 
fallen from 62 percent in 1980 to 35 percent in 2004, and the growing importance 
of US MNCs has ensured that its collective bargaining system is “closer to Boston 
than to Berlin.” 
 
• US employer associations oppose labour rights in China 
American employer associations have sought to block or weaken legislation 
designed at strengthening workers’ rights in other nations. China, now the world’s 
third largest economy, has no genuine collective bargaining between corporations 
and independent unions, and US employer associations want to keep it that way. 
The American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai and the US-China Business 
Council (USCBC) tried to block the adoption of China’s 2007 labour contract law, 
which provides minimal protections for some of the nation’s most vulnerable 
workers. Part of their campaign included thinly-veiled threats that US corporations 
would leave China if the law were to be enacted (US-China Business Council 
2006). US employers want to maintain a cheap labour force in China with few 
legal protections, but have other concerns, too. China is increasingly important to 
the establishment of global labour standards and the suppression of labour rights 
there encourages a “race to the bottom” in wages and standards in the rest of the 
world. But the USCBC has expressed a willingness to accommodate unions in 
                                                 
19 Eversheds, “Trade Union Roadshow,” May 16 2000, Ironmongers’ Hall.  
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China, as its state-controlled unions are unlike their US counterparts, “where, 
when they come in, they’re automatically antagonistic.20." 
 
Conclusion:the assault on bargaining and the end of US exceptionalism? 
The US currently has a labour law that is, fundamentally, a lie. To this day, the stated 
purpose of the National Labour Relations Act is to “encourage collective bargaining,” 
but the law has been interpreted and enforced in a way that makes it virtually 
impossible for workers to exercise their right to bargain collectively. As a result of 
aggressive employer opposition and weak protection for recognition and bargaining 
rights, the US has the highest unfulfilled demand for collective bargaining in the 
developed world. With the exception of Colombia, in no other democracy do 
employers routinely fight workers’ efforts to bargain collectively using every weapon 
at their disposal. The assault on bargaining, and the resulting decline in real wages 
for most workers, has contributed to the current economic crisis in the US.  
But strengthening bargaining rights will not come easy. US employer 
associations have promised “Armageddon” in the fight against the Employee Free 
Choice Act and have set aside a war chest of $200-300 million for the purpose of 
defeating this progressive attempt to restore the freedom to choose a union and 
bargain collectively.  In response to international support for reform, the far-right 
National Right to Work Foundation wrote: “AFL-CIO is touting the fact that Big Labour 
unions in 45 countries are pushing the US Congress…. Is this something they really 
want to brag about?”21  
While union density has declined significantly in some European countries and 
remained relatively stable in others, levels of collective bargaining coverage have 
remained high. But there is little reason for complacency. Fewer European employers 
are participating in industry-wide bargaining, and it is unlikely that this trend will be 
reversed anytime soon. Even in Scandinavia, which has long had the world’s highest 
rates of coverage, some employers are pushing for greater decentralisation of 
bargaining. Unions throughout Western Europe have also experienced a decline in 
their ability to influence national labour policy. Adding to the problem of labour 
movements in several nations, US-based employer groups, MNCs, and consultants 
are attempting to export the US model of union avoidance. The trend towards a 
union-free environment in the US makes it more likely that aggressive anti-union 
behaviour will spread in Europe and elsewhere. This fact alone provides good reason 
why global unions and progressives should support the Employee Free Choice Act. 
Recent developments in collective bargaining coverage in certain new 
democracies give more grounds for optimism.  However, in South Africa, Brazil, 
Argentina, Taiwan and elsewhere, collective bargaining coverage has increased 
significantly over the past couple of decades. Although still low by European 
standards, the trend in collective bargaining coverage in these countries have been 
upwards, not downwards, as is the case in several developed democracies. 
Governments in these countries have strengthened workers’ bargaining rights, while 
unions have linked their struggles to democratic movements for political reform and 
social justice. Much can be learned from their experience. 
                                                 
20 Quoted in Andrew Schneider, “Doing Business in China Will Cost More,” The Kiplinger Letter, 
October 1, 2008.  
21 National Right to Work Committee, “Bringing European Unionism to America,” January 14, 2009. 
Available at http://www.nrtwc.org/blog/archives/851 
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vii. The Global Impact of Employment and Work on 
Health Inequalities: the need for a new policy 
agenda22 
By J. Benach23, C. Muntaner24, O. Solar25, M. Quinlan26, 
H. Chung27, V. Santana28, M. Vergara M29. 
 
 
1. Employment and work under neoliberalism 
Work is the means through which most people provide for their daily sustenance. 
People work in or out of their homes, with or without labour contracts, and in either 
safe or hazardous working conditions. Although factors related to working conditions 
have received a great deal of attention, being recognised as a key social determinant 
of health and health inequalities, this has not often been the case for employment 
conditions. Labour markets and social policies determine employment conditions 
such as precarious or informal jobs, child labour or slavery, problems such as having 
highly insecure or low paying jobs, or working in hazardous conditions, which heavily 
influence individual and population health status and thus inequalities. These types of 
employment and working conditions have different implications for the health of 
populations and social inequalities in health across social classes, genders and 
racial/ethnic groups.  
Key influences affecting changes to employment dimensions over the past 
thirty years include the growing influence of corporations and the abandonment of 
Keynesian economic policies and social compacts. In their place has emerged a 
dominant neo-liberal model whose fundamental mission has been to facilitate 
conditions for profitable accumulation, with the consequence of transferring assets, 
wealth and income towards the upper classes and from poor to rich countries. These 
policies, often built on the dismantling of the post WW II cross-class agreement of 
corporatist order, have not only increased social inequalities across countries and 
social groups, but have also favoured the ideology of microeconomic rationality as 
the validating criterion for all aspects of social life and thereby resulted in 
universalised market dependence in a society (Rupert, 1990; Navarro, 2007).  
Neo-liberal policies and practices stem from the belief that competitive private 
markets deliver the best social outcomes including the following: (1) the reduction of 
                                                 
22 This paper presents a summary of the issues included in the book: Benach J, Muntaner C, with 
Solar O, Santana V, Quinlan M and Emconet network. Employment, Work, and Health Inequalities: A 
Global Perspective (forthcoming 2009). 
23 Mr. Joan Benach,  Professor of Public Health, EMCONET Coordinator 
24 Mr. Carles Mutaner,  Research Chairman of the Social Policy and Prevention Research department 
at the CAMH in Toronto 
25 Ms Orielle Solar is: Ministry of Health, Santiago de Chile, Chile 
26 Mr. Michael Quinlan,  University of South Wales 
27 Mr. Haejoo Chung,  Research Analysist EMCONET 
28 Ms. Vilma Santana,  Professor at the Federal University of Bahia, director of the Program of 
Environmental and Occupational Health 
29 Ms. Montse Vergara Duarte,  Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona 
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state interventions in economic activities30; (2) corporatisation, commoditisation and 
privatisation of hitherto public assets; (3) reduction of public social expenditures; (4) 
deregulation of financial transactions and interest rates, and the removal of credit 
controls; (5) liberalization of trade with removal of barriers to commerce; (6) the 
commoditisation and privatisation of land and the expulsion of peasant populations; 
(7) colonial, neo-colonial, and imperial processes of appropriation of assets, including 
natural resources ultimately backed by political violence; (8) conversion of various 
forms of collective property rights into exclusive private property rights; (9) more 
control over organised labour and limiting the right to organize; and (10) deregulation 
of labour with more “flexibility” in the labour markets, downsizing and outsourcing/off-
shoring (Harvey, 2003; 2006; Navarro, 2007). 
Under neoliberalism, the ideology of individualised self-interest and choice are 
seen as pre-eminent, while the significance of economic power imbalances amongst 
individuals and the counter-balancing role of collective interests are minimised. In this 
way, neo-liberalism has promoted individual assumptions of risk (e.g., individual 
pension plans rather than state pensions) and is much less sympathetic to 
redistributive mechanisms and social protection laws circumscribing business and 
commercial law and policies (on competition and the like) and more sympathetic to 
business practices such as downsizing, off-shoring, franchising, labour leasing, and 
greater flexibility in work arrangements, including “freer” international flows of labour 
(such as business and specialist migration, short-term entrants). The increased use 
of supply chains/subcontracting networks (at the national and international level), 
often driven by powerful corporations, has also accelerated changes to labour market 
conditions in both wealthy and poor countries. 
In wealthy countries, the outcomes of these changes include a reduced social 
safety net for the unemployed and poor, job losses in the public sector, growth in job 
insecurity and precarious employment, a weakening (in practice) of regulatory 
protections, and the historical re-emergence of an informal economy, including 
home-based work and child labour. Comparison between wealthy countries in 1880 
and poor countries in 2008 reveals some striking parallels in terms of labour market 
conditions, the power of labour, health infrastructure, and social protection (Steinmo 
et al., 1992; Quinlan et al., 2001) (see Table 1). This impact is further complicated by 
increased female workforce participation and an ageing population in these 
countries. In poor countries, the reliance on neo-liberal economic policy has resulted 
in a model of economic development oriented toward productivity and supplying 
products to global markets in three ways. First, irrespective of their effects on local 
communities, the strategies employed include “race to the bottom” working conditions 
to attract overseas capital and the use of corporate-friendly, low regulatory special 
export zones. Some of the harmful by-products of these practices include decreased 
domestic food production, rural dislocation, and social instability (Labonté et al., 
2005). In addition, cuts to the public sector have had significant implications on 
education and health expenditures. It has been argued that weakening the capacity 
of the state to redistribute income has undermined the low income/high health 
outcomes which a number of middle-low income countries managed to achieve in 
previous decades (Labonté, 2001). The formal sector has experienced downsizing, 
job insecurity, and outsourcing analogous to those in wealthy countries while the 
already substantial informal sector—exempt from most forms of social protection—
                                                 
30 This theory has not been followed in practice since many states have actually become more 
interventionists (e.g. in the US with large subsidies to the agricultural, military, aerospace, and 
biomedical sectors) 
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has grown in many instances. These are the three major setbacks to poor countries 
pursuing a neo-liberal economic framework. 
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Table 1. Work and the protection of workers’ health in wealthy and poor countries 
1880-2008. 
 Wealthy countries Poor countries 
 1880 1970 2008 2008 
Employment 
security and 
contingent work 
No regulated job 
security and 
substantial 
contingent work 
Secure jobs 
norm (except 
women)/small 
contingent 
workforce 
Decline in job 
security and 
growing contingent 
workforce 
No regulated job 
security and 
large/growing 
informal sector 
Minimum labour 
standard laws 
(wages and 
hours) 
No minimum 
wage or hours 
laws (except 
children) 
Universal 
minimum wage 
and hours laws 
Minimum wage and 
hours laws – some 
erosion 
None or ineffective 
minimum wage or 
hours laws 
Extent of union 
membership and 
collective 
bargaining 
Union density 
low (<10%) and 
limited collective 
bargaining  
Union density 
25->50% and 
extensive 
collective 
bargaining 
Substantial decline 
in union density and 
collective 
bargaining  
Union density low, 
declining and 
limited collective 
regulation of work  
Extent of 
vulnerable 
groups of 
workers 
Extensive 
exploited 
vulnerable 
groups (women, 
immigrants, 
home-workers, 
young and 
homeless, old) 
Still vulnerable 
groups (women, 
immigrants and 
home-workers) 
but more 
circumscribed 
Expansion of 
vulnerable groups 
(women, home-
workers, 
immigrants, 
homeless, old and 
young –child labour 
re-emerge) 
Highly exploited 
vulnerable groups 
(children, women, 
immigrants, 
homeless, 
indentured/forced 
labour) 
Extent of 
occupational 
health and safety 
law 
Limited OHS law 
(factories, mines) 
and poorly 
enforced 
Expansionary 
revision of OHS 
laws initiated  
Expanded OHS law 
but under indirect 
threat 
Little OHS law and 
hardly enforced 
(and only then in 
formal sector) 
Extent of 
workers’ 
compensation 
system 
No workers’ 
compensation 
system 
Mandated 
workers’ 
comp/injury 
insurance 
system 
Workers’ 
compensation 
/injury insurance – 
some erosion 
Limited workers’ 
compensation and 
only in formal 
sector) 
Extent of public 
health 
infrastructure 
(water, hospitals, 
sewer etc) 
Little public 
health 
infrastructure 
sewer, 
(hospitals, water) 
Extended public 
health 
infrastructure/ 
health insurance 
Public health 
infrastructure – 
some erosion 
Little public health 
infrastructure 
(hospitals, 
water/sewage) 
except in ex 
socialist countries 
where its being 
cutback 
Social security 
safety net 
(sickness, age 
and 
unemployment 
benefits 
No age pension, 
social security, 
unemployment 
benefits 
Age 
pension/social 
security, 
unemployment 
benefits 
Age, disability and 
unemployment 
benefits – cutback 
No age pension, 
social security, 
unemployment 
benefits 
State activity in 
utilities, 
education and 
transport  
Limited state 
involvement in 
education and 
transport 
Wide 
government 
involvement in 
education, 
transport, utilities 
Privatisation, 
competitive 
tendering and 
social capital 
erosion 
 
Limited state 
activity except ex 
socialist countries 
and all subject to 
privatisation, 
competitive 
tendering and 
social capital 
erosion 
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These impediments are further exacerbated by a series of exogenous factors, 
multiplying the scale of the problem. Elaborate supply chains obfuscate the ultimate 
producer of goods and services in ways that help perpetuate work arrangements that 
often bear a close parallel to the exploitation of vulnerable workers (i.e., women, 
children, and foreign-born workers) in wealthy countries over 100 years ago (Quinlan 
et al., 2001).  
In an increasingly globalised, market-based economic system, the political, 
economic, financial and trade decisions of a handful of institutions and corporations 
affect the daily lives of millions of people worldwide. These decisions create labour 
standards, occupational health and safety regulations, and union protections, among 
many others. Large corporations are particularly relevant to this process thanks not 
only to their growing power and resources, but also to their pervasive influence on 
key economic decisions that have serious consequences in the production of health, 
disease, and death (Wiist, 2006). Of the world’s 150 largest economic entities 
including countries, 95 are corporations. The revenues of Wal-Mart, BP, Exxon Mobil, 
and Royal Dutch/Shell Group all rank above the GDP of countries such as Indonesia, 
Saudi Arabia, Norway or South Africa (World Bank, 2005). Multinational corporations 
manufacture many of the goods and services we consume and they contract or 
subcontract millions of jobs, many of which have a negative impact on their 
employees’ health. Furthermore, corporate interests—predominantly neo-liberal 
policy instruments such as the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation, and the 
International Monetary Fund—and the governments of some wealthy countries 
(providing aid) in general have not been sympathetic to the expansion or upgrading 
of social protection frameworks within poor countries. It cannot be presumed that 
most poor countries will follow the path of wealthy countries over the past century in 
terms of labour market intervention and social protection. While a scaled-back 
welfare state persists in wealthy countries (Taylor-Gooby, 2008), these policy 
interventions are diminishing with the waning influence of labour unions. 
The organized labour movement that played a critical role in encouraging and 
establishing this social protection in the first place (in conjunction with the political 
crises and depressions of the 1890s and 1930s) has been in decline and/or been 
suppressed completely in some poor countries (Betcherman et al., 2001), further 
facilitating the changes of the neo-liberal regime. The international wave of 
resistance to neo-liberalism has led, however, to significant mass strikes and protests 
in many countries. An analysis of workers' movements and struggle on a world scale, 
over the past century and within the totality of global capitalism, shows that workers 
in different places are linked by the global division of labour and the international 
state system. When capital organises a profitable strategy, it produces resistance, 
generating new strategies of accumulation, and hence new forms of resistance 
(Silver, 2003). Both corporations and governments often hinder the development of 
trade unions in an attempt to shape working conditions that widen profit margins, and 
in turn fund lobbying activities. They may also limit involvement in work organization 
and occupational health and safety matters (Hogstedt et al., 2007). The result is a 
workplace environment where individual concerns and actions are very often 
emphasized, rather than collective ones. 
 
2. Labour market, employment conditions, and health inequalities 
“Free market” globalisation and increased global competition promote a continuous 
race to the bottom in labour costs. Therefore, corporations and the governments they 
control push labour standards down to levels of increased economic exploitation and 
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even slavery-like practices. This is particularly true in middle and low income 
countries. In other words, global economic pressures toward efficiency encourage 
the development of employment relations that are extremely unhealthy. The 
globalisation of production processes and the generation of health inequalities are 
rather apparent in the last decades, even in the most technologically advanced 
industries. Over the past decades capitalist globalisation has expanded economic 
migration, transforming the lives of hundreds of millions of people around the globe. 
In many countries, economic migrants meet the demand for flexible labour. Often 
labour markets are unable to provide workers who are flexible, mobile and willing to 
accept precarious employment conditions with long working hours for low pay. 
Fleeing poverty, war, or unemployment, workers migrate away from their families and 
neighbourhoods to serve as part of the labour force in rich countries and send capital 
in the form of remittances back to impoverished communities around the world. 
Neoliberal economic policies are also trying to create a new international guest 
worker system, guiding the flow of migrants on a global basis to fulfil corporate labour 
needs. In wealthy countries, employment relations are often subject to the provisions 
of law or a contract of hire. In these societies, the government is often the largest 
single employer although most of the work force is employed in small and medium 
businesses in the private sector. In middle income and poor countries however, most 
employment agreements are not explicitly subject to any formal contract, and a high 
proportion of total employment is within the informal economy.  
The ways in which any society approaches inequalities in health is a political 
issue. On the one hand inequalities may be accepted as the inevitable result of 
individual differences in genetic determinants, individual behaviours, or the market. 
On the other hand, they can be seen as a social product that needs to be remedied. 
Underpinning these different approaches to health inequalities are not only divergent 
views of what is scientifically or economically possible, but also differing political and 
ideological beliefs about what is desirable (Bambra et al., 2005).  
Thus, the reduction of health inequalities, especially attempts carried out at 
the level of social policy, will largely depend on the distribution of power among key 
political actors and the role of the state. While political and social scientists debate 
the structure, function and power of the state, this discussion has yet to penetrate the 
public health arena despite the state’s crucial influence on all health activities. We 
follow here a theory of power resources that identifies labour organizations and 
political parties as the key determinants of differences in the impact of the welfare 
state across countries and over time (Korpi & Palme, 2003). 
In spite of growing scientific evidence regarding the effects of employment 
conditions on health, almost no conceptual models has been proposed to explain 
these effects. In general, there is a great lack of research concerning the impact, 
pathways and mechanisms that connect employment conditions with health 
inequalities. There is however abundant literature about the effect of employment 
conditions on health, but it rarely focuses directly on the important role they play as a 
social determinant in shaping health inequalities.  
 
3. Macro-sociological employment relations and health 
To demonstrate the origins and consequences of different employment relations, and 
to trace the connection between employment relations and economic and political 
factors, working conditions, and health inequalities we have developed a theoretical 
model.  Put simply, they are a way of visualising the many factors that contribute to 
inequalities in health. Our explanatory model (Figure 1) begins with power relations 
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as macro-social determinants of employment conditions (i.e., full-time “permanent’ 
jobs, unemployment, precarious employment, informal employment, child labour, 
slave and bonded labour), employment inequalities by social class, gender, ethnicity, 
race, migration, as well as other social outcomes such as social and health policies. 
Employment relations in turn determine proximal working conditions which are 
shaped by the need to maximize labour effort and profits on behalf of employers. 
Such an explicit link between employment and working conditions (reducing labour 
costs and maximizing labour effort) sets our model apart from conventional social 
epidemiology (e.g., Marmot, 2004) and occupational health (e.g., Karasek & Theorell, 
1990). Our model also includes social networks as a moderating force on the effects 
of employment and working conditions on individual health. 
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Figure 1. Theoretical model linking employment relations with health inequalities. 
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Power relations (mostly in government and labour markets) can be characterized by 
indicators such as gender labour market inequality, proportion of precarious workers, 
or informal workers. Thus, country level macro-sociological indicators of inequalities 
in employment relations offer a starting social level of analysis in population health. 
Causal pathways originating at the national level cannot be uncovered with intra-
country individual level data as macro-social factors are held constant within 
countries (Rose, 1992). Labour market indicators at the national level have been 
incorporated in just a small number of recent population health studies (Muntaner et 
al., 2002, Navarro et al., 2003, Navarro et al., 2006, Chung & Muntaner, 2006). Yet 
employment relations are defining features of welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 
1990). In Europe, union strength indicators (e.g., union density and collective 
bargaining coverage) overlap with welfare state regime types and predict health at 
the national level (Navarro et al., 2006). Employment relations are also associated 
with welfare state redistribution policies (e.g., universal health care). Thus, a 
country’s employment relations determine proximal exposures that affect workers’ 
health via two social causal pathways: compensation and working conditions.  
 
4. Employment, working conditions and workers’ health 
The full account of how employment conditions negatively affect the health of 
workers needs to include a detailed exposition of generic as well as specific social, 
psychological and biological pathways. Although most pathways and mechanisms 
seem fairly general (e.g., unemployment can be a risk factor for depression, 
alcoholism and cardiovascular disease), there is also room for specific disorders tied 
to the negative effects of particular employment relations in specific populations (e.g., 
developmental disorders linked to child labour; post-traumatic stress disorders linked 
to soldiering, slavery or bonded labour).  
In this section we seek to compile evidence from various sources which is 
compatible with our model. This also means that we may not have enough 
information to confirm every pathway included in our model. However, we should be 
able to find available evidence broadly compatible with pathways hypothesised by 
the model. We concentrate here on the relation between the employment conditions 
and health. These dimensions may share some common pathways (e.g. lack of 
autonomy at work leading to mental illness) but may also be characterized by specific 
pathways (e.g., child labour leading to low growth). At the proximal level the 
pathways between social stress and disease (in large part a direct or indirect 
consequence of employment relations) are well understood and common to a host of 
social determinants. Social epidemiology and its associated disciplines have 
provided only a partial picture of the pathways and mechanisms linking employment 
dimensions to health inequalities. Moreover, the large majority of studies have been 
conducted in wealthy countries, thus precluding the examination of pathways and 
mechanisms that might be more important to low and middle income countries (e.g., 
informal labour, employment relations in extreme poverty and war, bonded labour 
and slavery). 
In our theoretical framework, the exposure to different working conditions is 
one of the causal pathways by which employment relations generate health 
inequalities: most of hazardous conditions and exposures are concentrated in middle 
and low-income countries, especially those with higher labour market inequality; in 
workers with non-standard work arrangements; and unequally distributed according 
to social class, gender, race/ethnicity, migrant status and age. We briefly review 
evidence on the ways by which working conditions emerge as a pathway to health 
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inequalities focusing on the links between employment and working conditions, and 
then showing the relations between working conditions with psychosocial factors, 
behaviours and psychopathological changes. Because the psycho physiological 
pathways and mechanisms common to many social stressors have been studied 
extensively in the last decade (Sapolsky, 1993; Brunner, 1997; McEwen, 1998), we 
concentrate our efforts on social and psychosocial pathways, with a particular effort 
in highlighting their integration. 
The relative political strength of forces in the market (corporations, institutions 
and unions), government (parties) and society (community and its forms of 
organisation) in a country are key determinants of the development of laws, 
regulations, and social protection, which influence working conditions. In the context 
of globalization, lack of barriers to move production from one country to another 
increases the power of companies and corporations, which can easily search for less 
regulated markets, with a global “domino effect” of labour markets deregulation. In 
order to open their markets, and in an attempt to shape working conditions that widen 
profit margins for corporations, governments collaborate with corporations in 
hindering the development of trade unions, and limiting their own involvement in 
public protection of work organization and occupational health and safety matters 
(Hogstedt et al., 2007). Stricter regulation of preventive measures in rich regions 
parallels an outsourcing of dangerous industries to poor countries, which derives in 
an “outsourcing” of occupational hazards, injuries and diseases. 
Workers’ control and participation in decision-making processes within firms is 
a key “protective” factor not only for the promotion of democratic work environment 
but also of workers’ health. Through the participation, workers can analyse and 
implement effective policies to address their own occupational health concerns. 
Labour unions are the most effective institutional tool to ensure good health and 
safety at work in advanced capitalist countries (Johansson & Partanen, 2002). A 
growing body of research attests to the influence that representative participation has 
on occupational health. Evidence shows that when trade unions are stronger, 
information and standards on workplace hazards are improved, health and safety 
systems work better and workers’ actions are more effective. Available experiences, 
knowledge and evidence support the conclusion that safety reps are a powerful force 
for improving workers’ occupational health in the EU (Walters & Nichols, 2007; 
Menéndez et al., 2008). The power of labour plays a vital role in the implementation 
of social policies, labour market regulations and collective bargaining. The specific 
effect of collective bargaining on workplace health and safety means adapting 
general legal preventive provisions into specific terms for the concrete realities of 
individual sectors, companies, production units, work  places and working conditions.  
The so-called non-standard forms of employment (precarious, informal, 
bonded, and child labour) do all share a pathway to health inequalities: the 
engagement in worse working conditions compared to the general situation of the 
full-time permanently employed. The relation between precarious employment and 
working conditions has been studied using the concept of temporary employment. 
Compared to workers with permanent contracts, temporary workers are exposed to 
higher level of physical hazards, such as painful and tiring positions, intense noise, 
repetitive movements; psychosocial stressors, such as less job autonomy and control 
over time on the job; organizational issues such as less freedom to choose when to 
take personal leave (Letourneux, 1998; Parent-Thirion et al. 2007). Temporary 
workers also suffer from a higher risk of occupational injuries (Virtanen et al., 2005, 
Fabiano et al., 2008), higher psychological morbidity and other health outcomes 
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(Artazcoz et al., 2005; Virtanen et al., 2005). Other less studied dimensions of 
precariousness at work, such as powerlessness or capacity to exercise legal rights 
are likely to imply the difficulty to negotiate and avoid hazardous working conditions 
(Amable, 2006; Benach & Muntaner, 2007; Menéndez et al., 2007). 
Workers in the informal economy, or informally employed workers at formal 
firms, whose condition is typically not monitored by the state, are engaged in the 
most dangerous activities, with high risk for occupational injuries or diseases, and are 
in a situation vulnerable to firing and economic difficulties due to low wages (ILO, 
2006a). Awkward postures and exposure to toxic chemicals, excessive noise, poor 
sanitation, high workload, pesticides, violence, and sexual assault (Iriart et al., 2006) 
are commonly observed in informal economy settings, along with scarce training and 
supervision and limited access to protective equipment. In addition to evidence on 
the impact of what are now pervasive work arrangements on health inequalities there 
is also now extensive research that imbalances in demand/control and effort/reward 
within workplaces have serious adverse effects on health (Marmot et al., 2006). This 
evidence is consistent with the broad thrust of this paper and indeed, strengthens our 
argument about the need to pursue quality in work. The relationship between self-
employment and working conditions may depend on type of job and context, with 
differences, for instance, between independent contractors and small business 
owners (Prottas & Thompson, 2006); higher autonomy may be counterbalanced by 
higher pressure and longer work hours. A study on self-employed workers in North 
Carolina disclosed elevated occupational fatality death rates, especially in retail and 
transportation industries, poor work organization, poor hygiene, ergonomic hazards, 
hazardous hand tools, and chemical exposures, particularly to pesticides and 
solvents (Mirabelli et al., 2003).  
Although by definition, forced labour is differentiated from poor working conditions 
or hazardous working environments, very often slaves are exposed to the worst 
hazards, pushed in these situations by the over-exploitative nature of the employer-
worker relation (Fassa, 2003; WHO, 2002). Though the invisibility of forced labour 
makes it a difficult area to investigate, a greater effort should be made to document 
working conditions in these settings. Unaffordable working conditions are one of the 
worst faces of child labour. Exposure to hazards in the workplace may be especially 
harmful for children due to increased vulnerability to biological or toxic agents due to 
the immature immune system, lesser bone elasticity, strength, and capacity to 
support heavy workloads, inadequate dimensions of tools and equipments. Children 
working in agriculture may be exposed to chemical agents such as pesticides, heat 
and harsh weather, repetitive work, hazardous equipments (hoes, tractor, etc), 
excessive work hours, demanding physical work, noise, and biological agents such 
as dust (ILO, 2006b). 
 
5. The recent global economic crisis 
Although neoliberalism and the deregulation of the financial sector has been hardly 
criticised in public health (Muntaner et al., 2001; Benach & Muntaner, 2005) the 
speed and magnitude of class inequalities has been fuelled by 30 years of neoliberal 
policies. In 2008 the meltdown in the financial sector arising from speculative 
investment practices (itself symptomatic of much deeper structural problems) rapidly 
impacted on the economies of both rich and poor countries. While the exact extent 
and likely length of the economic recession is still to unfold, it is now being 
acknowledged as the greatest upheaval since the Great Depression of the 1930s and 
in our own view parallels with the Great Depression – such as significant levels of 
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unemployment and large scale human misery - will only grow stronger as events 
unfold. The economic crisis is relevant to the issues presented in this paper on a 
number of grounds.  
First, and most obviously, the crisis is already contributing to a growth of 
employment arrangements that we identified as health-damaging in 2007 and 2008. 
Apart from the growth of unemployment the economic downturn will almost certainly 
lead to downsizing/restructuring as employers ‘respond’ to falling demand or seek to 
re-align cost pressures (Quinlan & Bohle, 2009). It is also likely that the flexible and 
insecure work arrangements – the growth of which marked the so-called prosperity 
phase prior to 2007 – will continue to grow along. Like in the Great Depression, 
intermittent employment (serial bouts of short term employment and unemployment) 
will become more common. Presenteeism/longer hours and other forms of work 
intensification as workers try to retain their jobs as well as more irregular hours will 
also continue to grow, perhaps at an accelerated rate (Quinlan & Bohle, 2009). The 
myriad of small subcontractors in elaborate supply chains throughout rich and poor 
countries are also likely to suffer (Quinlan & Bohle, 2008). It is also possible, indeed 
likely in our view, that work will shift even further to the informal sector and that 
practices like child and forced labour will become even more difficult to control. Thus 
the impact on unemployment and precarious employment of the so-called emergent 
economies is already severe (e.g., China and India). 
Second, all these employment conditions are associated with serious adverse 
health outcomes – both for workers, their families, and their communities. Therefore 
any global growth in these conditions will entail an exacerbation of these problems. 
Third, even leaving aside these health effects, these changes in employment 
conditions will lead to increased social inequality including lower wages. As it is noted 
in this book, these changes too will have important effects on population health. 
Governments in rich countries responded to the economic crisis by, amongst other 
things, providing massive bail-out packages to large banks and financial institutions 
who became enmeshed in, and indebted by, speculative investment in highly 
‘engineered’ but essentially valueless investment products like CDOs (Collateralized 
Debt Obligations). It is not clear how the massive bail-out packages will be funded 
but most likely ‘ordinary’ taxpayers will “foot the bill”, especially as large corporations 
have become so adept at minimizing their tax exposure through the use of tax 
havens, transfer pricing and the like – leaving the tax burden largely with workers. 
Indeed, at the end of 2008 and beginning of 2009 we are witnessing the expenditure 
of massive public funds to bail out banks and other institutions in the USA, UK and 
elsewhere. The very organs and advocates of big business who extolled the free 
market and shunned government intervention (apart from large but hidden industry 
subsidies and wealth transfers from the public sector such as those achieved through 
privatisation) now call for public support of private interests. In essence, the poor who 
suffered from the excesses of the past decade are now asked to ‘save’ those who 
engineered and benefited from these excesses. 
Fourth, it is also likely that, as is already the case with the environmental crisis 
and climate change, there will be arguments made by the very same businesses and 
associated interest groups/lobbyists who led to this debacle that the health 
inequalities related to employment conditions and other social determinants of health 
cannot be addressed until the global economic crisis is resolved. In a similar vein, the 
same neoliberal interest groups (and neoliberal agencies like the World Trade 
Organisation) are now arguing that maintaining, indeed extending, ‘labour market 
flexibility’ – the euphemism for precarious employment – is essential to re-initiate 
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economic growth. Thus, contrary to any careful assessment of evidence a critical part 
of the problem is redefined as the solution. 
Fifth, the contention that we cannot afford to deal with health inequalities in the 
present climate –while it will undoubtedly exert significant pressure on governments– 
represents not only a morally bankrupt position (why should those whose health has 
been compromised by flexible work arrangements so advocated by these same 
interests be now asked to carry the burden for that same interest groups’ own 
failings?) but also a misreading of the causes of the problem. As a recent ILO report 
(2008) highlights the growth associated with the latest phase of ‘globalisation’, 
including the use of flexible work arrangements and the like, has not contributed to a 
general narrower socioeconomic inequality – quite the reverse. Therefore waiting for 
better times to resolve these issues would be a bootless exercise in futility (even 
ignoring that the situation will actually deteriorate in the meantime). 
Sixth, it fails to acknowledge the role that the pursuit of policies that increased 
socioeconomic inequality within both rich and poor countries contributed to this very 
economic crisis. In other words the preferred solution is actually the cause of the 
problem. From the mid 1970s the Keynesian accord in socioeconomic policy that had 
been applied in rich countries following the Second World War was progressively 
abandoned in favour of neo-liberal policies that argued that deregulated markets 
were the best mechanism for achieving prosperity and public welfare. Keynesianism, 
it was argued, had failed to address stagflation (simultaneous inflation and 
unemployment), though note that the “free market” economists remain remarkably 
silent now when their preferred solution has also delivered stagflation. The elements 
of neo-liberal policy are sufficiently well known not be repeated in detail here but 
included privatisation, outsourcing/ competitive tendering for government services, 
de-collectivised/ decentralized industrial relations, an attack on and neutering/ 
refashioning of government regulation, and the advocacy of flexible work 
arrangements, balanced budgets (with profound effects on government service 
provision) and tax cuts for the rich and risk shifting from government to individuals 
(now required to invest for their own retirement and the like). As has been well 
documented this ideological philosophy had dominated decision making with 
governments and key agencies such as the WTO, IMF and WB. A point lost in the 
current debate around the economic crisis is that Keynesianism did not simply entail 
fiscal management – something that has now been re-embraced – but critical 
redistributive mechanisms (full employment, government services to protect the poor, 
progressive tax regimes and the like).  
In sum, however, imperfectly Keynesianism sought to manipulate social 
inequality to some degree in order to address the profound economic instabilities that 
arose from an unregulated market system and from capitalism in general. The new 
regime, on the other hand concentrated wealth in the hands of a few while income 
levels for workers often stagnated, and in wealthy countries at least, high levels of 
personal debt were increasingly used to sustain consumption (a marked difference 
with the Great Depression that is likely to exacerbate the effects of the present 
crisis). Further, current efforts at fiscal stimulus largely ignore the need for 
redistributive mechanisms. Pumping money into banks who still won’t lend because 
they cannot trust other financial institutions (and why would they as more evidence of 
ever greater debt burdens unfolds?) or to the automobile and other industries to save 
jobs (but it wont because the burgeoning wealth inequality and income/job insecurity 
means consumption will continue to contract) will not resolve the problem. Indeed, 
the latter was tried and failed in the Great Depression. 
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Seventh, the lessons to be drawn from the last two paragraphs are important. Not 
only has the notion of self-correcting markets and limited government intervention 
conspicuously failed but inequality needs to be a central component to redressing the 
current crisis. Employment arrangements should be a critical redistributive 
mechanism not a source of further exploitation and harm to the health of workers. 
Thus fundamental change is required in thought and action. It is unfortunately 
doubtful that governments will recognise these realities until the level of 
"immiseration" associated with the current crisis is too manifold to ignore in the 
context of pressure from social movements. 
 
6. A New Policy Agenda 
Neoliberalism has so steeped itself into the decision-making of governments that 
most policy-makers can no longer grasp the proactive role that government (at 
national and international level) can play in terms of social and economic 
development. Rather, the role of government has been limited to boosting private 
markets and, in times of crisis, responding to the lobbying of powerful special interest 
groups while the pleas of unions and other groups representing the vulnerable are 
largely drowned out. This needs to change.  
The broad framework for critical changes to secure a more sustainable and 
healthy workforce and society are clear. First, effective action needs to be taken to 
minimise if not eliminate work arrangements known to be harmful (precarious 
employment, informal work, slavery, child labour and forced labour) through devices 
like legislation, income transfers and empowering groups that represent the 
vulnerable. Integrated minimum labour standards and regulation (like supply chain 
regulation) to combat evasive tactics are necessary at both national and international 
level. Trade cannot be divorced from labour standards and arrangements to 
safeguard the latter need to be integral part of international commerce. Second, 
promoting ‘quality’ work needs to be a central policy objective of governments and 
multinational bodies like the EU. At an EU presidency conference held in Belgium in 
2001 such an effort was made but was quickly stymied by neoliberal opponents. This 
effort needs to be revived and extended. Again, this process must include unions and 
community groups as key decision-making participants. Third, inequality of income 
and wealth need to be addressed at both the national and international level.  
Far from being an economic impediment, initiatives in this directive can 
address the current economic, environmental and climatic challenges facing Europe 
and the world. Government investment in more effective and environmentally 
sustainable infrastructure including education/research, transport (freight and 
people), healthcare, energy (including the manufacturing of new technologies), food 
production and urban environments can be used to simultaneously create quality and 
healthier work while undertaking an essentially restructuring neoliberalism has clearly 
failed to deliver. Promoting this form of ‘development’ in poor countries and re-
orientating trade will avoid the current dilemmas whereby scarce healthcare workers 
are plundered from Africa by rich countries, domestic food production is sacrificed for 
export goods, and ‘dirty’ forms of manufacturing are shifted to poor countries. The EU 
should be ready to take a leadership role. 
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viii. A Progressive Agenda: Labour and Social 
Protection 
By Conny Reuter31 
 
 
An Old Crisis 
Progressive political forces are unanimous in their view that this crisis has not fallen 
from the sky, nor is it a new concept. What is different about this crisis is that it is like 
trying to stop a high-speed train in the countryside: many different experts want to 
contribute to putting the train back on track. 
 
The dramatic consequences of the crisis on people’s lives are direct consequences 
of the failure to set up the right policies in the past, which consist of:  
 
 Investing in people instead of investing in shareholder value 
 Reshaping a real economy around sustainable jobs and growth 
 Investing in public policies, social infrastructure and social services 
 Guaranteeing the transparency of financial markets and procedures 
 Protecting the public good and the general interest 
 Basing policy making on good governance 
 
These policies are not new, but under the sweet poison of so-called modernism, 
progressive forces often gave up these essentials when about to govern. 
 
What are the main effects of the crisis? 
 
Job losses - According to recent International Labour Organisation (ILO) forecasts, 
global unemployment could increase by some 50 million due to the economic 
downturn. Job losses will be even more relevant because of the precarious nature of 
the jobs created in the past. We have seen that even if it was very important to bring 
people back into the labour market and social protection schemes, the first to be fired 
are the last to be hired: that is to say, the temporary agency work forces, the part-
time workers and others in precarious job situations. According to European 
Commission’s figures (Employment in Europe 2007), between 2000 and 2006 over 
half of the total employment generated was with part-time jobs. 
Nevertheless, according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s (OECD) Employment Outlook 2007, even in rich countries, poverty 
and low pay have persisted and will rise as an effect of the crisis: across 24 OECD 
countries, the incidence of low pay (i.e. the percentage of workers earning less than 
2/3 of median earnings) has remained above 17%. In 2009, the proportion of people 
in vulnerable employment could rise to 45% of the total employed.  
 
Wages - It is always however a crisis for workers’ wages. In its Global Wage 
Report32, the ILO stressed that the global economic crisis is expected to lead to cuts 
                                                 
31 Secretary General SOLIDAR 
32 ILO Global Wage Report 2008/2009, www.ilo.org/global/What_we_do/Publications/lang--
en/docName--WCMS_100786/index.htm 
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in the wages of millions of workers worldwide in 2009, with a rise in the number of 
working poor living on less that USD2 per day.  
Based on the latest International Monetary Fund (IMF) growth figures, the ILO 
forecasts that the global growth in real wages will at best reach 1.1 per cent in 2009, 
compared to 1.7 per cent in 2008, but overall wages are expected to decline in a 
large number of countries, including major economies. Overall, wage growth in 
industrialised countries is expected to fall, from 0.8% in 2008 to -0.5% in 2009. This 
was the defensive calculation but with a recession and the fall in industrial 
production, this will be even more dramatic. 
At the same time, the report shows that these cuts in wages follow the trends 
of the last decade in which wages failed to advance together with economic growth: 
“while inflation was low and the global economy grew at a 4.0% annual rate between 
2001 and 2007, growth in wages lagged behind, increasing by less than 2% in half of 
the world’s countries”.  
 
Wages inequalities - Since 1995, inequality between the highest and lowest wages 
has increased often reaching socially unsustainable levels. Among developed 
countries, Germany, Poland and the United States are amongst the countries where 
the gap between top and bottom wages has increased most rapidly. In other regions, 
inequality has also increased sharply, particularly in Argentina, China and Thailand. 
Some of the countries which have succeeded in reducing wage inequality include 
France and Spain, as well as Brazil and Indonesia, though in the latter two countries 
inequality remains at high levels.  
 
Pay gap - The pay gap between genders is still high and is closing at a very slow 
place. Although about 80% of the countries for which data is available have seen an 
increase in the ratio of female to male average wages, the size of change is small 
and in some cases negligible. In the majority of countries, women’s wages represent 
on average between 70 to 90% of men’s wages, but it is not uncommon to find much 
lower ratios in other parts of the world, particularly in Asia. 
The gap in income inequality is also widening at an accelerated pace between 
top executives and the average employee. For example, in the United States in 2007, 
the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of the 15 largest companies earned 520 times 
more than the average worker. This is up from 360 times more then in 2003. Similar 
patterns, though from lower levels of executive pay, have been registered in 
Australia, Germany, Hong Kong (China), the Netherlands and South Africa. 
For that reason the crisis cannot be the new ‘discourse’ of those who have 
justified and put in place the wrong policies in the past, which have led to widening 
the gap between the wealthy and the most vulnerable: According to the United 
Nations (UN), the richest 10% of the world’s adult population receives 85% of global 
wealth; in contrast, the poorest 50% barely receives 1%. A Global Social Floor is 
indispensable to ensure a social dimension to globalization. (International Labour 
Organization, Can Low-Income Countries Afford Basic Social Security?, 2008) 
The crisis MUST be the opportunity to shift the paradigm of our model of 
development towards a social, sustainable and just model. More than a recovery plan 
whose role is to reply to an immediate urgency, we need a new development model 
and a new global governance system. 
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Decent Work is the Answer to the Current Crisis 
The recent call made by the Head of the German government and the Heads of five 
international organisations, including the OECD, ILO, IMF, WTO and the World Bank 
on the occasion of their meeting on 5 February 2009 in Berlin, reaffirms their will to 
improve cooperation to build a 'stronger, cleaner and fairer economy'. The same 
document recognises that the ILO's Decent Work Agenda is a key element to 
achieving the goal of a fairer economy as well as the importance for the international 
community to deliver on Millennium Development Goals and the fight against 
poverty.  
The message is clear; we cannot use the crisis to step back from previous 
commitments.  Rather, we have to reaffirm them and integrate them into a larger 
agenda, setting the policy frame allowing for the creation and fair redistribution of 
wealth.  
Decent work is a way to answer the crisis and we should push for a Decent 
Work Agenda to be adopted by all countries around the world, promoted by the IMF 
and World Bank.  
The EU should not miss this great opportunity to show its leadership and the 
quality of its strong social model. This model is no mere accident of history, but was, 
in former times of crisis, an investment in a fairer and more just society known as the 
welfare state. 
We know where protectionism combined with nationalism will lead. This 
historical experience need not be carried out again. 
Leaders have the responsibility to adopt fair responses to the current crisis by 
backing social protection and social dialogue. In a way, it is a moment of truth for the 
wider challenges, not just to provide larger answers on a larger scale. 
 
Amongst others, the urgency is now to:  
 Widen the coverage of unemployment benefits and insurance schemes, re-
skilling redundant workers and protecting pensions from devastating declines 
in financial markets; 
 Invest in and extend social protection and employment policies with a 
particular focus on the most vulnerable;  
 Maintain and expand development aid and other investment flows to 
vulnerable countries; 
 Public intervention through income support measures. A social investment 
approach based on the ILO Decent Work Agenda is necessary to counteract 
rising poverty. 
 
The EU has to put into place measures to ensure solidarity between Member States: 
 Protectionist reactions to the crisis can dangerously put at stake the internal 
market as well as the European Social Model and fundamental freedoms 
(such as the free circulation of workers); 
 Political reactions to uncertainty and economic distress in the form of racial 
and religious hatred, discrimination against immigrants and ethnic minorities, 
victimisation of union representatives and protectionist economic policies that 
would aggravate the crisis. 
 
In our understanding, developing and strengthening social protection systems is key 
to tackling the social and economic imbalances. Moreover, social protection and 
social assistance mitigate inequality.  
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For a low-income country, even a basic social protection package can make 
the difference between achieving and not achieving the first Millennium Development 
Goal of halving poverty by 2015. 
 
The minimum or Global Social Floor comprises the following social guarantees: 
 Access to essential health care benefits through pluralistic delivery 
mechanisms; 
 Family and child benefits; 
 Income support for the unemployed and the poor in the active age group; 
 Education and life learning schemes; 
 Sustainable pension schemes and disability grants. 
 
The Global Social Floor, can generate growth (cash injections in local economies), 
and promote peace, stability and social cohesion (through the redistribution of 
wealth).  
Its implementation is affordable even in low-income countries. According to 
ILO calculations, less than 2% of the global GDP would be necessary to provide this 
basic set of social guarantees to all of the world’s poor (ILO, 2006). 
 
Building a Global Welfare State 
We along with other progressive forces have to gain the opinion leadership of their 
political orientations if we want policies which are socially accountable.  
 
It is therefore up to us:  
 To show the validity and value of public policies in the short, mid-term and 
long run; 
 To create a global coalition of those forces which are able to propose realistic 
alternatives for getting out of the crisis, and for setting a new paradigm: 
sustainable growth and development! 
 
The coalition which has come together around the Decent Work – Decent Life 
agenda has shown both globally and at the European level, the capacity for 
mobilisation and outreach. It is up to progressive politicians, leaders and activists 
from unions and civil society to promote a new social deal. 
Through our cooperation with the members and partners of the Global 
Network in Africa, Asia, Latin America, North America and in Europe, we are ready to 
invest in a large strategic mobilisation of citizens who do not only say that another 
world is possible, but will act on it. 
The G20 Meeting (on 2 April 2009) should not only look at urgent measures 
on financial issues but also implement measures to promote decent work and social 
protection. The unions and civil society will mobilise in London calling for an economy 
based on a fair distribution of wealth, and decent work for all. 
With the renewal of the European Institutions in 2009, starting from the EU 
elections in June, civil society, both environmental and social NGO networks, have 
prepared a manifesto for a policy change. 
In this manifesto, we say that we need the Lisbon Treaty because: 
 
 We want the full applicability of the Charter of Fundamental rights;  
 We expect new or amended regulations concerning services of general 
interest (SGI); 
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 We are waiting for a potentially strengthened Open Method of Coordination 
(OMC) and institutionalised civil dialogue; 
 We see it as an opportunity to strengthen the social and citizenship dimension 
of Europe. 
 
On 7 October 2009, the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) will call for a 
big mobilisation around the World Day for Decent Work where the other partners of 
the alliance will again be present. 
In the field of social policies and social services, we have to make sure that 
the general interest prevails and that the policies are considered as in the public 
good, worthy of investment and not market-driven. 
For development policies, we need to show that the famous 0.7% of GDP that 
developed countries pledged to pay in development aid, is not a luxury but simply a 
modest reply to needs. 
Good governance does not only mean transparent and fair rules, good 
governance also implies the strengthening of the role of civil dialogue!  
 
 
SOLIDAR is a European network of 50 NGOs and labour movement organisations working towards all people 
living in dignity. Working in alliance with trade unions, SOLIDAR promotes equality, solidarity and social justice in 
the fields of social affairs, international cooperation and education in Europe and worldwide.  
For more information visit www.solidar.org 
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ix. Redistribution in the Age of Globalization:  
    in search of a new economic imperative 
By Javier Ramos Diaz33 
 
 
Although it is certainly arduous to synthesize the essence of an epoch, it is 
widely held that the last thirty years constitute the apogee of neo-liberalism on a 
global scale. Its core proposals are the true reflections of a vision that recover the 
centrality of the market to the detriment of the economic role of the state, while 
putting forward new social values (individualism, self-regulation, security) that 
challenge previous conceptions highly embedded in the public sphere. 
After the Second War World, the confluence of certain forms of industrial 
production (Taylorism-Fordism), public economic intervention (Keynesianism), social 
provision (Welfare States) and household structure (Male Breadwinner model) 
moulded the socio-economic order of the so called "Golden Age of Welfare 
Capitalism", although with notable international differences as a plethora of literature 
on "welfare state regimes" has stressed.  
This confluence made easier a wide compromise which basically meant the 
acceptance of a primary framework of property ownership together with rights of 
employment and citizenship in predominantly industrial societies. A mutual 
concession that made possible the institutionalisation of conflicts stemming from the 
tensions that exist between the inequalities inherent in capitalist property ownership 
and the idea of equality embedded in the concept of mass citizenship. It is what 
Crouch (1999) defined as the "Mid-century Compromise". 
Yet the oil crisis of the seventies altered the previous scenario and by 
extension the roots of the "Compromise". The decline in real rates of GDP and the 
on-going increase in public deficit and inflation, together with a slowdown in 
productivity and profits, and an increase in unemployment gave way to a period of 
economic uncertainty which transformed the socio-economic order.  
The need to maintain profitability under more restrictive economic conditions 
led employers to focus on achieving real productivity gains, expanding their markets 
and engaging in organisational decentralisation. These aims were accompanied by 
wider and more intensive processes of deregulation and employment flexibility that 
profoundly altered the previous labour scenario (Castells 1996).  
A new epoch of “flexible specialisation” emerged on the ground of more 
dynamic adjustments to economic challenges and uncertainties.  A new managerial 
strategy, defined as the “flexible firm” came into sight, dividing the labour force into a 
multi-skilled and functionally flexible protected core, and a disposable periphery with 
fewer labour rights that resulted in a segmentation of the labour market (Atkinson, 
1987) 
In this context advocates of labour market deregulation boosted a widely held 
view that the contrast between the “dynamic-unequal” USA and the “fossilised-equal” 
Europe suggested the existence of a trade-off between employment and equality. 
Countries with high income inequality and more flexible employment conditions 
showed better labour market performance, resulting in higher employment figures, 
                                                 
33 Mr. Javier Ramon Diaz,  Lecturer -e-democracy center, Zurich, Former Policy advisor for the Global 
Progressive Forum and the Socialist Group in the European Parliament 
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than those with high income equality and more rigid labour legislation. The 
persistence of rigidities in hiring and firing conditions, of a high tax wedge and of 
considerable varieties of “generous” welfare benefits, were presented as major 
obstacles to employment creation in developed economies since they raised the cost 
of production, hindered competition and limited future profits (for an overview see 
Krugman 1993, Siebert 1997). Reduction in unemployment rates should be achieved 
through more flexible strategies of labour market relations and less generous social 
assistance.   
In the last decades these principals have inspired a great number of policies 
not only in developed economies but in developing ones as well. The question 
guiding this chapter is whether this new economic paradigm has or has not served to 
improve people’s living standards worldwide. 
 
Globalization and the New Economic Order 
Although the term "global" is not at all new, it is perhaps the most appropriate term to 
define our epoch. In the last thirty years the so called "globalization index" has 
increased worldwide, particularly in Asia. All regions have registered an increase of 
interrelations. Even Africa, which is still the least “globalized” region, has experienced 
a boost in the globalization index.  
This process of globalization is not ideologically neutral, nor spontaneous, but 
highly inspired by the liberal conceptions embodied in the so-called "Washington 
Consensus".  The implementation of policies under the principles of trade and 
financial liberalization, privatization of state enterprises, redirection of public spending 
from indiscriminate subsidies toward pro-growth policies, liberalization of inward 
foreign direct investment and fiscal policy discipline, are modelling the global 
economy. 
For free-market advocates this is the best scenario to foster economic growth, 
employment and wealth. The implementation of policies inspired by the principles of 
liberalisation, privatisation and commodification is thought to be responsible for the 
expansion of the size of the market allowing both developed and developing 
economies to take advantage of the economies of scale, and of the higher efficiency 
in production and exchange. Capital liberalisation and free trade encourages exports, 
increases human and physical capital, and boosts the total productivity growth factor 
(Cline, 2004) so that the competitive playing field between industrial and emerging 
markets countries levels and the world gets flatter (Friedman, 2005). 
Indeed there are signs that developing economies are catching-up. The share 
of world GDP and world exports coming from developing economies has significantly 
increased in the last twenty years (World Bank, 2007). This is having a positive effect 
on poverty reduction. The percentage of people earning less than 1$ has decreased 
significantly and to a lesser extent the share of workers below 2$ (ILO, 2007). 
Additionally we are now witnessing a second cycle of globalization in which some 
emerging economies show a powerful capacity to export not only low-added value 
products, but also high-value ones demanding a highly skilled workforce (MRA 
report, 2007).  
Yet, there are also signs that shed serious doubts on this optimistic evaluation. 
To begin with, the apparent reduction of poverty might not be so straight forward. 
According to Wade (2007), the World Bank’s poverty headcounts have a large 
margin of error in all years. The often-cited comparison between 1980 and 1998: 1.4 
billion in extreme poverty in 1980, 1.2 billion in 1998 is biased as the Bank introduced 
a new methodology in the late 1990s which makes the figures no longer comparable. 
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Additionally, China and India, the two most important countries for the overall trend, 
have purchasing power parity figures (PPP-adjusted income) that contain an even 
bigger component of guess work than for most other significant countries.  
Other signs also contradict the positive image of globalization. Trade 
liberalization has brought about, not a global but a regional economic integration. 
East Asia, principally China and India, has profited in this new context the most, 
moving from the 4% of total world export in 1990 to 11% in 2004. Yet other world 
regions have hardly increased their export participation (Sub-Saharan Africa, South 
Asia, Middle East and North Africa, are all accounting for the same share of world 
merchandise exports as in 1990).  
Furthermore, although international trade and capital flows have been growing 
faster than ever, global income growth has been slower and the world economy is 
allocating a smaller proportion of its income to fixed capital formation (Akyüz, 2006). 
Similarly, although financial liberalisation has increased private capital flows at record 
levels, investment into new infrastructure and productive capacity has stagnated and 
international capital movements have led to greater economic volatility (van der 
Hoeven & Lübker, 2006) (For details see several chapters in this book which are 
devoted to analyse the crisis of the financial market) . 
Inequality is certainly growing worldwide. The gap between world regions and 
within countries has widened since the eighties. The sharpest rise has occurred in 
Eastern Europe, which accounted for the lowest inequality level until the mid-nineties, 
but inequality has also continued to grow in regions that already had high inequality 
indexes (Latin America and Asia). China, which is often presented as the 
globalization winner, is a paradigmatic case of growing inequality. Gini coefficient for 
both rural and urban population has significantly increased (0.224 in 1985 to 0.449 in 
2003; WIID, 2007).  But inequality has increased between rich and poor countries as 
well.  The ratio of GDP per capital in the richest country to GDP per capita in the 
poorest country rose from 42:1 in 1970 to 62:1 in 1990 and the ratio of GDP per 
capita in the 20 richest countries to the poorest 20 countries rose from 54:1 during 
1960-62 to 121:1 during 2000-2002 (Milanovic, 2005; Nayyar, D. 2003).   
Similarly, informal economy is growing worldwide (McKinsey GI, 2004). At the 
beginning of the 21st century it represented 41% of GDP in developing countries, 
38% in transition countries and 18% in OECD countries. In China 16% of GDP stems 
from informal sectors, growing at annual rates of between 12.51% (ILO 2002) and 
13,5% (World Bank 2002) per year. Other winners of globalization show high rates a 
well. India (23%), Argentina (26%), Korea (27,5%), Mexico (30,1%), Malaysia (31%), 
Pakistan (36%), Brazil (39,8%), Russia (46,1%) or Thailand (52,6% (Schneider, 
2002).  
Economic immigration from poorer to richer countries is at record levels 
(IOM,2008) and cross-border human trafficking (illegal immigration, prostitution) is 
increasing worldwide (Danailova-Trainor & Belser, 2006). Economic and political 
openness are related. If borders are more permeable for goods and services, they 
are also so for movement of people. Especially when i) fertility rates are falling to 
levels below replacement rates in most developed countries, whereas they remain 
high in developing economies, ii) some low-skilled jobs are not taken by local 
workers at low wages in developed economies, iii) better and cheaper 
communication and transportation that facilitate global movements and iv) new 
technologies that permit immigrants a fluent and easy communication with their 
countries of origin.  
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Due to this ever-increasing immigration, an estimated 190 million persons reside 
outside of their country of birth or nationality. The number of those living in foreign 
countries for more than one year (long-term immigrant) has been growing since the 
seventies. There were 84 million international long-term immigrants in 1975, an 
estimated 105 million in 1985, around 120 million in 1990, 150 million in 2000 and 
195 million in 2006 (Martin, 2001; OIM, 2008).  
Many countries are trying to regulate migration and decrease borders’ 
permeability through restrictive immigration laws. This is favoring the increase of 
professional smuggling and human trafficking, that not only bring migrants across 
borders but exploit and abuse them in receiving countries. According to recent 
investigations, about two thirds of global victims are trafficked intraregional within 
East Asia and Pacific (260,000-280,000) and Europe and Eurasia (170,000-210,000). 
The region of the Near East is a primary destination for victims from East Asia and 
the Pacific (12,500-16,000) (Danailova-Trainor & Belser, 2006).   
If all this was not enough, after a century and a half of industrialization, 
emissions of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere are increasing average global 
annual temperatures, resulting in climate change with the subsequent negative 
effects on the global economy and prosperity. With respect to the year 1856, 
emissions are 30 times higher today, whereas atmospheric CO2 concentration has 
moved from 275 parts per million (ppm) in 1856 to 380 ppm in 2004. 
By definition, climate change is a global issue, which does not fit into the logic 
of political borders, or other cultural and economic determinants. Yet, climate 
disasters are concentrated in poor countries. Some 262 million people were affected 
by climate disasters annually between 2000 to 2004, 98% of which were in the 
developing world. In the OECD countries 1 in 1500 people was affected by climate 
disaster whereas for developing countries the figure is 1 in 19 (UNDP 2008). Fight 
against climate change requires rich nations to cut emissions by at least 80%, with 
cuts of 30% by 2020. Emissions from developing countries would peak around 2020, 
with cuts of 20% by 2050. Between now and 2030, the average annual cost would 
amount to 1.6% of GDP. This stabilization target is stringent but affordable. The costs 
of inaction could reach 5–20% of world GDP (Stern Report). 
To conclude, it is possible to state that the current model of globalization is 
bringing about a substantive integration of new economies and a reduction of 1$ 
poverty (although there are serious doubts about the intensity of this reduction) but 
this is at the expense of increasing the levels of inequality, informal economy, 
economic immigration, human trafficking and ecological risks.   
 
The effects of Liberal Globalization in EU economy  
This scenario is affecting developed economies as well. If growth does not translate 
into development in emerging economies, central economies face not only 
relocations of production but pressures to deregulate employment, control salaries 
and reduce social policy expenditure as a result of competition from third countries 
with lower labor costs, lax labor laws and fairly small social policies (the famous 
"employment-equality trade-off"). 
We cannot forget that cross-national differences in social expenditure are 
huge. Total social security expenditure as a percentage of GDP was 26,8% in the 
European Union, 16,6% in North America, 16,1% in Oceania, 8,8% in Latin America, 
6,4% in Asia and 4,3% in Africa in 2000. The winners of globalization are devoting 
only a marginal part of their increasing GDP to social security. China, devoted only 
3,6%, India 2,6%, Singapore 3,3%, Malaysia 2,9%, Thailand 1,9% and Indonesia and 
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Philippines 1,7%. Other winners such as Russia, Brazil or Argentina devoted around 
10% of their GPD to social issues (ILO, 2000). The resulting reality is that around 
80% of the world’s working population has little or no social security (ILO 2007) 
This situation places "social dumping" and "off-shoring" at the forefront of 
economic controversies regarding the financing of the European welfare states. If 
wages are not adjusted downward in the EU, there will be a rise in unemployment as 
a result of inferior competitive rates and productive relocation. However, if wages are 
fully adjusted, then the result will be a rise in inequality. This apparent "employment-
inequality" trade-off  which has been considered the origin of one of the most 
important challenges for developed economies (Esping-Andersen, 1996; Scharpf, 
1999) has adopted a more complex dimension as some emerging economies are 
not only catching up in the low-skilled sector, but in avant-garde sectors as well.   
The consequences are already evident:  20% of total employment in the 
services sector in Europe is likely to be relocated (Welsum & Vickery, 2005). Most 
relocation is to new member states (51.2%), but Asia, primarily China and India now 
accounts for 36.3% and the rest of the world receives 12.5% of European off-shoring. 
And we are only seeing the beginning of job losses as a result of these relocations, 
(7.9% of total jobs lost in Europe in 2005, which in turn accounted for 1.2% of total 
employment loss compared to 2004), it is a troubling factor especially when the new 
EU member states are also beginning to relocate part of their production to other 
economies with lower labour costs (MRA report, 2007) 
But the effect of relocation is reflected not only in job losses, but in the 
pressures to deregulate employment that is not relocated. Temporary employment 
has grown throughout the EU, rising from 9% in 1987 to 14.7 in 2006. Temporary 
workers are increasing involuntarily (60.9% in 2006 compared to 50.5% in 1986). The 
duration of temporary employment contracts is decreasing, thereby increasing job 
insecurity of unprotected workers. While the number of temporary contracts of 
between 1 and 2 years has doubled between 1992 and 2006, temporary contracts of 
less than 1 month have risen by 293% over the same period, and those between 1 
and 3 months have also risen 256%. 
These alarming tendencies are important as differences in terms of legal 
protection and wages between permanent and temporary workers continue to rise. 
The risk of in-working poverty (being poor despite having a job) stood at 4% in 2006 
among the permanent workers and 12% among temporary workers (Eurostat 2008). 
And the wage gap between the two groups is remarkable with a 43% difference 
between temporary and permanent workers. 
The ILO estimates suggest that 20% of GDP and 15% of employment in 
developed countries fall within the informal economy, with a remarkable increasing 
tendency (the  percentage of workers employed in the informal economy rose in 
Western Europe from 12% in 1980/1990, to 15% in 1990/2000 (ILO, 2002 & 2004). 
Moreover, we have witnessed a loss of the importance of wages in the national 
income at a European level. At the EU-27, wages represented 50.3% of GDP in 1995 
and 49% in 2005. This trend has occurred in virtually all member states, although it is 
especially pronounced in the larger European economies (Eurostat 2008). 
 
What should be done? Some Tentative Reflexions 
The integration of economies that up until now were not involved in international 
trade is great news. Yet the economic consequences of this integration are not so 
positive.  In reality the benefits of the economic growth associated with globalization 
are being enjoyed by just a small percentage of the people, but the burdens of 
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growth, principally inequality, deterioration of working conditions, informal economy 
and human trafficking, are spread out among an increasing part of the population. 
The entry of developing economies, mainly China, India and Ex-Soviet 
Republics, into the globalized economy has brought about gigantic supply-side 
shocks. In 1985 there were about a billion and a half workers. By the year 2000 the 
global labour force had doubled to 3 billion (ILO 2007). This doubling, in the context of 
insecurity, labour precariousness and lack of social protection described above, is 
bringing about a formidable process of proletaritation which is breaking the nexus 
between economic growth and development. The fact that around 80% of the world’s 
working population has little or no social security despite the vigorous growth of many 
economies in the last decades (ILO 2007) constitutes the core of the problem.  
This is seriously damaging the sustainability of this growth model. Competition 
among economies is likely to be distorted unless a progressive harmonization of 
social standards and working conditions is achieved at the global level. The prospect 
of future growth and wealth will certainly be difficult to achieve if trade liberalization is 
just a question of extending the size of the market, ignoring social confluence and 
labour harmonisation. Therefore, although it is certainly ardours to synthesise the 
contents of a new proposal, one of its fundamental pillars should be the emphasis on 
social cohesion at the global level. 
In order to achieve this objective it is necessary to make a profound revision of 
the economic imperative ruling globalization. While trade liberalisation and 
macroeconomic stability may be necessary to sustain economic growth, they are 
certainly not sufficient to spread about well-being. Global institutions such as World 
Bank (2000) and ILO (2007) have acknowledged that neither trade, nor growth, 
automatically leads to poverty reduction, and by extension that the more efficient way 
to reduce poverty is tackling it directly.  
Therefore, greater concern for employment creation and income distribution 
should be more explicitly taken into consideration if the economic system is to 
perform better. We need to push the global agenda to favour a progressive 
integration of all economies into the global market, while at the same time developing 
new solidarity instruments in the face of rising inequalities and worsening 
employment conditions. 
In this respect it is indispensable to pay much more attention to the prospect 
of setting up a "Global Social Floor" and to spread out the "Decent Work Agenda". 
The first option is feasible if we link social expenditure to economic growth. In the last 
25 years some emerging economies have grown at a yearly rate of 10%, but their 
social expenditures have remained stagnant. A new economic imperative is needed 
to bring about a more balanced equilibrium between growth and social expenditure.  
The ILO has undertaken two studies, one in Africa (seven countries) and one 
in Asia (five countries) which provide a first estimation of the costs of the global social 
floor in low-income countries. In all of the 12 countries considered, the initial annual 
cost is projected to be in the range of 3.7 to 10.6% of GDP. More importantly, the 
implementation of the Global Social Floor is affordable even in low-income countries. 
According to ILO calculations, less than 2% of the global GDP would be necessary to 
provide this basic set of social guarantees to all of the world’s poor (ILO, 2008). 
The gradual application of these global objectives would mean a more 
equitable distribution of the benefits of market integration. The current economic 
scenario encourages global companies to select relocation from one economy to 
another searching for soft laws on labour conditions and taxation, as well as the 
capacity to impose on governments the most favourable conditions for investment.  
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This translates into rising inequality and a steady worsening of employment 
conditions.  
The Global Social Floor, once implemented, generates growth through cash 
injections in local economies, and it promotes internal demand that, at the same time, 
reinforces the upward economic cycle. This will favour stability and social cohesion if 
redistributive policies are implemented. Additionally, the improvement of economic 
opportunity is not only the best long-term solution to illegal migration, but will also 
enable the spread business worldwide. 
More political impetus should be aimed at reducing inequality on a global 
scale, to favor fair trade and a progressive integration of all economies into the global 
market but under the preponderance of new economic imperatives: redistribution and 
social cohesion. A globalization of this type does not involve autarkical solutions to 
global challenges but a significant integration by other means. Trade integration is a 
fundamental prerequisite for sustainable economic growth, but it must be 
accompanied by a distribution of its benefits that strongly reduce inequality and 
impede a deterioration of working conditions. This combination of economic 
integration and redistribution may trigger positive effects on the most important 
limitations embedded in the current model of liberal globalization.  
Europe must play a more active role in the design of another model of 
globalization that would encompass social policies as one of its pillars. Despite the 
fact that many European citizens are still enmeshed in the logic of their local reality, 
Europe is a vital global player. Not only because for 50 years we have been 
"globalizing" a continent with significant social, economic and cultural differences, but 
also because we are the region of the world where the most progress on equality 
across a range of social policies and labour guarantees has been achieved. 
In this sense the role played by progressive forces in globalization must 
significantly change. The ideological capital of progressive forces needs to be 
increased after 30 years of weak responses and accommodation to the liberal socio-
economic mainstream. No longer can progressives by their silence, reinforce the 
economic status quo; it is time to strongly transform it.  
"Third way" alternatives have shown to be a mere adaptation to the liberal 
principles that govern globalization, unwilling to provide a reliable substitutive model. 
So much more work needs to be done to move from analysis to a credible 
alternative.  Yet, the idea of associating growth and redistribution constitutes a 
promising starting point. 
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x. Trade is Part of the Solution to the Current 
Economic Crisis 
By Pascal Lamy34 
 
 
The economic crisis that is unfolding around us has generated a great deal of 
reflection on the international architecture that harnesses globalisation.  
For many years, critics of globalisation have taken aim at the so-called 
Washington-Consensus which advocates deregulation, minimal government 
interference in markets, privatization and, yes, open trade. Many in the international 
institutions have used the Washington Consensus as the benchmark when drawing 
up policy recommendations and those who have found fault with more market driven 
economic policies argue today that the Washington Consensus should be scrapped. 
Much re-examination of this institutional infrastructure is not only healthy, it is 
essential. What is clear is that there are gaps in the regulatory structure of the 
international economy that need to be filled. It's clear as well that a response to the 
crisis we face today must be a global one because the problems we have 
encountered are global in nature. The financial meltdown is a clear illustration of this. 
Money moves around the planet at a touch of a keystroke and lax rules pervade the 
financial industry. And yet we do not have a global regulatory structure for finance; 
we do not have a comprehensive system of transparent financial rules and 
procedures; we do not have a system for addressing international financial disputes. 
However, as we reassess international economic governance, we must take 
care that we do not throw the baby out with the bathwater. In composing a new 
architecture, we must learn from the lessons of history. One such lesson is that open 
trade works. It is the most efficient means of resource allocation and we know that 
those countries with open trading regimes generate more wealth than those which do 
not. We also know that inclusion in the global trading system helps poor countries 
grow and develop. Through active participation in the trading system, governments of 
developing countries have been able to lift some 400 million people out of abject 
poverty. China's accession to the WTO is a good example of this. Moreover, open 
trading relations between nations foster greater international harmony and 
cooperation.  
Critics of the WTO and the trading system sometimes make the mistake of 
confusing trade opening with deregulation or privatization. They see a financial 
system which lacks adequate regulation and has spiralled out of control, fuelled by 
excess and ever riskier instruments. But this is not the case with trade. More than 60 
years ago, the architects of the global international system recognized that 
isolationist policies in trade had contributed to worsening the Great Depression and 
had fuelled economic nationalism. During these 60 years – first with the GATT and 
then with the World Trade Organization – trade has been a multiplier of growth and 
an insurance policy against protectionism. Today, sophisticated global rules ensure 
that countries follow internationally-agreed procedures in their commercial 
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transactions. When countries divert from the rules and disputes arise, we have an 
advanced and highly successful system of dispute resolution.  
All of this permits trade opening to take place in an environment which is 
transparent, predictable and credible. Our rules-based system is global in nature but 
this does not mean that it is a "one-size-fits-all" prescription for opening trade. 
Developing countries are not expected to adhere to the same rules as more 
advanced countries. They have longer transition periods in which to apply WTO rules 
and greater flexibility in applying their commitments. Moreover, roughly a fifth of the 
WTO's budget is devoted to technical assistance programmes which are designed to 
provide developing-country officials with the training they need to better understand 
how the trading system can be of benefit to their countries. 
The poorest countries are afforded the greatest flexibility of all. In fact, in the 
Doha Development Round negotiations which are currently underway, Least 
Developed Countries are not required to reduce any of their tariffs or subsidy outlays 
and are not expected to open their services markets. Yet, developed countries are 
expected to do the maximum in support of the LDCs, largely through the scrapping of 
all quotas and duties on at least 97% of LDC exports.   
However, while trade is an engine for growth and development, it does not 
mean that trade is good for everyone, everywhere at all times. Just as factors like 
technological change have an impact on income distribution, there are losers from 
more open trade in industrial as well as developing countries. There are inevitable 
structural adjustments associated with it. Some sectors, firms or individuals gain from 
trade, while others have to adjust into alternative activities, if they can, in the face of 
new competitive realities. There are also countries that, frankly, cannot participate in 
the global economy. They lack the institutional, legal, technical and financial capacity 
to make trade work for them.  
All this makes a powerful case for addressing the social tensions arising from 
inequality, be this through public provision of basic services, better education and 
training opportunities or fiscal reform.  On the other hand, countries that miss out on 
international production opportunities risk being marginalized through globalisation. 
Firms' decisions on location are strongly influenced by the quality of the institutional 
framework, the costs of setting up a business and the quality of infrastructure. Not 
addressing these issues is likely to limit the participation of low-income countries in 
production networks, despite their advantage in terms of factor prices. Being left out 
is surely much worse than trying to manage change and localized losses against a 
background of generalized gains.  
It is therefore clear that the politics of trade have to be properly managed if 
societal gains are to be realized. Increasing inequality will be associated with an 
increase in opposition to trade and, ultimately, with more restrictive trade policies. 
Greater inequality will lead to increased calls for protectionism. 
Restoring the confidence of citizens in trade requires ensuring that the right 
accompanying domestic policies are in place, whether on health, pensions, taxation 
or education. In fact a double agenda is needed, coupling trade opening on the one 
hand, with the right domestic policies on the other. This is true for developed as 
much as for developing countries. the latter, however, maybe not having the 
necessary financial means. This is where development assistance comes into play.  
The WTO is at the centre of an international effort to boost Aid for Trade. For 
many countries the opportunities offered by the multilateral trading system cannot 
translate into reality unless and until it is accompanied by efforts to boost their 
productive capacities, to address bottlenecks or to help manage the adjustment. Aid 
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for Trade is a good example of how the international community can work together in 
a coherent manner to address these shortcomings. At the WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Hong Kong in 2005, the WTO placed the Aid-for-Trade agenda as a 
necessary complement to the results of the Doha Round. Since then the WTO has 
been working with other international organizations such as the World Bank, regional 
developments banks, OECD, UNIDO, UNDP, UNCTAD and ITC, with bilateral donors 
and with beneficiary countries, to mainstream trade in development programmes as 
well as to ensure adequate funding is provided for these projects. Today, as the 
economic crisis bites into our economies, it is important not to forget the 
commitments made to assist developing countries improve their productive 
capacities. 
We know that open trade makes sense economically and geopolitically. We 
know that the sophisticated system of multilateral rules provides a transparent 
framework.  However, it is also true that the system needs to be made more 
equitable and relevant, particularly for developing countries, through the conclusion 
of the Doha Round. 
In spite of all we have learnt about the advantages of such a system, the 
threat of protectionism is growing. The global economic crisis has produced fear and 
even panic in many quarters of our planet. Wherever I go these days I speak to 
political, business and union leaders and what they say to me can be summed up in 
the words “pessimism” and “fear.” Fear of massive job losses. Fear of a sharp 
decrease in trade which is stalling an important engine for growth, especially for 
many developing countries. Fear of lack of credit even for relatively safe operations, 
such as those to finance trade transactions, which is compounding the decline in 
trade flows.   
The world growth projections today are at 0 per cent, with developed countries 
posting a negative growth of -2 per cent and developing countries a positive one of 
around 5 per cent. The positive growth comes from emerging countries which are 
highly dependent on trade. Global export volumes will contract by 2.8% in 2009, says 
the IMF. In emerging countries, which are heavily dependent on exports for their 
growth, this has set off alarm bells.  
Trade has become another casualty of the recession provoked by the severe 
financial crisis which in turn was caused by lack of regulation, supervision and 
excess. In these times of serious economic crisis, our biggest challenge is to ensure 
trade is part of the solution and not part of the problem.  
In this period of uncertainty and fear, calls for a stronger role for governments 
and regulators to intervene resonate well. However, for this to be successful, all 
actors have to agree on common targets and enemies and work together. Global 
cooperation within and across countries is therefore of the essence. At times of 
global economic crisis, enemy number one is isolationism. In 1930, the US Congress 
passed, and President Hoover signed, the Smoot and Hawley Act which sharply 
raised US tariffs on more than 20,000 products. Other countries retaliated, raising 
their tariffs on US goods. The Great Depression followed. Whether it is with tariffs or 
with new, more sophisticated versions of Smoot and Hawley, today we run the risk of 
sliding down a slippery slope of tit-for-tat measures.  
To help WTO Members have a better and real-time idea of global trends in 
international trade and trade policy developments, we have set up a radar tracking 
trade and trade-related measures taken in the context of the current crisis. As of now, 
our radar picture shows that most WTO Members appear to have successfully kept 
domestic protectionist pressures under control. WTO Members have expressed their 
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concerns about rising protectionist pressures both in their export markets and from 
their domestic constituencies. They have also made many good suggestions on how 
we can improve the reports we provide them with on the application of trade 
measures. Our hope is that in providing a clear picture of these developments, world 
leaders can better appreciate the dangers and respond forcefully to such isolationist 
pressures. I have been heartened to see that a number of world leaders have acted 
against measures that would have, at the very least, annoyed their trading partners. 
This is not to say that governments must remain inert as job losses mount and 
social unrest grows. Governments must act to alleviate the social pain which is 
mounting. Although job protection does not mean protectionism. Social protection 
means improved training, better health care, more flexibility in pension plans and a 
social safety net guarding against workers displaced by foreign competition being 
consigned to society's sidelines. Protection, yes; isolationism, no. Governments must 
provide answers to the social unrest which is brewing behind the massive job losses. 
The stimulus packages governments are adopting must provide answers to those 
who are being left behind in this crisis.  
This is also the time to shore up global trade rules, making them more 
equitable, transparent and relevant. For more than 60 years these rules, which the 
WTO oversees, have provided a strong foundation for economic growth and 
development. A conclusion of the Doha Development Round of global negotiations 
would strengthen these rules and help ensure that trade is part of the solution to the 
economic downturn. A Doha Round on its own will not lift us out of this deepening 
recession, but more open trade would provide an important economic stimulus in its 
own right. It will also send the political signal that at harsh and difficult times, 
governments are capable of working together to provide the kind of global answer 
which is so desperately needed.  
This is why WTO Members should pick up from where they left off in 2008 and 
enter the negotiating arena with renewed commitment. I am encouraged to find 
support in this respect from many political leaders around the world and I count on 
them to show the way forward. We have accomplished around 80 per cent of our set 
targets in the Doha Round but with the necessary political guidance, the willingness 
to compromise and realistic expectations, I am convinced that we can conclude these 
negotiations rapidly. 
Yes, we are living in a changing world but, more importantly, we are living in a 
changed world, one which requires a new approach and a new infrastructure to help 
us chart a new course for international economic cooperation. A renewed 
commitment to rules-based open trade must be part of this paradigm. 
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xi. Europe and Africa Standing Together? 
By Ms. Aminata Traoré35 
 
 
Europe and us 
One of the features of a Europe comprising 27 members is to include colonial powers 
such as Great Britain, France and Belgium. After all, the former Belgian minister of 
Foreign Affairs and current European Commissioner for development, Louis Michel, 
declared about Africa “If France, Great Britain and Belgium adopt a common 
strategy, the others will follow.” 36 That’s often how our fate as Africans is sealed, 
without us knowing, and inevitably to our detriment. 
Europe being a key component of the machinery, our position in this market 
globalisation has already been designated. Our continent has been the backyard of 
Europe, where it can and wants to continue to draw upon our natural resources and 
select among workers strictly according to its needs. The modernisation of 
agriculture, industrialisation and trade to fulfil on a long-term basis the legitimate 
needs of the people have often remained pious vows, as the contents are not the 
same whether it is the dominant or the downtrodden. One can say the same 
regarding democracy, governance and human rights which the powerful and mighty 
respect to a certain extent, but in their climes they often deny and trample these 
same values. African leadership which ensues from such an asymmetry in the power 
struggle is formatted and weakened during dialogue. 
It is like this because Europe knows how to thank and reward leaders, whom it 
takes for granted, and make its mark, all the more so since it prides itself on being 
the first “donor” to the continent. 
With the Cotonou Agreement, which is a turning point in the relations between 
the EU and the ACP countries, Africa jumped in the so-called free market with an 
invisible hand which supposedly outdoes sovereign States in terms of wealth creation 
and distribution. Disqualified on this basis, the postcolonial State had to disengage 
itself not only from the production, marketing and the banking system, but also from 
vital social sectors that people desperately need. That’s how the vast majority of 
Africans are now deprived of education, healthcare, drinkable water because they 
are not able to afford them. 
 
Crises 
Three decades of African economies’ restructuring under the guidance of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have ruined our societies and 
our lives. And now the mainstream economic model, which accounts for all sorts of 
miseries, hardships and humiliations, has reached deadlock in the countries of 
“happy” and triumphant globalisation.  
The US-triggered subprime mortgage crisis in August 2007 is often presented 
by the defenders of the system as the spark that ignited the financial planet, with 
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dramatic social and economic consequences. In actual fact, it is the straw that broke 
the camel’s back. Such a situation was foreseeable and unavoidable due to the 
expansionist and predatory logic that has fuelled globalised capitalism. New products 
should create business opportunities for some, which is to say the initiators but what 
about the others.  In this case it’s people from underdeveloped countries that are 
becoming ever more impoverished day by day, despite the fact that their wealth 
contributes to fuel the engine of growth. The expansion and predatory exploitation 
destruction process is not specific to financial capitalism, whose recasting by 
moralising its actors is not enough to curb the crisis as it is. 
It has been systemic and rampant, under other forms since the 80’s, where in 
Africa, Latin America and Asia the severe structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) 
of the Bretton Woods institutions were supposed to hold it back and restrain it. 
Instead they translated into painful, unpopular, and inappropriate reforms.   
The lack of African information and reflection continues to conceal the role of the 
groundswell of economic liberalism. The winners of globalisation are confronted with 
the worst crisis since 1930. In the United States, Europe and elsewhere, banks which 
greatly lack funds, scarcely lend anymore to companies or individuals.  In these 
countries, a drop in production, factory closures, mass redundancies and lay-offs are 
rife.  
Africa does not escape from the consequences of the abrupt and brutal 
evolution of the global environment. How is it going to cope and come through? Is it 
going to lose the “gain” of economic reforms, ask worried liberals from here and 
elsewhere. From my point of view, there are two essential questions. Will Africa also 
have to pay dearly for the failure of the system or, take advantage of the present 
situation to move away from the supervision of world powers and IFI’s? Will Europe, 
its powerful neighbour, finally make concessions by acknowledging the right of 
Africans to think for themselves, to choose not only their leaders but also their proper 
economic and monetary policies, true to their interests? 
We must demonstrate audacity, insight and political courage because our 
continent can no longer afford to be seen as the anti-model, to be looked after and 
kept on the straight and narrow; on the global market that leads us into the abyss. 
The model is not in crisis in Africa. It has been a failure from the very start.  
 
From the G8 to the G20 
Attending the G20 could be a false challenge and a distraction for us. Those behind it 
have no intention of relinquishing the advantages, nor the margins of manoeuvre 
they have created for themselves thanks to reforms. This authority won’t do more 
than the G8 which may, during several summits, have granted a few seats to leaders 
from the South that were viewed as reputable, that is to say in full agreement with the 
market dogma and disciplined in the dismantling of their economies in aid of large 
Euro-American groups. To pledge 0.7% of their recovery and stimulus packages to 
save banks, as the British Prime Minister Gordon Brown considers doing, is a blend 
of diversion and corruption, as long as there are no serious discussions on where 
responsibilities lie  for the ruin of African economies. Let’s remind the reader that it 
was under the G8 presidency and the European Union presidency that Great Britain 
organised the 2005 Gleneagles Summit (Scotland) which made a mountain out of a 
molehill.  
Many Africans have fond memories of the impressive Blair Commission report, 
as well as Bob Geldolf’s ten giant concerts which strengthened and accredited the 
reality of poverty and deprivation in an Africa whose foreign debt should have been 
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alleviated. The aim was never to go beyond capitalism as a process of alienation and 
pauperization of the vast majority of Africans, and corruption of the elite. Debt relief 
for 18 poor countries, including 14 from Africa, and an increase in public aid 
appropriation for development of 50 billion dollars per year through 2010 lengthened 
the list of vain promises. The trick was to cancel and write off debts that the states 
are unable to reimburse without granting them the additional resources needed.  In 
return for this false generosity, the beneficiary states are compelled to carry on with 
and deepen economic policies that impoverish, dehumanize and force entire sections 
of the population to emigrate.  
  
Risks 
The great vulnerability of Africa given the consequences of the world financial and 
economic crisis, has to do with the hypocrisy of “rich” nations as well as our own lack 
of vision, solidarity and political courage. Nevertheless, we will have to face up the 
following realities: 
- The drop in demand for raw materials which our economies highly depend 
on, as the production falls in importing countries 
- The reduction of the volume of money transfers and remittances from 
emigrant workers due to the lay-offs that will continue to increase  
- The reduction of public aid for development, that of Europe having already 
dropped in 2007, where it accounted for only 0.38% of the GDP of the EU 
- The flight and net outflow of investment, although apart from certain 
strategic sectors, investment was not pouring in before, despite many 
African states being subjected to the required reforms.  
Most analysts do not comprehend the alarming political risks at stake. They regard 
the worsening of tendencies among African leaders and negotiators, as a reason to 
give even more choices and decisions to world powers which impose their 
conditions.  
Within its borders, the recent exacerbation of the international environment will 
generate new tensions and far more corruption in the quest to capture diminishing 
resources. The auctioning off of wealth will continue if people are not more well-
informed and organised in order to protect African heritage and public goods.   
  
Opportunities 
The collapse of the capitalist system could have, in the mindset of people from 
underdeveloped countries and in terms of North / South relations the same healthy 
impact as the participation of our countries had in the Second World War. We came 
through with a new look at the colonial system after realising it was not unshakeable, 
immutable and that settlers were not invincible.  
With regard to the neoliberal order, we must also say once and for all, that it is a 
dead-end and the disastrous economic policies it mandates constitute nothing less 
than violence perpetrated against a people. The G20, as I previously mentioned, is 
not the place for discussion as its most powerful members have yet to prove that they 
are credible or sincere interlocutors.  
More concretely, Africa needs to ask the fundamental question of political, 
monetary, economic and food sovereignty which also lay at the very heart and core 
of the struggles for national liberation. It was also on the agenda in the 80’s when 
after two decades of dependent and outward-looking development, postcolonial 
States came to the realisation that they were mistaken in terms of challenge and 
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strategy. It is in this context that in April 1980, heads of States and governments of 
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) adopted the Lagos Plan of Action in the 
Nigerian capital. This document was the successful conclusion and culmination of a 
long process of dialogue during which African countries devised the Monrovia 
strategy for the economic development of Africa. In one fell swoop, the World Bank 
discarded and jettisoned the Lagos Plan of Action and replaced it by a neoliberal 
agenda implemented through structural adjustment plans.  
With the orientation and control of the continent’s development no longer in 
the hands of its own leaders, our role becomes only to keep up the pace of reforms, 
that is to please Washington, Brussels, Geneva and other strategic places of 
decision-making, and consequently to betray our populations instead of feeling 
indebted and loyal to them.  
Isn’t it surprising that, after having converted the democratic transitions of the 
90’s into opportunities to liberalise African economies, the United States of America, 
Europe and their allies posed as defenders of the rights the African people and as 
judges of their leaders? Isn’t it a way of patronizing us by asking us to think and act 
locally by voting, instead of repositioning ourselves in the globalised world which at 
present works to the detriment of our interests? 
 
Citizenship 
It is urgent and of the utmost importance to contemplate political alternation in Africa 
in the light of what is at stake worldwide, e.g. trade, debt, environment and migratory 
flows. It is no longer a matter of going from one election to another, well or poorly 
organised, of entrusting our fate to the hands of leaders who are prepared to make 
concessions and compromise all their principles for the control of external resources, 
including the European Union’s aid. When they try to escape formal democracy by 
looking after the interests of their people, Europe tries to dissuade and deter them. 
The signing under pressure of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the 
EU illustrates how the continent’s democratisation efforts are being sabotaged and 
undermined. It aims to abolish and do away with non-reciprocal trade preferences 
and replace them with a free trade agreement, in accordance with the rules of the 
WTO. ACP countries will have to gradually remove and dismantle their trade barriers 
to become more competitive by 2020.   
Critical civil society and many well-informed African decision-makers know 
from experience that when it comes to ‘free trade’ rich countries are at liberty to cheat 
and grant themselves the right to distort and dissimilate in the competition game. 
One perfect example regards the farm subsidy policies in the United States and the 
European Union which have stifled and throttled the African cotton industry.  The 
defenders of the free and competitive market, especially right-wing parties, do not 
disarm. They are determined to corner African States more to have them sign the 
EPAs that are even more unjustified since the model they derive from is ailing. 
In September 2005, at the Economic Forum of Alpbach (Austria), I was asked 
by the organisers the following question: “Are Europe and Africa standing together at 
this time of globalisation?” It is a burning question given the financial and economic 
crisis which has shaken the world system. “I’ll believe it when I see it », I replied, 
making reference to the asymmetry in the power struggle between the regions and 
the right that Europe arrogates itself to interfere. To truly stand together means 
equality, justice and transparency in bilateral relations. The freedom of movement is 
one of the best guarantees.  
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Repressive migratory policies in Europe contradict its discourse on 
democracy, human rights and justice that are not only incumbent on African leaders. 
The responsibility of thinking masters and sponsors is engaged. The latter cannot 
provoke chaos through neoliberal policies going against the interests of the African 
people and then clear their conscience by asking humanitarian organisations to plug 
the gaps. Global governance and peace in Africa require the clarification of the 
intentions of Western and emerging powers, particularly China, in its quest for greedy 
acquisition of raw materials and farmland.  
The profile of new migrants be it laid-off workers, young unemployed 
graduates, peasants, or fishermen, is highly edifying given the damage inflicted on 
Africans in the name of a global market which is both unfair and destructive.  
Our distress calls as victims of the market have fallen on deaf ears. Allocating 0.7% 
to "poor” countries from their recovery packages which bail out bankrupt banks, does 
not remedy the situation. The required funds to fight against the food and 
environmental crisis remain clearly insufficient and sometimes non-existent. 
Europe could have been an ally as well as a privileged interlocutor in Africa by 
giving a different globalisation than the terrible model based solely on profit. The 
dilemma for Africa is that, once we are rid of the burden of odious debt, and equipped 
with industries that fulfil its needs, exporting of goods besides raw materials, it will 
still not be of interest to Europe or the other great winners of globalised capitalism, 
including China.  
  
Duty to assert truth and justice  
The way for the continent to extricate itself from the current stalemate lies in clarity, 
sincerity and insight.  We must examine, deal with and eradicate the harm that 
befalls Africa. The responsibility for this work of clarification is incumbent upon us as 
Africans. We need to revisit and compare former strategies to free ourselves from the 
crisis, especially the Lagos Plan of Action which has been completely overlooked 
because it has been denigrated, while the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) has been acclaimed by the international community. 
The authors of the Lagos Plan of Action were right in considering that the 
African crisis of the 80’s was a by-product of the world crisis. They were also right in 
concluding that the answer was closely linked to the improvement of the international 
environment and the withdrawal and pull-out from the global market for further 
regional integration and self-reliance.  
The current situation has reinforced and vindicated their thesis. The 
international environment has kept deteriorating, except in the realm of business 
which is at the centre of most states’ concerns; reforms for capital and goods to 
move freely. That’s how at the beginning of the 21st century, 20% of the world 
controls 60% of the planet’s wealth. For an Africa confronted with endemic, massive 
and chronic hunger and starvation, HIV/Aids and wars, it is not only a matter of 
coming through and surviving the current crisis, but also of confronting capitalism in 
its most deadly and destructive form. This prospect urgently requires the dynamism 
and activism of national, sub-regional and regional economies, based on the creation 
and distribution of wealth in accordance with our own needs and by protecting our 
own ecosystems.  
It’s about rewriting our vision and our priorities, not by continuing with the 
Lagos Plan of Action as written then but by revising it so that it is relevant for today’s 
challenges.  The new vision which will emerge will most certainly contrast with the 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).  
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Favouring and prioritizing human beings  
The only prospect that corresponds to Africa today, but also to Europe and the rest of 
the world is to once again focus our efforts and resources on human lives and 
ecosystems, which are both endangered by the cult of growth and competitiveness. 
Lessons can be learned from the last century’s and more recent years’ trials.  
Alternatives to chaos can be found in the values of culture and society that the 
people are able to promote if they are given the opportunity to learn, understand and 
involve themselves more in the process of decision-making. It’s about “weaving the 
new cord to the former one”, as goes an African saying, in order to reconstruct our 
crumbled and shaken beings, manhandled and distorted social bonds and 
endangered environment. This prospect starts with awareness and speaking out, by 
Africans in their national languages and at all levels regarding their daily lives, but 
also regarding global challenges: trade, climate change, debt, migratory flows… 
The other Europe, the people’s Europe, is well aware of the asymmetrical 
nature of the power struggle between their continent and Africa, as well as our 
common fate. Prepared to fight along with African civil societies, the existence and 
the struggle of these committed Europeans allow me to conclude that in face of the 
crisis of capitalism, the people of Europe and Africa can stand together. With their 
inexhaustible inner richness, their determination to live in peace, as equals and 
standing together, they can save human lives and the planet from the often foolish 
and destructive logic of the market.  
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xii. The Development Agenda as a Global Social 
Contract 
By Nancy Birdsall37 
 
(This essay has been taken from a lecture given by Nancy Birdsall to the Dutch Scientific Council 
(WRR) on  December 8, 2008, The Hague) 
 
 
Reframing the traditional development agenda 
We are in the midst of an extraordinary moment. On the one hand, in my country, 
there are enormously high expectations of a more pragmatic, active government 
calling on Americans’ shared interests in a better world beyond, as well as within our 
borders.  On the other hand, we are all absorbing the grim new reality of a financial 
crisis born in America now escalating into a global economic disaster, threatening the 
well-being of people everywhere and, sadly, undoing the recent gains against the 
terrible poverty so many people suffer in emerging-market and low-income 
economies.   
I believe those of us in the development community need to seize this moment 
and make of the current crisis an opportunity for a major change in the way we think 
about the development agenda. I want to suggest that we reframe the conventionally 
defined development agenda as, in large part, the construction by an activist 
international community of a global social contract.  A 21st-century global social 
contract should be designed to maximize the benefits of global economic 
interdependence (or to use the popular term “globalization”) while minimizing the 
risks and costs not only for the world’s poor, but for the world’s indispensable middle 
class, both the large middle class in the rich world’s mature democratic economies 
and the incipient middle class within emerging markets and in a few low-income 
countries. 
Defining development as construction of a global social contract suggests two 
challenges for development advocates. First, it suggests a definition of development 
as a global imperative in which all nations and peoples have a common interest 
rather than as a matter primarily of aid as charity passes from rich to poor nations.  
Indeed, if the current crisis increases awareness on the part of the world’s rich and 
powerful (people and nation-states) of their dependence on prosperity and security in 
emerging markets and other developing economies, that would be the silver lining in 
today’s cloud of gloom over the sinking global economy because it could motivate 
citizens and voters in the rich world to pay more serious attention to their own interest 
in progress in the developing world.  Second, it suggests putting high priority on 
strengthening the institutions that manage and protect our common interests by 
fostering growth and sustainable development worldwide.  In our global economy 
these institutions including the multilateral development banks, the World Bank, the 
United Nations agencies, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade 
Organization, the Basel Committee, and many more constitute the global “polity” we 
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need to manage the investment, protection and other functions that a robust global 
social contract implies.   
 
The ongoing crisis: a more activist state; a hyper-connected global economy 
Discussion of these points should be prefaced with two observations about the 
current crisis that bear on the overall message.   
First, the ongoing crisis will not lead to a fundamental rejection of markets but 
to a redrawing of the line between the state and the market in the mature Western 
economies.  On the one hand, what Churchill said about democracy is also true of 
market-driven economies: ”terrible until you consider the alternatives.” On the other 
hand, there is little doubt that American-style capitalism is under siege.   The state is 
resurgent, especially in the United States and the United Kingdom, where the era of 
Reagan and Thatcher has run its course anyway and is now decidedly over. In all the 
advanced economies, markets, particularly financial markets (the cowboy sector of 
American capitalism, which has in turn spread to Europe as well), will be “fettered,” 
that is, more regulated.  In the next few years, the views of people like, Ha-Joon 
Chang, will be far more influential than they have been as the balance of state and 
market in what are mixed economies shifts, and a more activist state emerges in 
Europe, Japan, and America38.   
One likely change in the balance will come in the form of an expanded 
domestic social contract by which citizens contract with each other through the state 
to guarantee access to health, education, and other public goods and protect against 
individual risks and the systemic risks that markets generate.  This will be true 
especially in the United States, leading to a kind of convergence with Europe in the 
nature of the welfare state.  Everywhere that democratic politics works reasonably 
well; the domestic social contract will be strengthened, especially the protection for 
the middle class.  In the United States, where the median wage has not risen in 
almost two decades and where “globalization” has become the scapegoat of a 
stagnant median wage and failed health and other social insurance policies, it will 
otherwise be politically impossible to retain even begrudging support for open trade 
markets and minimal levels of legally sanctioned immigration.    
The only question is whether a strengthened domestic social contract will take 
the form of increased public spending on health, education, and public infrastructure 
and a shift in the tax burden toward the rich in order to reduce taxes on the middle 
class, or direct government subsidies to protect “middle class” jobs in domestic 
industries, with attendant risks to the current global trade regime.  I hope it will be the 
former, but one way or another, implicitly or explicitly, governments in affluent 
democracies will be emphasizing increased support for their middle class majorities. 
The second observation is that the hyper-connectivity of the global market, 
including the reality of the rich world’s interdependence with the poor world, has been 
driven home. We have seen in the last couple of months a desperate effort at greater 
international coordination of macroeconomic and financial-sector policies because a 
failure of international coordination, as in the 1930s, means running the risk of a 
recession turning into a long and deep global depression.  There are calls to eschew 
beggar-thy-neighbor policies, both on the financial side (as when guaranteeing 
deposits in Ireland led to flight out of banks elsewhere) and in the real economy, to 
avoid (under the umbrella of “social” efforts to protect jobs) new trade and industrial 
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protection programs (though by early December such programs were already being 
actively discussed in Russia, France, and the United States).   
Perhaps most noteworthy, is that with the first-ever meeting last year of the 
heads of state of the G-20 (the G-7 plus 13 emerging markets including Brazil, 
Russia, India, China, Indonesia, South Africa, and others), we may have seen the 
beginning of the end of the increasingly irrelevant G-7 club of nations. The G-20 
meeting took place near the end of a year in which almost all of the paltry growth in 
the United States was due to exports of which almost 40 percent went to developing 
countries. In contrast to the past, this time it is the United States and to some extent 
Western Europe that bear responsibility (among other things due to their regulatory 
failures) for today’s economic losses throughout the world.  And for the first time the 
rich countries are dependent on growth and effective countercyclical policy in China, 
Brazil, the Middle East, and elsewhere to help keep their own economies afloat next 
year; they cannot manage any recovery, for themselves or for others, alone.   
For today’s rich countries, there is potential tension between a more activist 
state, which at the national level is more likely to intervene in support of home 
industries and jobs, and the demands on coordination of interdependence. Let us 
hope that in 2009, in contrast to the 1930s, “activism” takes a different form and the 
world’s richest and most powerful sovereign states will be able to subsume short-
term domestic political interests to the general global welfare if only because 
protecting global welfare is actually more consistent with their own overall long-term 
interests. 
What do these two observations, a more activist sovereign state and a 
continuing interdependence among sovereigns, have to do with the idea of a global 
social contract? The following: to save the hyper-connected global economy from its 
excesses and to make it fair and politically sustainable, there is a need for some sort 
of “activist” polity at the global level analogous to the state at the domestic level.  An 
activist global polity is needed to construct and manage a contract at the global level 
analogous to the social contract at the domestic level that exists in one form or 
another in most mature democratic societies. On the one hand a global social 
contract sounds worryingly utopian.  On the other hand, it is simply about adapting to 
the reality of a global market-driven economy that implies a convergence of global 
political necessity with the longstanding development agenda.    
In the remainder of this essay, I will discuss further the logic of a “global” 
social contract for rich nations, given their increasing interdependence with 
developing countries; describe the logic of a “social” contract, given the shortcomings 
and risks of market-based globalization; and then set out briefly four actions rich 
countries should put on their development agenda to build a durable and enforceable 
global contract.  
 
A global social contrac...t 
Why global? Global interdependence 
The rich world’s own security and material prosperity depend increasingly on shared 
growth and on stable and competent governments responding to their people’s 
demands and needs “out there” in poor countries.  One straightforward reason why 
this is true is that the relative size of the rich world economies and populations is 
declining. Under reasonable assumptions about future growth rates, the combined 
economies of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) will soon be larger than 
those of the G-7; they are simply likely to grow faster in the next several decades 
than rich countries, as their much lower per-capita incomes continue to converge 
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slowly to those of the rich world.  The middle class in those and other emerging 
markets is likely to be twice the size of the entire population of the United States 
within the next 20 years.  Three of the world’s five largest companies by market 
capitalization are Chinese, and by some accounts four of the top ten richest people in 
the world are Indian nationals.  As this century unfolds, it is in these fast-growing 
economies that rich-world producers will find new markets and rich, new investment 
opportunities, and from them will emerge the ideas, people, and innovations that will 
improve consumers’ lives everywhere.   
At the same time, most developing countries, even geopolitically ascendant 
China and India, contend with widespread poverty and misery and the attendant 
social and political problems. In India, approximately 2 million children die before age 
five, and 21 million children of primary-school age do not attend school.  Their new 
middle classes are weak and often disengaged politically except when their own 
parochial interests can be served.  (Indeed, my own analysis of income distribution 
data for over 50 countries indicates that most developing countries have no more 
than 20 percent of their populations in what I would define as the middle class – living 
on at least $10 a day per person and below the income of the 95th percentile of the 
total population; what we think of as middle-class consumers in Egypt, India, 
Indonesia, and Peru are actually among the 5 percent of richest households in their 
countries, and thus not in the “middle” at all.)   
A small middle class cannot provide the ballast that undergirds responsible 
and effective government as in the rich-world economies, where the large middle 
class supports the rule of law, respect for property rights and human rights, and 
access for all to education and economic opportunities. Growth without development 
in Pakistan and in Bolivia, Nigeria and other natural resource–based economies, and 
setbacks following a decade or more of growth in Côte d’Ivoire, Zimbabwe, and even 
Venezuela have been far more about local political failures than economic ones.  
Even those low-income economies with responsible leadership such as Ghana, Mali, 
and Morocco face daunting problems of management and capacity constraints that 
deeply undermine their well-intentioned efforts to reduce poverty. 
Yet the global community, including all of you and me, relies on competent 
governments everywhere to play by certain rules in our global society.  Incompetent 
and corrupt governments are weak links in the chain that provides global security and 
enables global prosperity.  Deforestation and the resulting climate risks in the Congo 
and Indonesia; avian flu incubated in Vietnam; consumer safety breakdowns in food 
and toy manufacturing in China; terrorist groups in the Philippines and Pakistan; 
none of these risks cannot be contained within the borders of the poor countries 
where they begin.   
From both the perspective of new opportunities out there, and of new cross-
border risks, development matters.  It is in the interests of rich countries to bind 
themselves in some contractual form to engagement with poor countries.       
 
Why social? Three market shortcomings 
Market reform and outward-oriented economic policies are not to be disdained.  They 
are a good part of the explanation for the rapid growth and huge reductions in 
poverty of the last two decades and more in China, India, Bangladesh, and Vietnam, 
just as they were earlier in the East Asian Tigers.  In China, it was liberalization of 
agriculture that started the process; in China and in India since the late 1980s a more 
business-friendly environment and openness to foreign investment have contributed.  
In Latin America and Africa, good macroeconomic policies in the last two decades, 
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helped along recently by the global commodity boom, have brought growth rates as 
high as 6%, and in the democracies of Africa 7-8%, finally bringing reductions not 
only in the rate of poverty but in the absolute numbers of people living in poverty in 
many countries. 
But I am no globophile.  Markets as a mechanism for organizing societies 
have fundamental shortcomings, and the effects of these are easily intensified in the 
case of global markets. Let me mention three. 
First, markets leave people and countries without the right assets behind. 
First, markets reward productive assets.  They tend to lock in pre-existing income 
and wealth inequality or, generate along with growth, increasing inequality.  
For individual people, the right asset in today’s global economy is higher 
education (and the skills and flexibility that higher education signals and reinforces).  
Since the late 1980s, the salary premium to higher education has been rising virtually 
everywhere.  Although the supply of graduates of higher education has been 
increasing almost everywhere in the world, the demand for their skills has increased 
even faster, fuelled by rapid technological change (consider the influence alone of 
the World Wide Web) and the nearly instant diffusion of new technologies in globally 
connected markets.  The demand for highly skilled and talented people at the global 
level has set off intense competition among rich countries to institute immigration 
policies not just to permit but to encourage the entry of skilled workers thus 
contributing to the much higher emigration rates of skilled compared to unskilled 
people from developing countries. (New research suggests that the benefits of that 
emigration for sending countries probably exceed the costs; I mention it here as an 
indicator of the reality of a global market rewarding education, not necessarily as a 
problem in itself.) 
For countries, the key asset appears to be stable and sound government 
institutions committed to the rule of law, human rights, and property rights.  An 
example of the wrong “asset” for countries is a comparative advantage in production 
and export of primary commodities, whether agriculture or, especially for immature 
democracies with minimal accountability to citizens, oil or other non-renewable 
mineral resources.  Countries that entered the 1980’s highly dependent on 
commodity exports such as Angola, Bolivia, Ghana, Malawi, Nicaragua, or Nigeria, 
that have failed to diversify into manufacturing, lost out on more than two decades of 
growth, in contrast to China, Malaysia, and (more recently) Vietnam.   One plausible 
explanation is that entry into manufacturing (and now perhaps into IT services) 
encourages the accumulation of skills by increasing the returns to human capital, and 
the diffusion of innovations that fuel endogenous growth.    
We entered the 1990’s with pre-existing inequalities within countries in 
education and a dramatic gap between the competence and stability of rich-country 
governments and that of the poorest countries.  The differences in assets have 
helped ensure that income inequality has risen in the majority of developing countries 
enjoying at least some growth; and that between the initially richest and poorest 
countries the gap in average incomes has grown dramatically, essentially because 
the poorest countries have grown little if at all, while the richest have continued to 
move ahead.   
A second shortcoming of markets, particularly financial markets, is volatility.  In 
2008, we saw how the tightening of fuel and food markets led to price spikes that 
were particularly painful for importing countries that had relied on global trade of 
these products. In the absence of any global arrangement or rules to make those 
markets more resilient and less volatile, it is not surprising to hear renewed calls for 
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energy independence in the United States and food security in the Philippines and 
Indonesia, despite the efficiency losses and other costs that shifting from openness 
to real autarchy in these markets would imply.  But of the triple whammy in food, fuel, 
and finance that poor countries suffered this past year, it is the financial one that will 
be the most costly and the best remembered, particularly in the emerging-market 
economies that had opened their financial and capital markets.   
Financial crises hurt all countries, but developing countries have tended to 
suffer much greater relative losses in the past, losses of 10 percent of GDP and 
more, compared to 2 to 3 percent in rich countries following banking crises.  And 
within countries, the poor who lose jobs and income often sell assets or take their 
children out of school, implying permanently lower lifetime income.   In Mexico many 
children who left school during the 1994-95 tequila crisis, never returned. 
For the relatively poor the results are long-lasting in other ways as well.  An 
example: the high public debt that follows government rescues of banks and other 
financial institutions, crowds out private investment and job creation and reduces the 
fiscal space for spending on infrastructure, education, and health programs that 
benefit the poor the most and help build a middle class.  There is good evidence that 
the labor share of total income relative to capital, declines during crises and never 
fully recovers.  Thus, volatility is complicit in contributing to income inequality. 
A third shortcoming of markets is that they cannot and do not address “public” 
goods, i.e. products and services on which market actors cannot make a profit (or 
fully capture the benefits were they to invest or spend).  Basic education is publicly 
financed almost everywhere in the world because basic education is a quasi-public 
good.  Parents (and their children) can capture some of the benefits of going to 
school but not all the benefits that societies reap, when more people are schooled.  
By the same logic, most governments spend public resources to prevent contagious 
diseases.  The classic case of a public good is control of pollution: the factory owner 
who implements pollution controls pays the cost of control (in the absence of a 
subsidy) but captures only a small part of the benefits to his community.  At the 
global level, the classic counterpart case is the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions.  Countries that commit resources to reduce emissions cannot capture all 
the benefits for themselves.  Just as local pollution control requires that some 
government entity impose regulations or create offsetting incentives through taxes or 
subsidies, global-level control of greenhouse gas emissions is likely to require that an 
activist international community (including at the least the major polluter countries) 
impose controls or agree on incentives.   
Climate change is another example of a global problem that hits the poorest 
people and countries the hardest.  By an unfortunate twist of fate, tropical countries 
that contributed least to the accumulation of gases are likely to suffer the worst 
declines in agricultural productivity, in precisely the sector where the poor within 
countries are heavily concentrated.  In the absence of corrective action at the global 
level, projected declines in agriculture in India are on the order of 30 percent in the 
next 70 years, and as much or worse in parts of Africa.  Sea level rise in Bangladesh, 
drought and floods, and the expanding reach of malaria and other diseases in many 
tropical areas will also hit hardest the most vulnerable.  And even for the same risks, 
poorer people and poor countries have fewer resources with which to protect 
themselves and adjust to changes and will therefore suffer much higher welfare costs 
if not higher absolute costs from the effects of climate change. 
Other global public goods that the market naturally neglects (in these cases a 
pecuniary market failure) include agricultural research and development likely to 
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benefit people and places with low incomes and limited market power, and health 
research and development on malaria and other diseases that primarily afflict the 
poor.  These are areas where in the last several decades large philanthropies like the 
Gates Foundation have stepped in to compensate for chronic underfunding by rich-
country “donor” governments. 
In short, in the absence of government intervention, markets alone are not a 
sufficient organizing principle for socially and politically stable societies.  They tend to 
generate inequality, since alone they favor those who already have financial or 
human capital or other assets (such as political privileges or family connections).  
They fail to protect the poor and vulnerable during financial and other crises, and 
alone will not provide the pension, health and other social insurance needs that 
reduce insecurity among the middle class (and invite reasonable risk-taking and 
innovation); and they naturally fail to provide for key public goods (due to what 
economists refer to as missing markets or market failures).   
 
Building a global social contract: A development agenda 
The conventional development agenda begins (and too often ends) with an emphasis 
on the quantity of aid.  Let me suggest a four-part agenda for building and sustaining 
a robust global social contract, which includes but goes well beyond aid.   
First, as is the case within country borders, there should be a laser-like focus 
on avoiding harm to any members of the global community.  An apt example is the 
imperative, from a development point of view, that rich countries during this global 
economic crisis do not yield to the protectionist pressures that were so calamitous in 
the 1930s for the then “world” economy. I am optimistic they will not as there is a 
further understanding today of the dependence on global trading opportunities.    
Doing no harm also requires changing some current rich-country policies and 
programs.  The Common Agricultural Policy, which ends up hurting developing 
country agricultural producers, is an obvious example in Europe, as are cotton, 
sugar, and other forms of agricultural protection in the United States.  The subsidy 
and protection for corn-based bio-fuel in the United States is discouraging investment 
in bio-fuels in which developing countries have or could have a comparative 
advantage. The WTO-agreed intellectual property rights regime reflects a trade-off 
between access and innovation pushed by the United States and others in the 1990’s 
that is inappropriate for the world’s poorest countries where the premium has to be 
on access, particularly to new medicines.  And then there is the tough issue of 
migration.   
A colleague of mine at the Center for Global Development argues that 
emigration is development. Certainly for the unskilled, emigration from a poor country 
to a rich country is the single easiest and most effective escape from poverty.  
Nigerian, Haitian, and Honduran construction workers and taxi drivers with little 
education can instantly increase their incomes fivefold and more by simply moving 
from their home to a rich country.  Immigration is a difficult domestic political issue in 
all countries, rich and poor, and it would be naïve to expect all countries to liberalize 
this market as they have liberalized trade and capital markets.  But development 
advocates could be more assertive in calling for easing of current illiberal restrictions 
on the movement of people across borders, given the growing evidence of the 
benefits of such movements for both sending and receiving countries.  
The idea of do no harm extends as well to enforcing anti-corruption rules on 
investors abroad and actively supporting the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative, the Equator Principles, the Kimberly process, and other efforts to bind 
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private and public agents to good behavior in their dealings with developing 
countries.  Cooperating on programs to document and fight illegitimate and illegal tax 
and capital flight also falls into this category. 
Second, again as is the case within country borders, all governments should 
allocate more resources to global public goods by spending both at home and 
abroad. As happens within countries, there should be some redistribution through 
taxes and expenditures of the burden and benefits of such spending from rich to 
poor, in this case across countries, in the enlightened self-interest of the rich. A good 
example is investments in clean-energy technologies to minimize climate change, 
including spending within rich countries on energy research and development.  
Naturally there is concern that rich governments will divert resources from traditional 
aid programs to “global” programs; but, in fact, recent evidence suggests that the 
effects of climate change are already imposing high welfare costs on the world’s 
poor, so whatever trade-off there may be, is far less clear than heretofore assumed. 
Ideally, in the context of a climate change treaty, the much greater per-capita 
emissions of rich countries compared to poor will imply major compensatory financial 
transfers from the former to the latter to purchase emissions rights. Those transfers 
would not be aid, with its administrative and proto-paternalistic burdens on poor 
countries, but legally based transactions in which all parties honor contractual 
obligations. In any event, R&D on clean energy would ideally include a major focus 
on sun, wind, and bio-fuel technologies that would tap the comparative advantage of 
developing countries, many of which literally have more sun than rich countries, and 
would be compatible with the needs of low-income and rural populations. 
Other global public goods include public investment in new and improved 
medicines and health delivery technologies, and in agriculture (for example to create 
a Green Revolution in Africa and elsewhere) oriented to the needs of people in 
developing countries, and public contractual commitments to finance successful 
development and deployment of such technologies by the private sector.  
Whether called “aid” (or better not – Jean-Michel Severino who heads the 
Agence Francaise de Developpement with his co-author Olivier Ray suggests the 
term “global public finance” in a recent paper)39, rich countries should develop and 
agree on clear norms and agreed financing mechanisms (the European Union 
aviation tax is an apt example) for the allocation of resources to global public goods 
relevant for poor countries and poor peoples. 
Third, donor countries should focus on the quality and at the least maintain the 
current quantity of traditional aid. In domestic social contracts, some transfers 
(publicly financed education) are meant to support future growth by maximizing 
society’s investment in human capital and to level the playing field in ensuring access 
to health and education; some transfers (public subsidies and provisions for old age 
and health insurance) provide social insurance across the board for all income 
groups; some transfers (welfare payments to the indigent and unemployable) are 
primarily humanitarian in the interests of social solidarity.  It is not always easy or 
useful to draw clear lines around these three purposes. As with domestic transfers, 
so with foreign aid it is not always easy or useful to distinguish between aid for 
“growth” and aid in the interest of global solidarity.  The Millennium Development 
Goals obviously address both growth and solidarity objectives; budget support 
provides for both; infrastructure investments and agriculture are usually viewed as 
mostly about long-term growth.   
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The bottom line is that aid can be framed as the counterpart of domestic public 
spending on health, education, credit programs for small businesses and so on 
which, as with domestic spending, has multiple purposes.  It compensates for the 
shortcomings of markets discussed above, both in the political interest of retaining 
the benefits of an open, global economy for all and in response to the solidarity 
impulse in an increasingly interlinked world. The striking difference of course is in the 
amounts spent – on the global social contract by rich countries less than 1% percent 
of GDP, while on the domestic counterpart upwards of 20%. 
The shadow of a “contract” exists at the global level in the form of the 
commitment of the traditional donor countries to spend at least 0.7 percent of their 
own GDP on aid – but of course (as amply demonstrated at the UN Doha 
Conference November, 2008 on financing for development) it is in fact only the 
shadow of a contract. In the face of political resistance to increasing aid in the next 
year, donor agencies would be smart to focus on getting better results for resources 
they already commit, and in ways that would create accountability of recipient 
governments to their own citizens, rather than to donors.  At the Center for Global 
Development, we have suggested one practical innovation toward that end (we call it 
cash-on-delivery aid)40, and there are others worth trying and systematically 
evaluating. Donors could easily and instantly move on far greater transparency of 
their allocations and expenditures, and all could increase the proportion of their aid 
that goes through multilateral institutions as one way to minimize recipient 
governments’ transactions and administrative costs.   
Fourth, and perhaps most fundamental, is the tougher issue of creating an 
effective global polity to manage a global social contract.  The global economy has 
far outstripped the institutions and clubs of nations that make up the global polity. In 
effect the economics of globalization has run far ahead of the politics of globalization. 
At the international level we have only the faintest shadow of the equivalent of the 
activist state at the national level, to fetter or manage a global economy or to provide 
the protection against its ravages for vulnerable global citizens concentrated in 
developing countries. What we do have is a hodgepodge of official and quasi-official 
institutions in which various combinations of nations make up the membership (the 
UN and its 20-odd separate agencies, the IMF, the WTO, the multilateral banks, the 
Bank for International Settlements, the club-like groups of nations (G-7, G-20, G-77, 
G-24). But in contrast to the sovereign state, this international polity is relatively weak 
and ineffective.  In contrast to the democratic legitimacy of most states, this polity 
lacks legitimacy.  As a result, in contrast to the condition of the domestic social 
contract in the world’s mature Western economies, the global social contract for 
which this international polity is responsible is fragile indeed. 
Yet the interdependence among nations illustrated by today’s financial and 
economic crisis highlights the need for a more “activist” international polity; not with 
the power of sovereign states but certainly with more resources and responsibilities 
than it has today.  In the near term, an activist international polity is needed not only 
for the coordination of a timely global fiscal stimulus and agreement on regulation of 
global financial markets, but also to agree on some minimal levels of protection 
(without protectionist trade and other policies) against the downside for vulnerable 
global citizens everywhere.  Beyond today’s crisis, ensuring that the global market 
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works better for the poor and middle class, as well as the rich, in some imitation at 
the global level of the domestic social contract, seems critical to the political 
sustainability of market-based globalization.   
So I would put high on the development agenda the need to move beyond ad-
hoc bilateral arrangements between rich and poor countries in 2 ways.  First is the 
strengthening of the international institutions where the solidarity norms and the 
global equivalent of taxes, subsidies and regulations for the global polity need to be 
embedded.  In the case of the development agenda, these include most obviously 
the IMF, the multilateral banks, and the United Nations; but also the WTO, the Basel 
Committee and so on. Second, for the financial institutions, is the reform of their 
governance to make them more representative and therefore more credible and 
effective in developing countries; I as well as others have written extensively on this 
issue. It is not surprising that the global trade, intellectual property migration and 
other regimes reflect the greater market (and military) power of rich countries; and 
that on such difficult issues as immigration that the domestic political constraints 
within rich countries tend to trump the needs of world’s poor. That does not mean 
that for solidarity reasons, and to politically sustain a global market system with all its 
benefits, the development community should stand aside and accept the hand dealt.  
On the contrary, it means there is logic in constant vigilance or readiness as global 
citizens to swim against the tide of market and political power at the global level, just 
as we do as responsible citizens within each of our countries, in the interests of a 
better world for all.  
 
In conclusion:  Restating two points about the global social contract 
A global market-based economy has tremendous potential benefits for improving 
lives by generating and allocating resources well, but only if it is complemented by a 
robust global social contract through which rich and poor nations bind each other to 
commitments in the interest of the common global good.  In conclusion, I would like 
to restate two points about this global contract.  
First, it provides a way for the development community to think differently 
about aid and to think beyond aid. Aid as part of a social contract across nations and 
peoples can be thought of not only in its traditional form of investment in people, 
infrastructure, and better government, likely to raise economic growth over the 
medium term, but also in the form of solidarity or redistributive transfers to protect 
and improve the welfare of unlucky fellow global citizens today.  Furthermore, aid is 
only one mechanism by which rich and poor nations interact. Beyond aid are trade, 
migration, investment, climate change, and other policies of rich nations by which 
they directly or indirectly affect poor nations and which should be shaped to promote 
development and the common global interest.   
Second, management of a robust global social contract requires a strong and 
effective global “polity” to provide opportunities for the unlucky, protect the 
vulnerable, and bind us all to agreed rules and commitments through and by which 
those opportunities and protections are guaranteed. Development advocates in this 
21st-century setting of global hyper-connectivity ought to put considerable priority on 
strengthening the institutions that make up our current global polity.  A key aspect of 
their strengthening is to make them more representative and legitimate.  Without 
greater representation of developing countries; small and poor, large and 
geopolitically ascendant, we put at risk the political and social sustainability of the 
market-based global economy itself.  It is in the end through these institutions that 
the habits and norms, as well as the rules of a global social contract, are most likely 
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to be shaped in a way that will put global markets and globalization to work for the 
majority of people everywhere. 
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xiii. Ensuring a Better Deal for Women 
By Jayati Ghosh41 
 
 
Background 
The financial crisis has drawn attention away from some important features of the 
preceding boom: it was both unequal and ecologically unsustainable. The economic 
boom drew rapaciously and fecklessly on natural resources. It was also deeply 
unequal. Contrary to general perception, most people in the developing world did not 
gain from that boom; instead, the poor effectively subsidised the rich. This was true 
internationally, as central banks of developing countries parked their growing foreign 
exchange reserves in the US, so that the South provided net finance to the North 
instead of using such resources for its own development. It was also true within 
countries, as profits soared but wage shares of national income declined sharply and 
agrarian distress persisted.  
The speculative housing bubble in the US attracted savings from across the 
world, including from the poorest developing countries, so that for at least five years 
the South transferred financial resources to the North. Developing country 
governments opened up their markets to trade and finance, gave up on monetary 
policy and pursued fiscally “correct” policies that reduced public spending. So 
development projects remained incomplete and citizens were deprived of the most 
essential socio-economic rights.  
Furthermore, despite the evident economic dynamism in some parts of the 
developing world, there was no net transfer of jobs from North to South. In fact, 
industrial employment in the South barely increased in the past decade – even in the 
“factory of the world” China. Instead, technological change in manufacturing and the 
new services meant that fewer workers could generate more output. So old jobs in 
the South were lost or became precarious and the majority of new jobs were fragile, 
insecure and low-paying, even in China and India. The agrarian crisis in the 
developing world hurt peasant livelihood and generated global food problems. Rising 
inequality meant that the much-hyped growth in emerging markets did not benefit 
most people.   
So the recent growth was not inclusive. But unfortunately the slump will be 
only too inclusive, forcing those who did not gain earlier to pay for the sins of 
irresponsible and unregulated finance, through loss of livelihood and reduced living 
standards. This is particularly true in the case of women in the developing worlds, 
whose lives have already been materially altered by many rapid social and economic 
changes. This essay examines these issues with special reference to women in 
developing Asia.  
It is commonplace to say that changes in the lives of women mirror broader 
changes in society, but possibly that statement has been more true globally over the 
past two decades than at any time in the previous century. There have been major 
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and rapid changes in the living and working conditions of women across the world, 
which have both reflected and been expressed in equally substantial changes in 
global economics and politics.  
Global capitalism is known to be systemically unstable and recently deflation 
and chronic unemployment have emerged as important characteristics even in 
periods of apparently high aggregate growth. The persistence of fairly high rates of 
open or disguised unemployment even in areas or sectors of high growth is now 
recognised. Interestingly, even though there has been something of a global boom in 
commodity markets and in certain developing economies for the past decade, 
employment generation has not really picked up commensurately and agrarian crises 
continue to plague most developing countries. Meanwhile, economic territories 
continue to be contested in new imperialist patterns, which cover not only conflicts 
over stable resources such as oil and other primary commodities, some new areas, 
which were earlier not even considered part of the realm of material transactions. 
The newest and most rapidly growing markets are those in intellectual property, and 
certain services and utilities that were earlier assumed to be the monopoly of public 
provision, such as power, water and telecommunications. Debates over permitted 
carbon emissions also amount to struggles over resources. At the same time, 
technological changes have also furthered the process of global corporate 
dominance by enabling the vertical disintegration of production and the spatial 
integration of ownership and control.   
These broader changes in the international economy have affected national 
and international labour markets. The most significant change is the increase in open 
unemployment rates across the world. By the beginning of the century, 
unemployment rates in most industrial countries were higher than they had been at 
any time since the Great Depression of the 1930s. But even more significantly, and in 
a break from the past, open unemployment was very high in developing countries. It 
has continued to grow thereafter, even though the general absence of social security 
provision or unemployment benefits in the developing world usually means that 
people undertake some activity, however low paying, and usually in the form of self 
employment. It is notable that open unemployment has been growing in the 
developing countries that are currently seen as the most dynamic  in the world 
economy, such as China, East and Southeast Asian countries and India, and in many 
of these economies, it has combined with the persistently high rates of 
underemployment.  
The decline in formal sector employment, especially in developing countries, 
has been associated with the proliferation of workers crowded into the informal 
sector, especially in the low-wage low-productivity occupations that are characteristic 
of “refuge sectors” in labour markets. While there are some high-value-added jobs 
increasingly to be found as “informal” self-employment (including, for example, 
software and some high-end IT-enabled services that allow home-based professional 
work) these are relatively small in number and certainly too few to make much of a 
dent in the overall trend, especially in countries where the vast bulk of the labour 
force is unskilled or relatively less skilled. In turn, this has meant that the cycle of 
poverty-low employment generation-poverty has been perpetuated and even 
accentuated because of the diminished willingness or ability of developing country 
governments to intervene positively in expanding employment generation.  
The emergence of global production chains is also an important feature in 
recent years. These are not entirely new, and even the current chains can be dated 
from at least the 1980s. However, two major sets of changes have dramatically 
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increased the relocation possibilities in international production. Technological 
changes have allowed for different parts of the production process to be vertically 
split and locationally separated, as well as created different types of requirement for 
labour involving a few highly skilled professional workers and a vast bulk of semi-
skilled workers for whom burnout over time is more widely prevalent than learning by 
doing. They have also enabled geographical relocation in service activities which 
were previously locationally rigid. Organisational changes have been associated with 
concentration of ownership and control as well as with greater dispersion and more 
layers of outsourcing and subcontracting of particular activities and parts of the 
production process. Therefore, we now have the emergence of international 
suppliers of goods and services who rely less on direct production within a specific 
location and more on subcontracting a greater part of their production and distribution 
activities. This has led to the emergence and market domination of “manufacturers 
without factories”, as multinational firms such as Nike and Adidas effectively rely on a 
complex system of outsourced and subcontracted production based on centrally 
determined design and quality control. More recent outsourcing in services ranging 
from publishing to back-office work also combines some amount of flexibility (which 
implies greater control over workers) with centralised control.  
In addition, there is much greater use by international capital of the skilled 
labour to be found in some developing countries, with the internationalisation of 
service industries, including banking and finance. This has greatly enhanced labour 
mobility of a small section of more skilled and professional employees, even as other 
labour finds it much more difficult to move, and aggregate rates of labour migration 
are lower than they have been in the history of capitalism. This has contributed in no 
small measure to the enthusiasm for the process of global integration among such 
groups of skilled workers in developing countries. In fact, an important reason for the 
success of imperialist globalisation has been its ability to draw local elites and middle 
classes across the world into its own ranks, to offer part inclusion into a privileged 
international space within which the travails of the local working poor can be 
forgotten, even while their crucial role in generating productive surplus within the 
local economy is perpetuated. 
Finally, a crucial feature of work processes across the globe has been the 
increase  in unpaid labour within households – dominantly (but not exclusively) 
performed by women, as governments renege on basic social responsibilities for the 
provision of public goods and services, and more of the care economy is devolved 
onto the unpaid sector. The peculiar combination of increased unemployment and 
increased requirement of unpaid labour is thus an attribute of labour markets 
globally.  
 
The Asian region 
All these processes are particularly marked for developing countries in Asia. This is 
now the most “globally integrated” region in the world, with the highest average ratios 
of trade to GDP, the largest absolute inflows of foreign direct investment, substantial 
financial capital flows and even significant movements of labour. These have been 
associated with very rapid changes in forms of work and life, especially for women. 
Indeed, the effects on economies and societies in the region have been seismic in 
their speed and intensity, and particularly in gender relations. The rapid growth of 
aggregate incomes (and equally rapid and sudden declines in some economies) 
have been accompanied by major shifts in employment patterns and living standards, 
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as familiar trends are replaced by sharp social changes that are now accelerated and 
intensified.  
There have been very rapid shifts in the labour market in the space of less 
than one generation, as Asian women have been first drawn into paid employment, 
especially in export sectors, and then ejected from it. The phase of disproportionately 
high use of women in export-oriented manufacturing in several rapidly growing Asian 
economies in the 1980s and early part of the 1990s was followed by a period of 
subsequent ejection of older women and some younger counterparts, into more 
fragile and insecure forms of employment, or self-employment or even back to 
unpaid housework (Ghosh 2004, 2009). Women have moved – voluntarily or forcibly 
– in search of work within and across countries and regions, more than ever before. 
Their livelihoods in rural areas, dominantly in agriculture, have been affected by the 
agrarian crisis that is now widespread in most developing countries. Across societies 
in the region, massive increases in the availability of different consumer goods, due 
to trade liberalisation, have accompanied declines in access to basic public goods 
and services. At the same time, technological changes have made communication 
and the transmission of cultural forms more extensive and rapid than could have 
even been imagined in the past. All these have had very substantial and complex 
effects upon the position of women and their ability to control their own lives, and 
many of these are still inadequately understood.  
The most significant change for women throughout the developing Asian 
region since the early 1980s was their substantial increase in labour force 
participation, which was then followed by a decline in the early years of this century. 
This was similar to a worldwide pattern of increasing work participation by women. 
But the Asian experience was somewhat different, in that (unlike, say, Latin America) 
this was part of – and even led - the general employment boom created by export-led 
economic expansion. (Chhachhi and Pittin 1996, Seguino 2000) This trend towards 
feminisation of employment in Asian countries resulted from employers' needs for 
cheaper and more "flexible" sources of labour, which meant more casualisation of 
labour, shift to part-time work or piece-rate contracts, and insistence on greater 
freedom of hiring and firing. All these aspects of what is now described as "labour 
market flexibility" became necessary once external competitiveness became the 
significant goal of domestic policy makers and defined the contours within which 
domestic and foreign employers in these economies operated.  
Women workers were preferred by employers in export activities primarily 
because of the inferior conditions of work and pay that they were usually willing to 
accept (Lim 1994).  They had lower reservation wages than their male counterparts, 
were more willing to accept longer hours and unpleasant and often unhealthy or 
hazardous factory conditions, typically did not unionise or engage in other forms of 
collective bargaining to improve conditions, and did not ask for permanent contracts.  
They were thus easier to hire and fire at will, or according to external demand 
conditions.   Life cycle changes such as marriage and childbirth could be used as 
proximate causes to terminate their employment and engage a younger and fresher 
set of female workers.  Greater flexibility was thus afforded to employers,  to offer 
less secure contracts. Further, in certain of the newer “sunrise” industries of the late 
20th century such as computer hardware  and consumer electronics, the nature of 
the assembly line work - repetitive and detailed, with an emphasis on manual 
dexterity and fineness of elaboration - was felt to be especially suited to women. The 
high “burnout” associated with some of these activities meant that employers 
preferred to hire workers who could be periodically replaced, which was easier when 
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the employed group consisted of young, mostly unmarried, women who could move 
on to other phases of their life cycle. 
The feminisation of such activities had both positive and negative effects for 
the women concerned. On the one hand, it definitely meant greater recognition and 
remuneration of women’s work, and typically improved their relative status and 
bargaining power within households, as well as their own self-worth, thereby leading 
to some empowerment. On the other hand, since most women are rarely if ever 
actually “unemployed” in their lives, as they are almost continuously involved in 
various forms of productive or reproductive activities (even if they are not recognised 
as “working” or paid for such work) paid employment for them may lead to an 
onerous double burden of work unless other social policies and institutions emerge to 
deal with the work traditionally assigned to (unpaid) women.  
Given these circumstances, it has been fairly clear for some time now that the 
feminisation of work is not cause for unqualified celebration by those interested in 
improving women’s material status. It is now becoming evident that the feminisation 
of labour in export-oriented industries may have been even more dependent upon 
the relative inferiority of remuneration and working conditions, than was generally 
supposed. Especially because it turned out to be a rather short-lived phenomenon. 
Already by the mid 1990s – the height of the export boom - women’s share of 
manufacturing employment had peaked in most economies of the region, and in 
some countries it subsequently declined in absolute numbers (Ghosh 2008). Some of 
this reflected the fact that such export-oriented employment through relocative 
foreign investment simply moved to cheaper locations: from Malaysia to Indonesia 
and Vietnam; from Thailand to Cambodia and Myanmar and so on. But even in the 
newer locations, the recent problems of various export sectors such as the garments 
industry worldwide have meant that jobs (especially for women workers) were 
created and then lost within the space of a few years.  
As women became an established part of the paid workforce and even the 
dominant part in certain sectors (as indeed they did become in the textiles, 
readymade garments and consumer electronics sectors of East Asia) it became more 
difficult to exercise the traditional type of gender discrimination at work.  Besides an 
upward pressure on their wages, which caused gender wage gaps to come down to 
some extent, there were other pressures for legislation to improve their overall 
conditions of work. But these strategies designed to improve the conditions of women 
workers tended to reduce their relative attractiveness for those employers who had 
earlier relied precisely on the inferior conditions of women’s work and their greater 
flexibility in terms of hiring and firing to keep their costs low and enhance their export 
profitability. The rise in wages also had the same effect. As their relative effective 
remuneration improved (in terms of the total package of wages and work and 
contract conditions), their attractiveness to employers decreased. 
Subsequently, manufacturing in Asia tended to occupy a much less significant 
position in the total employment of women, and also relied less on female 
employment at the margin. It is increasingly evident that export-oriented production 
does not always result in feminisation of the workforce, which is essentially 
dependent upon the relative inferiority of female wages and work conditions. If 
mechanisation and newer techniques require the use of more skilled labour, or if the 
gap between male and female wages in not sufficiently large, export activities do not 
need  to rely more on women’s labour. In conditions in which both male and female 
workers have been forced by adverse conditions in the labour market to accept 
adverse low-paid and insecure work contracts, as occurred not only in post-crisis 
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East Asia but in other countries of the region, there has been less overt preference 
for young women workers than was previously observed.  
The nature of such work has also changed in recent years.  It was already 
based mostly on short-term contracts rather than permanent employment for women; 
now there is much greater reliance on them as workers in very small units or home-
based production, at the bottom of a complex subcontracting chain. This became 
even more marked in the post-crisis adjustment phase. In South-east Asia, women 
have made up a significant proportion of the informal manufacturing industry 
workforce, in garment workshops, shoe factories and craft industries. Many women 
also carry out informal, temporary activities in farming or in the building industry. 
Home-based workers, working for themselves or on subcontracts, make products 
ranging from clothing and footwear to artificial flowers, carpets, electronics and tele-
services.  
The increasing use of outsourcing is not confined to export firms.  However, 
because of the flexibility offered by subcontracting, it is clearly of even greater 
advantage in the intensely competitive export sectors and therefore tends to be even 
more widely used there. Much of this cross-border outsourcing activity is based in 
Asia, although Latin America is emerging as an important location once again. Such 
subcontracted producers vary in size and manufacturing capacity, from medium-
sized factories to pure middlemen collecting the output of home-based workers. The 
crucial role of women workers in such international production activity based in Asia 
is now increasingly recognised, whether as wage labour in small factories and 
workshops run by subcontracting firms, or as home workers dealing with middlemen 
in a complex production chain.  
A substantial proportion of such subcontracting extends down to home-based 
work, which  provides substantial opportunity for self-exploitation, especially when 
payment is on a piece-rate basis; also such work is typically left unprotected by 
labour laws and social welfare programmes. However, even such home-based work 
may be in crisis, as the textile and garment exports from developing countries face 
increasing difficulties in world markets and the pressure of competition forces 
exporters to seek further  methods of cost-cutting. The extreme volatility of demand 
for labour that characterises factory-based export-oriented production has also 
become a feature of home-based work for export production. 
But paid work defines only part of the labour conditions of women. Recent 
economic policies and processes have generated more unpaid work as well.  
Macroeconomic policies of national governments that have systematically reduced 
employment opportunities for both men and women and allowed agriculture in the 
South to become a precarious and unviable occupation, have also reduced the 
quality of and access to public goods and services and thrown open many parts of 
everyday life to in equalising market processes. In general these economic policies 
have generally been in the interests of large corporate capital. The rich, and 
especially large corporations, have benefited from competitive offers of substantial 
and growing tax benefits, while the common people have been told that there is no 
money in the state treasury for basic public goods and services. Food security has 
been threatened in poor countries; other economic rights have been denied; social 
sectors such as health and education have been underfunded; and workers’ 
protection has been reduced. The increasing emphasis on markets has implied the 
commoditisation of many aspects of life that were earlier seen as either naturally 
provided by states and communities, or simply not subject to market transaction and 
property relations. For example, the inability or refusal of several governments to 
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provide safe drinking water has led to the explosive growth of a bottled water 
industry. A whole range of previously publicly provided services and utilities like 
power distribution and telecommunications have been privatised. Even the growing 
recognition accorded to intellectual property rights marks the entry of markets into 
ever-newer spheres. 
All this affects women and girls most directly. When incomes from work in the 
family go down, women are forced to seek any form of employment that will keep the 
household going. When there is less access to food, women and girl children tend to 
eat less. When the health services are inadequate, women (especially mothers) not 
only suffer the most, but they also have to bear the responsibility of looking after the 
sick and the old. When schools lack basic facilities or charge higher fees, girl 
students find it difficult to attend and get relegated to household tasks. When cooking 
fuel and clean drinking water are hard to come by, women have to somehow provide 
them for the family. So such government policies have led to large increases in the 
unpaid labour of women, and thereby contributed to a worsening quality of life for 
them.  
In addition, these economic changes have other adverse social consequences 
for women. The increasing emphasis on markets and profitability requires luring more 
consumers into the web of purchase through advertising and attempts to manipulate 
peoples’ tastes and choices. In this effort, advertising companies have notoriously 
used women as objects to purvey their products. The dual relationship with women, 
as objects to be used in selling goods, and as a huge potential market for goods, 
creates a peculiar process whereby women are encouraged and persuaded to 
participate actively in their own objectification. The huge media attention given to 
beauty contests, “successful” models, and the like, have all fed into the rapidly 
expanding beauty industry in developing Asia, which includes not only cosmetics and 
beauty aids, but slimming agents, beauty parlours, weight loss clinics, and so on. 
Many of these contribute to the most undesirable and retrograde attitudes to both 
women and their appearance, which can push women into newer forms of social 
oppression that may be no less demeaning than earlier explicitly patriarchal forms.  
One important response by Asian women to these changes has been 
economic migration. Asia has become one of the most significant regions in the world 
both for the cross-border movement of capital and goods, and for the movement of 
people. The picture of women’s migration in Asia today is complex, reflecting the 
apparent advantages to women of higher incomes and recognition of work, but also 
the dangers and difficulties of migrating to new and unknown situations with the 
potential for various kinds of exploitation. The desperation that drives most of this 
economic migration, and the exploitative conditions that it can result in, should not be 
underestimated. But it is also true that the sheer knowledge of conditions and 
possibilities elsewhere can have an important liberating effect upon women, which 
creates a momentum for positive social change and gender empowerment over time. 
 
Looking ahead 
It is clear that globally we need a clear change in economic strategy. Obviously, 
finance must now be controlled and directed. But it is equally important to increase 
public expenditure: to revive demand in flagging economies, to manage the effects of 
climate change and bring in widespread use of green technologies, and importantly, 
to provide minimally acceptable standards of living for citizens of the developing 
world. We must promote redistributive taxation and other policies to reduce economic 
inequalities, both within and between countries.  
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Of course, crises tend to make things worse, not better. As economies slow down, 
more jobs will be lost and people, especially those in the developing world who did 
not really gain from the boom, will face deteriorating conditions of living. But the 
gloom and doom is not inevitable. Now that there is overwhelming evidence of the 
failure of the economic model on which the boom was based, we can think afresh 
about how to organise economic life, both nationally and globally.  
Such new thinking has got to take into account the changed international 
context, in which the overwhelming dominance of the US is likely to be replaced by 
inter-imperialist rivalry and scramble for resources and markets, in which it will be 
harder for any individual country (or even the G-8) to impose conditions on others. 
Several points must be noted if we want real democratic change and not just more of 
the same. 
First, obviously finance must be controlled and the “innovations” in financial 
markets that are actually no more than sleight-of-hand scams must be disallowed. 
Otherwise we will remain vulnerable to more financial crises and continue to face 
speculative swings in prices of important commodities like food and oil. And poor 
countries will continue to send to rich ones, the capital they desperately need for their 
own development.  
Second, fiscal policy and public expenditure must be brought back to centre 
stage. Across the world, we need significantly increased public expenditure: to revive 
demand in flagging economies, to manage the effects of climate change and bring in 
widespread use of green technologies, to fulfil the promise of achieving minimally 
acceptable standards of living for everyone in the developing world.  
Third, restructuring the world order will have to be based on conscious 
attempts to reduce income and wealth inequalities, both between countries and 
within countries. We have clearly crossed the limits of what is “acceptable” inequality. 
The effects are upon us every day: in growing socio-political conflicts; in the spread 
of enthusiasm for terrorism and violence among the dispossessed and the frustrated; 
in the growing insecurity of daily life anywhere.  
Reducing inequalities is not going to be easy. It will require the North to reduce its 
consumption of scarce resources and carbon emissions, which means some 
reduction of average consumption generally. It will require the global elite, spread 
across both developed and developing worlds, to curb extravagant lifestyles. It will 
require wage shares of national income to rise from their current very low 
proportions, with corresponding declines in the shares of profits and interest. And it 
will require governments in powerful developed countries to recognise that they can 
no longer call the shots in all important international decisions. 
Finally, in order to ensure a better deal for women in the future, it is necessary to 
address four critical areas: 
• Ensuring more availability, and better terms and conditions for paid 
employment of women. 
• Reducing the pressures for and alleviating the conditions of unpaid work. 
• Increasing the access to basic needs and to essential health, nutrition, 
sanitation and education. 
• Managing the implications of ecological damage for social reproduction for 
women’s lives, and laying the foundation for more sustainable growth 
strategies. 
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xiv. Transnational Migration in the Era of 
Globalization: Issues, Prospects and Concerns 
By Praven Jha 42 
 
 
Introduction 
This article documents and analyses the movement of labour, in particular during the 
recent years of the so-called globalization period, across countries in search of 
employment. It brings into sharp contrast the fundamental asymmetry between the 
treatment of labour mobility and capital flows, and the theoretical assumptions of 
mainstream orthodoxy. It argues that while the rhetoric of globalization has been 
premised on greater integration in terms of trade and factor flows, labour mobility is 
highly regulated through restrictive instruments. 
Increasing inequality, reduced transportation costs and demographic 
imbalances in recent years have created pressure on migration, both on the demand 
and supply sides. However, the challenge of overcoming developmental obstacles 
and enhancing individual functioning through the instrumentality of migration requires 
that the issues of labour mobility be given favourable status vis-à-vis that of capital 
and finance. 
This paper begins by exploring some contentious issues regarding glob-
alization, and then provides an outline of labour mobility in a historical context. This is 
followed by a discussion of determinants and factors that influence the magnitude of 
migration at the national level and the benefits associated with it, and concludes by 
summarizing the main points emerging from the entire discussion. 
 
Globalization: Some Contentious Issues 
As is commonly acknowledged, globalization is a complex phenomenon and its most 
prominent dimension in the current phase has been the increasing integration of the 
global economy through trade, investment and finance flows. Theoretically, as well 
as practically, this integration involves a considerable erosion of a nation's capacity 
and willingness to intervene in the economic sphere in several important respects. 
The underlying premise of such a process is that increased competitive pressure to-
gether with ’market-friendly’ regulation is enough to generate socially optimal 
outcomes. Leaving aside the logic of this argument and without getting into any 
larger debates about the huge paradigm shift in macroeconomic policy regimes 
globally, we need to take note of the obvious arguments here in which the 
proponents of globalization have been quite selective in their championing of the 
‘virtues of liberalization and globalization’, revealing the implicit bias of their analysis. 
This feature comes out starkly, for instance, when we contrast the characteristic 
responses of protagonists of globalization towards the flows of finance and labour. 
While economists such as Dornbusch declared in no uncertain terms that: 
“The correct answer to the question of capital mobility is that it ought to be 
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unrestricted” (Quoted in [13]); the typical discussion in developed countries regarding 
immigration is the following: “Sure, our borders are long and porous, but that doesn’t 
excuse the United States from stating its objectives for immigration. What types of 
immigrants should this country admit? And how many immigrants does it want?” 
Borjas, [5]) 
The tenor of the analysis in the above-quoted article is strongly unsympathetic 
to the cross-border movement of workers. In general, the presumed economic 
ground to oppose migration is that it would have substantial adverse distributional 
consequences in receiving countries. 
In other words, the argument of detractors is that migration from developing 
countries would bring down wages and create unemployment in these countries. This 
argument has been advanced despite the fact that several statistical studies failed to 
find any negative correlation between migrant population and wage levels. 
Berkeley economist David Card, in a series of papers [6,7], systematically 
examined data that flies in the face of critics’ claims that migration has an adverse 
implication on the labour market opportunities of native workers. Card [6], studied the 
impact of migration on the lower end of labourers in Miami, when in the context of an 
influx of migrants the labour force swelled by as much as 7%. Data showed that it did 
not result in a reduction in the wage rate of native labourers, nor their employment 
opportunities. Again, using the US census data of 2000, Card [7] finds that the 
relative wage of native dropouts (i.e. the wages of unskilled labour) was uncorrelated 
with the supply of less-educated workers. Since the argument that large migration 
must reduce wages is based on a partial equilibrium approach, which arguably 
operates through changes in supply of the labour force, this finding renders the entire 
argument empirically untenable. Card [7], after careful examination of data, 
concludes: "Although immigration has a strong effect on relative supplies of different 
skill groups, local labour market outcomes of low skilled natives are not much 
affected by these relative supply shocks." 
A number of alternative hypotheses have been advanced to explain this 
phenomenon. However, in our view, it is the neglect of migrants’ impact on the total 
demand of goods and services that holds the key for understanding this apparently 
paradoxical result. Migrants are not only the source of labour in the countries of their 
destination, but also raise the level of aggregate demand through their consumption 
expenditure, implying negligible adverse consequences for domestic labour in terms 
of employment opportunities and wage rates. 
We may also emphasise that critics’ concern about unemployment and 
sources thereof are completely misplaced. Indeed, the era of globalization witnessed 
an increase in the global open unemployment market, which in 2003 was estimated 
to be about 188 million. However, the main reason behind job loss during this era is 
not labour mobility, as alleged by the critics; rather it is the deceleration, and in 
extreme cases, even collapse of real economies following the ascendance of neo-
liberal macroeconomic policy regime globally for almost three decades now, and the 
rise of finance capital as, arguably, the most significant entity in the contemporary 
global economy. In other words, holding migration responsible for unemployment in 
developed countries is hardly a tenable argument; it is not the case that on the 
aggregate employment front, developing countries have gained at the expense of the 
developed countries through migration or even a whole range of relatively recent 
labour practices such as ‘off-shoring’ or ‘body-shopping’ etc.; rather the transition to 
what several researchers describe aptly as a neo-liberal economic regime which has 
hurt the prospects of employment generation everywhere.  In fact, the ILO, through 
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its several publications during the last couple of decades, has expressed serious 
concerns over the unemployment growth in the global economy. According to the ILO 
Global Employment Trends Report (GET), the global unemployment rate would rise 
to 6.1% in 2009, up from 5.7% in 2007, resulting in an increase in unemployment of 
18 million workers in 2009. In the worst case scenario, however, the global 
unemployment rate may go over 7.1%, resulting in an increase in the global number 
of unemployed of more than 50 million. 
Sure enough, countries that become particularly acute victims of finance 
capital are prone to major shocks in the real economy as well as on the employment 
front, as was powerfully evident during the 1990s, for instance in the change of the 
unemployment rate in Latin American and East Asian countries in pre and post crisis 
years. In the immediate years following the financial crisis unemployment rates grew 
from 6% to 7.3% in Brazil, from 5.3% to over 10% in Chile, from 14% to 17% in 
Columbia, and from 2% to 3.7% in South Korea, (ILO [1]). If further evidence is 
needed, the activities in the global economy during the last 18 months, in particular in 
the USA, Japan, and several OECD countries should leave no doubt; the mayhem 
created by finance capital is there for all to see. As per the ILO Global Employment 
Trends Report (GET), unemployment rates sharply increased by 7% in developed 
economies and reached 6.4% in the European Union, in 2008. The unemployment 
rate in Latin America and the Caribbean witnessed an increase of 1%, in East Asia 
3%, in South East Asia and the Pacific 2%, and in Central and South Eastern Europe 
3%, reaching respectively the levels of 7.3%, 3.8%, 5.7%, and 8.8%. Relatively 
insulated regions such as Northern Africa, the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa 
have managed to sustain their pre-crisis employment levels so far; however the 
impact of the global downturn unleashed by the financial turmoil will sooner or later 
impact employment prospects in those regions too. Given these facts, even several 
ardent advocates of 'market fundamentalism ' are running for cover, as these 
countries are entering a period of one of the worst recessions since the Great 
Depression. 
Therefore it is the dominance of the neo-liberal ideology promoted 
aggressively by finance capital that has encouraged the pursuit of deflationary 
macroeconomic policies, thus indirectly lowering employment growth. Neither labour 
mobility has increased nor have changes in labour practices as noted above taken 
place. 
Patnaik [11], in his DD Kosambi lecture, points out at least three different 
mechanisms through which globalization, particularly financial globalization, creates 
conditions for a secular tendency towards income deflation and employment 
stagnation, and it may be worthwhile to recall his arguments here. To begin with, 
globalization, as mentioned earlier, is first and foremost a process of financial 
integration, resulting in massive cross-border financial flows. Given the potential of 
such flows to give rise to economic instability in a particular country, the issue of 
maintaining ‘investor’s confidence’ becomes a matter of paramount importance 
concerning macroeconomics. One particular recipe for maintaining such confidence 
is the reduction in the scale of government expenditure. As Patnaik suggests, 
apparent arguments for such reduction are based on fallacious reasoning of ‘sound 
finance’, which was rejected comprehensively quite sometime ago by Prof. Joan 
Robinson as ‘the humbug of finance’.  This aversion to financial capital for govern-
ment expenditure, mainly stemming from a steadfast ideological opposition to an 
interventionist state, is made concrete mostly by ‘Fiscal Responsibility’ legislations. 
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The legal limit on the relative capacity of the State to intervene in an economic 
sphere is further complemented by the process of competitive tax reduction by 
developing countries for attracting the flow of capital, reducing import duties because 
of trade liberalization, and reducing domestic indirect taxes. Failure to do so would 
amount to negative protection. The net result of all these changes is a reduction in 
one of most important sources of demand: Government expenditure, thus resulting in 
income deflation and employment reduction. 
Secondly, globalization contains an implicit tendency towards the destruction 
of domestic producers, particularly in developing countries. Inflows of short-term 
financial flows exert upward pressure on the exchange rate, which, in the absence of 
intervention, results in currency appreciation, lowering the export demands. Even 
when such pressures are absent, in-flow of imports and diversion of demand from 
high labour-intensive traditional goods towards imports or low employment intensive 
luxury goods have the effect of reducing employment in developing countries. 
Thirdly, the source of income deflation, highlighted by Patnaik as directly 
emerging from the process of globalization, is the declining term-of-trade of petty 
producers, in particular peasants. With the monopolistic power to set prices, an 
autonomous shift in terms-of-trade is brought about through the resulting higher 
prices for manufactured goods. This shift in terms-of -trade is conceptually equivalent 
of a tax imposed on peasantry, with similar aggregate-demand-reducing 
macroeconomic consequences. Furthermore, even as the terms-of-trade are 
occasionally moving in favour of such products, the presence of large transnational 
corporations in the marketing of primary commodities ensures that the terms-of-trade 
obtained by actual producers nevertheless is largely unaffected by favourable 
developments. 
The explanation of declining employment flexibility of growth in the neo-liberal 
economic order, manifested in the form of globalization, therefore lies in these 
reasons; not the ones adduced by opponents of migration. In conclusion, it is 
financial globalization, not increasing migration, which is responsible for current 
unemployment. 
 
A Historical Profile of World Migration 
Migration, in the modern sense of mobility of labour from the labour-abundant 
economies to labour-shortage economies goes back to the 15th Century (Nayyar 
[10]). Migration, in this period mainly consisted of slave labourers captured from the 
Western coasts of the African continent to the newly-discovered American continent 
to work on plantation farms and in households. The Atlantic slave trade was the trade 
of African people supplied to the colonies of the New World. Starting from the 16th 
century, it went unhindered until around about the 19th Century. West Africa and 
Central Africa were the source of this trade and destinations included new European 
colonies established in South and North America and the Caribbean islands. The 
continuous supply of slaves was ensured through coastal trading with Africans, and 
also by direct capture by European slave traders through raids and kidnappings. The 
current estimate of forceful migration of Africans in this period ranges between 10 
and 12 million, excluding the considerable number of slaves who died during the 
course of migration under inhumane conditions. 
Following the end of slavery in the British Empire in 1838, plantation owners 
turned to indentured labour to provide services on plantation farms. An indentured 
servant is a type of debt bondage worker. The labourer was contracted by of an 
employer for a set period of time, and received necessities, including food, drink, 
118 
clothing, lodging and transportation. These servants emigrated from a number of 
places, including China, Portugal and India. As a result, the ethnic composition of the 
Caribbean islands has changed considerably: Indo-Caribbeans form a majority in 
Guyana, and are present in considerable numbers in Trinidad and Tobago, 
Suriname, Jamaica, Grenada, Barbados, and other Caribbean islands. Nayyar [10] 
documents the case of indentured labour in the United States of America, where the 
source of migration happened to be Japan. The second phase of global migration, a 
very significant phenomenon during the second half of the19th Century and even 
later, was therefore in the form of indentured labourers from India and China to the 
Caribbean nations, Southeast Asia and Southern Africa to work in mines and 
plantations, mainly after the abolition of slavery in the USA and Britain. Movement 
was quite substantial. Roughly 50 to 70 million people migrated, which was around 
10% of the combined population of India and China (ibid.). 
Along with the forced movements of people, there was a voluntary flow of 
migration from Europe to America, New Zealand, Canada, Australia and South 
American countries (ibid.), which emerged as attractive destinations for settlement 
due to several factors. Starting from 1870 and before the outbreak of First World 
War, roughly 50 to 70 million people, as per different estimates, left Europe. Nayyar 
[10] argues that, going by a conservative estimate, this amounted to one-eighth of 
their population; in some countries such as Britain, Italy, Spain and Portugal, it was 
as high as 40% of the total population. This process of migration was driven, on the 
one hand by the of the abundance of natural resources, in particular land in newly-
settled territories, and on the other hand by increasing the displacement of labour 
due to the rapid decline of agricultural employment, without a compensating increase 
in manufacturing employment.  Political ties between labour-exporting and importing 
countries together with close cultural links meant that this phase of migration was 
relatively smooth: political friction now characterizing migration issues were, by and 
large, absent. 
World War I was followed by the enactment of immigration laws and erection 
of institutional barriers in the mobility of labour. Documentary requirements such as 
passports became mandatory. 
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Table 1: Migrant Population Profile (world) 
 
 
Indicators 1960 1970 1990 2000 2005 
Estimated number of international 
migrants at mid-year (Total) (In Million) 75 81 154 176 190 
Estimated number of refugees at 
mid-year 
(In Million) 
2 3.8 18 15 13 
Estimated number of female migrants at
mid-year (In Million) 35 38 75 87 94 
Estimated number of male migrants at 
mid-year (In Million) 40 42 78 88 96 
Population at mid-year (In Million) 3023 3096 5279 6085 6464
International migrants as a percentage 
of 
the population 
2.5 2.2 2.9 2.9 3.0 
Female migrants as percentage of all 
international migrants 46.2 47.2 49.0 49.7 49.6
Refugees as a percentage of 
international 
migrants 
2.9 4.8 11.9 8.9 7.1 
 
Source: United Nations [2]  
Note: The number of international migrants generally represents the number of persons born in a 
country other than that in which they live. 
 
 
Table 2: Growth Rate of Migrant Population (World) 
 
 
Period Growth rate of migrant 
population 
1970-1975 0.7 
1975-1980 1.3 
1980-1985 2.7 
1985-1990 6.7 
1990-1995 1.3 
1995-2000 1.4 
2000-2005 1.5 
 
Source: United Nations [2] 
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Unemployment during the Great Depression also reduced the political feasibility of 
labour imports, resulting in a low level of labour migration. Thus global migration, for 
a while, declined. 
The period after World War II witnessed a revival of labour migration. This 
phase peaked in 1985 (see Table 1). After that there was a distinct moderation in the 
migration rate, as it came down from 2.7% in 1980-85 to below 1.5% in the 
subsequent years (see Table 2).43 
Starting from 1970, there was incremental tightening of immigration laws, 
resulting in low over-all rate of growth in migration. However, the period of 
globalization saw, on a large scale, the emigration of people with technical skills from 
developing countries to developed countries. New destinations such as oil-exporting 
OPEC members also emerged as a destination for low-skilled labourers. Temporary 
migration of low-skilled workers also took place in the form of guest workers in 
Western Europe and the import of seasonal Mexican labour by US. 
Nevertheless, the proportion of migrants to total population worldwide has remained 
roughly constant, at between 2.9% and 3% (see Table 1), precisely in the period 
when trade and investment flows took off in the years of globalization. This intriguing 
stagnation is best explained by the fact that unlike trade and finance, where 
openness was peddled by international organizations, labour migration has, by and 
large, been conspicuous by its absence in international negotiations.  
 
Table 3: Estimated Migrant Population: Area-wise (2005) 
 
Area Migrant Population
(Million) 
Migrant Population 
(% of Total Population) 
Africa 17 1.9 
Asia 53 1.4 
Europe 64 8.8 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 
6.6 1.2 
Northern America 44 13.5 
Oceania 5 15.2 
Total 190 3 
 
Source: United Nations [2] 
 
Apart from the magnitude of migration, the regional distribution pattern conforms to 
the broad developmental stage of the recipient countries. In Africa, migrant stock as 
a proportion of the population is higher than in Latin America and Asia, mainly due to 
the presence of displaced people and refugees. Northern America, particularly the 
United States, has emerged as a key destination for, more often than not, technically 
qualified professional migrants (see Table 3). 
A common classification is to group international migrants into permanent 
migrants, (also known as emigrants) and temporary migrants (Nayyar [10]). 
Temporary migrants are further divided into those having professional qualifications 
and unskilled or semi-skilled. Apart from these usual categories, illegal migrants and 
                                                 
43 Period of 1985-90 is non-comparable, as creation of new nation-states out of erstwhile 
Soviet Union inflated migrant stock figures. 
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refugees also account for a significant share of the migrant population. Statistical 
information on a global level about these categories remains sparse (ibid.). 
 
Factors Determining Magnitude and Pattern of Migration 
Existing literature on migration identifies the determinants of the magnitude and 
patterns of migration under three broad categories: push-factors, pull-factors and 
obstacles to migration. Push and pull factors are those factors which respectively 
push people into migration or attract them. 
Push and pull factors together account for the migrant’s often difficult decision 
to leave their native land.  Although not exactly quantifiable, such decisions entail 
substantial emotional costs. It follows therefore, that for migrants to make such a 
decision, the perceived opportunities must be very high. Such opportunities include 
perceived differences in wage levels, probability of employment and difference in life 
style. Globalization, by increasing the inequality across the nation-states has thus 
created pressures on migration. 
The declining absorption of labour in the agriculture sector, and the lack of a 
corresponding increase in industrial employment constitute an important push factor, 
especially for semi-skilled workers in developing countries. 
On the demand side, demographic imbalances have been playing the role of a 
catalyst: the median age of the population has been steadily increasing in developed 
countries. With a larger share of older people in their population, industrialized 
countries require labour from the developing world to sustain their lifestyle and 
productive activities. 
Improvements in information and communication technologies, the advent of 
cheap mass transportation facilities and the consequential decline in the transaction 
cost of global migration in recent years, has led to the significant demand for the 
creation of migration. Given this demand, intermediary institutions supporting and 
facilitating global migration have also cropped up, thus making the process of 
migration slightly easy for migrants. 
These factors imply that in the era of globalization, with an increasing 
integration in terms of trade and finance flows, there should be a strong tendency 
towards labour mobility. However, as previously mentioned, migration has 
proportionately remained constant at the level of around 3%. This paradoxical 
situation could be explained in terms of asymmetric ‘rules of the game’: that is, 
institutional arrangements underlying global migration. 
 
Existing Institutional Framework for Labour Mobility 
In sharp contrast to trade in goods, there is no multilateral forum, institution or 
framework for coordinating the migration-related policies, leaving the entire question 
to national jurisdiction. Mode-4 in GATS is one possible exception that deals with the 
cross border supply of services. However, such services deal with temporary and 
professional migrants, which constitute a tiny fraction of the cross-border movement 
of people and where developing countries do not mostly have a comparative 
advantage. 
In the absence of such a framework, migration is dealt with by domestic laws 
and consular practices. Such laws explicitly stipulate various restrictions on the 
movement of labour, including numerical quotas. Additionally, the actual process of 
migration is directly affected by the consular practices, which serve as an extra 
barrier for migration. In contrast to “National Treatment” given to foreign investment, 
guest workers have to wait for a general amnesty and face “E-verify” programs. 
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These direct and indirect methods of restricting labour flows are responsible for an 
almost stagnant migration, even when integration in other ways is increasing. 
Thus as Nayyar [9] noted: "This asymmetry, particularly between the free 
movement of capital and the restricted movement of labour across countries, lies at 
the heart of inequality in the rules of the game for globalization in the twentieth 
century." Apart from its direct relevance on the fairness of the rules of globalization, 
absence of a regulatory mechanism on a global level is also responsible for 
increasing incidents of illegal trafficking of labour, particularly of children and women, 
by criminal syndicates. Such immigrants often end up as being acute victims of 
economic, racial and social exploitation. Obviously there are no institutions and 
mechanisms to address the injustices they are subjected to, as they are devoid of 
even basic recognition. 
We may also note here that every once in a while, terrible tragedies relating to 
illegal migration are reported by the media, and obviously not all the incidents come 
to light. In March 2008, 15 illegal immigrants aboard a rickety boat were rescued by 
U.S. authorities off the San Diego coast after an apparent botched maritime 
smuggling attempt. 15 dehydrated and sunburnt passengers were taken off the 24-
foot boat, named Seaulater, by authorities nearly a day and a half after leaving 
Rosarito Beach bound for Southern California. They were allegedly charged $4,000 
each for the passage. 
Other migrants also face similar life-threatening and dangerous circumstances 
in order to work in predominantly an informal sector, often on low wages. 
Interestingly, not only is there an outflow of labour from developing to developed 
countries, but also of finances; for instance the USA has seen an inflow estimated to 
be more than $100 billion per year. This asymmetric flow sustains the differences in 
living conditions, which further act as a catalyst for labour migration. 
 
Potential and Current Benefits of Migration 
Migration is a potential source of growth, employment creation, poverty alleviation, 
macroeconomic stability and welfare improvement, not only for developing countries, 
but for the world economy as a whole. 
Given the demographic imbalances, where developed countries are 
increasingly facing structural constraints due to the ageing of the population, 
developing countries have a younger population; migration can result in distinct 
welfare gains, both for the nation as well as the world economy. 
Problems associated with an ageing population such as high dependency ratio 
and declining labour force could be mitigated to a great extent by the transfer of a 
workforce. This conclusion is further buttressed by the presence of high open and 
disguised unemployment in developing countries, implying a low opportunity cost of 
labour transfers. 
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Table 4: Remittances Compared with Some Selected Sources of External Finance 
 (in billions $) 
 
Source of finance 2000 2005 
Remittances (Total) 131 262 
Developing Countries 84 191 
Industrial Countries 47 71 
FDI (Total) 1524 1001 
Developing Countries 271 628 
Industrial Countries 1252 373 
Portfolio Investment (Total) 1513 3273 
Developing Countries 84 188 
Industrial Countries 1414 3058 
Loans (Total) 508 1239 
Developing Countries 4 76 
Industrial Countries 504 1165 
  
Source: Singh [14] 
Note: Figures may not add up due to rounding off. 
 
The global positive impact of labour mobility is further reinforced by the special 
role it plays for home countries, mostly developing nations. Remittances sent by 
migrants can help support a sustained growth process in the source country, with 
enhanced consumption demands. It also typically leads to savings and investment on 
the household level, creating a virtuous circle of income generation, especially when 
migration is from poor and rural regions. Moreover, with the emerging shortage of 
labour in rural areas, it increases the bargaining power of remaining labourers, thus 
creating pressure for an increased wage revision and improved livelihood 
opportunities. 
Experience of migration, acquisition of skills and exposure to new 
opportunities result in higher productivity for workers, even when migration is 
temporary and migrants have to return home. Remittances have also been found to 
be responsible for the success of micro-enterprises in recipient countries. 
Cumulatively these factors imply a strong positive impact of migration on human 
development and the reduction of poverty, so much so that it has come to be 
equated with a “New Development Mantra” by some analysts [8]. 
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Table 5: Remittances, Poverty and Inequality in Selected Countries 
 
Country Year HCR PGR Gini Coeff. Migration Remittance
Bangladesh 1996 29.07 1.6 0.336 0.09 10.78 
Brazil 1997 5.1 0.5 0.517 0.11 8.08 
Colombia 1996 10.99 1.21 0.571 1.06 16.16 
Ghana 1999 44.81 8.71 0.327 0.32 1.44 
India 1997 44.03 NA 0.378 0.12 11.10 
Indonesia 1998 26.33 1.69 0.315 0.1 4.71 
Mexico 1995 17.9 2.92 0.537 7.39 40.30 
 
Source: Adams and Page [4]  
Note: HCR: Head Count Ratio; PGR: Squared Poverty Gap Ratio; Migration % of population; 
Remittances per capita official (1995 $)  
 
In recent years, the impact of migration on human development and poverty has 
been the subject of rich micro-level literature, which concludes that remittances have 
a significant positive implication on poverty alleviation [3]. Adams and Page [4] 
evaluated the impact of international migration and remittances on poverty in 
developing countries based on a data set that includes information on international 
migration, remittances, inequality, and poverty for 71 low-income and middle-income 
developing countries. These countries were selected because it was possible to find 
relevant migration, remittances, inequality, and poverty data for all of these countries 
since the year 1980. 
In their study, Adams and Page [4] found that the level of remittances per 
capita has a negative and statistically significant impact on each of the three poverty 
measures: headcount, poverty gap, and squared poverty gap. Estimates for the 
poverty headcount measure suggests that, on average, a 10% increase in per capita 
official international remittances will lead to a 1.8% decline in the share of people 
living in poverty. Remittances will have a slightly larger impact on poverty reduction 
when poverty is measured by more sensitive poverty measures: poverty gap and 
squared poverty gap. A selective list of countries documented by Adams and Page 
[4] is produced in Table 5. 
Moreover, at the macro level, remittances play an important role in bridging 
the foreign exchange gap, and complementing national savings. In particular, India 
has been an important beneficiary in this regard, being the largest remittance 
receiver in the world. As Table 4 suggests, migrants remitted close to $262 billion in 
developing countries. As the proportion of GDP, it was 1.4% of the GDP of low-
income countries in 2001 (Ratha [12]). This flow is quite substantial; as unlike the 
other sources such as portfolio investment, it is not subject to sudden reversal and 
indeed acts as a buffer in such situations, reducing the negative implications 
associated with the vicissitudes of speculative finance capital. For example, 
remittances continued to grow steadily in 1998-2001, even as capital flows witnessed 
a sharp reversal, as a consequence of ASEAN crisis [12]. 
Besides being a large and relatively stable source of external finance to the 
developing countries, remittances are more equally distributed among developing 
countries, with even relatively poorer countries having access to this source of 
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financing for their current account deficits. Ratha [12] documents that the top 10 
countries which received the highest remittances in 2001 accounted for 60% of total 
remittances; this is substantially lower than the share of the top 10 in total GDP, total 
exports and capital inflow which were respectively 68%, 72% and 74% in the same 
year. It follows therefore that remittances are relatively more equally distributed 
among developing countries than other sources of external finance, such as exports. 
One potentially disadvantageous outcome of migration, in the context of 
developing countries, is the reality of “brain-drain”- the flow of highly educated 
professionals from developing countries to the developed world. Given the 
asymmetric distribution of costs and benefits, it amounts to an unrequited transfer of 
scarce resources from developing countries to a developed one; this anomalous 
situation needs to be corrected through appropriate policies. 
To summarize, migration is an important catalyst for development, without 
entailing any significant trade-off, both on the macro and micro level. 
 
Conclusion 
The present era of globalization is marked by a persistent tension on account of two 
opposite factors. For one, technological changes and dynamics of globalization itself 
are creating demands for the transnational movement of people. 
Technological changes, increasing inequality in terms of opportunities, and 
unemployment in developing countries are some of the factors giving rise to such 
demands. All the same, growing demand for migration continues to be constrained 
by restrictive domestic immigration laws and consular practices. Such policies are 
entirely dictated by the interests of labour-importing countries, paying scarcely any 
heed to the needs of labour-exporting countries. The absence of any multilateral 
framework for dealing with the issue of labour migration in an equitable manner is 
thus indicative of the deeper problems associated with globalization. It is high time 
that appropriate multi-lateral dialogues take place between countries of origin and 
destination, covering key issues and policy concerns. 
The current state of affairs is unsatisfactory, not only from a broader and richer 
perspective of fairness, well-being and development, but also in the narrower, 
conceptual framework of efficiency and optimality. 
 On a policy level therefore, this analysis underscores the urgent need to 
create an international institutional framework for the contribution of migration to 
mutual development. The interests and rights of migrant workers deserve at least as 
much attention as the whole range of ‘rights’ extended to the interests of capital. 
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xv. Gone with the Offshore Wind.....tax, economic 
justice and the development agenda 
By Marta Ruiz Carnés44 
 
 
The current global crisis is producing very serious consequences for developing 
countries. Many voices are asking whether the renewed political attention to financial 
regulation will address the huge illicit flows of resources that leave developing 
countries every year. Tax havens, the majority in Europe and in African, Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACP) countries play a major part in this and are putting up a fight not to 
lose their status as secrecy jurisdictions. However, putting tax havens under control 
is not only a matter of concern for developing countries, it has global implications. In 
2009 the UK Prime Minister stated “We want the whole of the world to take action. 
(…) against regulatory and tax havens in parts of the world which have escaped the 
regulatory attention they need." Mr. Brown has indeed good reasons for taking action 
on tax havens. After the Northern Rock bank nationalisation in 2008, the government 
was criticised for losing control of it. The reason was that most of the “healthy” 
liabilities of the bank were held offshore in Jersey, in a separate company leaving the 
most risky lending on the Rock bank’s own balance sheet. The Government would 
therefore not be able to access these mortgages to pay off the debt.45 A good 
example of how tax havens enable the privatisation of profits and socialisation of 
losses. 
Developing countries suffer much further the consequences of the crisis. 
Increased vulnerability led by deregulation and liberalisation policies pushed for the 
last three decades; shortage of Official Development Assistance and reduction of 
available loans as a result of the credit crunch, are only some of the impacts that 
developing countries have been, and will be facing in the future. To these should be 
added the permanent leak of financial flows that fly every year to the North, as a 
result of an unfair and badly regulated financial system. While much of these reverse 
flows result from global imbalances of the financial system, such as the accumulation 
of dollar based reserves, a considerable amount are unrecorded tax haven 
channelled flows resulting from corruption, criminal activities and above all, tax flight 
from transnational companies. However, when it comes to the development agenda 
much of the attention keeps focusing on the some US$100 billion worth of aid flows 
and the insufficient and highly conditional debt relief initiatives. Illicit flows exceed by 
far the official inflows received in terms of aid, debt relief or private foreign direct 
investments all together.  
The financial crisis is triggering a renewed interest in tackling tax havens and 
some political leaders are beginning to bang the drum for the reform of tax havens. 
At their 22nd February preparatory meeting held in Berlin ahead of the G20 summit, 
EU leaders agreed on the need to crack down on tax havens and establish 
sanctions. French President, Nicholas Sarkozy, stated “We want to put a stop to tax 
havens, (…) with a list of tax havens and a series of consequences.” Adding that 
                                                 
44 Ms. Marta Ruiz Carnés,  Policy Advisor, EURODAD, Brussels  
45 See article “Northern Rock nationalisation runs into £49bn Granite barrier”; In : 
www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article3406368.ece  
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“Europe wants to see an overhaul of the system,” and stressing that “A new system 
without sanctions would not have any meaning.”46 German Chancellor Angela 
Merckel pointed to the need to "eliminate blind spots (…) when it comes to financial-
market products, market participants and instruments.” and added that “a list of 
uncooperative jurisdictions and a toolbox of sanctions must be devised as soon as 
possible”.  
There is a broad consensus on addressing tax havens as a major problem but 
the question is whether these statements will be translated into equally strong 
measures or will just be followed by cosmetic changes. The fact that Europe hosts 
many tax havens will not make substantive changes an easy task for the most 
proactive European leaders. This article sheds light on the role played by tax havens, 
the weakest link of an unfair financial system that is being questioned these days and 
that seriously threatens development. It will also raise key recommendations for 
change.   
 
A broken system where the South finances the North  
Many European politicians and citizens believe that Europe finances developing 
countries fairly generously and the EU generally positions itself as the leading donor 
of Official Development Assistance. In fact the reverse is the case. The UN 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs estimated that for Sub-Saharan Africa 
and generally for the least developed countries, the net financial flow has become 
progressively smaller and even turned negative in the last few years. Figure 1 shows 
the volume of financial flows between Southern and Northern countries.  
 
Global imbalances 
For middle income countries, which receive more investment, an important part of 
their outflows are interest and debt repayments, as well as profit repatriation from 
foreign direct investments. For emerging economies in general, especially for China, 
a large share of the outflows results from the accumulation of U.S. treasury bonds. 
While this outflow is not a loss, it prevents them from using their reserves for 
domestic productive investments. This huge accumulation of reserves is the 
response to protect their currencies from speculative attacks, and to prevent previous 
financial crises led by capital account liberalisation, financial sector deregulation and 
speculative capital flight.  
 
Figure 1 Net financial flows between developed and developing countries 1995-2006 
 
 
Source: UN DESA: World Economic Situation and Prospects 2007 
 
 
                                                 
46 See: http://bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&refer=home&sid=arqqvejukth4  
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The IMF’s damaging advice 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is responsible for overseeing the financial 
system. Since the 1980s it has instead spearheaded the liberalization and 
deregulation of global financial markets in most developing economies. This has 
made these economies more vulnerable to external shocks and to capital flight.  
 
The removal of capital controls and financial sector deregulation, both promoted by 
the IMF, has removed countries’ immunity to this financial contagion. Furthermore, 
the following of IMF’s advice after the crisis, further depressed the economy and 
exacerbated its dramatic social consequences. Under IMF advice, Indonesia had to 
diminish its fiscal deficit by reducing health expenditure by 12% in 1999. Education 
expenditure was also cut by 41% in 1999. According to World Bank estimates, the 
Indonesia, Chile, Thailand and Uruguay crises cost more than 30% of their 
respective GDPs. As a result of the financial crisis, real wages in Indonesia fell by 
41% and 2.5 million jobs were lost. In Korea, 2.1 million non agricultural workers lost 
their jobs and 1.4 million in Thailand47.  
 
In response to the current crisis, the IMF is back into action, linking its “traditional” 
structural adjustment conditions to the rescue packages. This raises serious 
concerns in the EU, where the IMF is active in new Member States. A recent ETUC 
paper reads “Europe not leaving new Member States at the mercy of IMF” and 
explains “growth dynamics in these countries will get short circuited, especially if the 
IMF returns and imposes its usual anti-growth/anti-social stabilization measures”48.  
 
This system shows that we are very far from achieving the world’s governments’ 
pledges at the UN Financing for Development conference in 2002 to “mitigate the 
impact of excessive volatility of short-term capital flows” and to strengthen “prudential 
regulations and supervision of all financial institutions, including highly leveraged 
institutions”. It is ironic that seven years ago, when negotiators agreed this text, the 
recommendations were aimed at decision makers in Asia and Latin America, not in 
Europe or North America where the crisis originated. 
The follow-up Conference on Financing for Development held in Doha end 
2008, simply reiterates that “macroeconomic policies (should) attach high priority to 
avoiding abrupt economic fluctuations”. On tax evasion, the text only mentions 
“effectively combating tax evasion” without even mentioning the need to tackle tax 
havens. The wording on progressive tax systems as a means to enhance domestic 
resource mobilisation was erased in the last minute term49. 
 
Cross border illicit flows or the hidden art of the iceberg 
Illicit flows can be defined as “The deliberate and illicit disguised expatriation of 
money by those resident within the country of origin”. 50 
                                                 
47 Eurodad, CRBM, WEED, Bretton Woods Project. “Addressing development’s black hole, regulating 
capital flight”. May 2008. See: 
www.eurodad.org/uploadedFiles/Whats_New/Reports/Capital_flight_report.pdf  
48European Trade Unions Confederation. “Action for recovery. A European plan to re-launch the 
economy: investing in people, the environment and innovation”. See: www.etuc.org/a/5589  
49 See. Doha Declaration at: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/630/55/PDF/N0863055.pdf?OpenElement  
See also Eurodad’s article: //www.eurodad.org/whatsnew/articles.aspx?id=3218  
50 Definition used by Raymond Baker and other analysts, including the Tax Justice Network.  
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By their nature, illicit flows from developing countries are very hard to estimate since 
they escape national and international controls. Attempts to scope these flows show 
that they represent a huge amount of money flying out of Southern countries each 
year. Recent estimates released in 2008 are close to $ 1 trillion per year at an annual 
growth rate of 18%.51 
 
The Global Financial Integrity (GFI) breakdown cross border illicit flows into three 
main components52:  
1. Firstly, bribery and corruption, that represent around 5% of the global amount. 
The stolen wealth looted by corrupted political leaders, bribes paid to elites 
and looted in private bank accounts are among the main causes of these illicit 
flows.  
2. Secondly, criminal illicit flows that include terrorist financing, smuggling, drugs 
money and other crime-related money, account for about 30% of the problem.  
3. Finally commercial transactions encompassing trade false pricing and false 
invoicing with the aim of escaping taxes, account for 65% of the problem. The 
largest percentage of cross border illicit flows is therefore channelled through 
commercial activities, and operated through tax havens. 
While much public attention has been given to the first 5%, including the programme 
Stolen Assets Recovery initiative (StAR) launched by the World Bank and the 
UNDOC53, tax related capital flight generated by transnational corporations and 
channelled through tax havens remains the biggest problem - both globally and in 
particular for developing countries.  
 
Why taxes matter for development? 
Low income countries (LIC) suffer from a chronic lack of domestic resources and 
dependence on external funding. This is conditional and unpredictable. The 
mobilisation of domestic resources was identified in 2002 as one of the key pillars of 
the UN’s Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development. But very little 
progress has been achieved in this area. Establishing capital controls, and instituting 
an effective fiscal policy constitute key instruments for governments to raise regular 
and predictable resources.  
 
After thirty years of policy liberalisation, tax administrations in most LIC are very 
weak and extremely dependent on indirect taxation, namely Value Added Tax (VAT) 
penalising the lower incomes. The average tax revenue in LIC was approximately 
13% of their GDP in 2000, less than half of the average, 36% for OECD countries. 
Moreover, the ability to raise direct taxes amount to 2-6% of GDP in poor countries, 
compared to 12-18% in developed countries.54 Under these conditions, mobilisation 
of domestic resources through progressive taxation systems remains a huge 
challenge for poor countries. Tax evasion and avoidance from developing countries 
represents a significant multiple of global ODA every year. This leakage is facilitated 
by tax havens, providing the necessary infrastructure and services in total opacity. 
 
                                                 
51 Global Financial Integrity. « Illicit financial flows from developing countries 2002-2006 », November 
2008. See: www.gfip.org/    
52 The World Bank has also used these estimates. See footfnote 10. 
53 See: www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/StAR-Sept07-full.pdf 
54 SOMO. Taxation and Financing for development. P. 2 & 3. October 2008. 
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Plugging these tax leaks will help redistribute wealth, restore government policy 
space and foster responsibility and accountability towards the population. For these 
reasons, the promotion of progressive tax systems, the strengthening of tax 
administrations and the fight against tax flight and tax havens need to be addressed 
as a priority within the area of development finance.  
 
In its report “Death and taxes”, Christian Aid outlines the crucial role taxation plays in 
a democratic society and summarises it in 4 R’s: Representation: by paying taxes, 
people contribute to building a strong state but they also become agents in the 
process of development – holding governments to account. Direct taxation of 
incomes and profits is the major channel in this process. Revenue: governments 
need taxes to provide systems of health, education, social security (…) and 
investments in infrastructure. Redistribution: taxes should reduce poverty and 
inequality, and ensure that the benefits of development are felt by all. ‘Re-pricing’: 
taxes can be used to deal with related social problems, for example, taxing carbon 
emissions to tackle climate change or taxing tobacco to limit damage to health55. 
 
Capital flight and debt in Africa 
Conservative estimates published by UNCTAD in 2007 show that Sub-Saharan 
African countries lose an annual average of $13 billion in capital flight.56 The total 
amount of capital flight between 1970 and 2004 from a 40 country sample, amount to 
US$420 billion in real terms. Capital flight represents 82% of the sample countries’ 
GDP and almost 300% of the debt stock for that period. The authors conclude that 
Sub-Saharan African countries are net creditors to the rest of the world and add, “If 
we could restore the stolen assets then there would be more than enough money to 
pay the debt”.57 They also explain that Africa has the highest ratio of privately held 
capital abroad in the form of capital flight. In 1990, about 40% of African private 
capital was held abroad.58 Trade mispricing is a further key conduit for illicit flows in 
Africa, as UNCTAD suggests: “capital flight from Sub Saharan Africa is fast 
approaching a trillion dollars, more than twice the size of its aggregate external 
liabilities”.59 
 
What are tax havens? 
Tax havens have at least one or more of the following features: 
Firstly, they provide low or zero taxes for non residents. Secondly, they provide high 
levels of secrecy to conceal the beneficiaries of companies, trusts, and bank 
accounts. Thirdly, they do not require any economic substance to the transactions 
booked in the jurisdiction. Finally, they provide preferential tax regimes for non 
residents to encourage profit and income shifting from other countries. 
Despite the fact that tax havens account only for about 3% of global GDP, 
they play a key role in global finance and global economy. According to the IMF, tax 
havens represented, in 2004, at least 50% of global financial flows and were involved 
in more than one third of global Investment Portfolios. UNCTAD estimates that more 
than one third of TNC foreign direct investment go to tax havens and explains that 
                                                 
55 Christian Aid.  “Death and taxes. The true toll of tax dodging”. May 2008. P.40 
56 UNCTAD. Economic development in Africa, 2007.Based on findings from Boyce and Ndikumana. 
See: www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_151-200/WP166.pdf  
57 Eurodad interview with L. Ndikumana, May 2008. 
58 Boyce and Ndikumana 2008. Op. cit. P.8 
59Global Financial Integrity.  “Illicit financial flows from developing countries: 2002-2006” Nov. 2008. 
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this trend has been increasing since the 1990’s. The Tax Justice Network estimates 
that rich individuals deposit around US$ 11.5 trillion in tax havens, representing a net 
loss of worldwide government tax revenue of US$255 billion per year.  As mentioned 
above, GFI estimate that illicit flows from Southern countries channelled through tax 
havens, amount to US$1trillion per year and growths at an annual rate of 18%. 
When it comes to identifying tax havens, one would easily first think of the 
white sandy beaches in the Caribbean. In reality, the city of London represents on its 
own around 40% of all the activities related to tax havens. London’s financial centre 
is the first to attract foreign banks. Around one third of global currency transactions 
transit through the UK, making some authors state that “London is with no doubt the 
largest tax haven in the world” 60. Many others are dependencies or overseas 
territories of European countries, such as: Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, 
Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey, Montserrat, (all UK 
dependencies), Aruba and Netherlands Antilles (dependencies of the 
Netherlands)61. Other European tax havens, Switzerland, Monaco, Andorra and 
Luxemburg for example, account for 30% of all offshore activities. Only the remaining 
30% is covered by the Pacific and Caribbean sunny territories we initially think of. 
According to the Tax Justice Network, the list of European tax havens is much 
longer than the one set up by official bodies. Some European tax havens other than 
Andorra, Monaco, Switzerland and Liechtenstein would be: Belgium, Cyprus, 
Germany (Frankfurt), Gibraltar, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy (Campione d’Italia & 
Trieste), Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, Portugal (Madeira), San 
Marino, Spain (Melilla) and UK (City of London). Europe is therefore a key player in 
the fight against tax havens and the interests at stake are huge. 
 
Who uses tax havens? 
Rich individuals wanting to escape regulation and taxes and criminal groups and 
corrupted individuals using tax havens for money laundering, are among the 
prominent users. In this article however, we will focus on commercial and financial 
actors, which account for the biggest share of the cross border illicit flow problem. 
 
Companies 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been a key driver for developing countries since 
the 1990’s, promoted by the international financial institutions (IFIs) as one of the key 
engines for development. But the results of FDI in terms of development are far from 
rosy. In order to attract FDI, countries have generally offered very favourable tax 
conditions which included tax exemption, tax holidays and other tax benefits, creating 
very unfavourable conditions for local investors to compete with.  
One of the consequences of this unfair system is the development of so called 
round trip investments, channelled generally through tax havens. In order to benefit 
from more favourable tax conditions, a local investor will shift to an offshore territory, 
from where he will invest in his original country but as a foreign investor, thus 
benefiting from better tax conditions. For years, the British Virgin Islands have been 
the second biggest investor in China, while in reality it was Chinese investors 
operating from offshore62. The same pattern has been followed in other regions. At 
the end of the day, small local investors are unable to compete with large ones, 
                                                 
60 C. Chavagneux and R. Palan. 2007. « Les paradis fiscaux », p.81. 
61 See: www.eurodad.org/uploadedFiles/Whats_New/Reports/factsheet_capitalflight08.pdf 
www.eurodad.org/uploadedFiles/Whats_New/Reports/Capital_flight_report.pdf  
62 Eurodad, CRBM, WEED and Bretton Woods Project. May 2008. Op. Cit p.11 
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increasing the countries dependence on external investors, whose main goal is to 
maximise profits including by minimising taxes. Figure 2 illustrates this phenomenon, 
showing the number of companies registered in tax havens as compared to local 
population of those territories. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Foreign investments and tax havens 
 
Source: Step journal & lawtax.net, 200463 
 
How do companies avoid and escape taxes? 
One key mechanism used by transnational companies to escape taxes is the transfer 
of false pricing or false invoicing. This means setting the price of sales between 
different entities within a multinational. In principle, transfer pricing is a legitimate 
practice, as long as it respects the “arm’s length principle”, that means that the price 
falls within the open market average price of the same product or service traded 
between unrelated companies64. Problems occur when transfer pricing becomes a 
tool to set artificially high or low prices in order to minimise taxes. The arm's length 
principle is largely bypassed, one of the reasons being that more than half of global 
trade occurs among subsidiaries of the same TNC65.  Much of these transactions 
involve very specific goods and services that may not have an open market price 
reference and that are simply set internally within the group. According to a survey of 
476 TNCs nearly 80% acknowledge having transfer pricing at the heart of their fiscal 
strategy.66 This suggests that false invoicing and abusive transfer pricing practices 
are part of the TNCs’ parent company strategy in order to minimise taxes. The parent 
companies are generally based in Northern countries and have subsidiaries in tax 
havens, where they can shift untaxed profits.  
TNC operations are taxed following the residence principle. They are taxed 
according to the territory where they are registered. TNCs set up subsidiary 
companies, where they will be taxed the least. For instance, Microsoft has placed its 
software intellectual property rights in its subsidiary firm in Ireland. By doing so, 
Microsoft paid $1billion taxes between 2001 and 2004; a rate of 12.5%, instead of the 
                                                 
63 C. Chavagneux and R.Palan.2007. Op. cit. P.63 
64 SOMO, 2008.Op. Cit. P. 8. 
65 Sony Kapoor “Exposing the myth and plugging the leaks”, n “Impossible architecture”, Social Watch 
report 2006, www.socialwatch.org/en/informesTematicos/99.html  
66 Chavagneux C. and Palan R. 2007. Op. cit. P. 65. 
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$2.8 billion at a 35% rate that would have been paid had the property rights remained 
in the US.67 
Another example is Ikea’s complex structure established through tax havens 
in order to minimise taxes. Italian magazine Altereconomia published in 2009 “The 
real fortune of Ikea (...), is not the idea of selling flat-pack furniture (…). Rather that of 
having built a very complicated company structure, a net created just to use the 
mechanisms of “tax planning” to pay as few taxes as possible without violating the 
law”68. 
Some striking examples of how companies false price imports and exports 
with the only aim of escaping taxes are flash bulbs sold at $US 321.90 each, pillow 
cases at $US 909.29 each and a ton of sand at $US 1993.67 when the average trade 
price was 66 cents, 62 cents and $11.20 respectively.69 
Transfer false pricing strategies become a real development concern as they 
deprive the poorest from their legitimate resources and divert them through corporate 
tax planning strategies. According to recent research led by Christian Aid, poor 
countries lose at least US$160 billion per year in tax losses as a direct consequence 
of transfer false pricing practices.70   
Other analysts estimate that capital flight from Africa to the US through trade 
false invoicing, amounted to more than US$20.5 billion between 2000 and 2005.71 In 
this period, capital outflows from Africa to the U.S. grew by more than 50%, both 
through low priced exports and high priced imports.  
 
Figure 3. Capital flight from Africa to the US as a result of transfer false pricing 
(2000-2005) 
 
Source: Maria E. De Boyrie, James A. Nelson, Simon J. Pak. “Capital movement trough trade 
mis-invoicing. The case of Africa”, 2007 
 
                                                 
67 Chavagneux C. and Palan R. 2007. Op. Cit. P.62. 
68 Altereconomia. « Ikea’s Duths trick », January 2009. 
69 P. Sikka. In The Guardian “Shifting profits across borders” Thursday 12 February 2009. See: 
www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/feb/11/taxavoidance-tax 
70 Christian Aid. “Death and Taxes: the true toll of tax dodging”. May 2008. See: 
www.christianaid.org.uk/images/deathandtaxes.pdf  
71The methodology used in this research is based on the Balance of Payments, which excludes some 
non recorded flows and gives, as a result more conservative estimates. 
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Bananas’ virtual trip through offshore land 
A concrete example of how transnational corporations shift profits and avoid taxes is 
the banana industry. Three big corporations, Chiquita, Dole and Del Monte, control 
more that two thirds of the banana market. They all have their headquarters in the 
US, where the nominal tax rate is 35% but their profit shifting mechanisms allow 
them to pay only 8% tax rate. In order to minimise taxes, these companies have been 
bundling different costs, treasury operations, intellectual property rights, etc, into 
offshore subsidiaries, allowing them to shift profits towards no tax jurisdictions while 
reporting lower benefits or even losses and subsequent tax benefits in producer 
countries. In this case, the trip from the producer country to the consumer in the 
supermarket, where the banana is sold at 1 Euro price, goes through the following 
havens: 
First, bananas are exported at 13 cents each from the producer country. Here, labour 
and other production costs account for 12 cents, which makes around 1% of taxable 
profit booked in the producer country. 
Second, the company invoices 8 cents fee charge for the use of purchasing network, 
registered in the Cayman Islands. 
Third, from the Cayman Islands another affiliate based in Luxembourg charges 8 
cents for the use of company financial services. 
Fourth, a subsidiary in Ireland charges 4 cents for the use of the brand. 
Fifth, another affiliate in the Isle of Man charges 4 cents for insurance services. 
Sixth, a subsidiary in Jersey charges 6 cents for management services. 
Seventh, from Jersey the banana travels to another subsidiary in Bermuda, where it 
is charged 17 cents for the use of distribution network. 
Eight, the banana eventually arrives to the consumer country where it is imported at 
60 cents and invoiced to retailers at minimal margin or even at loss. The retailer then 
adds a margin of about 40 cents, selling them at 1 Euro. This makes a 1% of taxable 
profit, booked in the consumer country.72 
 
Banks, insurance, hedge funds and other financial institutions:  Most international 
banks have subsidiaries in a tax haven. This network has facilitated the transfer and 
circulation of stolen assets from corrupted leaders, for instance, Sani Abacha’s stolen 
assets circulated via Crédit Suisse, Crédit Agricole Indosuez, BNP and many others. 
Tax havens have also allowed the financial and banking industry to develop 
speculative and risky products and host speculative actors. About 80% of hedge 
funds are registered in The Cayman islands73. Furthermore, the whole shadow 
banking system that has been creating and spreading risky financial products, 
without any control, was enabled by secrecy provided in tax havens.  
 
Accounting standards: setting and transfer false pricing. 
It is not surprising to see that transfer pricing regulations are easily circumvented, 
given that rules are set by the same companies that use them. Ernst and Young, one 
of the biggest accountancy companies, is a prominent member of the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB), a private body in charge of setting international 
accounting rules applied by most countries, and therefore used by most transnational 
companies. As journalist Prem Sikka explains, transfer pricing is a big business for 
this company, which markets its services with the following statement “Transfer 
                                                 
72 F. Lawrence and I. Griffiths, “Revealed: How multinational companies avoid the taxman”, The 
Guardian, 6 November 2007. Quoted by John Christensen, “Taxing transnational corporations” 2009. 
73 C. Chavagneux and R. Palan. 2007. Op. Cit. P.72. 
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pricing affects almost every aspect of a Multinational Enterprise (MNE) and can 
significantly impact its worldwide tax burden. Our professionals help MNEs address 
this burden (…). Our multidisciplinary team helps MNEs develop transfer pricing 
strategies, tax effective solutions and controversy management approaches that best 
fit their objectives”.74 
This practice creates enormous distortions in global trade and strongly pushes 
tax competition, which in general is detrimental to wage levels, working conditions 
and environmental concerns. It also nourishes huge tax losses at the global level and 
especially for poor countries where these big companies operate.  
 
Failed attempts to combat capital flight and tax evasion  
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is one of the 
key institutions to deal with tax havens. In April 1998, the OECD first published its 
report on “harmful fiscal competition” attacking fiscal practices aiming at attracting 
foreign capital. This led to the publication in 1999 of a list of 47 tax havens. A few 
months later, in June 2000, only 35 territories remained on the list since some tax 
havens declared their intention to take immediate measures. In 2001, the George W. 
Bush administration put strong pressure on OECD’s work to combat harmful tax 
practices. Tax analyst Richard Murphy explains that the OECD “saw no problem in 
denouncing what it described as harmful tax competition. Many states, led by 
Switzerland, Luxembourg and the Caribbean havens, argued that a tax regime is a 
sovereign prerogative (…: this argument gained a powerful ally once the first Bush 
administration came to power in 2001 and broke ranks within the OECD”75. US 
Finance Minister at that time, Paul O’Neil, stated that: “The US does not support any 
efforts aiming at dictating at any country what its tax rate or its tax system should be 
and we will not take part of any initiative aiming at harmonising tax systems”76. 
Following this trend, the OECD updated black list only accounted 7 countries out of 
the initial 47 and most of them have been progressively excluded on the basis of the 
good quality of their policies. The last updated list only names 3 remaining un-
cooperative tax havens: Andorra, Liechtenstein and Monaco77.   
The Financial Stability Forum (FSF) was created in 1999 in the aftermath of 
the Asian financial crises in order to promote financial stability and international 
cooperation in financial supervision and surveillance. The FSF works closely with the 
IMF and the OECD and drew up a list of 42 tax havens. In 2005, a new report 
published by the IMF with a list of 41 countries, expressed that good progress had 
been made except in two areas: lack of international cooperation and of information 
exchange as well as inadequate regulatory policy. On the basis of this conclusion, 
and despite the fact that these two elements are crucial for significant progress, the 
FSF declared, in 2005, that “the FSF’s 2000 list of 42 Offshore Financial Centres 
which helped the IMF to set priorities (…) has served its purpose and is no longer 
operative”.78    
Another body active on illicit flows is the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
established by the G7 Summit in Paris in 1989 in order to combat money laundering. 
The FATF has focused on drugs money laundering and, since 2001, in the financing 
                                                 
74 P. Sikka. In The Guardian “Shifting profits across borders” 12 February 2009. See: 
www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/feb/11/taxavoidance-tax 
75 R. Murphy. “Tax havens creating turmoil”. June 2008. 
76 C. Chavagneux and R. Palan. 2007. Op. Cit. P. 90. 
77 See: www.oecd.org/document/57/0,3343,en_2649_201185_30578809_1_1_1_1,00.html 
78 FSF. Press release 09/02/2007. See: www.fsforum.org/publications/publication_23_41.html  
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of terrorism. It set up a list of non-cooperative countries and territories, or countries 
having rules that might facilitate money laundering, and established 40 
recommendations to address the issue.  It identified 29 dubious territories by the end 
of 1999 but, in 2000, the list shrank to 15 “non-cooperative countries”. According to 
the FATF only 2 territories were identified as having dirty money circulating: Nigeria 
and Myanmar, and since 2006, its list of non cooperative territories is simply empty79.  
According to some experts, this name and shame policy has paradoxically 
strengthened the legitimacy of the strongest tax havens. Some powerful conservative 
think tanks in the US support them like the “Coalition for Tax Competition” that 
qualifies the OECD as “A global fiscal cartel to the benefit of a small bunch of 
overtaxed nations”80.  
 
A renewed interest to combat tax havens 
There is a renewed interest by world leaders, especially in Europe and in the US, to 
combat tax havens. The Liechtenstein scandal that burst in February 200881, 
exposing the issue of tax evasion in the EU through European tax havens such as 
Liechtenstein, opened the way to other European territories such as Luxembourg, 
Monaco and Andorra. But despite strong rhetoric statements from many EU member 
states that could be summarised in the Swedish Finance Minister Anders Borg’s 
words “Tax paradises in practice become tax parasites,”82 no concrete steps were 
taken. As Luxembourg’s Prime Minister gladly announced, when his country was 
pointed as suspect by the public opinion “I look forward to many years of fascinating 
and fundamental discussion”. A few months later, in the middle of the turmoil created 
by subprime crisis, he still proved to be loyal to his arguments by openly defending 
bank secrecy “I am of the opinion that the existence of banking secrecy is not at the 
origin of the financial crisis we are currently experiencing. The fact that we have 
banking secrecy in individual countries in Europe is not to be blamed for the fact that 
we are witnessing this financial crisis.” 83 
But despite Mr. Junkers fixed position, the financial crisis and its expansion 
throughout the world, has definitely led to questioning the role of tax havens and 
secrecy jurisdictions. While Junker praised bank secrecy, his French counterpart Mr. 
François Fillon sang a completely different tune arguing that “black holes such as 
offshore financial centers should no longer exist” adding that their disappearance 
should be a step towards “the refunding of a new financial system”84. Similarly, 
German Finance Minister Peer Steinbrueck openly pointed to Switzerland, saying it 
had failed to fully cooperate on taxation issues. "Switzerland should be on the 
blacklist and not the green list”85 he said. Indeed, tax havens host affiliates of most 
international banks that created off balance instruments, such as special purpose 
vehicles that generated the securitization of sub prime debts and other structured 
                                                 
79 See: www.fatf-gafi.org/document/42/0,3343,en_32250379_32236992_33916420_1_1_1_1,00.html  
80 C. Chavagneux & R. Palan, 2007. Op. Cit. P. 96 
81 See: www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,535768,00.html  
82 In New York Times: “European Commission moves to broaden the attack on tax havens”. 5 March 
2008. See: www.nytimes.com/2008/03/05/business/worldbusiness/05tax.html  
83 Declaration by Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker before the Chamber of Deputies regarding 
banking secrecy, 21/10/2008. See: 
www.gouvernement.lu/salle_presse/discours/premier_ministre/2008/10-octobre/21-juncker/21-chd-
eng/index.html  
84 See : www.24heures.ch/actu/monde/2008/10/14/fillon-veut-faire-disparaitre-paradis-fiscaux  
85 See : www.france24.com/en/20081021-world-leading-economies-tackle-tax-havens-oecd-france-
germany  
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toxic products. This renewed interest comes after more than two decades of 
decreasing efforts from the international community on this matter. 
While Europeans are waking up on this issue, the political tide is already 
moving towards the other side of the Atlantic. While he was still a Senator, Mr. 
Obama introduced, in 2007, the “Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act”, arguing that“We need 
to crack down on individuals and businesses that abuse our tax laws so that those 
who work hard and play by the rules are not disadvantaged”86. This act has not yet 
been approved, but opens a crucial space on the need to establish strict regulations 
to combat tax havens and tax evasion. 
 
Europe’s key role in curbing illicit flows 
There are several areas in which European governments can take the lead in order 
to foster transparency and improve stability at a global level.  
Firstly, with the strengthening and expansion of the European savings tax directive 
(ESD) that is under review. By obliging automatic information exchange, the directive 
dramatically improves transparency of financial transactions. Nowadays, however, it 
only applies to individuals’ interest income, which represents a very small part of the 
actual problem. A much broader scope should be applied to this principle. This would 
include an expansion to all legal entities and to all sources of income, not only 
interest payments. Such an extension would address illicit flows from commercial and 
financial actors, currently circulating in secrecy, and draining huge amounts of 
resources from States. The expansion should also be enhanced at the geographical 
level, incorporating other non European territories, which, to some extent, has been 
the case87. 
Secondly, Europe has a key role to play on setting international accountancy 
standards. This can be done by dramatically improving transparency in the way 
multinationals present their accounts. The present system allows companies with 
subsidiaries abroad to present consolidated accounts without breaking them down on 
a geographical basis where profits have been made. This is currently one of the main 
obstacles to combating transfer false pricing and profit shifting to secrecy 
jurisdictions. The European Parliament recently called for a country by country 
reporting standard for the extractive industry sector88. Country by country reporting 
should not be the exception but the rule applied to all economic and financial sectors, 
and Europe should firmly push in this direction. 
Global financial governance requires a balanced representation of countries 
not only in financial institutions but also in the standards setting bodies such as the 
IASB89. The EU Council has expressed concerns about IASB governance and 
legitimacy: “The current financial turmoil illustrates the importance of a robust and 
legitimate independent international accounting standard-setting process, which is 
responsive to the public interest and consistent with the objective of ensuring 
financial stability”. 90This means not only a stronger representation from other regions 
of the world - including developing countries - but also the implementation of the 
                                                 
86 See: http://taxjustice.blogspot.com/2008/11/obama-and-stop-tax-haven-abuse-act.html  
87 The collaborating non-EU states are: Switzerland, Andorra, Monaco, Liechtenstein, San Marino and 
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88 See: www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?Type=MOTION&Reference=B6-2007-
0437&language=EN 
89 International Accounting Standard Board. 
90 See: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/101732.pdf  
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principles of neutrality, transparency and public interest in all international accounting 
standards.  
Following the Liechtenstein scandal, the EU Council committed, in 2008, "to 
implement the principles of good governance in the tax area” and to “improve 
international cooperation in the tax area (…) and develop measures for the effective 
implementation of the above mentioned principles."91These principles are 
“transparency, exchange of information and fair tax competition”.  The Council added 
“the need to include in relevant agreements to be concluded with third countries by 
the Community and its Member States (...) a specific provision on good governance 
in the tax area”.92  
These principles have been ratified by the European Parliament’s report on 
tax fraud where it says that Europe should take the lead and make the elimination of 
tax havens at the worldwide level a priority, and “invites the Council and the 
Commission to use the leverage of EU trade power when negotiating trade and 
cooperation agreements with the governments of tax havens, in order to persuade 
them to eliminate tax provisions and practices that favour tax evasion and fraud”. 93 
The effectiveness of such a statement will very much depend on how broadly 
or narrowly we define tax havens. The OECD has proved to be too narrow when 
defining tax havens and needs now to dramatically strengthen its work against 
secrecy jurisdictions. 
 
Conclusion and recommendations 
The financial crisis is part of a broader and deeper systemic crisis and therefore, 
systemic changes will be needed. Combating tax havens is part of a broader set of 
reforms that many civil society organisations (CSO) are calling for. A large number of 
CSO are putting forward comprehensive reforms for a new financial system that 
respects a sustainable model of development. There are many proposals for a 
fundamental and democratic reform of the international financial architecture in order 
to guarantee stricter regulation, more transparency and better control of capital. 
These also include a in-depth democratic reform of the global governance system 
and fair distribution of global wealth through global taxes and progressive tax 
systems.94The implementation of such measures would be a win-win game for both 
the North and the South, generating productive and sustainable development-
oriented economic growth. 
In order to enhance policy areas in developing countries and mobilise 
domestic resources in the long run and on a predictable basis, progressive tax 
systems should be implemented and promoted by international financial institutions 
and donors. This directly implies strong efforts to strengthen tax administrations 
globally but more particularly in the South. It will be unrealistic to effectively combat 
tax evasion and avoidance as long as tax administrations remain much weaker than 
perpetrators of these schemes. To put things in perspective, the accountancy firm 
Ernst &Young alone employs 900 professionals to sell transfer pricing schemes, 
while the US tax administration employs about 500 full time inspectors to pursue 
                                                 
91 See: www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ecofin/100339.pdf  
92 See: www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ecofin/100339.pdf  
93 See: www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/file.jsp?id=5597642  
94 See the Declaration out of the World Social Forum 2009 “For a new economic and social model. 
Let’s put finance in its place” at : www.choike.org/gcrisis and see also : www.rethinkingfinance.org  
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these issues95. In Kenya, where estimates of annual capital flight amounts to almost 
$US700 million96, only three to five investigators are employed for the whole country. 
It is crucial to combat the channels and facilitators of capital flight. Tax havens 
should be dismantled and their users sanctioned. In order to end bank secrecy, the 
principle of automatic exchange of information and public disclosure of information 
should be applied globally. 
Global taxes on financial transactions and penalties on operations incurred with non-
cooperative territories should be implemented. These would not only penalise tax 
haven users, but would also free resources which could be redistributed to combat 
inequalities and foster sustainable development.  
An international tax organisation, under the auspices of the UN to address tax 
competition and tax evasion, should be put in place. A first step in the right direction 
would be the upgrading of the existing UN Tax Committee into an intergovernmental 
body, in charge of addressing these issues. A first outcome towards the elaboration 
of a binding framework could be an international code of conduct on tax evasion. 
It is fair to say, that many of the Southern small state tax havens that 
exclusively rely on offshore financial activities, would suffer dramatic consequences 
from a sudden end to offshore finance. This is why this process should be 
accompanied by a strong international financial effort to reorient these territories to 
real economic sectors leading their economies to a sustainable development pattern.  
Finally, the IASB should be strongly reformed. Civil society organisations call 
for its reform into a specialist Commission of the United Nations Economic and Social 
Committee. The accounting standards rules should prevent excessive risk taking and 
abusive behaviours. Amongst others, they should seriously address transfer false 
pricing by establishing detailed country by country reporting standards for all 
companies operations, including costs, benefits, taxes, etc.  
Given the global and systemic dimension of the problems we face today, 
global responses are needed. Many Heads of State are expressing the need to re-
build the financial system. To achieve this, strong measures to combat tax havens 
must be at the heart of the global agenda. Any regulatory or reform attempt will be 
useless if secrecy jurisdictions or tax havens continue facilitating a double standard 
whereby a minority are able to escape tax and regulation, to the detriment of the 
majority of citizens. 
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xvi. Community Banks - Microcredit:  
(The Brazil Experience) 
By João Joaquim de Melo Neto Segundo97 
 
 
“Capitalism has as its basis not only the idea that capital is private property, but also 
that it is concentrated in the hands of a minority.  Due to their lack of capital, the vast 
majority of people who have to work in order to survive, are forced to sell their 
capacity to produce to those who own the means of production. Therefore, capitalists 
have at their disposal a large supply of manpower begging to be hired, usually 
outstripping the demand.  
If these workers had enough credit, many of them would prefer to have their 
own business instead of working for somebody else. The larger the number of people 
that open their own business, the greater the possibility of success, since the 
injection of many small quantities of capital in the market boosts demand, allowing for 
new businesses to find buyers for their products.  There is a need to enhance access 
to capital for micro and small entrepreneurs, of which there were more than 10 million 
in Brazil in 2003, in addition to the huge number of unemployed, the million families 
that are assentadas (people given new land to cultivate) under the agricultural reform 
and more than 11 million families dependant on the Bolsa Familia (Government 
program to supplement poor families’ income). In spite of the various measures for 
democratization of credit taken by the current government, with examples such as 
the six-fold increase in Pronaf (National Credit Program for Family Agriculture), the 
large majority of those in need are still not taken care of." 
The above text was written by Professor Paul Singer and appeared in the 
newspaper Folha de São Paulo on June 10th, 2007; however, it could very easily 
have been the preface for a real practice that has been taking place in Brazil since 
1998: community banks.  
“Community banks offer solidarity-based financial services, in a network of an 
associative and communitarian nature focused on generating jobs and income within 
the perspective of the reorganization of local economies, having as their foundation 
the principles of the Solidarity Economy. Its objective is to promote the development 
of low income territories by encouraging the creation of local production and 
consumer networks based on the support of the Solidarity Economy initiatives and its 
diverse fields, such as socio-productive entrepreneurial activities, service delivery, 
and support to commercialization (markets, shops and solidarity fairs)." 
This definition was agreed on at the second meeting of the Network of 
Brazilian Community Banks, which took place from the 18th to the 21st of April 2007 
at Iparana (CE), and it is meant to explain or clarify an initiative that is gaining more 
and more momentum within the national economy.  
 
The Background 
This topic becomes relevant the moment the world is faced with a crisis that has its 
origin in the international financial system. This crisis is now widely discussed in the 
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different media networks; however, half of the Brazilian population has been 
excluded from this discussion for quite some time.  
The banking industry in Brazil is highly concentrated: the largest 10 banks own 
80% of the total liquidity owned by the 105 banks with a commercial portfolio and a 
credit offer that represents 75% of the total amount. For instance, the two largest 
financial institutions, Banco do Brasil S/A and Ciaxa Economica Federal are 
responsible for 25% of the total credit offer.  
Despite having grown in the past three years the credit offer is still 
disappointing in comparison to GDP, barely 27%, when compared to other countries 
such as Uruguay, Thailand and Chile where the indicator is significantly larger, 40%, 
99% and 70% respectively.  
Beyond the high concentration of their activities, banks are extremely selective 
in their credit offer and tend to favour transactions in neighbourhoods with stronger 
economic foundations. Furthermore, they finance part of the public debt, an activity 
which provides them with 40% of their profit on average. It is part of the nature of 
these financial institutions to concentrate their activities on  short-term gains, instead 
of financing the mid- or long-term opportunities. 
 
Banco Palmas: the Beginning 
The first community bank in Brazil was Banco Palmas, which was inaugurated in 
January 1998 in a neighbourhood called Conjunto Palmeira, which is located on the 
outskirts of the city of Fortaleza. The idea came from the Associaçao dos Moradores 
do Conjunto Palmeira (Association of Residents of Conjunto Palmeira) which has 
around 30,000 residents.  They developed an economic system which has an 
alternative micro-credit line (for producers and consumers), incentive tools for local 
consumption (credit card and social currency) and new ways of commercialization 
(fairs, solidarity shops/stores) promoting local job creation and income generation.  
Banco Palmas has three main characteristics: management responsibilities 
are borne by the community; an integrated system of local development which 
promotes credit, production, commercialization and training; and the local currency 
(Palmas currency), which complements the official currency (real) and is accepted 
and recognized by local producers, merchants and consumers, creating an 
alternative and solidarity market between the families. 
The Palmas currency is pegged to the real (R$) (1 Palma is worth 1R$), which 
allows productive entrepreneurial activities within the community, like commerce, 
industry and services, to exchange currency each time it is necessary to replenish 
stocks  of products that are not produced in the neighbourhood. The Palmas 
currency is already accepted by 240 businesses, which offer discounts from 2% to 
15% to encourage people to buy with the social currency.  
In March 2008 the Ministry of Work and Employment (MTE) hired the Federal 
University of Ceará to make an evaluation of the impact and image of the bank in the 
Conjunto Palmeira neighbourhood.  Some of the findings are worth highlighting:  
• 98% of those interviewed consider that Banco Palmas has contributed 
positively to the development of Conjunto Palmeira. 
• 90% believe that the bank has contributed to an improvement in their quality of 
life. 
• 26% believe that their income has increased because of the actions of the 
bank. 
• 22% found jobs thanks to Banco Palmas. 
• 61% would give the bank a rating of at least 9 out of 10. 
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These figures are supported by the words of one of the world’s most respected 
individuals in the area of finance, who states “Banco Palmas is similar to Wir Bank 
from Switzerland, created in 1934 and it is more advanced than the Grameen Bank 
of Nobel Peace Prize winner Muhammad Yunnus, because it provides the poor with 
better help to get out of poverty” (interest rates are lower). This statement comes 
from Bernard Lietaer, former director of the Central Bank of Belgium and an expert 
on complementary currencies (from frequent flyer miles to social currencies). Just as 
it is with the Palmas currency, Wir Bank makes transactions with the Wir currency as 
well as with Swiss francs. Of course, the scale of transactions of Wir Bank is much 
higher since they involve 65,000 businesses and the value of such operations is 2 
billion dollars a year. Author of the book “The Future of Money” (2001), Lietaer 
defends the view that social currencies promote certain exchanges that would not 
happen otherwise and help fight the liquidity problems that occur during recessions. 
He estimates that currently there are 5000 types of social currency. Furthermore, he 
firmly believes that “spreading banks such as Banco Palmas as a tool to reduce 
social tension, should be used as an important precedent for developed countries, 
such as Switzerland, to follow” (Jornal Folha de São Paulo 02/02/2009).  
 
Instituto Banco Palmas: Spreading the Idea 
In order to spread the social technology of the bank, in 2003 the inhabitants of 
Conjunto Palmeira decided to create the Instituto Banco Palmas. Two years 
afterwards the entity signed an agreement to enter into partnership with the 
Secretaria Nacional de Economia Solidária do MTE (National Secretariat of Solidarity 
Economy) and the Banco Popular do Brasil. The agreement allowed not only Banco 
Palmas but also the rest of the community banks to have access to credit and to act 
as banking correspondents of Banco Popular do Brasil.  
Thanks to that support it was possible to arrive at the number of 37 community 
banks by the end of 2008, 25 of them in the state of Ceará, 4 in Espírito Santo, 3 in 
Piauí, 2 in Bahia and 1 in Mato Grosso do Sul, Paraíba e Maranhâo. These banks 
are located in areas characterized by poverty, banking and financial exclusion, in 
quilombolas communities (where descendants of African slaves live), indigenous 
areas, communities of quebradeiras de coco (women whose job it is to cut open 
coconuts whose seed is used in industries to produce cosmetic products), and 
isolated districts in the semi-arid northeast and the urban periphery.  
The inhabitants of the majority of these places travel in paus-de-arara 
(privately owned trucks used to transport people) for about 40km just to pay their 
electricity bill or to receive their pension. Credit is not even a possibility and thus 
there is even less possibility of any local development.  
This was the case in São João do Arraial (PI), a region where quebradeiras de 
coco live and work. With 7,000 inhabitants, the city has an 81° HDI (Human 
Development Index), the lowest in Brazil, and 77% of its population lives on less than 
half the minimum salary, based on the data from the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP). The county’s economy is based on subsistence agriculture, 
mainly rice, corn, beans and yucca and raising animals such as pigs, cattle, goats 
and fowl. Moreover, the inhabitants work in the extraction of Babaçu , producing 200 
tons of almonds and oil. In order to understand the true dimension of the local 
poverty it suffices to say that within the county 260,000 USD circulate per month, of 
which 110,000 USD come from the INSS (National Institute of Social Security), 
110,000 USD from the City Hall, 30,000 USD from the government programme Bolsa 
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Familia and just 10,000 USD from local production, according to data provided by the 
local government of São João de Arraial. 
Similarly to the example above, the inhabitants of this city had to cover around 
30km of dirt road to the county of Esperantina if they needed any banking services. 
Besides paying the bills they also used these trips to buy whatever they needed, 
spending most of their income in their neighboring county. However, the story of São 
João de Arraial began to change at the start of 2007, when an NGO called CARE 
asked Instituto Banco Palmas  for advice on how to open a community bank in the 
city. With the support of the City Hall and the leadership of COCAIS (Council of 
Community Organizations for Support and Social Inclusion), a seminar was held to 
present the proposal and …Bingo! The local residents were mobilized. Afterwards, 
some community leaders and experts from the City Hall went to Fortaleza for a series 
of training sessions at the Insituto Palmas.   
As an infrastructure sponsored by the municipal authorities, on December 
12th 2007 the Community Bank of Cocais was inaugurated. Today, it is possible to 
use it to pay bills, receive pension payments, and have access to credit and social 
currency for consumption in São João do Arraial. One of the municipal laws to 
support the Banco Cocais lays down that government workers of the municipality 
receive their salary from the community institution, giving the option that up to 25% of 
the payment can be in social currency. Thus, São João do Arraial began to redesign 
its own development.  
The DNA of the community banks is the same everywhere: local economic 
flow of credits for production purposes (in Real R$) and credit for consumption in 
social currency, with ownership of the financial system in the hands of the 
community.   
Nevertheless, every institution has its own name and currency and its own 
social organization which manages the project. A community bank is not a branch of 
a central bank, even though it follows a reference and common work methods 
defined by the Brazilian Network of Community Banks. 
 
The Structure 
In order to better understand the inner workings of a community bank, it is essential 
to describe its main structure. 
 
A. Objective of a Community Bank 
Promote the development of low income areas, through the encouragement and 
creation of local production and consumption networks, based on the support of the 
economic initiatives by the Solidarity Economy and its diverse scope such as: socio-
productive enterprises, service provider, support for commercialization (markets, 
solidarity fairs) and consumer organizations. 
 
B. Characteristics of the Community Bank: 
• the community itself decides to create the bank, becoming its manager and 
proprietor; 
• it always acts with two credit lines: one in Real currency (R$) and another one 
in circulating social currency; 
• its credit lines stimulate the creation of local production and consumption 
networks, promoting the endogenous development of the area; 
• it supports enterprises, as a commercialization strategy (solidarity shops, fairs, 
central office for commercialization etc.);  
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• it acts in areas characterized by a high degree of exclusion and social 
inequality; 
• it is aimed at a public characterized by a high degree of social vulnerability, in 
particular the beneficiaries of governmental programmes;  
• it aims to establish its financial sustainability in the short term, obtaining 
subsidies justified by their social utility. 
 
C. Financial Services offered by the Community Bank  
• Local social currency   
• Solidarity credit through the concession delegated by financial institutions 
such as Banco Popular do Brasil  
• Credit for financing solidarity enterprises 
• Credit for personal and family consumption without interest  
• Popular Solidarity credit card 
• Opening account and account statements  
• Deposits  
• Invoice reception (water, electricity, telephone etc.)  
• Subsidies and pension payments  
• Cash withdrawals with or without credit card 
 
D. Functioning of the credit system in Community Banks 
• The interest rates are lower than the market interest rates. 
• The credit system is fair. In solidarity finances this means for instance, that 
those with fewer resources pay lower interest rates and those with more 
resources pay higher interest rates. The interest rates are progressive to 
ensure a proper distribution of income. In this system the fortunate subsidize 
the most vulnerable in economic terms.  
• This solidarity dimension has to be understood by the residents and recipients 
of credit. A policy of lower interest rates is not enough if its application does 
not raise critical awareness and a sense of solidarity among the population. 
Only these values can have a mid- and long-term impact in the process of 
radical transformation of the structures of society.  
• The community itself (members of the association of residents and the credit 
recipients) owns and manages the credit system. As a result, any income from 
the credit operations, return on resources, interest and fees have to remain 
within the community. When we say “remain” it means that the community is at 
the same time customer and owner of these resources. The self-management 
aspect is extremely important. Many credit systems that function in specific 
communities simply provide a credit operation, but the resources generated 
are directed towards the headquarters of the main bank. This means that the 
recipients of credit are merely clients and so end up contributing to increase 
the wealth of the financial institution at the expense of the community. 
• The credit system serves as a supply source for the production chains, the 
local production and consumption networks, the production arrangements and 
other ways to foster the creation of solidarity cooperation networks.  Credit can 
be made available to someone but soon they have to be encouraged to 
participate in one of the local networks of producers and consumers. In other 
words, it is essential that the recipient of credit (individual or group) is involved 
in some way with a local production or social network. 
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• For the credit analysis other verification tools for the trustworthiness of the 
client are used than the traditional capitalist instruments. One of the tools often 
used is the “neighbour guarantee” or the “introduction” system which basically 
means the recipient needs to have a reference from a local organization (e.g. 
association, church, union). Trust, therefore, has to be put in the community 
which ultimately decides on the future or direction of the credit system 
 
E. The Circulating Social Currency and the Community Bank 
The circulating social currency serves as a complement of the national currency 
(Real R$)), created by the community bank. It is essential to cultivate the 
circulation of money and wealth within the community itself, strengthening local 
commerce and generating jobs and income.  
 
These social currencies possess some characteristics that make them different. 
Let us see what these characteristics are: 
 
a) The local currency is backed up by the national currency (Real R$)). Basically, 
for each unit of social currency issued, there is a correspondent value in the 
national currency. 
b) The currency is issued with security measures (paper money, watermark, 
barcode and serial number) in order to avoid falsification.  
c) The currency circulates freely in local commerce; generally, those that use the 
social currency get a discount from businesses and producers to encourage 
the use of the currency in the municipality or neighborhood. 
d) Any producer, shopkeeper or entrepreneur that is registered in the community 
bank will be allowed to exchange the social currency for the national currency 
(Real R$) if he or she needs to buy or make a payment outside of the 
municipality or neighborhood.  
 
Through the partnership with Banco do Brasil, the Instituto Banco Palmas  organizes 
and manages a credit fund, which transfers a start-up sum of 30,000 R$ for each 
new community bank that is created. Furthermore, Banco do Brasil has also made 
available the software that it uses to monitor the activities of each bank, in order to 
avoid mistakes by correcting possible distortions. In this way, out of the thirty-five 
community banks integrated in the Brazilian network, thirty use the same credit fund 
and are linked by a computer program.  
From the legal point of view, each community bank functions as a Civil Society 
Organization of Public Interest (OSCIP) of Micro-credit.  Instituto Banco Palmas acts 
as an umbrella organization; it manages the network which provides legal support to 
all the community banks, the majority of which are just local associations with no 
institutional structure.  
As part of being an OSCIP, Instituto Banco Palmas can establish partnerships 
with the public sector and official banks, generating resources and technologies for 
the benefit of the community banks that are part of the network.  
 
Starting up a new Community Bank  
For a new community bank to be created three factors are necessary/essential: 
1. Local mobilization and a community organization process, and a strong, 
motivated civil society institution to manage the bank.  
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2. Availability of premises and infrastructure provided by a local partner, usually 
municipal City Halls. 
3. Organization of training sessions for the agents, credit managers and cashiers, in 
addition to  the sensitization of the local economic actors to join the initiative 
 
It is the responsibility of Insitituto Palmas to certify the creation of a new community 
bank and to communicate the creation of a new social currency to the Central Bank, 
even though other organizations that take part in the Brazilian Network of Community 
Banks also facilitate training and consulting services in other states.  
 
Next steps for Community Banks 
Despite the financial crisis the Brazilian Network of Community Banks continues to 
grow all over Brazil. With its decentralized model and broad social supervision, 
focused on the balance between local production and consumption, it has already 
had an impact on the lives of more than 200,000 people.  
 
After so many successful initiatives a new set of goals has been defined for the 
future.  
 
1. To create 1000 banks by the end of 2010 of which 300 should be in the north-east 
of Brazil. 
2. To have at least one community bank in each state of Brazil by the end of 2009. 
3. Develop a legal framework for community banks; a bill Nº 93/2007 supported by 
congresswoman Luiza Erundina. 
4. To set up the Centro Palmas de Refêrencia, a place to train future employees of 
the bank.  
5. To train 200 technicians in community banks by the end of 2009. 
6. To obtain 10 million R$ to fund the community banks with low interest rates and 
long-term repayments 
7. To help 2 million Brazilians benefit from proper financial services by the end of 
2010. 
8. To create the Latin-American Network of Community Banks. 
 
The Insitituto Palmas is aware that in order to accomplish these goals a broad 
process of training, mobilization and community organization throughout Brazil will be 
necessary. To find organized areas and properly trained and empowered community 
leaders are the biggest challenges faced by community banks. Despite the best 
efforts by different social movements, taking into consideration our vast territory, 
there are still very few organized communities in Brazil. Of these, only a few give 
economic issues priority. The vast majority of local organizations are focused on 
initiatives such as, inter alia, the regularizaçao fundiária moradia (right to build and 
own a home), access to health services, education, and human rights.  
The economic issue, focused on financial and banking exclusion, remains 
distant from social movements, almost a taboo. The economy is viewed as just for 
economists, a hard topic that is almost never found amongst the priorities of local 
organizations. However, an example for the popularization of this type of initiative is 
being practiced outside Brazil.  
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In March 2008, the Palmas Institute signed a Memorandum of Understanding for 
social and economic cooperation with the Ministry of Popular Power for the 
Communal Economy of the Venezuelan Government.  
As part of this agreement, the Instituto Banco Palmas trained a team of 30 
technicians of the Venezuelan government in the methodology of the community 
banks and they established a visit schedule for monitoring and training in Venezuela. 
At the same time, the government of Hugo Chavez passed the Law of the Communal 
Banks, which provides that for each organization of 200 families a Communal 
Council can be created to form a community establishment. This process has 
resulted in the foundation of 3,600 community banks in different states of Venezuela.  
Thus, a priority for the Brazilian Network of Community Banks is the creation of a 
legal framework of a similar nature in Brazil. An important step towards this goal is 
the already mentioned bill Nº 93/2007 by Congresswoman Luiza Erundiana, which is 
being discussed at the National Congress. The text provides for the creation of the 
National Segment of Popular and Solidarity Finances. Its approval will constitute a 
great leap forward in the democratization of the Brazilian financial system – or more 
importantly – for the financial and banking inclusion of more than half the Brazilian 
population that continues to have no access to commercial (public or private) banks. 
A look at the current international state of affairs encourages us to reflect that 
this alternative way to understand the world of finance, starting at the local 
community, stands out as an alternative to the globalized exclusion and speculation 
so present in the current global financial system. We believe that the poor, when 
empowered, become the solution; they are capable of creating their own financial 
system, in harmony with the local culture, strengthening neighbourhood relationships 
and cooperation. 
It is not our objective to create a movement for the elimination of the current 
financial system. On the contrary we aspire to start a global crusade for the 
broadening of financial and banking services. It has been proved that commercial 
banks (public or private) only reach a small part of the world’s population, leaving the 
poor outside of the financial system. Thus, our model becomes essential; it is more 
democratic, humane, and inclusive. After all, it is named community bank because 
the common-unity itself is the owner of the bank.  
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xvii. Tax Havens: Tax Evasion, Regulatory Avoidance 
and Uneven Globalization98 
By Christian Chavagneux99, Richard Murphy100, Ronen Palan101 
 
 
In September 2007, only a month after the beginning of one of the most devastating 
financial crisis ever experienced, the British bank, Northern Rock, was on the brink of 
collapse. Northern Rock had expanded rapidly prior to its failure, funding its growth 
as an aggressive player in the international market for Collaterized Debt Obligations 
(CDOs) and emerging as the fifth-largest mortgage provider in the UK. Those bonds 
were, however, issued not by Northern Rock itself but by what became known as its 
shadow company, Granite Master Issuer plc and associates. What was intriguing 
about the arrangement was that Granite was owned not by Northern Rock but by a 
UK charitable trust established by Northern Rock.  Much of the management of the 
resulting, supposedly independent, structure was located in Jersey, well known as a 
European tax haven.  
In March 2008 came the collapse of Bear Stearns, a leading American 
investment bank. Bear Stearns had haemorrhaged funds through its hedge funds, 
many of them registered in the Cayman Islands and Dublin’s International Financial 
Centre - both well-known offshore finance centres.   
This was not a coincidence. If you think of tax havens as sun-kissed exotic 
islands reminiscent of the Garden of Eden where a few billionaires, Mafiosi, and 
corrupt autocrats hide their ill-gotten gains, then think again. Tax havens are the 
underlying constant theme of the financial crisis of 2008-9. Lehman Brothers, the 
next to fall (its collapse triggered a month of financial panic throughout the world), 
was registered in Delaware, a state that has served as an internal tax haven in the 
United States since the late 19th century. The Lehman collapse was followed by the 
Madoff scandal, a supposed $US 50 billion Ponzi scheme orchestrated by the well-
known Wall-Street financier, Bernard Madoff.  It took little time to discover a link 
between Madoff’s scam and tax havens’. ‘Madoff Spotlight Turns to Role of Offshore 
Funds’, announced the New York Times (30 December 2008) 
We do not suggest that tax havens caused the financial crisis of 2008-9, but 
we do believe that they were one of the most important actors precipitating the crisis. 
We argue that their regulation is key to any future plan to stabilize financial markets.  
We are not alone. The French, German and British governments, and the 
administration of President Barack Obama, are all keen to pressure these havens, for 
the sake of stability and, not unnaturally, for other, more traditional reasons as well. 
For tax havens are places where one can avoid or evade at least one of life’s 
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absolute certainties, taxes, and so they leave a gaping hole in most states’ finances. 
Tax havens also help those who use them escape other regulations, launder money, 
hide money from partners or spouses and secure secrecy for their commercial 
activities.  
Individually tax havens may appear small and insignificant, but in combination 
they play an important role in the world economy in two respects. Firstly, they 
undermine the regulatory and taxation processes of the mainstream states by the 
provision of what may be described as 'get out of regulation free' cards to banks and 
other financial institutions, to international business, and to wealthy individuals. 
Secondly, in doing so they skew the distribution of costs and benefits of globalization 
in favour of a global elite and to the detriment of the vast majority of the population. In 
that sense tax havens are at the very heart of globalization, or at least the heart of 
the specific type of globalization that we have witnessed over the past three decades. 
 
Money, wealth and tax havens  
The names of offshore jurisdictions have appeared with  monotonous regularity in 
every financial crisis or scandal that has erupted over the past 20 years, whether 
financial crises in East Asia, Russia and Argentina or the corporate fiascos 
associated with companies such as Long Term Capital Management, Parmalat, 
Refco, Enron, and more recently Northern Rock, Bear Stearns and Madoff’s Ponzi 
scheme.  
The sense of fiasco perhaps reached its pinnacle when it was revealed in 
February 2008 that a dog named Günter joined 1,400 of his fellow German citizens 
(most of the conventional homo sapiens variety) and set up anonymous trusts 
managed by Liechtenstein's LGT bank to avoid German taxation (Dinmore and 
Williamson, 2008).  But relatively unknown banks in very small havens were not 
alone in pursuing such activity: in June 2008, an employee of UBS, the premier 
Swiss bank, pleaded guilty to helping a Russian oligarch evade millions of dollars’ 
worth of taxes in the United States. In November 2008 a senior Swiss-based 
employee of the same bank was indicted on charges of tax evasion in the USA. The 
UBS employee estimated that $20 billion of assets were involved and the total fee 
income to UBS each year might have amounted to $200 million. He stated that UBS 
chose to ignore regulations with regard to the operation of offshore accounts for its 
U.S. clients and in the process facilitated tax evasion. 
The evidence is clear that tax havens and the tax evasion that at least some of 
them facilitate are serious business. At some point quantitative growth accumulates 
to a qualitative change, and the impressive figures associated with tax havens 
suggest that they play an important if often overlooked role in the contemporary 
world. We hope that anyone who still believes that tax havens are a mere sideshow, 
the playground of the rich and famous, will think differently after they read this book.  
The statistics are certainly impressive. In our estimate there are between 46 
and 60 active tax havens in the world right now; they are home to an estimated two 
million international business companies (IBCs), a term used to describe a 
bewildering array of corporate entities, most of them extremely opaque, and 
thousands upon thousands (if not millions) of trusts, mutual funds, hedge funds, and 
captive insurance companies. About 50% of all international bank lending and 30% of 
the world’s stock of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) are registered in these 
jurisdictions. Some very small islands are among the world’s largest financial centres: 
the Caymans, a small set of islands in the Caribbean and a British Overseas 
Territory, is the fifth-largest international financial centre in the world. That list 
153 
contains, in addition, the small British Crown jurisdictions of Jersey, Guernsey and 
the Isle of Man, as well as what we call intermediate havens, such as Switzerland, 
Luxembourg, Ireland and Singapore.  
The global rich - the ‘Richistanis’ as Frank (2007) calls them - hold between 
them approximately US $12 trillion of their wealth in tax havens. It is as if the entire 
U.S. annual Gross National Product (GNP) were parked in tax havens.  
The hedge fund industry has discovered the delights of tax havens. According to 
some estimates the ‘big four’ Caribbean havens - the Caymans Islands, the British 
Virgin islands, Bermuda and the Bahamas - are home to 52% of the world’s hedge 
fund industry. But these figures are disputed. The Cayman Financial Services 
Authority claims that 35% of the world’s hedge fund industry is located in its territory 
alone (Cayman Islands Monetary Authority (CIMA) figures as reported in GAO 2008) 
and some cite an improbably high figure of 80%. This unresolved debate is 
disconcerting: it shows how little we really know about the hedge fund industry. 
The statistics are staggering, but these are only numbers and numbers need 
interpretation. What these figures represent can be captured in one word: avoidance. 
They are the abstract expression of the collective efforts of the state, corporate and 
business elites of the world to avoid the very laws and regulations which they have 
collectively designed. 
Such elites seek to avoid, first and foremost, taxation. They seek to avoid or 
reduce their share in the collective effort that pays for the ‘collective goods’ provided 
(or supposedly provided) by states, such as security, economic, political and social 
stability, health, education and infrastructure. However, elites also seek to avoid 
regulations. The regulations they seek to avoid are often the financial and business 
rules and norms that states introduced to maintain order and stability-without which 
the rich would not have become so rich in the first place. Tax havens allow people to 
manage many other, more esoteric social regulations, among them the avoidance of 
gambling and pornography laws.  
Granted, not all taxes and regulations are necessary or socially beneficial. Not 
long ago, most advanced capitalist countries heavily regulated their broadcasting 
industries, allowing only state-sponsored broadcasting companies to operate. The 
growth of offshore radio stations such as Radio Luxembourg and Radio Caroline, 
both of which operated on the tax haven principle (Palan 2003), appears in retrospect 
to have been a beneficial development. Here, ‘offshore’ proved to be a modernizing 
force compelling governments to abandon intrusive regulations. Broadcasting, 
however, is uniquely accessible to all. In most cases - indeed, in all the cases 
discussed in this book - entry barriers to the range of benefits offered by tax havens 
are high, limiting their clientele to a small and extremely wealthy minority. As a result, 
unfortunately, tax havens benefit the rich and the powerful, while the costs are largely 
borne by the rest of society.  
This is the crux of the matter and what makes tax havens a highly political 
issue. Tax havens are among the most significant, if persistently overlooked, 
structural factors that are determining the distribution of the benefits and costs of 
globalization among the world’s peoples. That they skew the benefits of globalization 
to favour a small minority of the world’s rich and powerful is a matter of the highest 
political importance. 
We can find examples of people taking advantage of collective goods for 
private pleasure at every level of society, of course, from the poorest to the richest. 
The tax haven phenomenon, however, and the figures cited above are testament to 
this, and is a massive organized attempt by the richest and most powerful to take 
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advantage of collective goods on a scale rarely seen; and it is, perhaps for the first 
time, taking place globally. Tax havens are, therefore, at the heart of a particular type 
of globalization; globalization that is characterized by a growing gap between the 
very rich and everyone else. Such globalization is neither necessary nor inevitable.  
Rather it is a product of a complex set of factors, key among which has been lenient 
and forgiving attitudes toward tax havens that have characterized international 
politics (and most especially those in which the United States has been involved).  
 
What are tax havens? 
It is not easy to define tax havens. At this point we suggest that tax havens are 
places or countries (not all of them are sovereign states) that have sufficient 
autonomy to write their own tax, finance and other laws and regulations. They all take 
advantage of this autonomy to create legislation designed to assist non-resident 
persons or corporations to avoid the regulatory obligations imposed upon them in the 
places where those non-resident people undertake the substance of their economic 
transactions.  
An additional characteristic that most tax havens share is an environment of 
secrecy that allows the user of structures created under local law to do so either  
completely anonymously, or largely so.  
The third common characteristic is ease and affordability in gaining access to 
the entities incorporated in the territory. 
 
Evasion and avoidance 
Tax havens are used, as their name suggests, for tax avoidance and evasion 
purposes. However, these two terms are often confused and so some clarification is 
essential at this stage. 
Individuals and companies just about anywhere in the world have the 
opportunity to undertake what might be described as ‘tax planning’ within the law of 
the territory in which they live or operate. For the vast majority of the world’s 
population, however, including most people in advanced industrialized countries with 
reasonable wages, the concept of ‘tax planning’ is largely meaningless: tax is 
normally deducted at source from earnings, and that is more or less that with regard 
to the settlement of tax liabilities.  
For the wealthy minority of the world’s population and for most companies, tax 
planning is, in contrast, an important part of their business and personal lives. There 
is even a special term to describe the life experience of some: they are called PTs, 
the ‘permanent tourists’ or those who are for tax purposes the ‘permanently not there’ 
(Maurer 1998). This is an extreme, however, and in practice tax experts distinguish 
between three basic approaches to tax strategy.   
The first is ‘Tax compliance’. This happens when a company or an individual 
seeks to comply with tax law in all the countries in which they operate, makes full 
disclosure of all relevant information on all their tax claims and seeks to pay the right 
amount of tax required by law (but no more) at the right time and in the right place 
where ‘right’ means that the economic substance of their transactions is consistent 
with the form in which they are declared. These people are considered tax compliant. 
At the other end of the scale is tax evasion. Tax evasion is an illegal activity 
undertaken to reduce an individual or company’s tax bill. It occurs when a taxpayer 
fails to declare all or part of his or her income or makes a claim to offset an expense 
against taxable income that he or she did not incur or were not allowed to claim for 
tax purposes. Tax evasion is a criminal offence in most countries but a civil offence in 
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a minority of countries, such as Switzerland and Liechtenstein. The difference is 
significant. Countries cannot legally cooperate in civil matters and hence the Swiss 
authorities’ most common response to other countries’ requests for assistance in 
cases connected to tax evasion has been that eager and keen as they are to stamp 
out such unsavoury practices, sadly they are unable to cooperate because tax 
evasion is a civil matter in the Swiss Federation. Their hands are therefore tied, and 
Switzerland, is of course, a democracy.  
This characteristic response has been highlighted in recent events. In 2008, 
when massive tax evasion through highly secretive Liechtenstein foundations was 
made public, a Liechtenstein spokesperson explained how surprised and 
disappointed they were to ‘learn’ that these secret foundations, set up under a law 
passed in 1926, could be abused by foreigners for tax evasion purposes. 
Liechtenstein, she said, was perhaps a tad naïve, believing that most people in the 
world would behave just like its own citizens and would cheerfully pay all taxes due - 
but naivety, she said, was not a crime. The implication was clear: Liechtenstein 
wished us to believe that it was taken for a ride by these nasty foreigners. 
Liechtenstein had been known for nearly a century as one of the world’s most 
secretive tax havens and was associated with a string of scandals. Few were 
deceived by the response. 
Finally, there is tax avoidance. Tax avoidance is the grey area between tax 
compliance and tax evasion. This is the favourite area occupied by an army of 
accountants, lawyers, bankers and tax experts. Strictly speaking, a tax avoiding 
individual or a company seeks to ensure that one of three things happens. First, they 
might seek to pay less tax than might be required by a reasonable interpretation of a 
country’s law. Second, they might hope that tax is paid on profits declared in a 
country other than where they were really earned.  Third, they might arrange to pay 
tax somewhat later than when the profits were earned. 
Legally, there is a clear difference between evasion and avoidance. Tax 
professionals like to cite a series of court rulings, mainly from the major countries in 
the world, which appear to support the legality of tax avoidance. The reality, however, 
is more complicated. First, the tax rules of almost every country are complex, and 
much avoidance relies on the existence of doubt. Second, when transactions take 
place across international boundaries in a world that has no global tax rules, the 
opportunities to play off the taxation law of one state against that of another (a 
process that tax professionals call ‘arbitrage’) is often difficult to resist. The 
consequence is that the line differentiating tax evasion from avoidance is often too 
difficult to determine in general terms, and is way beyond the ability of most of those 
who participate in tax haven practice to either know or understand - a fact that the tax 
professional can easily exploit. For that reason, we talk of avoidance and evasion 
without significant differentiation, relying in doing so on the maxim of former UK 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Dennis Healey who famously described the difference 
between the two as being ‘the thickness of a prison wall’. 
How much tax is evaded through tax havens? The most candid and accurate 
answer we can give is that nobody knows. But as States feel that they are losing 
more and more tax receipts, some figures have been coming out. Richard Murphy 
calculates that annual avoidance in the UK is about £97 billion – 16.6% of expected 
tax receipts or 6% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The IRS believes that the US 
tax gap is about $330 billion a year or 16% of federal revenue and 2% of GDP. 
Official figures in France indicate that the French state loses 40-50 billion euros a 
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year, roughly 3% of GDP. The European Union estimates the tax gap for the entire 
Union at 2-2.5 percent of GDP. The numbers at stake are very high. 
 
Tax havens and the professionals  
The debates on tax havens rarely acknowledge one crucial factor: the role played 
throughout the years by commercial firms of accountants, lawyers, bankers and tax 
experts that service them.  
The biggest accounting firms, together with lawyers and bankers, tax experts 
and financial traders, plus their associated trust and corporate services companies, 
are to be found in most tax havens, but most prominently in the thirty or so largest 
jurisdictions.  These professionals are crucial: as far as we can tell, they were 
present at each and every legislative innovation designed to avoid tax and regulation. 
They advised and coaxed the politicians to provide the legislation they needed to 
pursue their trade, and on occasions they drafted that legislation for the states in 
which they had located themselves. The professionals have also been present in 
each and every redrafting of the laws of offshore, while the professionals are the 
ones who actually set up the offshore facilities that such legislation enables; the 
professionals innovate new techniques of evasion and avoidance, which they sell to 
clients; the professionals lobby against changes in the laws against tax havens; the 
professionals are also there to argue that tax havens are an entirely legitimate form 
of business.  
The professionals are therefore absolutely irreplaceable, for they ensure that 
the business of tax havens flourishes. Most tax havens are very small jurisdictions 
and do not have the manpower and skills to operate on a global scale. The State of 
Jersey provides a perfect example. Probably few if any members of the State of 
Jersey have any real understanding of how ‘the offshore finance community’ within 
Jersey works or what it is its denizens really do. They are simply a legislature for hire, 
doing what is asked of them. So, for example, Jersey’s obnoxious Trust Law of 2006 
was passed without a vote since no one objected, or as far as we can tell even 
commented on it, in that Island’s State Assembly. But legislators did do exactly what 
was asked of them: they provided what the local financial services industry 
demanded. In so doing they implied their understanding of something very simple 
and straightforward: that in exchange for legislation the tax havens collect revenue 
from some activities that the offshore community brings into their jurisdiction without 
encountering any obvious costs. It seems to be a win-win situation serving the 
interests of all, and so why spend time on the boring details of trust laws?  
These professionals make up the so-called Offshore Financial Centre (OFC) 
community. They are international, transient, and interested only in following the 
money. If for any reason the money leaves a tax haven, you can be fairly sure that 
the OFC community will follow it. The perfect example of this type of behaviour is 
found among the Big Four accountant firms, which are all, almost without exception, 
present in all the world’s significant tax havens, including the most abusive. The 
people who service these firms are rarely local, and, it is now becoming increasingly 
clear, they rarely integrate into the local community. They service a client base that is 
almost never local, unless it be the local lawyers who are servicing offshore clients, 
and their reason for being there has little to do with geography but everything to do 
with the money flows they are managing.  
Precisely because these people are transient, they have little real regard for 
local regulation. They may pay lip service to it as part of their costs of operation, but 
they can also afford to ignore it, as they evidently did in the case of UBS in the United 
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States, some of the consequences of which we have already noted. Their belief is 
simple: if a problem of compliance were to arise, they could simply move on. As a 
result, compliance is not a real issue for them, and that is why, we suggest, it is 
obvious that despite the theoretical soundness of the local regulatory systems, actual 
compliance rates are so low. 
Any effective regulation of the offshore world (a hot topic of debate for the past 
decade, and likely to be equally hot in the next), would require not just that tax 
havens be regulated, but that the professional operators be regulated as well - and 
not just with regard to what they do in such places, but with regard to what they 
facilitate. They will resist such moves, but this is a battle that must be won. Not only 
because tax havens are not really home to the vast amount of money that the figures 
suggest. They are very largely ‘recording havens’ or, to use the jargon, ‘booking 
centres’ that serve as legal domains for the registration of contractual relationships 
that take place elsewhere (although they collect license fees and other revenues in 
return). The staggering statistics belie the fact that at heart, tax havens are largely a 
fiction, one almighty fictional world that is aimed at one thing: at the avoidance of 
taxation and regulation in the world in which the transactions they record actually 
take place or have real impact. Their activity is entirely parasitic, feeding on both the 
world economy and the system of states. That is why tax havens are one of the most 
important political issues of our times. 
 
Regulatory responses to tax havens 
The astonishing statistics associated with tax havens tell us, therefore, that they have 
played a central role in skewing developments in the world economy in two ways. 
First that they have helped to undermine the international financial regulatory 
environment, as well as the taxation policies of all those countries and regions that 
participate in globalization, as well as those that do not.  Second, that in doing so, 
they have served collectively as a vehicle for skewing the allocation of costs and 
benefits of globalization.  The degree to which modern business, large and small, 
have become embedded in tax havens, while astounding, is rarely acknowledged. An 
international company or business with no links to a tax haven is a rare species 
nowadays. But the impact of tax havens is felt largely indirectly, revealed through the 
statistics that show a persistent growth in the gap between rich and poor since the 
1980s all over the world.  The role that tax havens are playing in undermining 
financial regulations has come to light only recently.  
Yet, all this was known for a while. How could the leading industrial countries 
allow these small jurisdictions to rise and flourish? Well, they did and did not. On the 
one hand, countries such as the US, the UK, France and Germany sought from time 
to time to close certain loopholes, pressurizing this or that tax haven to change some 
of its rules and policies. There were also some feeble attempts, dating back to the 
interwar period to try and develop a coordinated international response to tax 
havens. But frankly, not much was accomplished. Worse, the very same countries, 
with the possible exception of France and Germany after WWII, were indeed major 
players, as we will see, in the development of the tax haven phenomenon. 
For a number of reasons, however, the sentiment has begun to change 
towards the end of the 1990s. Since then a number of initiatives, led initially by the 
OECD ‘harmful tax competition’ campaign, began to gather steam. In 2006, however, 
Jason Sharman (2006) exposed these efforts largely as futile in an excellent detailed 
analysis. Yet, only three years later, it appears that tax havens are under greater 
threat today than ever.  
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While concern with tax havens has gone on a long time, the full impact of tax havens 
on the world economy took a long time to mature and may have dawned first on the 
leaders of the European Union. While the OECD campaign was largely in a 
doldrums, the EU has emerged as the effective leader in the global struggle against 
tax havens.  
Since 1997 a Code of Conduct on Business Taxation is in place. The code 
does not have the status of a legal instrument, but it provides an informal approach to 
regulation which is proving surprisingly effective (Radaelli 2003). In adopting this 
code, member states work to eliminate several harmful tax competition practices and 
avoid new ones. Whereas the OECD campaign is limited to financial and other 
services, the EU Code looks at business activities in general, with greater emphasis 
on mobile activities. It thereby avoids charges of a bias against mobile capital lodged 
by Luxembourg and Switzerland. The code of conduct also overturned another 
traditional objection of tax havens. To avoid the charge of imperialism, the code does 
not elaborate a principle of “just taxation” and impose it on recalcitrant states. 
Instead, taking a line adopted by the OECD, the code accepts the principle of tax 
competition, allowing states freedom of choice in this matter. However, the EU insists 
that the tax regime’s rules be applied equally on all businesses in the jurisdiction, 
domestic and foreign. The Code targets the practice whereby non-residents are 
provided ‘a more favourable tax treatment than that which is generally available in 
the Member State concerned’.  
The code confronts, therefore, jurisdictions that have created a niche for 
themselves in the global economy precisely by distinguishing resident and non-
resident companies for tax purposes. Citing the code, for example, in 2006 the 
Commission forced Luxembourg to abandon its 1929 holding companies. Similarly, 
the adoption of new tax regimes by Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man from 2008 
onward (notably the 0% tax rate on business profits) may be taken to task for not 
respecting the code. 
The EU is also pushing for the harmonization of company taxation across the 
continent. Multinational companies with subsidiaries in more than one European 
country pay taxes in countries where they operate, but they tend to shift profits to the 
lowest-tax country through complex systems of transfer pricing. The EU is proposing 
a European-wide tax base that would reduce the incentives to shift profits by applying 
a “formulary apportionment.” In this process group profits will be taxed just once in 
the EU and tax revenues distributed among countries according to an agreed 
criterion (e.g., amount of capital invested or sales turnover) as is already done 
between states in the United States and between provinces in Canada. The 
Commission gave itself until 2008 to come up with a directive for company taxation, 
but the Irish 2008 no vote in the referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, partially won on 
the claim that the EU supposedly threatens the Irish tax system, has delayed the 
directive. 
Any state can serve effectively as a tax haven by sheltering savings from 
taxation. The EU put forward a clear set of proposals to deal with this sort of abuse 
as well. Since July 2005 all member states are required to exchange information with 
the relevant national authorities. Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg retained their 
bank secrecy rules but are required to impose a withholding tax on earnings from 
deposits starting at a rate of 15% from 2005 to 2008, rising to 20% from 2008 to 
2010, and to 35% thereafter. The Liechtenstein affair in early 2008 reinforced France 
and Germany’s resolve to increase the scope of the European Savings directive and 
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European states are now engaged in negotiations to determine an extended 
directive. 
Is the mantle of the driving political force against tax havens likely to pass to 
the USA with the Obama administration?  The issue was certainly known to both the 
Clinton and the George W Bush administrations, and the Clinton administration was 
one of the drivers of the multilateral efforts against tax havens.  But one of the first 
acts of the Bush administration was to withdraw support from multilateral efforts to 
combat harmful tax competition.  President Obama, however, has already played an 
important role as a Senator in various initiatives to combat tax havens and some 
declarations he made by the end of 2008 seem to confirm his political will to clamp 
down on tax havens. Whether the US will emerge as an ally of some of the leading 
European states such as France and Germany in the fight against tax havens is still 
to be seen. But it will be amongst the most important political choices made by the 
Obama administration with regard to the regulation of international finance. 
 
The next step in the battle against tax havens  
It is very obvious that the world’s tax havens have a significant impact upon its 
economies and the distribution of income and resources both within those economies 
and between states. What then are the most crucial next steps in the battle against 
tax havens? 
The answer, we argue, at this point is secrecy. Without the deliberate veil of 
secrecy that tax havens create, those using tax havens for the purpose of tax and 
regulatory avoidance would be readily identifiable, and as such would either desist 
from doing so of their own volition, either for fear of the effect on their reputation or 
from fear of prosecution, or they could actually be prevented from doing so by the 
states in which they really undertake their economic activities. Tackling secrecy, 
however, is likely to be insufficient by itself. There remain legacy issues arising from 
the existing international architecture which will have to be addressed as well. Our 
recommendations are clustered around these two themes. 
Secrecy is created within tax havens under the pretence that as sovereign 
jurisdictions, it is their sovereign right to write their laws as they wish. The impact of 
these provisions, however, is felt outside tax havens. Those who wish to address 
secrecy have a choice: they can either try to break the secrecy that these 
jurisdictions create from within those places, or they can seek to break it in the places 
where it has impact, or finally they can try to work around the issue. Despite 
tremendous pressure from civil society groups, tax havens have been very reluctant 
until now to give up their secrecy provisions. We do not believe that they are likely to 
change their position on the matter in the short term, particularly when reform in the 
United Kingdom, Delaware, Nevada and other locations appears to be a necessary 
prerequisite of any action in the secrecy jurisdictions. 
As a consequence the attempts to break this secrecy from outside these 
jurisdictions are at present receiving greater attention. One line of attack consists of a 
proposed extension of the EU Savings Tax Directive. This directive was a substantial 
step forward, as we saw, but it was limited in its impact because all privately owned 
trusts and companies were excluded from its scope. In December 2008 the EU 
published a proposed revision to the Directive. In what can only be described as a 
bold move, it has sought to link together the information that banks must hold on the 
beneficial ownership of the entities with which they contract and the obligation to 
either automatically exchange information with the country of residence of the 
beneficial owner of an account, or to withhold tax of up to 35% from payments made 
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as an alternative. This requirement will apply to all paying agents who operate within 
the EU, and any additional states that apply this directive. This proposal, in effect, 
means that the actual beneficial owners of those entities located in tax havens must 
be known and indentified. Offshore entities, such as International Business 
Companies, or offshore trusts, will be treated for tax purposes as being located in the 
countries where the beneficial owners are. Information will then be exchanged with 
the countries where the beneficial owners are, by-passing the jurisdictions where the 
entities are registered. The entities include both companies and trusts and all other 
similar structures.  
This is an extraordinary breakthrough: it basically sweeps aside all the tax 
planning that is undertaken offshore and says that the entities in question are owned 
by and must be taxed in the countries in which they really reside. There are, of 
course, obstacles to progress: the Directive must be supported by all EU states and it 
is not clear that support does exist as yet, with particular opposition coming from 
Luxembourg, but the mere presence of this proposal gives a clear indication of the 
direction of travel in which the EU wishes to proceed. 
Similar indication is available from the USA. The Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act is 
drafted legislation before the U.S. Senate, but has the advantage of having President 
Barack Obama's name on it from the time when he served in that body. The 
fundamental presumption of the pack is that the person who engages with a tax 
haven entity has control of it, enjoys the benefit of its income and has the duty to 
declare that income in the USA unless they can prove the contrary. Legislation with 
similar intent has been tabled in Germany in January 2009 as well, whilst Germany is 
also seeking to deny tax relief on payments made to tax haven entities, even if within 
commercial groups of companies. In both cases, this is a blunt legislation that has 
the effect of presuming the taxpayer guilty until proven innocent! No doubt, this 
approach is likely be the basis on which it is criticised.  
Another approach to tackling secrecy has been proposed for multinational 
corporations. With minor exceptions, the vast majority of corporations have to 
prepare accounts in accordance with the requirements of the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) or its US equivalent, the Federal Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB). Under the rules of both bodies, multinational corporations 
at present do have to submit consolidated accounts to their members. These 
eliminate all intra-group transactions from view, including transfer pricing. In addition, 
under the now common rules issued by the two bodies, almost no geographical 
reporting of the transactions of the entity is required. As a result it is almost 
impossible to establish where a multinational group of companies trades, where it 
makes its profit, where it locates its assets and where it pays its tax.  
Civil society groups, led by the Publish What You Pay coalition and the Tax 
Justice Network have argued that these corporations should be required to account 
on a country by country basis, meaning that they would report their sales by location, 
both the party and intragroup, their costs on a similar basis, where they employ their 
staff and what they pay them on the country basis, and by country what profit they 
make, what tax they pay what assets they have located in that place. Their argument 
is that this reform would substantially reduce shareholder risk; that it would enhance 
the allocation of assets and reduce the cost of capital within groups of companies 
and so bring economic benefits, and that it would make these corporations 
accountable for the actions they undertake in all countries in which they trade.  By 
arguing, however, that this disclosure should be made for all jurisdictions, without 
consideration of size or the volume of trade undertaken there, the disclosure would 
161 
also expose the use of secrecy jurisdictions by these groups, and for both third-party 
trading and poor intragroup transactions, with the latter having particular significance 
for transfer pricing issues, where it is thought that much of the tax abuse of 
developing countries is perpetrated.  
This proposal, in common with those from the EU, USA and Germany, works 
round the secrecy provisions offered by tax havens. Hence, the consent of those 
locations is not required for the policy to work, or for the accounting of these 
corporations for their actions within them to be put on public record. The direction of 
policy is indicative of the state of frustration that has been reached: negotiating for 
the reduction of secrecy in the jurisdictions is not working. It is widely acknowledged 
that the Tax Information Exchange Agreements that should supposedly ensure 
information exchange between those who have signed them and the major state 
participating partners is not giving rise to any meaningful exchange (just four 
exchanges had taken place between Jersey and the USA between 2002 and 2008) 
and therefore measures have to be taken to attack secrecy which do not require 
these places consent. 
That being said, considerable problems within the jurisdictions need to be 
addressed as well. There is an obvious and continuing problem with regard to the 
regulation of banking in these places. As has been shown by banking failures in 
Iceland, Ireland and the Isle of Man, the capacity of small governments to support the 
depositors of a bank that is failed is very limited. It exposes those who have acted in 
good faith to unnecessary risk, potentially burdens the population of these places 
with debts which they have not reasonably afforded, and ultimately transfers risk onto 
the rest of the banking system that suffers from the failure of counterparties to many 
of their transactions.  
Whilst it is true that very few independent banks indeed are actually located in 
the smaller secrecy jurisdictions, there does remain considerable risk in the tax 
havens where the ratio of banking assets to local GDP can be astronomical. In 
excess of 500:1 in the case of the Cayman Islands, and at least 80:1 in the case of 
Jersey. This is particularly troublesome to the United Kingdom who has responsibility 
for both those jurisdictions. Until very recently, banks have vigorously fought previous 
attempts to exchange information for taxation purposes: the major UK banks did so in 
the case of the 2007 exercise by HM Revenue & Customs that revealed that more 
than 40,000 of their customers in the Crown Dependencies were evading tax. But as 
a consequence of the financial meltdown of 2007-9, many banks in many countries 
are now at least part state-owned. The attitudes by those banks towards information 
exchange may therefore change.  
In the same vein, it has also been suggested that regulatory reform might 
require that the parent company directors of these banks be responsible for the 
activities of their tax haven subsidiaries. In addition, the major financial centres have 
to decide if they wish to bring the funds, notionally resident in tax havens inside a 
domain for regulatory purposes on the basis that the funds management is located 
within their territory. Their right to do so is obvious: as the liquidation of hedge funds 
managed by Bear Stearns in the Cayman Islands revealed, there was no local 
substance to the Cayman Islands management of these entities; all decisions were 
taken in New York. If that is true for liquidation purposes, it is equally true for 
regulatory purposes: it is up to the regulators to make this point, and to claim their 
right to regulate these entities which would then become substantially more 
transparent as a consequence. All these reforms follow the familiar theme, noted 
above, of imposing control from outside the tax havens. 
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Some of those jurisdictions will refuse to cooperate. It is apparent that many 
have reacted to previous attempts to regulate them by promoting yet more secrecy, 
providing ever more sophisticated and obscure financial entities. This trend may well 
continue in some locations, such as Panama, Dubai and Singapore which remain 
largely outside the political control of other states which have made clear their 
commitment as the basis of their financial services industry. 
For these states, sanctions are needed to ensure their compliance with 
internationally agreed standards of conduct. The cost of financial failure has now 
been identified, and its imposition upon the ordinary taxpayer of the world will in due 
course be quantified. As a result it is likely that the political will to reduce risks will be 
substantial. Those small states that refuse to participate in that process are likely to 
be the subject of considerable pressure. Many will succumb relatively easily. For 
example, all those jurisdictions under the influence of the United Kingdom will almost 
certainly be brought within the regulatory environment as a result of EU action. 
Others, such as Bermuda and Switzerland are clearly in the US sight lines. As they 
are targeted, the pressure on the remaining secrecy jurisdictions will increase. Then, 
and only then, will sanctions be imposed because the chance of further additional 
capital flight to another location will be eliminated as the number of available 
territories is reduced at that time. 
How far away is this? It is hard to tell. Few would have predicted the progress 
in the battle against secrecy abuse that has been seen in 2008, or the change in the 
political climate that it created. The progress of the initiatives that have resulted will 
depend, in no small part, upon the severity of the recession in which the world now 
finds itself. But if, as expected, the impact of that recession will be long-lasting then 
the progress of these initiatives will be rapid simply because the governments of the 
world will need all the resources they can muster to support the creation of a new 
financial architecture in which stable banking institutions can trade. As their 
experience of owning banks progresses they will realise that the use of the capital 
that they provide to support secrecy jurisdiction transactions is not in their best 
interests. Then we can expect change. It might come as a result, sooner than anyone 
might have predicted. There is nothing like self-interest to spur action. 
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xviii. The case for Europe as a Global Rule-setter 
By Pervenche Berès102 
 
 
The economic crisis or the failure of the model of deregulation: 
The crisis that has been unfolding since the summer of 2007, first on the US financial 
market before spreading globally, hitting our economies and causing major social 
consequences, has shown how deeply intertwined the global economy has become. 
It has made the case for global governance, including all-encompassing regulation 
and multilateral surveillance. It also re-opens the pending debate between supporters 
of self-regulation or business-friendly attitudes on the one side, and partisans of 
public intervention on the other side. Finally, the crisis triggers a reflexion on how to 
organise the checks and balances of the global financial system.  
These debates were biased for a long time, because the advocates of market 
regulation were accused of hindering financial innovation which is seen as a major 
source of investment for the economy, and of chasing away capital through over-
regulation. The financial innovation of the last years has undoubtedly enabled a 
considerable development of financing mechanisms for the economy. But it has also 
brought about a financialization of the economy that in a period of cheap money 
didn’t result in an optimal allocation of capital. Capital looked for high returns first 
before thinking about long term investments that are essential for our economy to 
adapt to the vast challenges posed by globalisation, demographic ageing and climate 
change.  
Today this crisis brings back to the agenda simple but healthy principles that 
had been forgotten; especially that high profit often bears high risks. After the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system, 30 years of financial liberalisation on the 
global scale and ten years of cheap money that was driven by politics and promoted 
by the international organisations, this system has reached its limits. It is the end of 
the Reagan-Thatcher decades that have brought us to this real first crisis at the heart 
of the system. It shows that markets can’t be trusted to settle things on their own; 
they need rules within which to evolve. That is why I am deeply convinced that we 
socialists are actually the best allies of well functioning markets. We should act as 
regulators and not mere facilitators of market mechanisms and we must always keep 
in mind the global picture and long term objectives. Liberals perceive self-regulation 
as better regulation, but in doing so they are mislead.  Markets are neither perfect, 
nor tend towards equilibrium. They are blind. Instead they follow cycles, oscillating 
between booms and busts. Future regulatory and supervisory frameworks must build 
on this "changed economic paradigm" instead of continuing to ignore it!  
But there is more to the current crisis than the extraordinary melt down of 
financial capitalism gone mad due to a lack of structures. The deadly spiral of the US 
housing bubble fed by an illusionary faith in ever increasing real-estate prices, and a 
criminal distribution of credit, is only the symptom of a more complex phenomenon. 
This phenomenon is a short-sighted abuse of the factors that are at the heart of 
globalisation: communication and transport innovations. These innovations have led 
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to joint ventures with Western companies where goods are produced at low prices 
and low environmental standards; they are then shipped back and sold on the 
domestic markets.   
This massive movement of outsourcing has transformed China into a global 
manufacturing workshop. It puts wages under pressure, especially in the US, where 
the device to keep the economy, -i.e. consumption, growing, was the development of 
credit and indebtedness. This has created dramatic global imbalances where the 
richest nation in the world, the US, lives on credit on the expense of one of the 
poorest nations in the world, namely China.  As we can witness now, this situation 
was highly unsustainable. 
  Today the large stimulus packages launched by the new US administration 
are welcomed as a great relief by the rest of the world that relies greatly on American 
growth. It is true that in the short run, they will contribute to getting the economy 
started again and towards recovery, but one has to be aware that this kind of 
intervention, if it is not very carefully designed, will only reproduce the causes and 
mechanisms that have lead to the current crisis. We urgently need to find a 
sustainable exit strategy, because one thing is certain, a return to the status quo ante 
is not an option! 
The lesson to be learned from this tectonic move we are experiencing today is 
that we need strong multilateral surveillance mechanisms, including monetary 
policies in all countries, if we are to avoid the development of such bubbles and 
global imbalances in future. 
It is this clash between both mechanisms on the micro and the 
macroeconomic level that lead to the mess we are currently in. Our answer therefore 
cannot consist merely of stimulus packages to revive industries from the past, or in 
capital injections for banks in distress.  It has to be more comprehensive and address 
the system as a whole.  
Tomorrow’s model, which I call “the second age of globalisation”, will be 
marked by the return of inflation, whereas in the last ten years globalisation has on 
the contrary led to a decrease of inflation. This should lead to real adjustments, such 
as a radical change in US consumption patterns which challenges the distribution of 
wealth, the development of another growth model for China more focussed on its 
internal market, a rise in influence of the euro as a reserve currency and a return to 
regulation and supervision of the financial markets. But these developments won’t 
take place without public intervention to direct and to shape them. No supranational 
entity is better prepared to play a leading role in this new age of rule-setting than the 
European Union.  
 
Thoughts about regulation: 
Today, the tools of normalisation and regulation have become major issues in the 
global competition. They can be used as a protective and sometimes even 
protectionist weapon. But the quality of regulation can also become an asset serving 
the strategy of a financial centre. This is a major field of competition between the EU 
and the US, and at present, international discussions are organised around the 
regulation drafted by these two regions. 
One might wonder why and how alternative models to regulation, such as 
codes of conduct or self-regulation developed at all.  For me, the explanation lies 
firstly in the complexity of technological developments and innovations. At some 
point, the legislator no longer had the necessary level of expertise required to impose 
rules on new developments and therefore gave way to professionals who necessarily 
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had vested interests in the norms they produced. It is, to some extent, the credit 
rating agencies’ conflict of interest, between an advisory function and a rating activity, 
transposed at a more global level.  By giving up on his normative role in order to 
promote industry friendly regulation by private actors, the legislator also abandoned 
his role of promoter of the general interest; this led to an effective privatisation of 
regulation and a complacency vis-à-vis the development of tax havens. 
A second set of explanations regarding the emergence of alternative means of 
regulation is that the public authority was lagging behind the economic actors’ global 
development. This is strikingly true in the whole debate around supervision. We are 
faced with cross-border, multinational conglomerates that no longer fit into the 
traditional categories of national and sector regulation.  Their activities don’t fall 
within the remit of one single entity with the power and the means to monitor them. 
This raises a double set of questions: how to regulate and supervise such actors so 
that the totality of their activities is covered, and to what extent does this imply 
transfers of sovereignty? Are governments ready to give up some sovereignty for the 
sake of efficient supervision and regulation and what do they ask in return for this 
transfer of sovereignty? 
In the turbulent times we are going through, some governments pretend to 
take action by resorting to protectionist tools. But these are an illusion because the 
crisis is global and because for one country’s economy to start exporting again, its 
neighbour’s internal market must also be in recovery. In a situation where the public 
opinion remains focused on domestic debates and politicians see the remit of their 
actions and of their careers only in the national arena, this kind of reflex can easily be 
understood. But it doesn’t provide us with efficient and sustainable answers. It is up 
to us as socialists to take the risk of long term and global initiatives. After all, 
internationalism has always been one of our founding principles and therefore we 
should be the ones to gear our actions to this end, remembering at the same time 
that we can never give up the short-term issues on which people expect us to deliver.   
In doing so, I believe that three aspects need to be taken into account in 
elaborating a new means of regulation: 
The first element is that there ought to be a new balance between actors. All 
stake-holders have to be taken into account when rules are drafted. Rules can’t rely 
on the expertise of the industry itself, but must reflect the concerns of consumers, 
users, employees alike. Taking the interests of all stakeholders into account is the 
only guarantee that a long-term dimension of action will be considered and that we 
put an end to short-term visions and behaviours. 
Secondly, there needs to be a global, supranational authority in charge of the 
implementation of global financial regulation. It can’t be that norms are negotiated in 
international forums and that afterwards only some of the participants apply them. 
This undermines the authority of the principles and standards that have been drafted. 
Upholding multi-speed regulations and regulatory loopholes creates an unlevel 
playing field and fragilizes the entire system.  
Beyond the question of how to draw up regulations, it is crucial to ensure that 
they are implemented and respected. 
 
The example of accounting standards: 
The dilemmas and challenges posed by the attempts at global rule-setting are 
perfectly illustrated by the example of international accounting standards (IFRS). This 
topic is not known by the wider public because it wrongly seems to refer to a rather 
technical and complex topic. But in reality, accounting standards have the primary 
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task of promoting transparency in financial reporting and the development and 
effective functioning of capital markets, the guarantee of avoiding pro-cyclicality and 
insuring financial market stability as well as preventing systemic risk. 
Around the 70’s, there was an awareness at the European level that 
companies active on the (not yet finalised) single market needed to present their 
accounts in a standard format. The difficulty of this task was two-fold: harmonising 
national practices and finding an answer to the lack of standards that would have the 
capacity to reflect the complexity of the operations that were involved. The existing 
national accounting standards were not able to address this issue. At the time, some 
argued in favour of taking over the British or even the American standards. But 
instead of copy-pasting them, Europe made a daring move and decided to overcome 
its internal diversity and contradictions by enabling the drafting of international 
accounting standards. This was very attractive at the time as it was already clear that 
the future horizon of activity would be global. To a certain extent, this can be seen as 
the precursor to globalisation. From the start the United States developed an interest 
in this strategy and took an active part in the setup of the institutional framework in 
charge of drafting those new standards, notably around the concept of fair value. 
Some of these institutions were even based in New York.  
As financial reporting involves highly public decision-making powers that have 
a major impact on many other areas of financial and even tax law, democratic 
legitimacy must ensure that the interests of all those affected are suitably 
represented and balanced in a transparent procedure using fair rules.   
On the European side however, the Commission appeared to lack the human 
resources and expertise to take the lead in this process and therefore left it up to 
sector professionals. This means that no public authority defined the European 
interest in the process to ensure that the concerns of all stakeholders were taken into 
consideration. Moreover, the budget of these private normative institutions was 
funded by the private sector, which even further deprives the public authorities of 
power, influence and control. This is the first example of self-regulation in global 
capitalism. Whereas in other areas the Commission did take the initiative of drafting 
the rules that the EU needed even at times exporting them to the rest of the world, 
here, in the specific case of accounting standards, this activity was outsourced to a 
private body. The EU decision to oblige publicly traded EU companies to use 
international accounting standards from 2005 onwards significantly changed the 
context for the IASCF/IASB, which became a quasi law-maker, at least for the EU, 
because on the other side of the Atlantic, the US authorities took the view that IFRS, 
even though actively co-drafted by them, are not compatible with their own norms, 
the US GAAP (Generally Agreed Accounting Principles) and therefore refused to 
apply them.  
Two lessons can be drawn from this case study. The first one is a positive 
one, because it shows where the power of the EU lies today. Indeed, since the 
generalisation of IFRS, the industry has called for endorsement of the IFRS in the 
US.   
The second lesson to be drawn is less positive and sheds light on how we can 
improve in future. The lack of involvement on the part of public authorities in this 
whole process of drafting international accounting standards explains the current 
debates about the governance and the accountability of the IASB (International 
Accounting Standards Board), their integration in the global framework of financial 
governance and how to organise the European representation in its realm. Progress 
is finally under way, as the European Commission, after many calls from the 
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European Parliament, is now proposing to partly fund the international institutions 
that draft these standards which would increase its oversight over these institutions 
and their work. But this is only a first step and the whole issue of international 
accounting standards should be discussed on a political level in the framework of the 
G20 negotiations that will, hopefully, deliver profound changes in the international 
financial architecture. 
A further example can be found in the case of credit rating agencies. Rating 
agencies perform a public role. Their task is to enlighten the markets. The ongoing 
financial turmoil has highlighted several concerns about rating agencies that the 
European Parliament has already voiced103: conflict of interest, governance, reliability 
of ratings and rating of complex financial products. Transparency and understanding 
of underlying risks, in particular of complex financial products, need to be 
considerably enhanced. These concerns have been known for a long time and to 
avoid an unwelcome intrusion from legislators, the industry agreed on the 
introduction of a voluntary code of conduct in December 2004 under the auspices of 
the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). But the crisis has 
proven this code of conduct to be as ineffective as past ones.  
In the end, the European Commission, which had been rather reluctant to 
address the issues that the European Parliament pointed out five years ago, put a 
proposal on the table to address them104. The 3 big credit rating agencies that benefit 
from a quasi monopoly in their field deploy a lot of lobbying efforts to minimise the 
effects of this legislation and argue that a global activity like theirs can’t be regulated 
locally. I strongly reject this argument and hope that the EU will put enough pressure 
on the G20 to deliver concrete results in terms of the regulation of credit rating 
agencies. It will be even more legitimate to do so if it manages to reach an 
agreement over the Commission's proposal beforehand. All this will take political 
voluntarism, a willingness to take action and a sense of responsibility that are 
mandated by the dramatic nature of the crisis. Moreover, the argument put forward 
by the industry, namely that ratings once issued are global by nature, only reinforces 
my strong conviction that such global goods or services have to be regulated very 
carefully. 
The last point I wish to mention regarding credit rating agencies is the 
following one: beyond the huge responsibility they bear in the organisation and the 
functioning of markets, they also exert an abnormal influence on public authorities 
when rating sovereign debt. How can it be that private institutions that are sharing a 
market through a quasi monopoly and whose methodology and conflict of interests 
are largely questioned can put governments under pressure and influence structural 
reforms by threatening to downgrade the rating of their debt?  
One solution to this problem that is largely debated today on the EU level is 
the common issuance of debt, so-called euro-bonds. This would be an interesting 
solution that I call for, but it doesn’t solve the principle problem of private institutions 
exerting a lucrative activity that puts democratically elected governments under 
pressure. 
In these times when anything is possible, we as progressives should be bold 
enough to say that this system can’t be right and that it doesn’t serve the general 
interest of the people. We should call for an overhaul of public debt ratings so that it 
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is put in the hands of public authorities such as a national and/or the European Court 
of Auditors. 
Because the market has set the wrong incentives, another area where 
socialists should take the lead and call for global or at least European regulation is in 
the area of remunerations. I believe that market discipline and financial institutions' 
corporate governance and incentive models (compensation) need to be revamped. 
Their short-termism has been a strong fuel for the entire system. Financial institutions 
should disclose their remuneration policy, in particular the remuneration and 
compensation packages of directors. Furthermore, disclosure and transparency 
should be combined with a requirement for supervisors to look into the remuneration 
packages of financial institutions, and if necessary require the supervisors to act. In 
their assessment of risk management, prudent supervisors should take into account 
the influence of remuneration, bonus schemes and taxation to ensure that they 
contain balanced incentives and do not encourage extreme risk-taking. Today we are 
told that this is not possible because of competition concerns. I agree that setting 
such rules on company or even national levels would distort competition and push 
top-executives to look for better conditions in other companies or abroad. That’s why 
I'm convinced that for this purpose guidelines should be designed at the European 
level. Here again, this should serve as a baseline for negotiation at the global level. 
It is my strong belief that the crisis we are witnessing can’t be solved by 
conventional tools. It is not a cyclical crisis, but a systemic one. A qualitative change 
is needed and I am convinced that we as socialists have the right grid of analysis and 
tools to offer. The principles guiding our actions are that public authorities need to 
take back the lead in global standard-setting, that Parliaments can ensure that the 
executive takes this role seriously, and that Europe can be a motor in this process.   
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xix. Finance, Crisis, and the Real Economy 
By Prabhat Patnaik 105 
 
 
The crisis that is currently afflicting the capitalist world economy is commonly seen as 
an aberration. This aberration, it is argued, became possible because of the lack of 
adequate regulatory mechanisms with regard to the financial sector. The crisis could 
have been avoided with impunity if only sufficient safeguards, such as supervision 
and regulation of the financial sector, had been put in place. It represents an 
avoidable “system failure”.  
My purpose here is to argue that the current financial crisis represents not a 
failure of the system but the system itself, that it is the result of the modus operandi 
of contemporary capitalism rather than being unrelated or extraneous to it. The view 
that such crises are part of the modus operandi of modern capitalism is not some 
idiosyncrasy on my part; on the contrary it was central to Keynes’ analysis. And 
accordingly, those who argue that the crisis constitutes an aberration or a system 
failure, even though many of them advocate Keynesian remedies to get out of it in 
the present circumstances, are being at best “contingent Keynesians”. There is 
nothing wrong with being a “contingent Keynesian”. This fact should be noted; as 
should the fact that Keynes’ deep insights into the capitalist system have not yet 
been fully utilized in order to comprehend the current crisis. 
Having developed his short-period theory of employment, Keynes sought in 
The General Theory to insert it into a theory of the trade cycle, and in doing so he 
observed an important characteristic of the cycle. He wrote: “There is, however, 
another characteristic of what we call the Trade Cycle which our explanation must 
cover if it is to be adequate; namely, the phenomenon of the crisis- the substitution of 
a downward tendency in favour of an upward tendency is often sudden and violent, 
whereas there is, as a rule, no such sharp turning point when an upward tendency is 
substituted by a downward one” (1949, 314)106. He saw the crisis as being endemic 
to the system, not an aberration in its functioning; as one of its essential 
characteristics as opposed to a symptom of its failure. He attributed the crisis to a 
sudden collapse in the marginal efficiency of capital, which in turn was related to the 
phenomenon of speculation. 
He defined “speculation” as distinct from “enterprise” as follows: “If I may 
appropriate the term speculation for the activity of forecasting the psychology of the 
market, and the term enterprise for the activity of forecasting the prospective yield of 
assets over their whole life, it is by no means always the case that speculation 
predominates over enterprise. As the organization of investment markets improves, 
the risk of the predominance of speculation does, however, increase” (1949, 158). 
Speculators in short are concerned, according to him, “not with what an investment is 
really worth to a man who buys it ‘for keeps’, but what the market will value it at, 
under the influence of mass psychology, three months or a year hence” (1949, 155). 
                                                 
105Dr. Prabhat Patnaik,  Sukhamoy Chakravarty Chair, Centre for Economic Studies and Planning, 
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi  
106 All quotations from Keynes are taken from the 1949 edition of The General Theory of Employment, 
Interest and Money, Macmillan, London. The page numbers are given in brackets. 
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Now, monetarist writers, whose views have come to dominate the economics 
profession in the period of neo-liberalism, see speculation as price-stabilizing in asset 
markets, and hence as an altogether benign phenomenon. And, precisely because it 
is a benign phenomenon, it has little analytical significance for explaining booms and 
crises. Speculation according to Keynes however did not give rise to asset-market 
stabilization but to bouts of euphoria or “speculative excitement” as he called it. And 
he was right; speculation in real life is far from being asset-price-stabilizing.  
This is obvious from two recent examples. Oil prices which rose to an 
incredible $140 per barrel in early 2008, had crashed to as low as $35 per barrel 
within less than a year. Likewise the stock markets in “Emerging Market Economies” 
have moved within the space of a few months in the most volatile manner. In India for 
example, the stock-exchange price index, the Sensex, which was escalating by 
almost a thousand points a week to reach 21000 just a few months ago, has now 
crashed to less than 9000. Neither the earlier escalation nor the current collapse can 
be explained by any non-speculative factors, i.e. by any hypothesis that holds 
speculation to be price-stabilizing. The same is true about the incredible rise and fall 
in oil prices. 
Speculation generates bouts of euphoria or “speculative excitement” which 
have the effect of pushing up asset prices in a cumulative manner. An initial rise in 
some asset prices, no matter what the cause, gives rise to expectations of a further 
rise, and hence to an increase in the demand for the assets in question which 
actually contributes to raising their prices further; therefore, the process feeds upon 
itself and we have asset price “bubbles”. Such “bubbles” typically characterize 
financial assets, which have low carrying costs and hence are more prone to 
speculation; but they are not confined to financial assets alone (as the housing 
market “bubble” in the United States has demonstrated). 
Such “bubbles” have an obvious impact on the real economy. The rise in asset 
prices fed by speculative euphoria improves, for the individuals who own these 
assets, the estimation of the position of their wealth, and hence causes an increase 
in their consumption expenditure, and as a consequence an increase in employment. 
Likewise such a rise in asset prices, where the assets in question are producible, 
causes an increase in investment expenditure on those assets, which leads to their 
larger production, and hence to more employment. In short, speculative euphoria in 
the asset markets leads to a situation where the boom of the real economy, 
stimulated by whatever had caused the initial rise in asset prices, becomes more 
pronounced/prolonged. Or, putting it differently, speculation acts as a “super 
multiplier” (to use a term coined by the English economist John Hicks) or “compound 
multiplier” (as Polish economist Oskar Lange put it) upon the real economy. 
Speculation itself does not engender the boom; but it contributes to a prolongation of 
the boom by the euphoria it generates.  
However, if for some reason the asset price increase wanes or comes to a 
halt, speculators attempt to sell off the assets in question causing a crash in the 
asset prices. This causes a reduction in consumption expenditure (because of the 
wealth effect), a collapse in the inducement to invest (since the price of the capital 
asset falls below its cost of production); a collapse in the state of credit, as banks 
face insolvency; and even a possible collapse in the inclination of depositors for 
holding bank deposits, which was the case during the Great Depression. In short, 
there is no longer any confidence in holding claims upon others, and hence a 
corresponding increase in liquidity preference; i.e. there is a disinclination to hold any 
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asset other than pure cash.  Not all crises display this severity; but to a greater or 
lesser extent these features mark any crisis. 
Speculation therefore has the effect of making the boom more pronounced 
and/or prolonged; but it also has the effect of precipitating a crisis as distinct from a 
mere cyclical downturn. In the absence of speculation the boom in the real economy 
will be a much more truncated and tame affair. But precisely, because it is not a tame 
affair it is followed by a crisis. 
Two conclusions can be drawn from the above analysis based on Keynes. 
First, since speculation is endemic to modern “free market” capitalism, where 
financial markets play a major role, speculation-engendered euphoria and the 
consequent pronounced booms, together with crises, in the sense that Keynes had 
defined them, are also endemic to modern capitalism. “Bubbles” constitute in other 
words the modus operandi of the system. Secondly, if “Bubbles” must  be eliminated 
and speculation curbed, then it is not enough to put in place some regulatory 
mechanisms; an alternative instrument for generating pronounced booms in the real 
economy has to be found; otherwise, the economy would remain more or less 
perennially sunk in stagnation and mass unemployment.  
The contrast between Keynes and Dennis Robertson, a well-known 
Cambridge economist who was a younger contemporary of his, on this question is 
instructive. Robertson had argued that to eliminate the trade cycle, and hence by 
implication the rigors of the crisis, monetary policy should aim at increasing the rate 
of interest to truncate the boom deliberately; that is, whenever employment rose 
above the average level of the past decade or so, monetary policy should 
deliberately aim at preventing such an increase; and likewise whenever employment 
threatened to fall below this average level, monetary policy should be used to counter 
such a fall. Robertson thought that full employment was an “impractical ideal”, but 
monetary policy of this sort, while stabilizing employment at some level less than full 
employment, might well do so at an average that was higher than what would 
actually be obtained on average if the trade cycle ran its full course. Keynes was 
sceptical about this last proposition, and indeed thought that the opposite was more 
likely. But, above all, he felt that such an outlook was “dangerously and 
unnecessarily defeatist. It recommends, or at least assumes, for permanent 
acceptance too much that is defective in our existing economic scheme” (1949, 327).  
Instead, what he suggested was that government policy should aim to achieve 
full employment; his suggestion was that when “disillusion” came, and with it the 
“error of pessimism” that threatened a collapse of the boom, monetary policy should 
aim at lowering the rate of interest to keep the boom going. “Thus the remedy for the 
boom”, he wrote, “is not a higher rate of interest but a lower rate of interest! For that 
may enable the so-called boom to last. The right remedy for the trade cycle is not to 
be found in abolishing booms and keeping us permanently in a semi-slump; but in 
abolishing slumps and thus keeping us permanently in a quasi-boom” (1949, 322). 
But, above all, taking the economy close to full employment and keeping it there was 
not a task exclusively of monetary policy; fiscal policy had to be used in addition, with 
the State playing a pro-active role in demand management. Keynes in short wanted 
the regime of “bubbles-led growth” such as characterized so-called “free market 
capitalism” in the era of finance to be replaced by a regime of State-led growth or 
fiscally-stimulated and fiscally-sustained growth107. 
                                                 
107 In drawing this contrast I do not mean that the “bubbles” are not themselves fiscally-aided. The 
dotcom and the housing bubbles in the U.S. for instance were aided by significant tax concessions by 
the government. But there is a difference between fiscal aid for a “bubble” and fiscally-sustained 
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The fact that finance capital would oppose such State intervention in demand 
management, or what he called the “socialization of investment”, was anticipated by 
Keynes, hence his remark about the need for the “euthanasia of the rentier”. After all, 
when Lloyd George, who had been the British Prime Minister during the first world 
war, had put forward a proposal on Keynes’ advice in 1929 for public works financed 
by government borrowing to mitigate unemployment, which was already quite high by 
then in Britain, the British Treasury, under the influence of the financial interests 
represented by the City of London, had come out in opposition to it. This “Treasury 
View”, which upheld that any such borrowing-financed public works project would 
“crowd out” private investment, to use a contemporary phrase, had called forth, by 
way of intellectual rebuttal, an article by Keynes’ pupil Richard Kahn in the Economic 
Journal in 1931, which can be considered the first salvo of the “Keynesian 
Revolution”. Keynes was thus familiar with the opposition of the financial interests to 
his proposals.  
Keynesian “demand management” managed to overcome this opposition and 
gain currency only in the post-war period, when there was a changed correlation of 
class forces all over the world, with finance capital in retreat and with working class 
movements, whether expressed through Communist or Social Democratic 
movements, in the ascendancy. This conjuncture however, even though it lasted for 
well over two decades, finally had to change. Finance capital, strengthened over 
time, even during the period of Keynesian demand management, by what Marx had 
called the process of “centralization of capital”, eventually acquired the nature of 
international finance capital, through a process of “globalization of finance”. As a 
consequence, the incompatibility between the caprices of finance capital and State 
intervention in demand management became insurmountable. With “globalization”, 
the caprices of such international finance capital necessarily had to triumph over 
whatever autonomous predilections the nation-State had, otherwise, there would 
have been capital flight from the economy in question; and this led to the demise of 
Keynesianism. 
But let us leave aside for a moment this changing historical conjuncture. The 
important analytical point that emerges from Keynes’ writing is that in the absence of 
State intervention in demand management through the use of fiscal means, the 
process of growth under capitalism is bound up with the existence of “bubbles”. 
Bouts of speculative excitement followed by “disillusion” and “errors of pessimism” 
are the hallmark of capitalist dynamics. Hence periods in capitalism which are not 
characterized by Keynesian demand management, which means both the pre-war 
years and the post-“Keynesian” years of neo-liberal policies under “globalization”, 
would necessarily be characterized by “bubbles-sustained growth”, in which case 
“crises” cannot be seen as constituting “aberrations” or “system failure” but must be 
seen as the system itself.  
Not to do so amounts to analyzing the neo-liberal epoch as if it were still 
characterized by pro-active Keynesian State intervention; it is to miss the distinction 
between the “Keynesian” and “neo-liberal” periods of post-war capitalism. In the 
Keynesian period, a financial crisis of the current sort would indeed have been an 
aberration; and it is not surprising that the first major financial crisis to hit the 
capitalist world occurred only in 1973 (i.e. after the “Keynesian” era had ended, with 
                                                                                                                                                        
growth, which typically involves the erection of a regime that tries to restrict the formation of bubbles 
through regulatory measures.  
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the introduction inter alia of free financial inflows among major capitalist countries). 
But under the “neo-liberal” dispensation it is the rule, exactly as Keynes had argued.  
It follows that in the United States in the recent past if “sub-prime” loans had 
not been given, or if financial “oversight” had led to brakes on lending, or if the rate of 
interest had not been lowered, then the boom would have come to an end much 
sooner than it did, and unemployment would have increased much earlier. True, the 
crisis would not have been as severe or sharp as it has turned out to be, but the price 
paid for a possibly less severe crisis would have been a less pronounced or sooner 
truncated boom. After all, Alan Greenspan was doing exactly what Keynes had 
suggested, namely to keep the boom going by lowering the interest rate, so that 
either the old “bubble” continued or some new “bubble” was generated that would 
take the place of the bursting old one. The fact that the “housing bubble” that was 
stimulated by the decline in the interest rate enforced by Greenspan kept the boom 
going even after the “dotcom bubble” had collapsed only vindicated Greenspan’s 
position.  
Of course any prolongation of the boom in this manner brings with it the 
danger of a more severe crisis attending its collapse, but then the real panacea for it 
is not the truncation of the boom but its sustenance through other means, in 
particular fiscal means. In short, it is not enough to say that “sub-prime lending 
should have been avoided” or that “the interest rate should not have been steadily 
lowered” or that “financial regulation should have been tighter”. All these statements 
have to be accompanied by some alternative suggestions for prolonging the boom; 
and these would necessarily have to focus on fiscal effort, exactly the way that fiscal 
effort is being emphasized now as the way out of the crisis by the “contingent 
Keynesians”. To what extent, and under what other concomitant conditions, the U.S. 
would have been able to substitute fiscal effort for financial laxity as the means of 
sustaining the boom, especially in view of the “leakage” abroad of the impact of any 
fiscal stimulus because of its large import propensity, is a matter that need not 
concern us here. But the point is that, since financial laxity played a role in sustaining 
the boom, merely debunking it as the cause of the crisis is inadequate108. 
Putting it differently, since the so-called “system failure” could not have been 
avoided with impunity; it is misleading to call it a “system failure”. Rather it is the 
system itself which was at the root of the trouble. The “system” itself could of course 
have been replaced by an alternative “system”, State-led as opposed to “bubbles”-led 
growth. But that would have meant going back to the era of Keynesian demand 
management, which the advanced capitalist countries, pursuing neo-liberal policies, 
                                                 
108 This should not be taken to mean that fiscally-sustained booms, which overcome the syndrome of 
bubbles and the bursting of bubbles, can for that reason last forever. They obviously cannot, but what 
constitutes the limit to such booms is a matter that need not detain us here. One possible limit is the 
emergence of supply constraints, especially when the possibility of obtaining primary commodities 
gratis from the colonies via what economic historians have called the “drain of surplus” through 
taxation is no longer available; such supply constraints can result in extremely high rates of inflation in 
the presence of speculation. The last section of this paper discusses such speculation-engendered 
inflation. To prevent such speculation a “Keynesian demand management regime” must ensure social 
control over the financial sector. In other words, “socialization of investment” requires as a necessary 
complement “social control over the financial sector”. Even if this is assured, a fiscally-sustained boom 
will still not last for ever because of class reasons, such as class conflict over distributive shares, and 
the undermining of the discipline that capital imposes on labour. See M.Kalecki, “Some Political 
Aspects of Full Employment” in Selected Essays on the Dynamics of the capitalist Economy, 
Cambridge, 1971; R.E.Rowthorn, “Conflict, Inflation and Money”, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 
1970; and P.Patnaik, Accumulation and Stability Under Capitalism, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997.    
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including the policy of “sound finance”109, under pressure from international finance 
capital, had already abandoned. 
To argue the “system failure” or “aberration” thesis presupposes that the 
“aberration” did not contribute anything positive to the real economy; that in its 
absence the system would have performed almost equally well. In short, it amounts 
to saying that the system itself can perform adequately without these “aberrations” 
and hence also avoid crises, but these “aberrations” gratuitously superimposed upon 
the system because of lack of “oversight” and lack of regulation, even while not 
contributing anything positive to the functioning of the system, contribute towards a 
“system failure” and a resulting crisis. It also suggests that Keynesian measures are 
needed only because of this “system failure”, since once the crisis has hit the system 
the normal monetary policy instruments cease to work; but in the absence of such 
“system failure” these normal monetary policy measures are quite adequate for the 
system. 
Paul Krugman, currently a strong advocate of a Keynesian fiscal stimulus, is 
quite explicit on this. He argues for instance that the “Treasury View”, which held that 
a fiscal deficit “crowded out” private investment and which Kahn had criticized in his 
famous1931 article, “makes good sense” in normal times. His argument is not of the 
simpliste kind which holds that the interest rate equilibrates the demand for and 
supply of “savings”, or of “loanable funds” or some other flow variable, and that a 
fiscal deficit, by increasing the demand for such a flow variable, “crowds out” private 
investment. On the contrary he sees the interest rate as being determined by 
monetary policy. But he argues that even in the case of an accommodative monetary 
policy, i.e. even if the short-term rate of interest, which is fixed by the monetary 
authorities, is kept unchanged, the long-term interest rate will nonetheless rise in the 
event of larger government borrowing. This is because the long-term interest rate is 
determined by the expected average of short-term rates, and people expect the 
short-term rate to be jacked up in the wake of the fiscal deficit’s increasing the level 
of activity. 
Since this is supposed to happen in “normal” circumstances, let us now focus 
exclusively on “normal” circumstances. In such circumstances, people will expect the 
short-term interest rate to be raised only if there is no full “crowding out”, i.e. only if 
the level of activity increases in the wake of the fiscal deficit. But in such a case the 
total magnitude of profits, and hence the rate of profit, will also increase which will 
push the marginal efficiency of capital schedule outwards. If this happens then 
despite people expecting the short-term interest rate to rise in the future, there will be 
no reason why there will be any crowding out at all. In other words, if we assume full 
“crowding out” then there is no reason why the interest rate should at all be expected 
to rise and hence for any crowding out to occur at all, which invalidates our 
assumption; on the other hand, if we assume partial “crowding out” then the rate of 
profit must increase which implies that even if the rate of interest is expected to 
increase there need be no crowding out at all. Thus whichever way we look at it, the 
argument is flawed, and reflects the discomfort of contemporary economists, even 
radical ones, with Keynesianism. 
                                                 
 
109 The U.S., being the leading capitalist power whose currency is still considered “as good as gold” by 
the world’s wealth-holders, is not obliged to follow policies of “sound finance”, since capital flight will 
scarcely occur from the U.S. Indeed the U.S. has often run up substantial fiscal deficits even when the 
other capitalist countries were being obliged to restrict their fiscal deficits. But even in the U.S. there is 
a perennial pressure for fiscal “prudence” in the contemporary period. 
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Krugman argues for a Keynesian fiscal stimulus in the current situation, because he 
contends that, the advanced capitalist economies are in a “liquidity trap” where there 
is no expectation of a rise in the interest rate in the foreseeable future, and hence no 
question of any “crowding out”. But since private spending is not sufficiently 
forthcoming, a fiscal stimulus is essential.  
This illustrates what I call “contingent Keynesianism”, that in “normal” times we 
do not need Keynesian fiscal stimulus because the economy performs adequately 
without it. But only when an “aberration” occurs, of the sort we currently have, a 
Keynesian fiscal stimulus becomes necessary. But this distinction between “normal 
times” and periods of “crisis” resulting from “aberrations” is itself invalid. If in “normal” 
times fiscal stimuli are avoided because they supposedly ”crowd out” private 
investment, then such “normal times” must be characterized by “bubbles-led growth”, 
as Keynes had suggested, in which case the “crisis” must be seen as being 
embedded in such “normal times”. 
The “contingent Keynesian” argument restricts the application of 
Keynesianism to crisis periods alone (this is reminiscent of the Austrian economist 
Joseph Schumpeter’s concession to Keynesianism that it could be legitimately 
considered only as the economics of the “depression” period) when “sound finance” 
has to be abandoned because monetary policy ceases to work as the economy is 
caught in a “liquidity trap”. 
A word on the concept of the “liquidity trap” may not be amiss here, since it is 
commonly misunderstood. The usual interpretation of the concept, namely that at a 
certain interest rate the demand for money becomes infinitely elastic because bond 
prices are so high that everyone becomes a “bear”, is meaningless: if people still hold 
bonds at this interest rate, the question arises: why do they do so? And if they do not 
hold any bonds, i.e. all bonds are held by banks; in this case the idea of an infinitely 
elastic demand for money loses all meaning. The “liquidity trap” cannot be reflective 
of a state of equilibrium in wealth-holding decision, as the liquidity preference 
schedule is. Any point on this schedule shows the demand for money at a certain 
interest rate on the presumption that this demand is the aggregation of individual 
demands if every individual reaches equilibrium with regard to the form in which he or 
she holds his wealth at this interest rate. But this cannot be said of the “liquidity trap”. 
The “liquidity trap” is not reflective of a situation where every individual is in 
equilibrium with regard to his or her form of wealth-holding at the corresponding 
interest rate. The “liquidity trap” therefore can never be considered a part of the 
liquidity preference schedule, as is usually depicted in textbook diagrams. 
It can only be considered as a state of affairs arising in the context of a 
dynamic disequilibrium where, at the prevailing interest rate, people prefer holding 
money to holding bonds, but are content to hold their existing portfolios even if these 
are not optimal from their points of view. It is in other words a situation where the ex 
ante demand for money at the prevailing interest rate is higher than the ex post 
holding of money for all economic agents, including banks, but this fact does not alter 
the interest rate because agents are content to let this divergence persist. 
This situation of “excessive” liquidity preference typically is supposed to be 
unrelated to the state of the marginal efficiency of capital schedule, and the “liquidity 
trap rate of interest” is simply supposed to generate, given the state of the marginal 
efficiency of capital schedule, an amount of private investment that is way below 
what full employment, or even an adequate level of employment, warrants. But this 
understanding is erroneous. Liquidity preference and the state of the marginal 
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efficiency of capital schedule are themselves not unrelated, the desire to hold money 
being simply the obverse of the collapse of the marginal efficiency of capital 
schedule. 
This fact is missed by many writers who hold the existence of an 
independently given “liquidity trap” as the main reason why the self-equilibrating 
nature of the labour market may break down, i.e. why a crisis of persisting 
unemployment may arise. (Here we are talking about general perspectives and not 
specific explanations of the particular crisis of the present). The liquidity trap 
however, is not the cause of the crisis, in which case since the occurrence of such a 
weird phenomenon of excessive liquidity preference can be assumed to be rather 
rare, the crisis itself would be rather rare. It is on the contrary a result of the crisis, or 
more accurately a reflection of the crisis which as we saw earlier is endemic to the 
system and is marked by a collapse of the marginal efficiency of capital. 
Much of the monetarist critique of Keynesianism is based upon this 
misinterpretation of the “liquidity trap” as being the cause of the crisis, the “fly in the 
ointment” that alone can prevent the smooth self-adjustment of markets including the 
labour market. As long as the liquidity preference schedule is downward sloping and 
the interest rate can be pushed down with an increase in money supply in wage units 
(i.e. relative to the money wage), a money wage cut will always raise employment 
exactly as orthodox theory predicts. Only in a liquidity trap, however, things will be 
different. And if a liquidity trap represents such an extreme case that it is more 
curious than anything else, then all is well with orthodox theory. 
But this interpretation both of the “liquidity trap” and of Keynesianism is wrong. 
Once we see Keynes’ theory in the context of a cyclical process where the cycles are 
associated with the building up and bursting of speculative bubbles, then clearly 
“excessive” liquidity preference, characteristic of the crisis, or the bursting of the 
bubble, becomes a real life phenomenon. And when there is this excessive liquidity 
preference, captured in the concept of the “liquidity trap” neither monetary policy, nor 
any money wage cut can eliminate unemployment. The self-equilibrating market 
disappears into thin air.  
To be fair, the “contingent Keynesian” position perhaps sees the situation of 
“excessive” liquidity preference in this manner; but it attributes its emergence to 
aberrations rather than the very functioning of the market system in the context of 
speculation. But precisely because it is “contingent Keynesianism” its belief that the 
“normal” functioning of the market is smooth, weakens its own case vis-à-vis the 
orthodoxy. The fact that the idea of a coordinated fiscal stimulus by a group of 
advanced countries, which was an idea put forward by Keynes during the Great 
Depression (the same idea had been put forward by many others including several 
German Trade Unionists) and which was revived recently during the G-20 meeting, 
has been pushed into the background of late, is the result of pressure from 
international finance capital, and has therefore to do with material interests rather 
than with intellectual reasons. But the intellectual diffidence of “contingent 
Keynesianism”, which concedes to orthodoxy theory that its analysis is valid in 
“normal times”, certainly does not help its cause.  
So far, I have discussed only one aspect of speculation as it affects growth 
under contemporary capitalism. Let me now move on to another aspect. The boom 
creates inflationary pressures in critical primary commodities like oil. In the case of 
agricultural primary commodities, any inflationary pressures can be kept in check 
through the imposition of an “income deflation” on third world economies from which 
many of these agricultural primary commodities originate, and where there is much 
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absorption of all such commodities110. But in the case of oil, where the major 
producers are organized into a cartel, the question of imposing such income deflation 
simply does not arise. In the case of oil, and hence of such other commodities whose 
prices move in a manner complementary to oil, such as food-grains in the recent 
period because of the diversion of grains towards bio-fuels, the capitalist boom is 
associated with inflationary pressures which are aggravated by speculation. Even in 
the case of agricultural commodities, whose prices are not directly linked to the price 
of oil, speculation may still lead to substantial increases in their prices, 
notwithstanding the income deflation imposed on third world countries through the 
“neo-liberal” policies associated with globalization. 
In short, if in the boom speculation operates on prices of assets, especially 
financial assets which keep the boom going, it also operates on the prices of 
commodities, which threaten the boom and which in any case bring great hardships, 
even during the boom, to the ultimate users of such commodities. (The benefits of 
such speculative price rises of commodities scarcely accrue to the direct producers 
of such commodities, who, in general, are peasants and petty producers). It follows, 
that even if the world economy gets out of the current crisis of recession, that fact will 
only reopen the prospects of commodity price inflation. The recession caused by 
speculation is bad enough; but the inflation caused by speculation that follows in the 
wake of the world economy moving out of the recession will be scarcely better. 
Speculation in the area of international finance capital in short pushes 
capitalism into a crisis of a profound sort, where the “crisis” as Keynes saw it is 
embedded within an even deeper crisis, whose hallmark consists in the fact that 
overcoming the crisis of recession will almost immediately, or within a fairly short 
period, push the economy into commodity price inflation, especially oil price-inflation, 
which will have serious consequences for food-grain prices hence for mass hunger. 
The system’s space for operation shrinks drastically because of speculation in 
contemporary capitalism 
 
 
                                                 
110 For an explanation of the concept of “income deflation” and an elaboration of this argument, see 
P.Patnaik, “The Accumulation Process in the Period of Globalization”, www.netwrokideas.org 
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xx. From Global Financial Crisis to World Economic 
Crisis 
By Francisco Rodríguez Ortiz111 
 
 
1. Introduction: from financial crisis to the risk of wage deflation 
The 21st century started with favourable omens for developed capitalist countries. 
The organised labour movement was weakened and divided. Emerging economies 
were poised to take-off. The US was consolidating its financial, economic and military 
primacy. The European Union, lacking international political relevance, pursued its 
enlargement and culminated its path to integration with the introduction of a common 
currency, the Euro. Markets were in the midst of a strong drive for deregulation. 
Globalisation, increasingly driven by international finance, accorded the leading role 
to markets regulating themselves but only a secondary one to government 
intervention.   
However, the financial factor, which had taken the lead in shaping up the new 
economic order, was to become the triggering factor for the biggest crisis to shake 
capitalism since the Thirties. Financial crises are nothing new, but they tend to be 
more frequent and severe since the economy has become increasingly virtual and 
finance took on a life of its own away from the real economy. The current process of 
accumulation is no longer reliant on modernising production processes and social 
institutions, such as was the case under the Ford system. The markets tend to 
behave anarchically in the grasp of international finance which has been moving 
away from the real economy as the value of the whole array of financial instruments 
exceeds by far that of the underlying real assets on which they are based. 
Financial crises have become recurrent since the 90’s.  For instance, the 
Asian Crisis was a dark foreboding of how deep financial crisis can grow in a global 
system which is so little regulated and as opaque as the present one. 
As remarked by Stiglitz112, when short-term capital markets are liberalised 
prematurely, before the development of adequate supervisory bodies, they prompt 
banks to grant an exceedingly large amount of credit without due risk assessment, 
increasing the likelihood of financial crises and economic downturns. Financial crises 
have become inherent to the system. This situation should have paved the way for 
greater intervention by public authorities to help prevent and avert their spreading. 
Nowadays a financial crisis brought about by the excessive indebtedness or 
leveraging of credit institutions, companies and consumers, is coupled with a 
“classic” crisis which finds its roots in the necessary shedding of debt, the vanishing 
of the “wealth factor” linked to the plunge in the prices of movable and immovable 
assets, the retrenchment of investments, the deterioration of the labour market, 
tighter wage restrictions and morose consumption. These phenomena may only be 
partially offset by a drop in interest rates and bigger budget and fiscal stimuli. The 
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112 Stiglitz, Joseph: ”La reforma de la arquitectura económica mundial: lecciones derivadas de las 
últimas crisis”, Ekonomiaz, number 48, Vitoria 2008. taken from Journal of Finance, Volume 
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real economy was bound to fall into the trap created by globalised finances and, with 
a fallback effect at play, the financial sector is now in turn stricken by the adverse 
effects of the economic downturn.  
The current crisis shows another unique feature: not only is it global, having 
spread from the real estate to the credit sector and from there to all the economic 
sectors, but also because unlike the 1998 Asian crisis, its hard core is to be found in 
the leading capitalist countries, from where it radiates to the periphery. Contrary to 
the “decoupling” theory, emerging economies will be hard hit by an increasingly 
systemic crisis mirroring the cracks in the worldwide economic interdependency and 
the capital appreciation systems. 
Global as the crisis may be, the macroeconomic actions undertaken by 
governments have been lacking in coordination, as shown by the various choices 
used to manage monetary policy. As for the Euro-zone, not only had it to contend 
with the adverse fallout from the international crisis, but it also had to absorb the 
results of a mismatched monetary policy devised for an altogether different reality, 
plus being hamstrung by the inconsistencies in the Growth and Stability Pact and 
having to comply with a competition policy which hampers the rebuilding and 
dynamization of the industrial  fabric. Growth and stability are perceived113 to be 
paramount “public goods” for the achievement of full employment, economic and 
social cohesion, environmental protection, etc. 
Mistakes in macroeconomic policy and financial markets' regulation have triggered 
inadequate moves in the real estate and financial markets, all the more so since the 
risks stemming from a liquidity glut in the world had been underestimated. At a later 
stage, the various options to get out of the crisis might help in coalescing the forces 
most hostile to the legacy of the “European social model”. In a context of mass 
unemployment, the alibi of improving competitiveness as the way out of this crisis 
may well engender a growing challenge to the social gains won by workers in the 
more developed countries.  
As underlined by Aglietta114, the new competition conditions shift the brunt of 
the necessary adjustments to the wage earners. These wage restrictions will be all 
the more acute in the short term and will be explained away as being a requisite for 
improving the bottom line of businesses, notwithstanding its negative effect  on the 
spending capability of individuals. Our societies, plunged in a deep downturn, are 
less vocal about income redistribution and are showing a greater tolerance for 
inequality. And yet, underlying the present economic downturn and financial crisis, 
there lurk the abuses in the deregulation of labour markets, long taken to embody the 
very paragon of a rigid market. Developed countries seem to opt for a non- 
cooperative strategy of competitive wage deflation, although there is a danger that 
such restrictive wage policies end up fuelling the deflationary trends already 
underlying the new model of accumulation.  
The current crisis challenges the very feasibility of a financial model which is 
becoming more and more speculative. Employment will shrink, while consumption 
and investments will dwindle. The credit crisis will buttress the retrenching effects. 
Housing demand will retract further, and there will be a sharp decline in both their 
prices and employment figures. All of this will rebound negatively on the financial 
sector itself. 
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2. Factors which have triggered the international economic and 
financial crisis 
 
2.1. On Greenspan monetary policy and its economic effects  
Between 2001 and June 2004 US economic growth was encouraged by the 
accommodating monetary policy applied by the Federal Reserve. The Federal 
Reserve deployed a defensive strategy focused around offsetting the impact from the 
drop in stock exchange earnings through a promotion of the real estate and bond 
markets. Monetary policy had to furnish the financial system an ample supply of 
liquidity, stimulate expenditure by individuals and bring down investment costs. The 
steep drop in interest rates, which became negative in real terms, led to an increase 
in real estate wealth, which allowed households to offset the drop in value of their 
financial assets from 2000 to 2002.  This appreciation of real estate equity in 
conjunction with strong job creation encouraged individuals to raise more debt, and 
later use the rise in the value of their collateral to take on more credit. Financial 
institutions, too, became increasingly leveraged. The outlook of constant price 
increases in real estate equity prices heated the market, paving the way to the 
subprime situation. The strength of the whole structure was underpinned by the 
assumption that interest rates would not rise and the assets would keep on 
appreciating. The drop in interest rates led to indiscriminate granting of mortgages, 
which underwent securitisation, and to the issuing of corporate debt. In an 
environment with an oversupply of liquidity there was a swollen demand for assets 
endowed with a high credit rating. In addition to that, many countries were in the 
midst of budget consolidation processes and the amount of public debt was therefore 
bound to be scarce. To meet this growing financial demand would result in the 
creation of the most complex financial engineering. Debt types of various kinds were 
packaged and marketed. Many products were simply devoid of regulatory 
frameworks, and the maximisation of earnings led many institutions to take on an 
excessive amount of debt to be able to purchase those assets. Investment banks, not 
supervised by the Federal Reserve in their liquidity and solvency ratios, would drive 
their leverage ratios to unprecedented levels. 
“Investment banks, being free of controls, can leverage at a much higher level 
than commercial banks, thus taking advantage of the high shadow price of financial 
regulation. In a market with negative interest  rates and a two digit growth in real 
estate assets, the temptation to  cobble together  instruments which would make it 
possible to finance real estate credit, and to sell them to investors who were greedy 
to get high  earnings, was huge.” 115 
Should monetary policy change course and the real estate market crash, 
purchasers would default massively and the financial instruments of this market 
would skydive. Assets would turn illiquid and mistrust would spread through the 
interbank market. As the credit market shut down, financing problems in the housing 
market would be exacerbated, with a most deleterious effect in the creditworthiness 
of the financial market. 
Even though the Federal Reserve tightened up monetary policy from June 
2004, long rates did not absorb the rise in short rates (oversupply of world liquidity 
until 2007, credibility of the US financial system, demand for risk free certified long 
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rates claims from loan and savings banks, etc.). This was in part due to the 
expectation that structural adjustments changes (increased competition in markets, 
technological breakthroughs and productivity gains, massive imports of manufactured 
products from low cost countries, wage restraint in the face of relocation threats, 
precariousness in the job market, salary levels no longer linked to inflation, etc.) 
would make it possible to curb long  term inflation. So, it turned out that the new 
conditions shaping up accumulation made credit policy far more accommodating than 
what would otherwise have been the case if judged only from the Federal Reserve 
actions. Nevertheless, the matching of long and short rates continued to be a source 
of problems. 
“The near match of long and short rates continues to pose serious problems. 
On the one hand, it weakens considerably the banks profit margin and their 
economic balance (they borrow short and lend long). On the other, it deprives 
monetary policy of any room for manoeuvre, making further increases extremely 
dangerous and nullifying its current effects on inflation.” 116 
Financial globalisation and an international liquidity glut, due to the US over-
indebtedness, made monetary policy transmission channels less effective. As noted 
by Vladimir Borgy: 117  “however, the most persuasive explanation is a process by 
which the US excessive indebtedness  has led to excessive world liquidity, keeping 
interest rates at an abnormally low level and fuelling  rises in assets prices, in such a 
way that ultimately  it degrades the implementation of US monetary policy” 
Greenspan’s policy of cheap money and diversified risks would create a real 
estate bubble in the US which would spread to the world financial markets through 
the explosive emergence of financial products linked to real estate assets and a 
boom of the more speculative hedge funds. 
 
2.2 On the companies' financial leverage 
The low cost of financing and credit facilities have made it easier for companies to 
take on increasingly higher levels of debt. They have used debt on a massive scale 
to raise their profit margin and to distribute generous dividends. This has pushed up 
the stock quotations of companies which used their shares as collateral to raise new 
loans. In this way their financial leverage became extraordinarily high since the cost 
of the debt was below their profitability (ratio between operating results after tax and 
the sum of equity and debt). But should monetary policy change course, companies 
and investment funds holding debt at variable rates would be in dire straits. The debt 
burden would simply be too high in relation to the market value of their assets and 
the banks' balance sheets would consequently be weakened. As remarked by Michel 
Aglietta,118 “creation of worth derives then from a rationale based on making 
imbalance a permanent goal” . Stock markets would turn upside down and 
companies would no longer be in a position to release the necessary financial flows 
to service their debt.  Whereas earlier they were eager to pile debt upon themselves, 
now they wanted to get rid of it. They would then be facing a contradictory restriction 
in this adverse stage of the financial cycle: they would need to trim their investments 
and achieve high profit margins to boost equity and soften the blow of financial 
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leveraging. From there would follow greater pressures to tighten up the labour market 
and bring down wages to be able to reduce unit labour costs. 
 
2.3 Subprime crisis and crisis of the financial system 
The primary core of the crisis is to be found not so much in the growth of mortgage 
defaults as in the financial edifice built upon real estate mortgages. More worrying 
than the defaulting of subprime mortgages was the exponential growth of losses for 
those who, through misuse of financial leveraging, had invested on paper linked to 
the payment of such mortgages. The system was heading for a fall off the cliff if, with 
debt-financed leverage levels which could be 50 fold (assets being up to fifty times 
bigger than capital), the assumption that housing prices could not plunge turned out 
to be wrong. The model had not taken on board those risks inherent to the primary 
market (housing). The subprime crisis would have remained in the real estate market 
had it not been for the generalised securitisation of loans by the banks. Banks spread 
these complex products among international investors using them to refinance and 
grant further loans. 
The financial crisis dries up the interbank and credit markets. Banks can no 
longer resell their real estate linked assets. The mark to market value of such assets 
does not stop shrinking. The banks are in the eye of the storm for several reasons: 
they have traded directly in the US mortgage market, they have bought claims and 
have granted loans to customers to finance transactions in the securitisation market. 
They are being walloped by the problems and bankruptcies of the funds they loaned 
to, and they sustain losses derived from the explicit or implicit liabilities they had 
entered into with them. The number of players swept up in the process, through 
securitisation and leverage, is very high, even without having traded directly on the 
US mortgage market. The losses have eaten into the banks' capital, and they have 
responded by cutting back on their credit lines.  The “guarantee” which came with an 
AAA rating turned out to be a deadly trap. Should the banks fail in transferring those 
loans to institutional investors, they would remain as assets in their balance sheet119.  
This would inhibit  their credit capability, all the more so since their ability to grant 
loans was already  curtailed  because  they had committed large amounts of equity to 
finance corporate transactions. 120 
José Carlos Diez  mentions a “financial decelerator”. The decline in housing 
prices weakens the ability of households to raise debt. Companies encounter more 
problems to raise fresh financing, and the situation is compounded by the financial 
institutions' liquidity problems, leading to a further credit crunch. Impact on 
employment is devastating. Families, facing a restricted ability to take on new debt, 
seeing how the wealth factor vanishes, and being more and more anxious and 
restless about jobs and wages, choose to balance their finances and throttle back 
their spending. The crisis takes hold of the real economy. 
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2.4 Liquidity and creditworthiness crisis and the role of central banks 
The leading central banks were forced to take massive action to guarantee liquidity in 
the interbank market: they expanded their open market transactions downgrading the 
quality of the collateral, and extending payback schedules. 
But, whereas the Federal Reserve, having become the leading force in managing the 
crisis, decided to step up to the hilt the bailing out of investment banks, the ECB, in 
the grasp of its inflation phobia and suffering from the effects of the so-called wage 
second round effects, has kept up far too long its steadfast line on the risks of a 
inflation spiral. The ECB Governor went on record when he addressed the European 
Parliament on January 23rd: 
“In all circumstances, but even more particularly in demanding times of 
significant market corrections and turbulences, it is the responsibility of the Central 
Bank to solidly anchor inflation expectations to avoid additional volatility in already 
highly volatile markets.” 
He showed his preference for upholding interest rates and massive injections 
of liquidity. Even more so, scared by the peak in the HICP, he would make the 
mistake of raising the intervention rate to 4.25 percent in July 2008, even though he 
eventually caved in to merciless reality in October 2008. Indeed, the main central 
banks in the world had to step up interest rates' cuts at the beginning of September 
2008. Eventually, the Federal Reserve would set them at 1 percent, and the ECB, 
departing from its notorious monetary orthodox practice, had to trim them down to 2.5 
percent. Yet, it kept on insisting how important it was in such turbulent times to 
uphold the principle of sustainability of public finance. Such an attitude was 
tantamount to sarcasm when public authorities were compelled to raise massive 
amounts of debt to bail out private financial institutions. And, of course, he stressed 
the urgency of greater efforts to make labour markets more flexible. 
Recession is causing a steep decline in the price of raw materials, pushing the 
major economies of the world to the threshold of deflation, in itself a bigger risk. In 
view of this, central banks, and especially the Federal Reserve, have chosen to 
increase their money supply. Having learned the lessons from the Great Depression, 
they have bailed out the banks, participated in their recapitalisation and guaranteed 
deposits to avert a money supply crunch which would turn recession into depression. 
Only in this way might some measure of normality be brought back to the interbank 
and credit systems. 
However, it is doubtful that easing the money supply can help in stimulating 
spending in a context of unemployment, strong wage restraint, readjustment of 
former excessive indebtedness and a credit crunch. Interest rates, for all the power 
they may wield, are hardly the magic wand to all the problems bedevilling today's 
economy. Investment and expenditure will not pick up unless families, banks and 
companies have got rid of and written off the excesses they previously indulged in 
and cut down their debt, and until the situation in the labour and interbank markets is 
brought back to normal, consumption and investment will not bounce back. It is likely 
that cutting prime rates will not re-establish the interbank financing flows. If the 
interest rate cut is not passed on to consumers and businessmen and is used instead 
to improve banks' balance sheets, the monetary policies will need to be shored up 
with a budget stimulus package. The central banks' strategy for economic recovery is 
showing its shortcomings. As remarked by Keynes, "You can lead a horse to water 
but you cannot make it drink". 
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3. A systemic crisis and the search for a financial and economic 
New Deal   
This global crisis has shown the dangers of over-indebtedness, the instabilities 
created by distancing financial engineering from productive logic and the 
shortcomings in the regulation, supervision and risk evaluation. It represents the final 
outcome of the excesses incurred since the eighties by the liberalisation and 
deregulation of the markets. 
Faced with the enormity of the crisis, the political and monetary authorities had 
to adopt a package of heterodox measures that would have been unthinkable just a 
few months earlier. First came the Paulson Plan, whose first draft entailed the 
creation of a federal agency to buy the credit institutions' “toxic” assets so the 
polluted loans would disappear from the banks' balance sheets. It was rejected by 
Congress. Following the announcement of several plans by EU Member States, the 
chosen option was the direct buying of preferential shares to reinforce private banks' 
equity and boost credit flow to companies and consumers. As in Europe, the Federal 
Government would underwrite new rights' issues by banks. But the most heterodox 
move would fall on the Federal Reserve who, after having agreed  to the direct 
buying of companies' IOUs to palliate credit limitations, would not hesitate to engage 
a higher gear at the end of 2008: it did earmark  800 billion dollars for the financial 
markets and for loans to consumers and companies. It increased its monetary supply 
to buy mortgage assets tainted by toxic debts, a role previously assumed by the 
Treasury121.  
This measure, primus inter pares in the heterodox measures, preceded as it 
was by taking direct control of the major U.S. investment banks in the United States 
and the mortgage or commercial banks in Europe, could only be understood within 
the scope of an economy sliding into deflation and the gradual running out of room 
for manoeuvre for managing monetary policy from the interest-rate side. While the 
Paulson Plan leaned ultimately on the taxpayer and led to a slow and uncertain 
recapitalisation, the Federal Reserve made use of what euphemistically is referred to 
as "quantitative expansion" of the monetary base. Financial assets would no longer 
be bought by issuing debt as in Spain, but through direct monetary expansion. It 
does not seem the ECB is willing to go that far.  
In parallel, the U.S. and European authorities seemed willing to increase 
significantly their deficit and debt levels in order to buy assets of varying levels of 
toxicity and to activate, through fiscal measures and government expenditure, the 
components of aggregated demand. 
As an example, the U.S. Treasury Secretary proposed to raise the 
indebtedness ceiling from 10,6 to 11,3 billion dollars. In the most favourable 
hypothesis, the indebtness to GNP ratio, that was low at around 30 percent, would 
exceed 70 percent in 2009. The European deficits will be higher than 3 percent in 
2009 and public indebtedness will again grow substantially. The economic crisis and 
the massive State aids it has induced have reopened the debate on the European 
goal of reaching zero deficits by 2010. The time has come for unqualified support for 
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the aggregate demand components, with special attention to household 
consumption. Growth is still the best antidote against chronic government deficits. 
Nothing would be more destructive for government finance than the world economies 
entering into depression. The budgetary effort, needed from all countries, should be 
headed by those with current account surpluses. These schemes for boosting 
aggregate demand would then have to be coordinated internationally to prevent them 
from benefitting those countries with a more conservative agenda. The government 
deficit of some would become the surplus of others. 
From October 2008, governments were compelled to launch massive rescue 
plans of their financial systems. Banks needed recapitalisation after having their 
resources destroyed by the real estate and securitisation crisis, the depreciation of 
financial assets and the defaults on loans by consumers and companies. All this 
increased the need to expand their reserves.  
Not being able to call on the markets made firm Government action 
necessary. It took the form of purchasing preferential shares (surprisingly forsaking 
the right to vote in exchange for a dividend; once the government agrees to support 
the banks the logical consequence would be to take part in their management) - 
purchases of damaged and illiquid assets (estimating their value is difficult), providing 
government guarantees, exchange of mortgage claims for bonds which can be easily 
converted into cash etc. Leaving aside national variations, governments have 
introduced guarantees on interbank markets loans. The banks need to be sure they 
will recover their equity in the case of default by the borrower. But monetary policy is 
not enough to pull the economy out of recession. This is the reason for several 
budgetary action plans implemented since October 2008. The forthcoming U.S. 
administration will enlarge them. It has stated its intention to boost government 
expenditure.  
The nature of liberal capitalism, in vogue since the eighties, will be 
substantially altered. With the crumbling of the economy breaking the gospel of the 
intrinsic efficiency of the markets, interventionism is seen as the lesser evil. It 
appears that government funds will have to be mobilised to bail out an increasing 
number of activities and sectors. But priority is being given to the financial system. 
Should it collapse it would ravage the world economy given the significance of the 
brokerage activities of banks. Out of this deep crisis, so close to a credit crunch, 
should emerge a new regulation of the world's financial system, addressed to curtail 
and supervise the unlimited capacity of risk- taking enjoyed by financial institutions 
working outside any supervision. Thus, on 15 November 2008, the G20 put up the 
idea of tightening the regulation of the almost totally unhindered freedom enjoyed by 
the derivatives markets, though the U.S. did not want to bind them too tightly, to 
prevent charges of restricting market freedom. 
The economic role of governments will have to be redefined. A new mix 
between government and market is needed. Even if many people, among them the 
EU Commissioner of Economic and Monetary Affairs, would increase the regulatory 
component of the financial system and reduce it for the non financial sectors to 
enhance their flexibility (the labour market?).  
For the time being Europe is only coming up with fragmented initiatives from 
its Member States. While trying to come to Washington with a coordinated response 
strategy to the crisis, in fact the apparent agreement did not overcome national 
quirks. The European nations seem unable to present a concerted answer seemingly 
preferring the uncooperative and counterproductive Merkel's "first one out" tactics. 
Nevertheless, faced with the scope of the crisis, the European authorities have been 
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forced to better coordinate their actions. The Eurogroup, with the participation of the 
UK, produced a plan in October 2008 focused on three central measures: to keep 
providing liquidity to the more damaged banks by buying their 'healthy' assets; 
recapitalise creditworthy institutions injecting equity into them by buying their shares; 
and to underwrite new debt to banks up to 31 December 2009 to facilitate loans to 
business and families. The authorities agreed to provide a guarantee for interbank 
transactions. It was thought that by ridding this market of lack of confidence among 
partners the main cause of tensions would disappear. The funds engaged by the EU 
Member States exceeded those of the Paulson Plan (Emergency Economic 
Stabilisation Act), which points to the intensity of the crisis in Europe. The intention 
was to give an EU character, actually a cosmetic touch, to what had only been a 
series of national initiatives that made the European institutions look like the great 
absentees in this unprecedented global crisis. The Member States have concocted 
national plans: for infrastructures and aid/loans to small and medium-sized 
companies (Germany) or to strategic companies (France); reducing VAT to 15 
percent to boost consumption (United Kingdom); reducing social security costs 
(Germany); 400€ income tax rebates  (Spain), but there is no common strategy. Up 
until now national governments have been responding on a case-by-case basis to 
the evolution of a crisis that is getting the better of them. While Sarkozy advocated 
common action with a longer reach than the mere flexible collaboration of the 27 
national plans, the German Chancellor refused any initiative that would put more 
money in the EU coffers. As their main net contributor, Germany privileged national 
stimuli over common action. 
The Commission's scheme, for which opening the 'government faucet' "has a 
stronger positive impact on short-term demand than fiscal rebates", has three pillars: 
coordinating the national plans so they do not mutually interfere; increasing the 
resources of the European Investment Bank; and modifying the Structural and 
Cohesion Funds' regulations to speed up the payments to  Member States. There is 
no agreement to encourage both consumption and investment by coordinating a tax   
(VAT) cut. The plan proposed a reduction in national company income tax to 
stimulate investment in a context of growing unemployment. I would put forward a 
selective tax cut (unlike the 400€ cut per taxpayer) so households can spend and 
save more.  
In all, contributions to the EU budget included, Member States could commit 
common actions of up to 200 billion euros (1.5 percent of EU's GNP), the upper limit 
imposed by Germany that stated the EU "should not launch itself on a millionaire's 
race for who approves the biggest bail out plan". The amount is a modest one, lower 
than the 2 percent recommended by the IMF after the Washington summit, though 
higher than the EU budget itself. 
The situation repeated itself; the Commission had not had a plan for the 
financial crisis and would not have one for the economic downturn. Each State would 
draw up and promote its specific plan.  
This crisis has highlighted the need for firm government intervention and 
revealed the need for renewed international architecture of the financial and 
monetary systems in a globalised economy. Its global character calls for a regulation 
and supervision frame that is also global. This leads us to a redefinition of the IMF 
role, the great absentee. There is not an international lender of last resort acting as 
guarantor to lower the cost of indebtedness. The current IMF, with its limited 
resources, is designed to impose budget and fiscal discipline to developing countries 
and "solve" their problems in financing external debt. While Europe advocates 
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strengthening the Financial Stability Fund, set up to "promote international financial 
stability, improve the operation of financial markets and prevent financial 
perturbations having cross-border effects", as well  as coordinating  national 
regulations, the U.S. has veto power in this Fund and does not want to hear of a 
global supervisor. They will not go further than reinforcing the coordination 
mechanisms. The G20 has remained at the rhetorical level and been incapable of 
starting the reorganisation of world capitalism. It is indeed disappointing that hedge 
funds, having contributed so much to financial leveraging, are still outside 
government supervision. And there is not even a mention of fiscal paradises. 
Banning them and imposing boundaries on speculative financial products seem more 
efficient than dusting off the Tobin Tax. A residual tax on speculative capital 
operations, difficult as they are to define, appears today less interesting than laying 
down rules to regulate the derivatives market and to stimulate cash-based products.  
The depth of the financial crisis and its contagion of the real economy have 
brought back to life the paradigms of the Keynesian countercyclical interventions. 
Governments, even those operating within the liberal dogma of market freedom, 
have had to step in to stabilise the economy. Jaime Requeijo, analysing the late 20th 
century "modern" crisis, wrote: “While it is possible Keynesianism is on the retreat in 
academic circles, it is still very much alive in economic policies and, much more so, in 
the devolution of the crisis management to governments”122. Faced with the evidence 
that monetary policy alone cannot overcome the crisis and could even lead into the 
liquidity trap if the deflationary trends are confirmed, hopes are now pinned on 
budgetary policy, notwithstanding deficit and indebtedness risks.  
 
Conclusion: the master beams of anti-crisis actions 
We are facing a complex crisis and the solutions being suggested are out of step and 
lagging behind the pace set by this downturn. The authorities, lacking the necessary 
information, underestimated its depth and the effects on the real economy. 
Central banks will need to keep on providing the liquidity required to prevent 
the financial sector meltdown, as well as directly injecting capital and discounting 
commercial paper. They will also need to provide the economy with mechanisms for 
ensuring the existence of payment and credit tools. It is the only way to arrest the 
multiplication of company bankruptcies. But capitalisation by the governments will 
need to go hand in hand with the direct management of the bailed out institutions. It 
cannot be limited to a mere cover up of the bad speculative practices of some. 
Even if the continuous and aggressive interest rates cuts are reducing the 
leeway of monetary policy, central banks need to show the willingness to set them at 
zero if needed. Monetary policy is losing multiplier efficiency and could even fall into 
the "liquidity trap", with the subsequent deterioration of economic activity as soon as 
interest rates are bereft of leeway. The consequences would be more 
unemployment, new falls in consumption, new investments retrenchment, etc. 
  Added to this, consumers, who previously tended to over-indebtedness, have 
withdrawn their consumption of durable goods at a time when the wealth effect has 
turned negative and the job market expectations look gloomy. They seem more 
prone to save, depressing even more the demand for goods and services, although 
the fall in inflation is slightly reactivating households' disposable income. It is also 
likely that real interest rates will remain high to allow states to keep on financing 
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themselves, thus preventing monetary policy from boosting more consumption and 
investment.  
A parallel requirement is to hike the banks' minimum capital requirements, to 
get rid of excessive financial leveraging and fine-tune the regulation and supervision 
of all financial entities by a central authority. “Without a swift recapitalisation bank 
deleveraging would continue and the amount of loans allowed to the real economy 
would keep falling”123 . As companies undergo more difficulties and need to reduce 
their debt they could feel tempted to cut salaries to be passed on to prices so as not 
to lose market share. The results would lead to a generalised deflation and a 
subsequent deterioration of real debt and of the stimulating effect of the budget.  
Another consequence is the need for use of fiscal and budget stimulus policies 
to dynamize the various components of aggregate demand. But as the Japanese 
crisis showed, higher transfers to households might well stimulate their propensity to 
save at a time when prices decelerate very quickly. Then, government expenditure, 
beyond and without forgetting ordinary headings, should prioritise social, economic 
and technological infrastructures, the environment, and research, development and 
innovation expenses;  in short, sectors that can have a positive long-term effect on 
workforce productivity. These are unavoidable measures to counter job destruction.  
The government deficit will deteriorate due not only to the automatic stabilisers 
but also to the discretionary actions of governments, which need to act forcefully. 
They would need to increase government expenditure further than they seem ready 
to go: 7 percent the U.S. and 4 percent the EU in 2009. This poses in no uncertain 
terms the question of how to finance it, and even more so as liquidity is getting 
scarce. But it is a minor problem in an emergency situation like the current one. A 
"crowding-out" effect propelling debt rates' increase does not look likely in a context 
of moroseness of the private components of aggregate demand. Currently, the main 
economic and social problems are not those linked to the short-term sustainability of 
government finances, however important their long-term sustainability may be. 
  The European countries' economic and financial interdependencies are so 
high that none of them can aspire to overcome the paralysis without a deepening of 
the European integration process. Nevertheless, and here lies the major 
contradiction of the integration process, the room for manoeuvre of EU Member 
States has been curtailed while alongside it macroeconomic regulation at European 
level has not emerged.  
As Fitoussi 124 mentioned, if the EU, bereft of a unitarian political perspective, 
refuses to see itself as a "great" economic country, it should come as no surprise that 
European nations see themselves individually as a "small" country in a playing field 
that is no longer just Europe but the world. This renders impossible a common 
response to a systemic global crisis. 
 
 
                                                 
123 Nadal Belda, Alberto: ”La crisis financiera de Estados Unidos”, Boletín Económico ICE, Madrid, 
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xxi. Towards a Global and Ethical Approach to 
Environmental Challenges 
By Cristina Narbona Ruiz125 
 
 
The crisis: an opportunity to overhaul the economic model 
The current crisis offers a unique occasion to review from a progressive approach the 
economic model and, in particular, the relationship between economy and ecology. 
In the past few months we have seen the emergence of the dire economic, 
social and environmental consequences of a system which privileges personal profit 
over the general interest, and greed and wastefulness over responsibility and 
prudence. Thus, an economic and cultural paradigm based on the myth of boundless 
abundance is sinking. The share of responsibility of those on the left who have 
tolerated or even justified the prevalence of the market over public regulation cannot 
be eluded. 
This crisis must be tackled urgently, but by understanding its deep roots and 
not yielding to the temptation of tending only to the more serious symptoms. All the 
analyses point to the subordination of the real economy to a financial economy that 
generated astronomical profits for a tiny minority of the world population, and 
promoted excessive consumption and indebtedness; while concurrently social 
inequalities and the systematic destruction of the ecosystems escalated. The lack of 
regulation and insufficient public oversight favoured this process. Public authorities 
tolerated speculation and tax avoidance, which run alongside pollution and the 
exhaustion of natural resources. All in the name of a type of economic growth that in 
no way increased global well-being, but rather increasingly threatens it for future 
generations. 
For too long, even among the political left, environmental demands have been 
considered incompatible with economic growth, and in turn with job creation and 
social progress. The reality is that the economy has never been 'autonomous' from 
ecology: all the economic processes are interdependent with ecological processes. 
The consequences of having ignored this reality have become tragically evident 
today. As evident, unfortunately, as the capacity of the dominant economic model to 
destroy employment and seriously compromise the delivery of basic public services. 
By no means did environmental demands trigger this crisis, nor were the demands 
for social justice the culprits of the financial catastrophe, but rather quite the other 
way around. 
On the other hand, the experience of some European countries have shown 
throughout the years that higher and lasting levels of continued job creation and 
increasing well-being, alongside reinforced environmental and social requirements 
are possible; in contrast to other countries such as Spain, where unemployment rates 
remained stable in a period of fast economic growth which featured a combination of 
low skilled  jobs, scant  attention to the  impact on eco systems  and the inefficient 
use of natural resources. 
 
                                                 
125 Spanish ambassador to the OECD and Former Minister of the Environment, Spain 
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Since the mid-20th century there has been increasing scientific knowledge on the 
risks of ecological deterioration of our planet created by our economic model. Since 
the 90s there has been mounting evidence that global warming is the fallout of the 
overuse of fossil fuels and massive deforestation, two of the 'conditions' for economic 
growth. Climatic change is already on the political agenda of most countries, but until 
now the effectiveness of the existing policies has been minimal. 
Climate change is just one face of the ominous incidence of human activity on 
the ecological balances, with very serious consequences for the less favoured 
citizens, especially in the poorest countries, and even, according to Pentagon studies 
that were kept secret until very recently, with significant consequences for peace and 
international security. 
Other environmental challenges are still far from the political decision making 
arena. One example is the loss of biodiversity. Among other effects it has brought the 
extinction of species essential for the production of foodstuffs. FAO data from 2007 
shows that almost 80% of the fishing-grounds are already exhausted or on the brink 
of depletion due to overfishing. Pressure on biological resources also reduces the 
potential for remedying illnesses and entails higher vulnerability risks to the 
geographical propagation of pests. But there are hardly any binding commitments to 
protect biodiversity at the national and international levels.  
Air, water and ground pollution create increasing threats to public health, 
particularly in the poorest countries and developing economies. One million people 
die yearly in China solely due to pollution-related causes. Scarcity of drinking water 
and inadequate treatment of sewage is the number one cause of disease in the 
world. 
Climate change is fuelling the recrudescence of adverse meteorological 
phenomena that are felt more severely by the populations of less developed 
countries. From 1984 to 2004, natural disasters caused 900,000 victims in these 
countries, with 75,000 in the rich countries. The fourth Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel of Climatic Change (IPCC), published in 2007, confirms that 
the ability to adjust and become resilient to climate change (and any other ecological 
risks) depends on the economic and social development level of the country. 
Africa is the great paradox. Despite contributing only 4% to the world 
emissions of greenhouse gases, it suffers the worst consequences of climate 
change: longer lasting droughts, more frequent floods, growing desertification and 
biodiversity loss. The IPCC estimates that by 2020 more than 400 million Africans will 
be severely affected by global warming. 
As stated in the Brundtland Report (1987), "As a system approaches 
ecological limits, inequalities sharpen". Climate change, as any other environmental 
impact of our economic model, is above all a huge ethical problem, since those who 
suffer more greatly from the decline of the ecosystems are not only those who are 
the least responsible for it, but also those who benefited the least from the global 
economic growth. This demands a much more committed answer from developed 
countries. They need to re-orientate their consumption patterns while contributing to 
the introduction of cleaner technologies in developing countries. 
On top of its ethical dimension, environmental decline carries increasing 
economic costs. The OECD has estimated the economic cost of environmental 
'inaction' since 2004.  Its methodology was later adopted in the World Bank reports 
(since 2006) and the well-know Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change 
for the UK Prime Minister (2007). The costs of "inaction", broadly understood as total 
absence, insufficiency or delays of the decisions for reducing environmental risks, 
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are much higher than those of adopting the right policies in time. The mentioned 
reports see the yearly cost of inaction reaching 20% of the world GDP by 2050. Its 
counterpart, should action be taken, is only 1%.  
This means that, even in a strictly economic approach which overlooks the 
ethical dimension, it is preferable to face up to the environmental challenges sooner 
rather then later. This reasoning has been absent from the recent operation of the 
economy that promoted, or at least tolerated, the pursuit of short-term personal 
profits. Maybe falling prey to short-term electoral interests, once again public action 
has failed by not favouring long-lasting collective benefits. 
Political reaction has been absent even when the short-term effects of the 
ecological crisis rocked the economy as seen with the spectacular increase of energy 
and food prices in 2008.  There is a tendency to interpret these signals as cyclical 
and not as evidence of the gradual depletion of fossil fuels in the case of energy or 
the effects of climatic change and the quality loss of soils in the case of foodstuffs. 
Strong political leadership is needed to go beyond the described economic 
paradigm. In fact, the biggest current political challenge is leading the transition 
towards a more equitable economy that duly respects the environment and reinforces 
democracy: an economy that produces longer lasting well-being for more persons; an 
economy based on a new approach to the concept of efficacy, beyond the one 
measured in monetary terms, focused on answering more social needs with less 
resources and generating less pollution; an economy that imitates the natural 
processes that guarantee the maintenance of  life, diversification, closed loops, and 
symbiosis in the long-term. 
Undoubtedly, this downturn has revealed how extremely grave mistakes have 
been made when developing business strategies free of environmental constraints, 
as in the case with the auto industry in the US, and has brought about a renewed 
interest in energy efficiency and renewable energies. Every public stimulus plan 
aimed at economic recovery incorporates “green policies” of varying scope and 
intensity. 
Nevertheless, in many instances the positive impact of these action plans will 
be far smaller than the negative effects from all the other policies which have been 
adopted. What is sorely missing is a global approach that consistently    integrates 
environmental constraints into each and every one of these measures.  In this 
context it is worth mentioning the initiatives taken by the US for building up 
renewable energies and calling for better energy efficiency in all sectors of 
production. 
In summary, the present crisis should be seen as a manifestation of the lack of 
economic, environmental and social sustainability of our present economic model. It 
should be understood that in a long term perspective the economy is fully dependent 
on ecology and J. Genereux 126 wrote that the “economic laws” are “man made laws”, 
reflecting human priorities and institutions, whereas “natural laws”, be they from 
biology or chemistry, cannot be circumvented by human action without entailing 
results which may even become irreversible. Therefore, to get out of this crisis 
ecology must lay down conditions, such as social justice, goals, and economic 
rationale and show the way to proceed. 
A specific way to act upon this approach is given by the advocates for the so 
called “economics of functionality”, which makes the case for a shift from an 
economic model focused around the sale of products to another based upon the 
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renting and selling of services. Such an approach would make it possible to move 
back from the symbolic value we attach to material goods, favouring instead their use 
value. In Europe many cities have wide experience in renting council-owned bicycles 
and now this is being extended to publicly owned vehicles along the same lines. The 
environmental results and the improved use of public spaces have been both fully 
encouraging and herald the extension of this approach to many other durable 
consumer goods.  
 
Democracy and sustainability: the right to the environment 
Overcoming the present downturn calls for a paradigm shift which begins with  
accountability and the recognition of the right to a dignified life for all the citizens of 
the planet, both those living today and those who will live in it tomorrow. 
The environmental challenges are not marginal issues stemming from an 
“aesthetic” stance towards the natural environment, but rather indispensable 
conditions for the health, quality of life and progress of the human race. Each and 
every human being is equally entitled to breathing unpolluted air, to have access to 
enough drinking water and to enjoy our natural habitat. Those are rights inextricably 
linked to the most fundamental of all, the right to life.  
As observed by J.P. Fitoussi and E. Laurent, “environmental equality is the 
true key to sustainable development, and this calls for us to step up our claims for 
more democracy.  The food crisis, as the energy crisis, highlights the relationship 
between distribution of resources and distribution of rights, between ecology and 
democracy” 127. 
It would however be impossible to implement a “full equality of rights” to 
natural resources without first introducing sustainability criteria. For example,  the 
right to food must be understood as an entitlement to an adequate caloric  diet to 
keep the subject in good health, but it is not tantamount to an unlimited  right to an 
animal protein rich diet which is unsustainable from the public health point of view 
due to methane emissions and intensive usage of land and water. The same can be 
said about the right to use energy resources, which does not extend to energy waste 
as practiced by rich countries. 
A specific instance of the need to distribute environmental rights according to 
fair principles is that of the future agreement on the fight against climate change. The 
EU, following the suggestion from Spain among others, champions the gradual 
convergence of CO2 per capita emissions in order to introduce an element of justice 
which would make possible the involvement of developing countries in such an 
agreement. Following this approach Eco-equity, composed of a group of researchers, 
has put forward a calculation method to distribute the effort required to mitigate 
climate change which takes into consideration the per capita emissions, emissions 
accumulated since 1990, per capita income and the relative poverty level in each 
country. According to this calculation, the commitments geared toward reducing 
greenhouse gases by 2020 would represent an amount equal to 1.5% of the US 
GNP, 1.1% of the EU GNP, 0.7% of the Chinese GNP and only 0.08% of the GNP of 
all the developing countries combined. 
Amartya Sen 128 goes as far as saying that “a famine means that people are 
starving, which does not imply that there is no food to eat ... famines never happen in 
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128 A.Sen.“Poverty and famines: an essay on entitlement and deprivation“, Oxford University Press, 
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a truly democratic country.” Furthermore, many studies129 prove that “democratic 
quality”, the set of mechanisms guaranteeing the exercise of rights, accountability 
and participation of the public, has a far greater effect on a country's environmental 
quality than on its level of economic development. 
 
Measuring development and well-being 
If the time has come to argue for worldwide ecological emergency and social justice 
as effective priorities of political action, this requires above all a new interpretation of 
the notion of well-being more in tune with the new conception of the relationship 
between people and between human beings and nature. 
Up to now the GDP has been the primary indicator of “economic success” and 
even of social advancement, even though it does not take into account at all basic 
components of wellbeing such as income and wealth distribution, environmental 
quality, gender equality and quality of public services. 
Alternatives to GDP have been suggested since the beginning of the 1970´s 
130, and a whole array of indicators have been developed, especially since the UN 
“Human Development Report” in 1990 and the subsequent work by the Nobel  
Laureate for Economics, Amartya Sen. 
However, this analytical work has hardly spilled over into the realm of political 
debate, where GDP continues to hold sway even today as an indicator holding more 
relevance than that warranted by its content. Such a consideration is linked, once 
again, to the dominant values. GDP measures the amount of goods and services 
traded in the market, determined by prices, overlooking the social and environmental 
effects of the current production and consumption model. If   one or other indicators 
do not substitute for GDP, or at least complement it when assessing the evolution of 
the economy and the effectiveness of public policies, the reason is due to an 
“ethical”131 choice and not to technical problems in developing or making available 
other indicators. GDP is not an indicator of well-being at all132; if it continues to be the 
main indicator in the political and economic debate it is because the main goal of the 
dominant economic model is not the continuing well-being of all its citizens. 
Selecting the “best possible well-being indicator”, or specifically weighing up 
several indicators, is thus subordinate to the goals of public policies and to the 
citizens’ own perceptions of their quality of life. 
The OECD takes an active role in this discussion and it promotes an 
international platform to improve the measurement of social progress. The results will 
be made public in the course of this year. In addition, the French Government has 
instituted a Committee to pursue the same goal, headed by J. Stiglitz, A. Senn and 
J.P. Fitoussi. 
At any rate, most of the available indicators on well-being today incorporate 
variables measuring environmental quality, depletion of natural resources or eco-
system degradation. The value of human well-being as the quality of the whole life 
web to which we belong is then explicitly recognized .This calls for a different outlook 
on our world, identifying basic elements which are vital for happiness and whose 
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significance had been relegated by the dominant cultural patterns of the “consumer’ 
society”. 
 
Conclusion 
Natural resources are limited, but our imagination and determination in building a 
better world should know no bounds. The chief role of progressive forces has always 
been to push for a transformation of society beyond the dominant particular interests 
holding sway at any moment in history. Following on from the struggle for the rights 
of workers, women and minorities, the struggle must urgently be pursued for the 
rights of all citizens on this planet, those of today and of tomorrow, to dwell in an 
environment that is able to guarantee them health, quality of life and durable 
progress. 
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xxii. Climate Change, the EU and Markets for 
Emissions 
By Navraj Ghaleigh133 
 
 
Introduction 
The concept that anthropogenic climate change is the greatest of the 21st century’s 
challenges has been taken seriously by the EU. Keen to fill the vacuum left by the 
Bush Administration’s abstention from multilateral attempts to engage with the 
problem,134 the EU has positioned itself as a climate change leader to the USA’s 
laggard. The most striking evidence of this role may be found in the EU’s Emissions 
Trading Scheme135 - anyone with even a nodding familiarity of global carbon markets 
recognises the position of primacy held by the Scheme within them. With a trading 
volume of at least €28bn in 2007, the EU ETS represents approximately 70% of 
global traded volumes in carbon products136 and 62% of physical volumes137. It is 
variously described as “the main driving force of the global carbon market”, “the main 
driver for emissions reductions, both at homes and in developing countries”138, “the 
engine, perhaps even the laboratory, of the global carbon market”.139 The EU ETS’s 
trading volumes dwarf those of its rivals - the voluntary Chicago Climate Exchange, 
the New South Wales ETS, the New Zealand ETS and the fledgling Japanese 
scheme - none of which has a volume equal to even 1% of the EU ETS140. Within its 
own territory the Scheme is a significant policy instrument, with 40% of the EU’s total 
GHG emissions within its regulatory ambit, representing approximately 11,000 of the 
EU’s largest emitting installations. For the period 2008-2012 alone it is estimated to 
generate emissions reductions of 3.3% (139 MtCO2 p.a.) from the base year of 1990 
in the EU-15141. Whilst the European Climate Change Programme (ECCP) extends to 
issues of fuel efficiency and quality, vehicular emissions, biofuels, renewables, and 
carbon capture and storage, it is no exaggeration to describe the EU ETS as the 
keystone in the architecture of the European response to global climate change. 
This paper commences with a discussion of the science of climate change and 
the international legal framework that underpins responses to the problematic – a 
crucial if not always considered matter – including the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (Part A). The Kyoto Protocol is rightly considered to 
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form the basis of current commitments to emissions reductions. The discussion here 
however seeks to ground it in its economic context which in turn raised a set of 
challenges for the EU in the Kyoto negotiations (Part B). Part C introduces the EU’s 
principal legislative commitment in the wake of that process and consequent 
regulatory realignment – the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. The state of the art of 
climate change negotiations, mechanisms and processes is addressed in Part D 
which seeks to outline the major currents of intellectual debate, diplomatic progress 
and structural capacity in climate change processes. 
 
Part A: Climate Change Science and the Framework Convention 
It is ‘very likely’ that the major risk of global climate change comes from 
anthropogenic increases in greenhouse gases142. The greenhouse effect is the result 
of certain gases (principally water vapour, carbon dioxide and to a lesser extent, 
methane) which envelop the earth, regulate the in- and out-flow of the sun’s energy 
and make the earth habitable. In its absence, the earth’s temperature would be about 
-18°C. Carbon dioxide, the most voluminous of the greenhouse gases, was present 
in the pre-industrial (1750) atmosphere at a concentration of 280 parts per million 
(ppm). Its rise to 379 ppm by 2005 is substantially a function of global 
industrialisation, which is in turn driven by fossil fuel combustion. In the same period, 
methane (which has a global warming potential approximately 70 times greater than 
CO2 by mass) has increased in concentration from 715 to 1774 ppm143. Other human 
activities, such as deforestation also contribute to global climate change, as to do 
emissions of methane from agricultural sources and the loss of soil carbon due to 
excessive ploughing and intensive agriculture. The effects of global climate change 
are likely to be felt world-wide, but with differential impacts. Predicted rises in global 
temperatures would potentially have world-wide effects on sea levels, forests, 
agriculture, natural ecosystems, and population distribution144. The ability to adapt to 
such changes is not unconnected to the economic wealth, technical capabilities and 
government structures of different societies. 
Science has played a decisive role in the formation of the current regime of 
climate change. Indeed, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
was established in 1988 by UNEP and WMO “anticipating the critical role that 
scientific consensus would play in building the political will to respond to climate 
change.”145 Established to review the scientific evidence and make recommendations, 
the IPCC’s reports are recognised as the definitive source of information on climate 
change. The most recent Assessment Reports of 2007 give the lie to suggestions 
that climate change is a natural, not anthropogenic, phenomenon, finding that the 
rise in global average temperature since the mid-20th century is “very likely” (that is, 
more than 90% certain) to result from the increase in human-induced greenhouse 
gas emissions. If left unchecked, such increases in emissions are “likely” (more than 
66% certain) to result in an average temperature change of up to 6.4oC by 2099. In 
addition, the IPCC predicts an average sea level rise due to thermal expansion and 
melting of ice of up to 65 cm by the year 2100, with the probability of reduced 
precipitation in Africa, Southern Europe, Amazonia and central North America due to 
temperature increases.   
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Legal responses to climate change have had, inter alia to address the fact that 
greenhouse gas production goes to the heart of energy, transport, agricultural and 
industrial policy in all developed states and increasingly in developing ones too. The 
objective of the Convention is not to reverse greenhouse gas emissions but to 
stabilize them 'at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system'. The principles listed in Article 3 include reference to inter-
generational equity, common but differentiated responsibility, the precautionary 
principle, and the right of all parties to sustainable development, as well as the need 
to promote 'a supportive and open international economic system'. Policies and 
measures taken should be cost-effective in the sense that they will ensure 'global 
benefits at the lowest possible cost' – a consideration that looms large in the 
architecture of the Kyoto Protocol itself. As articulated in Article 4, the explicit 
assumption is that the developed states that have contributed most of the 
greenhouse gas emissions should also contribute most to tackling the problem, both 
by providing resources and by 'taking the lead' in adopting control measures. 
 
Part B: The EU and Climate Change 
Before examining the substance of the Kyoto Protocol, we should pause to consider 
the EU’s own methods of addressing environmental concerns. Prior to and continuing 
into the 1990s, the EU adopted a policy approach of “regulatory environmentalism”, 
premised on the assumption that reliance on free-market solutions would misallocate 
natural resources and produce inadequate incentives to prevent environmental 
degradation146. There also existed a secondary and emerging strain in EU policy that, 
as early as 1993 in the form of the Community’s Fifth Environmental Action 
Programme, acknowledged the limitations of command-and-control regulation and 
the utility of market mechanisms to “internal[ise] external environmental costs”147. 
Also familiar is the influence that these American domestic policy successes had in 
the negotiations at Kyoto, the architecture of the Kyoto Protocol and in particular the 
flexibility mechanisms contained in its Articles 6, 12 and 17148.  
The key feature of the Kyoto Protocol is its establishment, for the first time, of 
quantitative restrictions on emissions from industrialised economies. These states 
listed in Annex B of the Protocol149 are limited in their emissions of the six 
greenhouse gases listed in Annex A. The quantified emission limitation and reduction 
commitments contained in Article 3(1) (that seeks to ensure that overall emissions 
from annex B states are reduced to at least 5% below 1990 levels within the period 
2008 to 2012) is of course subject to Article 4(2)(a) of the Convention. Article 3(1) 
sets out different limits for each party, in deference to their particular circumstances, 
including ability to reduce emissions, access to clean technology, use of energy and 
so on.  In most cases (including the EU, USA and Japan) a reduction of between 5% 
and 8% is specified, but New Zealand, Russia and Ukraine need only stabilise 
emissions, while Norway, Australia and Iceland are permitted to increase by amounts 
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ranging from 1% to 10%. All parties listed in annex I of the Convention must show 
'demonstrable progress' in meeting their Kyoto Protocol commitments by 2005150. 
Whilst reductions of 5% or so may seem low, they are deceptive.  Choice of 
1990 as the main base year means that percentage reductions of up to 30% or more 
of present emissions will have to be made by those states whose greenhouse gas 
emissions have increased since 1990. The United States is in this category: in 2000 
a cut of some 36% would have been needed to reduce its emissions to 1990 levels.  
In certain circumstances economies in transition, including Russia and Ukraine, may 
opt for a base year earlier than 1990151 in order to enable them to increase emissions 
because their economies have contracted so sharply since then. Developing states 
are not included in annex B so no emissions limits apply to them and they are not 
required to do more than meet their existing commitments under Article 4(1) of the 
Convention152.  
The possibility that some developed states might find it economically 
advantageous to meet their commitments jointly, and that developing states might 
also benefit from such assistance, was envisaged in Articles 4(2)(a) and 4(5) of the 
Convention and in a decision of the 1st COP, although the commitments of each 
party would not thereby be modified153. Such ideas were more fully articulated in the 
Kyoto Protocol and in particular, in its three flexibility mechanisms – Clean 
Development Mechanism under Article 12, Joint Implementation under Article 6 and 
International Emissions Trading under Article 17. Before each of these is explored at 
greater length, it is necessary to consider their conceptual underpinnings. 
 
Economic Background 
The Kyoto Protocol’s use of market based instruments to generate emission 
reductions is commonly described as innovative or radical154. Whilst this may be true 
in the context of international environmental regulation, its pedigree in both theory 
and practice is venerable. Those familiar with Law and Economics theory will 
recognise in techniques such as carbon trading the legacy of Pigovian and Coasian 
economics. The former identified the social benefits of compelling companies to pay 
for the costs of their own pollution155, whilst the latter’s The Problem of Social Cost 
demonstrated how allocating property rights and allowing trade yields pareto efficient 
results156. These insights laid the foundations for market mechanisms, such as 
emissions trading, as an alternative to traditional command-and-control methods, 
based on its claim to deliver environmental outcomes at the least cost. 
The rationale of mechanisms such as emissions trading is as follows. A 
regulator sets a cap on aggregate emissions, distributes the right to emit to regulated 
facilities (with their emission allowances totalling less than the aggregate emissions) 
and permits the market to determine the emission price and degree of abatement at 
individual facilities. If the regulator allows regulated facilities to transfer their emission 
allowances, the distribution of emission reductions among facilities will be equal to 
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the marginal cost of emission reductions among facilities157. If the marginal cost of 
emission reductions varies among facilities, total costs can be lowered by 
reallocating greater effort to the facility that can lower emissions at a lower cost. 
Thus, when marginal cost is equal among facilities, total costs are lowest and the 
environmental target is reached.  
Market mechanisms were first used as environmental tools in the USA in the 
1990s in the form of Title IV of the Clean Air (Amendment) Act 1990. A response to 
SO2 generated acid rain, the Act allocated a fixed number of allowances to the 
electricity industry, with firms being required to surrender allowances for tons of SO2 
emitted, with transfers being permitted and banking158. The success of the scheme in 
terms of costs but also as a driver of abatement innovation exceeded expectations. 
As a consequence the tool of emissions trading gained favour domestically and most 
significantly at the multilateral level, where it formed a key negotiating strategy for the 
Clinton administration in negotiations leading Kyoto159. Each of the three Kyoto 
‘Flexibility Mechanisms’ seeks to draw on the logic of the Coasian privatisation of the 
commons and trading the resultant property rights with a view to achieving emission 
reductions in the most cost effective manner, in the optimal global location.  
 
Part C. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
It is notable that having ‘lost’ the battle of ideas over the optimal means by which to 
tackle climate change, the EU subsequently embraced the new settlement with 
gusto. The Kyoto Protocol committed the EU to an 8% GHG reduction by the end of 
2012. Reductions were to be re-assigned to Member States pursuant to its own 
‘Burden Sharing Agreement’160, facilitated by one of the EU’s few negotiating 
successes at Kyoto, Article 4(1)161. Foremost amongst the jointly implemented 
responses of the EU is the Emission Trading Directive162. The Directive followed 
Commission consultations, studies and finally a “Green Paper on Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Trading within the European Union”163 which acknowledged the EU’s 
Kyoto obligations as well as the necessity that that process did not represent the 
outer limit of the EU’s relevant ambitions. Accordingly the proposal was for a scheme 
whose industry sector coverage was substantially repeated in the final Directive164, 
though with a threshold of 50MW rated thermal input. In terms of quantum of 
allowances and distribution, the Green Paper saw a role for the Commission only for 
purposes of determining Member States’ internal allocations where the risk of 
national discrimination arose. The setting of total quantities of allowances was for the 
Member States themselves. The question of free allocation (by grandfathering or 
benchmarking) or auctioning was left open whilst the need to avoid discrimination 
against new entrants was given consideration.  
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In terms of the substance of the process, it is notable that the questions of industry 
sector coverage and thresholds attracted minimal contention165. Furthermore, the task 
of setting total quantities of allowances to be allocated and the task of distributing 
those allowances which were envisaged as separate in the Green Paper, were 
combined into what were to become National Allocation Plans.  This created the risk 
that the “level of ambition under the scheme risks being diluted as a result of industry 
lobbying over their allocations…rather than ensuring that negotiation over the 
distribution [between and within Member States] is a zero sum game with no impact 
on the environmental integrity of the scheme.” 166   
 
Legal form 
The EU ETS is in its basic structure a conventional cap-and-trade scheme167. At its 
heart a fixed number of allowances are issued which are divided into a quantity of 
pollutant which is emitted over commitment periods or phases. The level of resultant 
emissions is thus equal to the established cap on emissions. Allowances are 
allocated to operators who are then obligated to monitor and report their emissions, 
and to surrender at the end each period an equal number of allowances to the units 
of pollution emitted. Penalties are attached to non-compliance. The scheme also 
provides for the buying and selling of allowances between parties, whether regulated 
entities with obligations under the Scheme or mere third parties.  
To this generic schema, the EU ETS’s specific approaches to coverage and 
allowance should be noted. The Directive’s coverage of activities, detailed in its 
Annex I, excludes aviation, shipping and most contentiously the aluminium and 
chemical sectors while including energy, ferrous metals, minerals, and pulp and 
paper. The Commission’s Explanatory Memorandum to its original proposal justified 
the chemical exemption on the basis of its mere 1% contribution to the EU’s total 
CO2 emissions and the fact that the large number of installations (approximately 
34,000) would create significant administrative complexity to the Scheme168. The 
Memorandum remains silent on the exclusion of the aluminium sector. These choices 
have generated much subsequent controversy, not least before the ECJ169.  
Allowances, as we shall see, have been a source of at least equal 
controversy. Defined by Article 3(a) as one tonne CO2e170, allowances are allocated 
and issued to installations by way of a two stage process. Stage one requires 
Member States to develop National Allocation Plans “stating the total quantity of 
allowances that it intends to allocate for that period and how it proposes to allocate 
them…based on objective and transparent criteria, including those listed in Annex 
III.”171 Such NAPs are subject to Commission approval, only after which may MSs 
definitively determine the total quantity of allowances and the allocation of the same 
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amongst installations172.  As with the question of sectoral scope, the details of such 
matters have greatly exercised the ECJ and are discussed below. 
The EU ETS has been implemented in phases - 2005 to 2007 and 2008 to 
2012 - which coordinate with the Kyoto Protocol compliance period. Subsequent 
phases are intended to run in consecutive 5 year periods. Phase I is commonly 
described as a learning-by-doing phase, allowing Member States to get acquainted 
with a novel system, to make progress towards their Kyoto Protocol commitments 
and  towards meeting their particular CO2 goals pursuant to the Burden Sharing 
Agreement.173  The Scheme may be extended to other greenhouse gases and 
installations in subsequent phases. 
As is well known, the ‘trial period’ of Phase I was characterised by a price 
collapse in late April 2006 after the publication of the verified emissions data by 
Member State after Member State revealed that emissions were significantly below 
their allocations to installations. Pre-announcement OTC prices were slightly over 
€30/ton, by mid-May had fallen to approx. €15/ton and then to near zero from early 
2007 until the end of Phase I. In a sense it is inaccurate to characterize this as a 
market failure – on the contrary, it might be argued, the market reacted precisely as it 
ought to have by adjusting when information that changes expectations was made 
available. Once aggregate emissions and the resulting demand for allowances were 
known, the fact of over-allocation had its predictable price consequences.174 
Thereafter, Phase II contracts dominated the markets’ attention, with December 2008 
EUAs ranging between €12-25 per tonne, remaining within the €20-24 band for the 
majority of the year. Upon the commencement of Phase II, such prices remained 
durable (at around €20-25 for most of 2007), revealing the price of emitting GHG in 
the EU but also sending a strong signal to FlexMechs project developers that 
emission reductions generated through projects which generate carbon credits would 
find a robust market in the EU ETS.175 
A consequence of the Phase I price collapse was its impact on the design of 
Phase II. The Commission’s approach to the Phase II caps has been described as 
“unquestionably tough”,176 being much tighter than in Phase I in an overt attempt to 
create demand for emission reductions, whether generated within the EU or in non-
Annex I countries. The Phase II cap for EU 27 is 2,098 Mt/yr, cutting Member States’ 
suggested allocations in NAPs by 245 Mt/yr (10.4%). The largest absolute cuts were 
in Poland (76Mt), Germany (29Mt), Bulgaria (25Mt) and the largest relative cuts in 
Baltic States (ave. 37%).177 These figures represent a cut of 130MtCO2 (6.0%) below 
2005 verified emissions and 160MtCO2 (7.1%) below 2007 verified emissions. 
Constraints on Member States’ ability to comply with the Scheme are eased 
somewhat by Phase II’s credit limits (the maximum CDM/JI volumes that can be 
purchased for compliance purposes) which vary according to Member States from 
10% in most cases, up to 22% for Germany. Coupled with tightness of allocations, 
this creates the possibility for sizable offset/credit imports. Nonetheless it remains the 
case that the EU ETS is projected to reduce EU-15 emissions by 139MtCO2 p.a. 
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during 2008-12 (a 3.3% reduction from the 1990 baseline). The ongoing impact of 
such measures is demonstrated by the fact that whilst the 2006 emissions of only 4 
of the EU 15 were lower than their Kyoto target (France, Germany, Sweden and the 
UK), that figure is expected to rise to 12 of 15 by 2010 (Denmark, Italy and Spain 
being the miscreants).178 Such is the strength of these projections that the operation 
of Phase II in much of 2008 saw relatively strong prices between €19-29/ton, 
although that price had halved since the onset of the global recession in February 
2009. 
 
Part D. An Assessment of the State of the Art 
The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review,179 commissioned by the 
United Kingdom Treasury and a comprehensive treatment, describes anthropogenic 
climate change in terms of catastrophic market failure. Its main conclusion is that in 
order to avoid the worst effects of climate change, prompt investment totalling one 
percent of global gross domestic product per annum is necessary. Investment would 
be required for mitigation and adaptation, thereby encompassing inter alia low carbon 
energy technologies and carbon capture and storage. The failure to do so, argues 
Stern, could risk global GDP being up to twenty percent lower than it otherwise might 
be.  
In this context, emission reductions required by the Kyoto Protocol seem 
overwhelmingly inadequate. Similarly, whatever the achievements of the Clean 
Development Mechanism, it is clear that it has so far failed to drive technological 
innovation at an appropriate rate, or facilitate technology transfer on a scale that 
meets the needs of the burgeoning new economies of India and China in particular. 
Indeed a brief analysis of global energy forecasts brings the scale and dynamics of 
the relative positions of industrialised and emerging economies into sharp relief.  
Global demand for energy is forecast to increase by 66% by 2030, with fossil 
fuels accounting for 86% of the total. Whilst energy usage by OECD and non-OECD 
states was roughly equal in 2005, the latter’s share is set to increase to 59% in 2030, 
with India and China’s accounting for the majority of that extra demand. Global CO2 
emissions are estimated to increase from 28.1 billion metric tons in 2005 to 42.3 
billion tons in 2030 and the share of non-OECD economies rising from 51% in 2005 
to 63.3% in 2030.180 If such figures appear to support the argument for uniform 
emission reductions, it is of course the case that the historic responsibility for global 
emissions lies mainly with developed, not developing economies, and has facilitated 
a level of welfare the latter are keen to emulate. Moreover, disparities exist in per 
capita CO2 totals. Indian and Chinese emissions stood at 3.7 and 1.0 metrics tons 
per capita in 2004 as compared with 9.5 and 19.7 metric tons per capita for Japan 
and the USA. Even after the forecast increases by 2030 to 7.1 and 1.8 metrics tons 
per capita for India and China (with the US and Europe remaining substantially the 
same) the gap persists.181 
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The Negotiating Context 
Before considering possible amendments to the existing regulatory architecture of 
climate change, we must ask how future agreements will be negotiated. Whilst the 
negotiations under the auspices of the Framework Convention are clearly central, it is 
important to note the existence of parallel processes.  
The Kyoto Protocol commitment period expires in 2012. At the time of writing, 
many of the key issues necessary for a successor agreement were expected to be 
substantially settled at COP 14 in 2008, if not their details. Adoption of a new protocol 
was scheduled for COP 15 at Copenhagen in December 2009. Both will build upon 
the Bali Roadmap – a series of decisions taken at COP 13 in December 2007, which 
include the Bali Action Plan,182 purporting to chart the course for a new negotiating 
process, with the aim of completion by Copenhagen. It also includes the AWG-KP183 
negotiations, the launch of the Adaptation Fund, and the Article 9 review of the Kyoto 
Protocol, as well as decisions on technology transfer and reducing emissions from 
deforestation. This is an ambitious agenda. 
Running in parallel with the ‘Convention’ negotiations are two other processes. 
The Major Economies Meeting (MEM), initiated by President Bush in 2007, is 
avowedly “a new initiative to develop and contribute to a post-Kyoto framework on 
energy security and climate change…” that seeks to “contribute to existing national, 
bilateral, regional and international programs” and not undermine them.184  Not 
surprisingly it has been viewed with some suspicion, given President Bush's less 
than firm commitment to action on climate change at home and abroad. Moreover, 
participation is limited to major actors (principally OECD nations, USA, China, India, 
Brazil, EU) rather than the more broadly based Convention processes. A similarly 
handpicked parallel process operates under the auspices of the G8. Commenced in 
2005 under the British Presidency,185 the G8 has undertaken various actions to 
combat climate change, including a ‘dialogue’ with Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, 
China and India. As with the MEM, the G8+5 process is intended to complement the 
UN Framework Convention process and recognises it as the “only forum in which 
binding agreements on future frameworks can be negotiated.”  
The 2008 G8+8 meetings in Hokkaido186 reaffirmed that future cooperation 
would be “rooted in the objective, provisions, and principles of the Convention” and in 
the Bali Roadmap. “Serious consideration” would be given to the “ambitious IPCC 
scenarios,” and the role of technology in addressing climate change.187 Most 
significantly, governments agreed on the “goal of achieving at least a 50% reduction 
in global emissions by 2050”.188 Compared with the emission reductions of the Kyoto 
Protocol, this would represent a significant change in the commitments leading 
economies are prepared to undertake. Whilst the Summit Leaders Declaration states 
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that, “this global challenge can only be met by a global response, in particular, by the 
contributions from all major economies, consistent with the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”,189 it is far from clear that 
emerging economies take the same view. The Declaration emerging from the larger 
meeting of the MEM states the need to “ensure the agreed outcome [of negotiations] 
maximizes the efforts of all nations [with] nationally appropriate mitigation actions, 
supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity-building, with a view to 
achieving a deviation from business as usual emissions”190 This differently nuanced 
emphasis is characteristic of post-Kyoto negotiations. 
On the relative negotiating positions of Annex I and non-Annex I parties – and 
hence the future articulation of the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibility – the most striking development of recent years has been the vast 
economic expansion of India and China. As we have seen, most of the commitments 
under the Convention and the Protocol apply only to developed state parties. Given 
recent patterns of industrialisation, is it appropriate, or sustainable, for non-Annex I 
parties to continue to be largely unconstrained by the climate change regime? Whilst 
the Convention and Protocol provide some incentives for developing states to tackle 
greenhouse gas emissions, through various provisions on technology transfer, the 
clean development mechanism, and 'additional' funding from developed states and 
the Global Environment Facility, they have trenchantly resisted the application of 
quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments.  
The background to this position is twofold. First is the historic fact that 
industrialised economies have long benefited from massive GHG emissions, are 
substantially responsible for the current problems and should not as such deprive 
newly industrialising economies from similarly raising the standard of living of their 
own citizens. Secondly, the rejectionist position  taken by the Bush administration vis-
à-vis the Kyoto Protocol, and its general appearance as a climate change denier, has 
not persuaded emerging economies that they are obliged to undertake binding 
commitments. Moreover, pursuant to Article 4(7)’s '[t]he extent to which developing 
country Parties will effectively implement their commitments under the Convention 
will depend on the effective implementation by developed country parties of their 
commitments….'.191 Here we can see that the already limited obligations of 
developing states appear to be conditional on provision of benefits by developed 
states. Whilst a regime in which one group of states bears most of the burdens and 
another group reaps most of the benefits accurately reflects a sense of historical 
responsibility for the causes of climate change it is far from clear that this approach is 
optimally placed to solve the problem at hand. The question thus arises whether the 
articulation of the principle of common but differentiated responsibility found in the 
Kyoto Protocol is sustainable given the scientific urgency indicated by the 2007 IPCC 
Assessment Reports and the economic realities of Indian and Chinese 
industrialisation.  
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Post-Kyoto, Pre-Copenhagen 
As noted above, the Bali Action Plan aims to chart the course for a new negotiating 
process, with the aim of completion by the Copenhagen Conference of the Parties in 
December 2009. The preamble to the Bali Action Plan speaks of the need for “deep 
cuts” in global GHG emissions and refers to the “urgency” of the task, with the work 
of the IPCC playing an important role.192 The report indicates that global emissions of 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) need to peak in the next 10–15 years and be reduced to 
very low levels, well below half of levels in 2000 by the middle of the twenty-first 
century in order to stabilize their concentrations in the atmosphere at the lowest 
levels assessed by the IPCC to date in its scenarios. This goes further than either the 
Kyoto Protocol or the UNFCCC in emphasizing the immediacy of the problem. The 
majority of countries, with EU leadership, wished to consider cuts of between 25%-
40% for rich countries, by 2020, but agreement was blocked by the USA, Canada 
and Russia.193 The commitment to “Measurable, reportable and verifiable… 
mitigation commitments or actions including quantified emissions limitation” for all 
developed country parties is however important in ensuring that the USA, which is 
not a party to the Kyoto protocol, remains involved in mitigation efforts.194 Although it 
is moving in a positive direction, the Bali Action Plan frustrates hopes of establishing 
binding targets, which will be the focus of subsequent negotiations. 195 
The Bali conference made significant progress on putting deforestation and 
forest degradation firmly on the agenda – issue areas long accepted to mark the 
most significant failings of the Kyoto Protocol.196 Decision 2/CP.13 required the 
SBSTA to undertake a program of work in relation to this, with a report to be made at 
COP 14. This builds on the groundwork done in the Marrakech Accords on defining 
and adopting methodologies. The same decision invites developing countries to 
“explore a range of actions, identify options and undertake efforts, including 
demonstration activities, to address the drivers of deforestation relevant to their 
national circumstances”.197 Developed country parties are “invited” to mobilise 
resources in support of this, although it is left open what incentives might be 
provided.198 Decision CMP3/6 established Good Practice Guidance for land use, land 
use change, and forestry activities. 
The inclusion of Carbon Capture and Storage Technology in the CDM 
continues to be discussed by the SBSTA. Strengthening of the previous regime on 
technology sharing is necessary if the potential for cooperation is to be realised. Here 
the Experts Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT) established by the Marrakech 
Accords has an important role to play. Decision CP13/3 establishes a very 
comprehensive work programme including assessing the gaps and barriers to 
                                                 
192 Decision 5/CP.13.  
193 See Climate Change Strategic Comments (2008) vol 14, available from the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies at www.iiss.org 
194  Morgan, Post-Kyoto: The International Context for Progress on Climate Change, Memorandum to 
the House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, at 1.5.  
195 Ibid, at 1.1. See also UK House of Commons, Environmental Audit Committee, 6th Report: 
Reaching an International Agreement on Climate Change (London, 2008). 
196 See generally, “Climate Policy, Carbon Markets and Forestry”, Vol. 2, No. 3, Carbon & Climate Law 
Review (2008). 
197 Ibid, at 3. 
198 In addition, the World Bank has launched a Forest Carbon Partnership Facility to help demonstrate 
the feasibility of accurately accounting for REDD reductions. The two components are a $100 million 
“readiness” fund focusing on capacity building and a $200million carbon finance mechanism for pilot 
projects. The Bank has already raised roughly half of this money from nine industrialized countries and 
The Nature Conservancy.  
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technology transfer, developing a set of performance indicators to monitor and 
evaluate the effectiveness of the technology transfer framework and bringing forth a 
strategy paper on how to move forward. The issue of secure funding for the EGTT is 
also given continued precedence. Decision CP13/4 requests the GEF to develop a 
plan for scaling up funding for transfer of environmentally sound technologies. 
Decision CMP3/1 on the clean development mechanism reiterates many of the 
concerns relating to establishing baselines, approval of methodologies and 
monitoring that have plagued the CDM from its inception. No promises about the 
long-term future of the CDM were made. In relation to Joint Implementation, there 
was again little in the way of radical reform. 
Post-Kyoto, the two-track framework of Annex 1/non Annex 1 countries is 
likely to include further commitments for developing countries. Article 1(b)(ii) of the 
Bali Action Plan calls for “nationally appropriate” mitigation actions to be undertaken 
“in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner.” This may be compared to the 
commitments in Article 10(b) of Kyoto Protocol to: Formulate, implement, publish and 
regularly update national and, where appropriate, regional programmes containing 
measures to mitigate climate change and measures to facilitate adequate adaptation 
to climate change. 
It is clear that, whilst the Bali Action Plan remains informed by the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibility, developing countries are increasingly 
expected to play a full role in mitigation efforts. The language used, although short of 
binding commitments, indicates that concrete evidence of progress will be required.  
The strengthening of the Dialogue on Long Term Cooperative Action on Climate 
Change to form an Ad hoc Working Group199 is another step towards a more 
inclusive international framework. This is a positive step in relation to the long-term 
actions necessary by all countries to address climate change. 
 
 
Conclusions 
The foregoing seeks to place the EU’s responses to the climate change challenge in 
a global and intellectual context. Suffice to say despite its singular contribution to the 
process, by way of the EU ETS, the EU’s leadership position in the approach to the 
Copenhagen COP is not secured. This is so not least because of the US position 
which post-Bush is only slowly emerging, so it is difficult to predict their appetite for 
adopting a leadership role in the negotiations. The Obama administration is certain to 
be different from its predecessor’s but what shape that may take is uncertain. 
Further uncertainty, and undermining of the EU ETS, arises from the global 
recession. In early 2009 it was certainly the case that it operated as a significant 
interruption to the process, and Parties appear reluctant to table serious offers whilst 
they try to take stock of the impact of the recession. Furthermore, the global down 
turn is causing both a significant downturn in carbon prices and price volatility – 
problematic both for the making of investment decisions and the impact on carbon 
abatement projects.200 As with Phase I of the EU ETS, the recession is undermining 
the capacity of markets to deliver meaningful carbon abatements.  
 
                                                 
199 Decision CP.13/1 at 2. 
200 For the most recent EU response, see Communication ('Towards a comprehensive CC agreement') 
COM (2009) 39. 
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xxiii. Participatory Budgeting: Understanding the 
new role of participatory institutions in 
contemporary politics* 
(the case of Brazil) 
By Leonardo Avritzer201 
 
 
Since the middle of the twentieth century, legitimate government has been 
increasingly associated with the existence of electoral mechanisms through which 
the general population of citizens delegate power to political agents authorized to act 
on their behalf (Schumpter, 1942; Sartori, 1962; Dahl, 1990; Bobbio, 1984).  
However, in the last 10 years, democratic theorists have begun to question this 
association in two ways.  Firstly, the construction of a supra-national political 
organization in Europe created of multiple and superimposed forms of national and 
post-national representation.  The overlapping of different levels of participation and 
the emergence of a post-national political institution brought into question the role of 
political parties, which did not exist at the supra-national levels as well as the form of 
dealing with post-national forms of political representation (Held, 2004; 
Habermas,2003; Schmitter, 2000; 2003).   In the place of political parties, new forms 
of civil society representation and political participation (Baquet and Sintomer, 2005) 
at the European level began to emerge (Risse, 2003), raising questions about how to 
coordinate various forms of representation and whether civil society organizations 
could be considered “functional equivalents” of political parties.  The question on how 
political participation fits into the European political arrangement is still an open one. 
A second debate that led to the re-evaluation of the role of participation 
occurred through a variety of experiments in the developing world (or in the South) 
promoting the participation of civil society organizations in public policy formulation 
and implementation.  These new “hybrid” institutions (Avritzer and Pereira, 2005; 
Avritzer, 2009) are now very common in Latin America (Dagnino, Olvera, Panficci, 
2005; Abers and Keck, 2006; Peruzzotti, 2006), and have also been created in Asia 
(Heller, 2006; Jun, 2009) and in Africa (Friedman, 2009).  Of all these countries, 
Brazil seems to be one of the most advanced in terms of creating new hybrid forms 
of state civil society relations.   
Political participation in democratic Brazil has been marked by two important 
phenomena: the expansion of civil society involvement in public policy making and 
the growth of new types of “participatory institutions”.  Since the end of the 
authoritarian period (1964-1985), civil society actors have demanded greater 
presence in policy deliberations in health, social services, urban policy and other 
areas (Coelho, 2004; 2005; Cunha, 2004, Avritzer, 2006, Avritzer, 2007).  Alongside 
increasing support for decentralization and “stakeholder governance” coming from 
the international policy community, this demand from civil society helped produce a 
                                                 
* Parts of the data used in this paper were originally written in co-authorship with Brian Wampler for 
the World Bank project “The Expansion of Participatory Budgeting in Brazil”. 
201Mr. Leonardo Avritzer,  Associate professor at the Federal University of Minas Gerais and 
coordinator of the think-tank Prodep, Brazil. 
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series of new deliberative arenas.  The Participatory Budget experiments, initiated by 
the local administrations of Worker's Party - which involve local citizens in decisions 
about basic infrastructure - have been studied in depth (Santos, 1998; Avritzer, 
2002a; Avritzer, 2002b; Faria, 2005; Wampler, 2008).  The Participatory Budget has 
disseminated throughout Brazil and mobilized large numbers citizens – 
approximately 180,000 people in four major cities alone in 2004202. Less well studied 
are hybrid institutions called “councils” which bring together civil society organizations 
and state actors and have a formal mandate to make health care, social assistance, 
environmental, urban and other policies at the municipal, river basin, state and 
national levels, also have a strong impact in Brazil.  (Coelho, 2006, Abers and Keck, 
2006; Tatagiba, 2002.).  Participatory budgeting also expanded to Europe where, in 
2008, there were more than 100 cities practicing participatory budgeting (Sintomer, 
2008; Alegretti, 2006). 
These new deliberative institutions have largely been understood as places of 
increased political participation in the sense that they increased the direct 
participation of citizens in the polity.  However, it is also correct to point out that their 
main role has been to bring citizens into policy making arenas and to provide new 
forms of articulation between participation and representation.  These new forms of 
participation also enhance the deliverance of public goods, making PB an efficient 
public policy.  In this paper, I will first explain the main characteristics of PB in Brazil.  
Secondly, I will give details of PB expansion inside Brazil and make reference to its 
expansion in Europe and Africa.  Finally, I will make a proposal for the 
implementation of participatory budgeting in different situations. 
 
The emergence of participatory budgeting in Brazil 
The social and political origins of participatory budgeting must be traced back to the 
tradition of mobilization in the city of Porto Alegre in the extreme South of Brazil 
during the post-war period.   The origin of popular movements in Porto Alegre was 
marked by the formation of Fracab, Federation of Community Associations in Rio 
Grande do Sul, in the second half of the 1950s (Silva, 2001: 79).  Porto Alegre 
neighbourhood associations in the 50s aimed to foster a “humanist, anti-paternalist” 
form of participation which departed from forms of political clientelism organizing 
associations in other larger cities of Brazil (Silva, 2001: 81).  Porto Alegre also had a 
strong tradition of leftwing politics which can be traced back to the same period.  
Between 1947 and 1963, the PTB (Brazilian Labor Party) received the largest share 
of the votes in all the elections for City Council whereas in the rest of Brazil it was 
closer to 12% of the national vote.  Thus, participatory budgeting has its origins in the 
presence of a more democratic and horizontal political practice in one region of the 
country during the 1946-1964 democratic period. 
Brazil passed through 21 years of authoritarianism after the break of 
democracy in 1964.  At the time of democratization (1985-1988), the main electoral 
contest at the local level, was between candidates of the left and the right in most 
Brazilian capitals apart from Porto Alegre.  There, the contest was between the PDT, 
a center-left party which sought to retrieve the populist past, and the PT, which 
sought to renew the Brazilian left and proposed popular councils to govern cities 
(Keck, 1992; Abers, 1996). Neighbourhood associations and the PT, however, 
claimed that the forms of participation were too limited.  It was in this context that 
UAMPA, the União de Associações de Moradores de Porto Alegre, launched the 
                                                 
202 This figure refers to 2004 and was obtained by totaling the participation in PBs in São Paulo 
(80,000), Porto Alegre (30,000), Belo Horizonte (30,000), and Recife (40,000).   
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idea of participation in the budget-making process (UAMPA, 1986).  Porto Alegre 
was thus the only city in Brazil in which political competition in the aftermath of re-
democratization occurred among sectors of the left and centered on the issue of local 
participation.  It was in this context that Olívio Dutra was elected mayor of Porto 
Alegre in 1988, and introduced participatory budgeting as a means of deliberating on 
the distribution of public goods by his administration.   
Participatory budgeting in its Porto Alegre version (1990-2005), introduced 
many new institutions, three of them with strong deliberative elements: the regional 
and the thematic assemblies, the Council of Participatory Budgeting (COP), and the 
determination of the rules for decision-making203. The regional and thematic 
assemblies are places where participants can make claims, criticize the 
administrative actions of local authorities, and negotiate their priorities among 
themselves.  In Porto Alegre there are 16 regional and five thematic assemblies.  The 
format of the regions was a point of conflict between social movements and the 
administration.  Social movements pressed hard to maintain the pattern of collective 
action in the city’s regions, arguing that the administrative design of districts would 
conflict with the mobilization of many community movements (Baierle, 1998).  The 
city agreed to redesign the regions in a way that overlapped with existing forms of 
mobilization.  Thus, the first element of the deliberative process was an attempt to 
combine the logics of collective action and administration starting the participatory 
process from the bottom. 
Regional and thematic assemblies are places for discussion and deliberation.  
An analysis of the socio-economic characteristics of the participants shows the 
strong presence of poor city-dwellers in the regional assemblies: 30.22% of the 
participants earn no more than twice the minimum wage and 25.51% two to four 
times the minimum wage, indicating that participants in the PB come close to the 
socio-economic condition of the population at large.  In each assembly, 45 minutes 
are open for contributions of the participants.  Presence in the assemblies does not 
necessarily translate into equality at other levels, as is indicated by Table 1, which 
correlates income with active participation in Porto Alegre’s PB. 
 
Table 1: Socio-economic condition of the participants and of the speakers in the 
Assemblies in POA204 
 
Income (multiples of 
minimum wage) 
Participants 
 in the assemblies
Never spoken in  
assemblies 
Up to 2 30.22% 47.30% 
2 to 4  25.51% 37.90% 
4 to 8  20.60% 37.20% 
8 to 12  9.43% 27.10% 
Others 14,24% --------- 
Total 100,00% 100% 
 
                                                 
203 There are many useful descriptions of the functioning of participatory budgeting which I will not 
repeat here.  For a full description of the process see, Baierle, 1998; Santos, 1998; Abers, 2000; 
Avritzer, 2002c; Baiocchi, 2002. 
204 Source:Cidade, 1999. 
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We can thus note several deliberative characteristics of the PB regional assemblies 
in Porto Alegre.  In the first place they express the social diversity of the city, a 
characteristic that establishes a new social balance in deliberation about the 
distribution of public goods.  In the second place, although there are still some 
inequalities in relation to gender or class participation, there is rough gender equity in 
the number of interventions.  Women participate in PB meetings slightly more than 
men (51.4% of participants are women) and are also more willing to speak.  
However, we should also note that socio-economic condition sharply predetermines 
the inclination to speak.  Among the participants who make up to twice the minimum 
wage, a majority of the participants, 47.30%, have never spoken in an assembly.  
The number of those who have never spoken stands in inverse proportion to income.   
A second deliberative body of the PB is the COP, the Council of Participatory 
Budgeting.  The COP is formed during the second round of regional assemblies, 
when the region elects councillors to the PB Council.  This process leads to the 
formation of a council composed as follows: two councillors from each of the 16 
regions (32), two from each of the five thematic assemblies (10), one from the 
UAMPA and one from the public service trade union (2).  The PB Council has 44 
members.  Administrative members do not vote, although they participate regularly 
and wield considerable influence205. The PB Council is a deliberative body in which 
two types of negotiations take place: between community members on their priorities 
and between community members and the administration on the final format of the 
budget.  Several decisions are made at this level, among them the substitution of 
previous assembly deliberations by other deliberations due to what is called a 
‘technical veto,’ when the administration disallows the decisions of regional 
assemblies on technical grounds.  The most common vetoes involve environmental, 
property, and financial issues.  Common environmental vetoes in Porto Alegre 
include the channelling of local creeks, which the population demands but the 
administration regards as a cause of summer floods206. Property issues involve the 
misidentification of land as belonging to the city; when it turns out to be owned by 
state companies, the state, or the union, the cost of public works increases. 
Financial issues, finally, which involve the cost of extending sewage or water 
pipelines.  In all these cases, there is vigorous debate between the members of the 
PB Council and the administration, with mixed results.  One of the important results 
of these debates is the requirement imposed by the administration that the 
technicians attend the regional and thematic assemblies and discuss their positions 
on these issues with the population.  Again, it is important to note that the presence 
of the technicians in popular assemblies enhances their deliberative nature.  PB 
council is also a key element of bottom-up design.  It is an institution constituted at 
the end of open entry assemblies.  In spite of the use of representation in its 
composition its members are strongly linked to the regional leaderships from the 
places in which they have been elected.  The presence of PB councils is a key 
element of bottom-up design because it expresses the concentration of most of the 
decision-making process in the hands of civil society actors.   
                                                 
205 To my knowledge there is only one city in which the administrative members vote in the PB Council, 
the city of Santo Andre.  Santo Andre changed the composition of its P.B.  council in 2004 and 
cancelled voting prerogatives of the administrative personnel 
206 Pavement has been the public good mostly demanded in Porto Alegre since the emergence of the 
PB.  As of today, 6 million square meters of pavement have been laid.  As a consequence of the 
increase in the amount of pavement in the city, the soil of the city became impermeable and summer 
flooding increased.  This has led to a technical veto on new channeling of creeks. 
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The third deliberative element of the PB is the process of decision-making on rules 
for deliberation.  Porto Alegre inaugurated a rule-making process that has been 
followed by other cities in Brazil.  In this process, the city determines the initial rules 
for deliberation (regimento), and then the PB Council is able to change them at the 
beginning of the following year.  These rules involve: the composition of the Council 
of PB (COP); the attributions of the COP; rules for the election of local delegates; 
conditions for losing a mandate; rules for argumentation in the COP; rules for the 
election of a coordination body within the COP; and, last but not least, rules by which 
the COP can change the rules for deliberation.  Thus, the COP may be understood to 
be a body which sets up its own forms of regulation, from its composition to its rules 
for deliberation.  It shares some of its prerogatives with other bodies, such as the 
CRC and the GAPLAN.  However, the final budgetary deliberation takes place at the 
COP level and includes making rules for the COP’s future operation. 
The most familiar theories about Porto Alegre’s PB argue that participation 
increased quickly due to its deliberative elements (Avritzer, 2002a; Baiocchi, 2003; 
Wampler and Avritzer, 2004; Santos, 2006).  Despite low rates initially, participation 
in the new institution grew rapidly and it is worth exploring the details of the process.  
Regions with previous traditions of participation, like Parthenon or the East zone of 
the city, had relatively high levels of initial participation whereas regions without such 
traditions, such as Restinga and Navegantes, had lower levels.  Here, we see again 
the importance of civil society organization for the emergence of the institutional 
innovation.  Without the participation of neighborhood association members in the 
initial deliberations, the process could have collapsed.  Learning and demonstration 
effects occurred as the neighborhoods singled out above received more benefits than 
the least organized regions, leading to the reorganization of the more populated 
neighborhoods (Abers, 2000; Wampler and Avritzer, 2004; Baiocchi, 2005).  PB in 
Porto Alegre has enjoyed steady growth in participation, rising from 976 people in 
1990 to 26,807 in 2000.  This evolution tells us something important about the 
relationship between civil and political society in the consolidation of participatory 
arrangements.  Civil society was responsible for the initial success of the 
arrangement by providing the participatory institution with actors capable of fulfilling 
the roles required of them: attending meetings, identifying neighborhood problems, 
and participating and deliberating in councils (Wampler and Avritzer, 2004).  Political 
society and the state then generalized previously existing practices to the rest of the 
city: they extended forms of participation to other neighborhoods and ensured that 
this would be the only way of claiming public goods in the city.  Together, the two 
actions led to the consolidation of participatory budgeting in the early nineties as a 
strongly deliberative institution. 
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Table 2: Participation in Porto Alegre’s P.B.  by selected regions207 
 
 Region 1990 1992 1994 199
6 
1998 
Regions with strong Leste 152 510 339 623 710 
associative traditions Lomba 64 569 
 
575 973 638 
 
 Partenon 75 1096 
 
661 809 805 
 
 Cruzeiro 181 297 
 
494 649 604 
 
       
Regions with weak Navegantes 15 165 135 495 624 
associative traditions Nordeste 33 276 
 
350 682 906 
 
 Restinga 36 369 
 
1096 763 1348 
 
 Centro-Sul 101 591 352 151 1461
 
Thus, it is possible to note the importance of Porto Alegre in the emergence of the 
participatory design.  Porto Alegre’s politics is directly linked to the bottom-up design 
of participatory budgeting.  Civil society and political societies in the city have 
influenced a radically participatory design that caught the attention of Brazilian 
political actors from the early nineties on.   However, in spite of the influence of civil 
society in the original design and in spite of the consensus of Porto Alegre’s political 
society on the design, two issues are important to keep in mind: the first one is that 
PB expanded from Porto Alegre to other cities in Brazil from 1993 to 1997 mainly due 
to the initiative of the PT.  From 1993 to 2000 the number of PB cases expanded to 
120, among them 37 (49%) belonged to PT administrations; in spite of the fact that 
most of the expansion of PB from 1993 onwards was based on the bottom-up design 
of Porto Alegre, most of the new cases adapted the design in its bottom-up elements 
in order to make it more palatable to both the local PT and the rest of political society, 
in particular, City Hall.  In the next section of this article I will deal with the expansion 
of participatory budgeting to other regions and cities in Brazil. 
 
The expansion of participatory budgeting in Brazil 
Participatory budgeting emerged in Porto Alegre in 1990 and expanded to the rest of 
Brazil and, by the beginning of the 21st century, to many other counties in Africa, 
Europe, Latin America and Asia (Avritzer, 2002a; Wampler, 2003; Wampler and 
Avritzer, 2005; Sintomer, 2008).  The expansion of participatory budgeting in Brazil is 
noteworthy for numeric, political, and regional reasons.  Numerically, PB expanded 
from 13 cases in 1992 to 53 in 1996 to 120 in 2000 to 190 in 2004 and to 201 cases 
at the end of 2008.  The significant expansion of PB over a twenty-year period means 
that PB has been adopted in municipalities that are significantly different from Porto 
Alegre, the municipality with the first PB program.  The greater number of PB cases, 
combined with a careful tracking of PB over the past twenty years now provides us 
                                                 
207 Source: Wampler and Avritzer, 2004 
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with an incredible opportunity to better understand how factors such as region, 
municipality size, and political party affect how PB programs function.   
The adoption of PB evolved in regional terms as PB expanded out of its 
original base in the South and Southeast of Brazil to other regions, particularly, the 
Northeast region (see table 3 below).  The expansion of PB poses important 
research and institutional design questions to policy makers: How does municipality 
size or region affect PB performance? Which are the important institutional design 
innovations and continuities? How does variation in the institutional design of internal 
processes affect PB performance?  Finally, how does party governance affect PB 
performance? There has been a de-centering of PB as it is no longer closely tied to 
the Workers’ Party, which led us to investigate how PB has been adapted to meet 
local needs. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Experiences of P.B.  in Brazil 
  
Total 
number % PT 
1989-
1992 13 92% 
1993-
1996 53 62% 
1997-
2000 120 43% 
2000-
2004 190 59% 
2005-
2008 201 65% 
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The map bellow shows the spatial distribution of PB experiences: 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of 2005-2008 PB experiences 
 
 
The main identified in PB are: (a) the institutional design of the participatory process 
that brings citizens into budgetary decision-making; (b) the administrative 
agency/department that is responsible for the program; and (c) the frequency with 
which the participatory budgeting process is held.  In the following sections of this 
article, I will outline each one of them. 
 
Institutional Design 
Participatory budgeting emerged in Porto Alegre with a very specific design as I have 
demonstrated above.  Assemblies would take place every year at the regional level 
(sub-municipal).  Two processes, based on the results region-level deliberations and 
voting, ensured that policies were implemented according to the demands of the 
regional assemblies.  A municipal-wide Participatory Budgeting Council would 
oversee the drafting of the budget and the implementation of the public works would 
be carried out by the planning department (GAPLAN).  A detailed analysis of these 
institutions shows that they were designed to fit into Porto Alegre´s politics.  Regional 
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assemblies were designed to fit in with the participatory logic of the city of Porto 
Alegre, which was very intense in the beginning of the 1990s.  The structure of a 
council and an administrative agency were also important for the success of 
participatory budgeting.  The PB Council was important to establish a process of 
debate on budgetary issues outside the government.  The regional assemblies were 
not the place for in-depth discussion on the whole of budget due to the importance of 
technical issues and also due to the way citizens and CSOs were organized.  Many 
important issues were discussed in the assemblies such as who will aquire housing 
or whether the city would need new large avenues, such as the third “perimetral”, the 
most expensive public work carried out in Porto Alegre during the 90’s.   
In addition, GAPLAN (Planning Department) also played an important role in 
the success of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre due to many coordination 
issues that emerged from the participatory process and needed to be tackled by the 
administration.  An administrative body with direct links to the mayor helps to solve 
crucial problems in the implementation of PB.  Since the organization of PB in Porto 
Alegre was based on the political needs of CSOs and government officials, it is 
important to see how variation in this feature would affect the PB process.  Today in 
Brazil, the most successful cases of participation have adapted the Porto Alegre’s 
proposal of PB administrative organization.  In a research carried out in 2008 we 
found that in 32, % of cases, the PB administration is transferred to the Planning 
Secretary.  If we concentrate on cases of continuity of PB for at least eight years, this 
data increased to 38, 2% (Avritzer and Wampler, 2008).  In our view, this 
demonstrates that adaptation of the PB adminsitrative location is one key to its 
success.   
Thus, the Brazilian experience shows many different options of institutional 
design for participatory budgeting Belo Horizonte placed PB in its Planning 
Department, as did the city of Recife but there are other alternatives such as its 
allocation to the secretariat of government or the creation of a participatory budgeting 
secretariat which the city of Uberlandia did in the late nineties.  It is important to 
evaluate success in relation to where participatory budgeting is allocated when we 
consider the possibility of expansion of the experiences of participatory budgeting to 
other countries in Latin America and Africa. 
It is also important to analyze, the cycle of the participatory process as we 
discuss reasons for variation.  Porto Alegre´s participatory process has been on a 
yearly basis.  However, the yearly process does not fit completely with the 
administrative dynamics.  Very few public works can be delivered in one year, due to 
the manner in which the Brazilian public administration works.  Bidding processes in 
Brazil are slow as is the administrative process of implementation of public works.  
Although participatory budgeting created a public pressure for more efficiency in both 
areas (Marquetti, 2003), the fact that it assumed an unrealistic view about the 
completion of demands did not help its success.  The solution of the city of Porto 
Alegre was to try to finish most of the demands for public works before the electoral 
period (Santos, 2002).  Therefore, variation in timing is an important consideration 
when we think about the expansion of participatory budgeting.  A more realistic 
approach as to how long  it takes to process demands and how not to make 
excessive demands that governments may not be willing to meet in the short term is 
important for the success of participatory budgeting.  Thus, it is important to bear in 
mind the two main variations caused by PB expansion: institutional placement of PB 
in the administration and duration of the budget cycle.  Both of them should be 
adapted during the process of expansion of participatory budgeting. 
218 
 
Cases of Participatory Budgeting 2005-2008: explaining long term trends 
The number of cases of PB in Brazil during the 2005-2008 period is 201 (Avritzer and 
Wampler, 2008).  This number is nearly the same between 2001 and 2004 (172 
according to a previous research and 199 in our most recent data collection).  The 
first important issue to analyze is the distribution of cases according to region and 
municipal size.  Historically, Brazilin PB case experiences have been concentrated in 
the South and Southeast regions, as well as in municipalities with more than 100,000 
residents.  With regard to city size, the first observation is that 41% of the 2005-2008 
experiences are located in cities with more than 100,000 residents and 40 % of all 
PB cases are located in cities with a population between 100,000 and 500,000 
people208. Importantly, this means that a little fewer than 50% of the PB cases were 
functioning in either small or mid-sized municipalities. 
A second clearly identified trend is a change in the regional profile where PB is 
being adopted.  There has been a de-concentration from a strong presence in the 
South and Southeast regions of Brazil and a growing presence in the Northeast 
region.  Table 4 hereunder shows the PB experiences in Brazilian regions during the 
2001-2004 administrative periods and compares it with the incidence from 2004 to 
2008  Furthermore, the growth in PB in the North doubled during 2005-2008, which is 
remarkable given the smaller number of municipalities in this region (verify # of 
municipalities per region).  There was also a comparable level of growth in PB cases 
in the Center-West region, also with conditions of minimal growth 
 
Table 4: Percentage of PB experiences  
 
Years Regions of 
Brazil 1997-2000 
2001-
2004 
2005-
2008 
North 2,5% 5,5% 8,5% 
Northeast 14,2% 22,6% 22,4% 
South 39,2% 22,6% 21,9% 
Southeast 41,7% 45,2% 41,3% 
Center 
West 2,5% 4% 6,0% 
 
 
Thus, it is possible to make the following argument on incidence of PB experiences in 
Brazil between 1997, 2004 and 2008.  There is a de-concentration of experiences 
from the South and Southeast regions.  The decrease is more important in the South 
whose number of experiences decreased by 10% from 32, 9% to 22, 9%.  The 
number of experiences in the Southeast region remained more or less stable 
concentrating 40, 2% of the experiences.  The most important increase has taken 
place in the Northeast region where the total of experiences went from 16,45 to 
21,0%.  The above data indicates a new equilibrium among PB experiences among 
Brazil's regions.   
 
                                                 
208 Brazil has 5,592 cities.  However most of these cities are very small.  The number of cities with 
more than 100,000 inhabitants in 2008 was 224 (4%). 
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Continuation/Maintenance of PB programs 
An interesting finding is the degree of continuity of PB between the 2001-2004 and 
2005-2008 administrative periods.  We differentiate between two kinds of continuity: 
the first is between two administrations (2001-2004, 2005-2008) and the second over 
three mayoral administrative periods (including the 1997-2000 periods).  There are 
116 cases of continuity during the 2001-2004 and the 2005-2008 mayoral periods.  
There are 40 cases of PB continuity between 1997 2008.  What characteristics are 
associated with municipalities where PB endures? 
The first important characteristic of the cases of PB continuity is that these 
cities have socio-economic living standards that are well above the Brazilian and the 
PB average.  The Brazilian HDI is 0,699, and the average HDI for cities which have 
PB is 0,753.  When it comes to continuity this average goes even higher reaching a 
gap in between 0,701 and 0,800 in 47,4% of the cases.   
The population of the municipality and that of the municipality’s region are two 
other factors that have a significant effect.  Continuity between 2001 and 2008 was 
stronger in the Southeast region with 40,9% of the cases.  When it comes to the 
second higher incidence of continuity the Northeast and the Southern regions occupy 
the second place with 23,6% of the cases.  Table 3 below summarizes the cases of 
continuity according to region and size of city: 
 
 
Table 5: Continuity between 2001-2004 and 2005-2008 mayoral periods 
 
Regions of 
Brazil % Size of city % 
North 5,6 Up to 20,000 19,1 
Northeast 30,3 From 20,001 to 50,000 21,3 
Center West 5,6 From 50,001 to 100,000 14,6 
South 15,7 Above 100,001  39,3 
Southeast 42,7 Above 100,001 and 500,000  5,6 
 
 
Two important patterns in the data on continuity can be ascertained: 
The first pattern already noted in Wampler's and Avritzer's (2005) work is the 
concentration of PB cases and the cases of continuity in cities with socio-economic 
indicators above the Brazilian average.  There are two explanations: the first one 
regarding the election of administrations whose cities rank between in the HDI cannot 
be explained by PB itself.   It is the strong electoral presence of the PT in these cities 
that may explain the implementation of PB there.   The PT is elected in these cities 
and implements participatory budgeting there.  However, the continuity issue has to 
be explained in a different way since administrative continuity in Brazil is not so 
strong and large cities are particularly competitive.209 Here the explanation of 
administrative success emerges as strong and PB is a large part of this argument.  
Large cities with high HDI have more likelihood of having PB for 8 or 12 years 
                                                 
209 The rate of administrative continuity at the local level in Brazil is 39,4%, the number of reelected 
mayors in the year 2000.  There is a regional variation in this number with a 48,2% rate of reelection in 
the Northeast and 34,1% in the Southeast. 
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showing that there is a combination of strong electoral insertion of the PB and the 
success of the administrations which have implemented it.   
The second pattern has to do with the expansion of PB to the Northeast 
region.  In previous researches made on a number of cases of PB since 1997, the 
Northeast region of Brazil always ranked low in terms of number of cases.  In 
between 1997 and 2003, the Northeast region has had 14 cases of PB totaling 
13,6% among the 103 cases (Ribeiro and Grazia, 2003).  In the following 
administrative period between 2001 and 2004, the Northeast region had 30 out of 
170 cases making up 16.4% of the total cases (Wampler and Avritzer, 2005).   In the 
current administration, 2004-2008, the number of cases of PB in the Northeast region 
increased to 21%.  Thus, we can see a change in the regional profile of PB with the 
number of cases decreasing in the Southern region and the number of cases 
increasing in the Northeast of Brazil.  What kind of new institutions does PB involve 
and how does it work in the Northeast? Does it have an impact on the administrative 
performance in the region? What can be proposed in terms of PB expansion to other 
countries? 
 
Understanding the Potential of the Expansion of PB 
Participatory budgeting can be expanded outside its initial context.  Data for Brazil 
clearly shows that participatory budgeting has expanded to all regions and has 
recently made important inroads in the northeast of the country, one of its poorest 
regions.  However, in order for participatory budgeting to expand outside its original 
context, two conditions must be met (and they are valid outside Brazil as well). 
The first one is an institutional adaptation.  Porto Alegre, the city that 
generated PB produced specific institutions, including a direct link between the 
mayor’s office and PB which gave the latter a centrality in the public administration.  
The expansion of PB tends to change this institutional arrangement.  In its expansion 
to other cities in Brazil, but also to European cities, PB transforms itself into one 
participatory policy in the administration.  This changes its relation within the 
administration and it is better for PB in this situation to be located in Planning 
Secretariats.  The data that we have for Brazil shows that this adaptation is not 
crucial for the success of PB that may still have democratizing and distributive effects 
in this situation. 
The second important issue involved in the expansion of PB, particularly to 
poor regions, is the way it allocates cities to regions and increases access of the poor 
to public goods.  This is the most important aspect of PB that is reproduced in most 
of the new experiences in Brazil: distribution of public goods in the poor regions 
based on lack of access to public goods.   This is the aspect that makes PB 
distributive and whose results are very clear.  This feature is also readapted in many 
experiences, some of them involving the distribution of public goods and others 
expanding PB to the discussion on how to re-organize social policies. 
The last important point to be made is the adaptation of the budgeting cycle.  
PB was introduced in Porto Alegre as a yearly budget program.  However, even in 
Porto Alegre this was one of its most vulnerable points, because as I have already 
stated, it is very difficult to implement budget decisions in Brazil in a one year time 
gap.  One of the important adaptations of PB, that also seems to work well in other 
countries in the developing world, is the biannual budget cycle for PB.  It has been 
adopted in important cities in Brazil such as Belo Horizonte and Montes Claros.  This 
is also one of the adaptations that make sense at the international level.   
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To conclude, PB is an important instrument for the democratization of public policies 
in Brazil.  It has been successfully expanded outside Porto Alegre.  One of the 
reasons for its portability is its adaptability to different institutional formats.  
Experiences in Brazil and elsewhere show that once PB is adapted it can work well in 
different contexts. 
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xxiv. Democracy and New Technologies: 
        Democratic innovation or illusion? 
By Fernando Mendez210 
 
 
The various contributors to this volume have been asked to consider the 
phenomenon of globalization and to critically evaluate its impact across a number of 
areas. One of the areas, which like globalization is equally difficult to pin down, is the 
topic of democracy. In this essay the nexus between democracy and a specific 
attribute of globalization, namely technological change will be explored. Fortunately, 
the editors have provided a small analytical window of opportunity for grappling with 
what would otherwise have been a herculean task. Instead of an academic-style 
paper on the topic, the editors have asked for a macroscopic overview of the salient 
themes and some indication (speculation) on possible longer term trajectories. 
Nonetheless, the fact that both globalization and democracy constitute examples of 
contested concepts par excellence suggests that some definitional precision will be in 
order. This is what I propose to tackle in the first section, and then proceed to delimit 
a narrower area that is focused on the purported impact of technological change on a 
variety of democratic processes. Against this backdrop I will then explore three 
possible medium term trajectories for ICT and democracy.  
 
On globalization 
Let us start, then, by saying a few words about globalization. The concept is used to 
refer to a complex array of overlapping processes at the macro-level that seem to be 
related to the increasing intensity and variety of interactions between individuals and 
social groups across space and time. In facilitating these myriad exchanges of an 
economic, cultural, political and social nature, the most recent manifestation of 
globalization has overcome a series of previous barriers in an unprecedented way. 
However, contrary to suggestions of automaticity, globalization is an overtly political 
phenomenon. Indeed, we need not be reminded of Polanyi's observation that liberal 
markets do not emerge in a political vacuum to realize globalization's political nature, 
or that the present process has been encouraged, if not subsidized, by a complex 
decision-making web of generally acquiescent political authorities. Politics matters, it 
could hardly be otherwise. More relevant to our analysis, however, is the fact that 
what appears to matter most is a particular form of politics practiced in a specific type 
of political regime, a democracy. In other words, at the forefront of the process we 
refer to as globalization are some of the world's oldest democracies. Admittedly, 
these archeo-democracies have been recently and enthusiastically joined by a 
variety of neo-democracies -the latter being a rather broad church which includes 
many regime types that more accurately warrant the label of hybrid-democracies.  It 
appears that democracy and globalization seem to be interlinked in ways that make it 
extremely difficult to identify any clear direction of causality.  At such a meta-level of 
abstraction the tensions, interactions, and feedback mechanisms between 
democracy and globalization make it difficult to discern possible pathways of cause 
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and effect. We could therefore try a move down the ladder of abstraction. One way to 
accomplish this is by focusing on a particular manifestation of globalization and trying 
to investigate its impact on democracy. This will be the approach adopted in this 
essay.  
One relatively unambiguous manifestation of globalization is the role of 
technological change. The spectacular global proliferation of the Internet since the 
mid-1990s offers us an illustrative example of such a process of technological 
change. The Internet merely represents one of the latest innovations in information 
and communication technologies (ICT), though it is arguably one of globalization's 
most potent symbolic markers. As an example of technological change, the ICT 
variable can at least be broken down into analytically manageable chunks. 
Furthermore, a causal type relationship between ICT and democracy can be 
specified that, in principle, is empirically explorable. The thesis could be formulated in 
the following way: the rapid, apparently uncontrollable diffusion of ICT is impacting 
upon the way in which citizens, civil society and political authorities organise 
themselves, communicate and exchange information with each other, and take 
collective decisions. This is a relatively easy question to answer in the affirmative. In 
countries where there is access to ICT, say,  above a certain minimal threshold, it is 
reasonable to assume that ICT is impacting on the way certain individuals, groups 
and political organisations interact and perhaps even ultimately on how they take 
collectively binding decisions. The interesting question, therefore, is not whether ICT 
is having an impact per se, but rather the intensity, direction and overall effect of the 
impact. For political scientists the pertinent research question is typically formulated 
in terms of whether ICT is having an effect on democratic performance. When this 
question is asked in relation to one or more democratic regimes, the methodological 
aim is to somehow attempt to isolate the ICT variable and ascertain whether the 
latter has had any effect on some democratic criterion, such as the quality or quantity 
of political participation. The range of applicable democratic criteria suggests that 
there are important ideational and normative considerations at play when addressing 
the purported impact of ICT on democracy. We will attempt to specify this connection 
more fully below. 
 
On ICT and Democracy  
Two questions are raised by the discussion thus far. First, what do we mean by ICT 
and, second, how might it affect democratic processes. The first question is relatively 
easy to answer since it has an obvious material manifestation. As the acronym 
suggests, ICT refers to a vast array of information and communication technologies 
that had been around for some time as largely separate fields, but which converged 
spectacularly in the 1960s to bring about various so-called revolutions, the IT 
revolution, the mobile phone revolution, and the Internet revolution -to name but a 
few. Thus, ICT is a broader concept than the Internet and it includes other channels 
such as mobile telecommunications or digital television. Much more sophisticated 
taxonomies of ICT could obviously be formulated, but this would not necessarily add 
much to our understanding since the material dimension of ICT is characterised by 
rapid change or, to put it more accurately, by an accelerating pace of technological 
obsolescence. In other words, even in the short term the physical properties of ICT 
are changing so dramatically that it makes little sense to try to anticipate medium-
term, let alone longer term dynamics. From a quantitative standpoint, therefore, we 
can assume that the variety and scope, as well as the intensity and frequency, of 
ICT-enabled interactions is likely to increase and spread over time. In terms of our 
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line of inquiry, this suggests that fine distinctions or extended taxonomies of the 
material properties of ICT are less important than ICT's normative application in the 
political realm. This ideational dimension, which will be clarified below, has attributes 
that are more 'sticky' than those properties of a material nature.  
The importance of ideational factors calls for a more carefully tuned analysis 
of the application of ICT to the democratic process. Such an approach is less 
concerned with statistics on the availability and deployment of this or that ICT 
technique in a given country and its possible correlation with a country's rank on 
some quality of democracy measure. Many social scientists engage in this type of 
inquiry by making use of the datasets readily available from international agencies 
specialized in compiling such statistics. The correlations that emerge from this type of 
study might demonstrate empirical regularities, for instance that authoritarian regimes 
have less internet hosts per capita of population than democratic regimes, or that 
archeo-democracies tend to have higher ICT deployment than neo-democracies. 
Though valuable in themselves, such findings can only scratch the surface of the 
social phenomenon. Whilst it may be possible to agree on certain objective brute 
facts about the material dimension, i.e. the rate of broadband penetration, the 
number of internet service providers, the number of mobile phone subscribers etc., 
what is missing from this account is what philosophers call intentionality. In the social 
(and political) world, the physical brute facts are directed at something and it is this 
intentionality that largely distinguishes the social sciences from the natural sciences. 
Intentionality is thus a convenient way to bring the discussion back to what it is that 
ICT techniques are directed at. This raises the second, more complex question of 
how ICT may affect democratic process.  
Once we have shifted from the relatively simple material properties of ICT to 
examine its directedness in relation to democratic processes, a host of tricky issues 
are raised mostly connected to the meaning of democracy. Scholars have argued 
endlessly over this question and we shall not rehearse it in any detail here. The most 
relevant point for our discussion on ICT and democracy is perhaps the rather heated 
debate during the 20th century on whether to concentrate on the form of democracy 
(i.e. its procedural features), or whether to focus on democracy's content (i.e. its 
substantive features). It is probably fair to say that the debate was resolved in favour 
of the former rather than the latter, though as we shall see below, the substantive 
features of democracy cannot be ignored. Scholars who focused on the form of 
democracy tried to ascertain what constitute the minimal features of a democracy 
while remaining agnostic as to specific institutional arrangements. Notable attempts 
at a minimalist or generic working definitions of democracy include those offered by 
Schumpeter, for whom democracy was a ‘method’ for arriving at political decisions, 
or Dahl’s influential conception of democracy which is premised on the continued 
responsiveness of rulers to the preferences of the citizens, as well as more recent 
attempts, such as those of Schmitter and Karl, which have stressed the notion of 
accountability.  
What tends to unite scholarship on the form of democracy is the following. 
First, a focus on the relationship between citizens and rulers and second, a 
minimalist understanding of the properties of a democratic regime that does not 
privilege any specific institutional arrangement or format. By adopting a minimalist 
understanding of democracy's operational procedures we can answer the 'directed at 
what question' in relation to ICT. If we understand democracy as a form of 
governance in which citizens hold rulers accountable for their actions or where rulers 
are more responsive to citizens' preferences, then we can delimit our empirical 
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inquiry on the impact of ICT to precisely this narrower dimension. This substantially 
reduces our analytical universe. On the plus side, the benefit of this property 
reduction is that it allows us to exclude a wide range of ICT-related phenomena that 
are mentioned in the literature and frequently conflated as being part of a democratic 
process but do not satisfy this condition. For instance, this understanding would 
exclude a range of ICT innovations in e-government or e-administration which are all 
about making government operate more efficiently rather than democratically.  On 
the down side, we are still left with a vast array of ICT techniques that could 
potentially be used to make rulers more accountable and responsive to citizens. This 
suggests the need to refocus on questions of intentionality and, more specifically, on 
some of the underlying normative conceptions of democracy that underpin ICT 
experimentation. Why should this be so? Well, for the simple reasons that the 
material properties of ICT cannot be divorced from their social intentionality.  It is this 
interaction between the material and the ideational that defines the social facts we 
are trying to investigate. What I will suggest is that ICT techniques deployed in the 
democratic realm can be grouped under three primary categories and that this should 
probably hold across different linguistic and cultural divides. This is because ICT 
techniques applied in the democratic realm, as defined by our minimalist 
understanding, are informed by particular conceptions of democracy. It could hardly 
be otherwise. At the risk of gross simplification, there are at least three ideal type 
conceptions of democracy whose primary focus is on strengthening specific 
mechanisms of (1) representation; (2) participation and (3) deliberation. We shall now 
investigate the connection between each of the three models of democracy and the 
development of specific ICT techniques. 
 
On three conceptions of democracy  
All conceptions of democracy are based on some ideal account of values, e.g. 
freedom, political equality, enlightened understanding, and these values inform 
prescriptions about specific institutions such as the functioning of elections, forms of 
direct participation like citizens' initiatives, or deliberative institutions such as citizens' 
juries. Each of the three conceptions analysed below occupies a large space in 
political theory and one could easily identify additional models. Furthermore, there 
can be a great deal of overlap between them. Nevertheless, as we shall see, the 
three highly stylized conceptions of democracy have rather important prescriptive 
implications for our inquiry into ICT-enabled democratic experimentation.       
 
1. ICT and representation: ICT techniques are especially suited to improving the 
transparency of the political process. This is very important for the 
representative conception of democracy because of the delegated nature of 
modern forms of liberal democracy. Since universal participation in the 
contemporary national state is impractical for reasons of size and scope of 
policy-making, the classical variant of democracy had to be reinvented to 
incorporate mechanisms of representation. The key was to have citizens elect 
political representatives at regularly convoked elections and to be able to hold 
them accountable through sanctioning measures such as dismissal at 
subsequent elections. For some proponents of this minimal conception, such 
as Schumpeter, democracy was simply an efficient method for citizens to 
choose among a cartel of competing elites who would then get on with the job 
of governing. Through this act of delegation and ex-post sanctioning, the 
principal (citizens) would exert control over its agent (political representatives). 
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In such a political marketplace greater transparency is an important lubricant 
because it helps to reduce information asymmetries between agents and their 
principals, increases competition among elites, and may even ultimately lead 
to more electoral choice.  
 
Within the representative conception, ICT offers the potential to improve political 
transparency and monitor representatives more closely. A rather primitive example 
(these days) is a basic government website, which could contain information on 
parliamentary sessions, pending bills, as well as delegates' salaries, their declared 
commercial interests, and so forth. More sophisticated versions might have webcast 
feeds of live parliamentary debates, committee meetings etc., and these could be 
coded and archived in ways that facilitate an easy retrieval of information. There is no 
need to be restricted to the websites of political authorities, political parties or 
representatives. In fact, the websites of politically active civil society organisations 
could become increasingly rich repositories of political information. Many such 
websites are presently searchable by electoral district or constituency and provide 
information on, say, a representatives' campaign donations and their subsequent 
voting behaviour. Sometimes they offer tools that reveal representatives/candidates 
or political party's position on salient issues and allow for these to be matched with 
citizens' own preferences.  ICT tools are being developed to enable citizens to 
monitor their representatives' performance in novel ways, in real time or through pre-
configured alert systems on salient issues that have been pre-selected by citizens. In 
short, the ability to collect and store political data, organise it and retrieve it 
seamlessly and instantaneously is unprecedented. However, the intriguing element 
that flows from a representation conception is that it is not vital for citizens to actually 
get actively involved. The business of monitoring can be simply left to intermediaries 
organisations such as the media and civil society. The lubricant of ICTs helps to 
achieve a more transparent and efficient political marketplace, with improved 
signalling mechanisms that foster greater competition among competing elites and 
improved electoral choice. Crucially, these ICT developments do not require much 
time or commitment from citizens since competitive elections still provide the central 
mechanism for dismissing representatives.  
 
2. ICT and participation: The participatory conception of democracy is rather 
more demanding of the citizen than the previous model. In its ideal form it 
would resurrect many of the perceived positive elements of Athenian 
democracy, in terms of an assembly of directly participating citizen legislators, 
while avoiding some of its more unsavoury features such as its very restricted 
notion of who counts as a citizen. Although the modern variant of participatory 
democracy has many strands to it, there is an identifiable common thread. 
This is the notion of self government by a community of citizens directly 
engaged in the process of making the decisions by which their lives are 
regulated. Rather than the passive involvement of the representation model, 
participatory democracy is predicated on an active conception of citizenship. 
However, as noticed by Rousseau -one of participatory democracy's most 
famous proponents- the model is only suited to small-scale communities such 
as the city-states of Ancient Greece, Renaissance Italy, or his own birthplace 
in the Republic of Geneva, rather than the modern national state. It is 
precisely on this last point where some theorists see potential for ICT to 
overcome constraints such as size and scale. Like the New England town 
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meetings that inspire this model, the starting point for a participatory variant 
would be at the local level where citizens would interact directly with one 
another. These horizontally spread community assemblies could also be 
vertically integrated through regional and national systems that enable citizen 
legislators to actively discuss salient issues at all levels of political 
aggregation. Furthermore, since political participation is radically incomplete 
without an actual decision at the end, citizens would need a mechanism to 
make their preference count. This is where the mechanisms of direct 
democracy, such as the referendum and the citizen's initiative, come into play. 
  
In the participatory model the properties of ICT operate in at least two principal ways. 
First, they provide the logistic tools for distributing the flow of information within and 
across communities at all levels of public aggregation. This is no small achievement 
even in a medium-sized country let alone a continent-sized democratic polity such as 
the US or India. Second, ICT can be used to facilitate the decision-making process 
through a variety of electronic voting technologies permitting citizens to not only 
express their preferences on a range of issues but to do so in a convenient and 
effortless way. In this regard, one could list a host ICT tools that can be used, and 
are being developed, in order to facilitate citizens' direct participation such as e-
voting, e-consultation, e-petition, e-budgeting, e-referendums, e-enabled citizens' 
initiatives, and so forth. One could make a number of further distinctions such as the 
degree to which the results of any ICT-enabled direct participatory mechanism are 
legally binding on authorities (e-consultation may not be, whereas an e-enabled 
referendum could be) and whether they are initiated top down or from a bottom up 
process.  An e-enabled citizen's initiative or an e-petition is bottom up (i.e. proactive) 
whereas an e-consultation or e-budgeting is generally top down (i.e. reactive). 
Notwithstanding these distinctions, the cumulative impact of these ICT tools, if made 
available and used intensively, offer radical opportunities for reconfiguring current 
models of democracy by opening up new spaces for direct forms of citizen 
participation.  
 
3. ICT and deliberation: The deliberative model is the most demanding on 
citizens. It sets a high standard for citizen deliberators who are expected to 
interact discursively with one another on the basis of reasoning that is rational 
and acceptable to all. The intellectual backdrop to much of the present 
deliberative discourse swirling in the air flows from two sources on either side 
of the Atlantic: the revival of political philosophy in the Anglo-Saxon world 
brought about by the American philosopher, John Rawls, and work on the 
transformation of the public sphere by his European contemporary, Jurgen 
Habermas. Building on the latter's conception, in an ideal deliberative setting 
where participants are exposed to a plurality of viewpoints; legitimate public 
policy making is about reasoned argumentation. Arguing or deliberating 
acquires some very special procedural characteristics in this conception.  Put 
very simplistically, in tackling a given issue of public salience, citizen 
deliberators' first need to be capable of imagining themselves stripped of their 
possible communal associations, ethnic, class and professional ties, etc. This 
generates favourable conditions for a type of political argumentation that is 
more enlightened since it is constrained by the need to argue in terms of a 
universal common good rather than the particularistic interests of a specific 
group or constituency. In this more impartial speech setting, the 'force of the 
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better argument' is likely to prevail, as is its corollary, a more legitimate public 
policy. Whether one comes at this from a Rawlsian 'original position' or a 
Habermassian 'ideal public sphere',  philosophically both tend to converge on 
some rationalist procedure for creating legitimate public policies.  
 
How, then, does the deliberative conception relate to ICT?  The simple answer is that 
ICT can help to create favourable conditions for deliberative interactions by opening 
up new, online spaces of opinion formation. The spectacular proliferation of social 
networking sites, such as Facebook or MySpace, is an example of the technological 
architecture that could be used to this effect. Much hope is placed, therefore, on 
electronically mediated forums or virtual communities that could be configured to 
maximise deliberative ideals. Deliberative dynamics could spontaneously emerge in 
civil society initiated online forums, or they might be facilitated by the recent 
proliferation of web blogs, though strictly speaking the latter would need to cross-link 
with alternative viewpoints to maximise the deliberative ideal.  In a vibrant civil 
society, deliberative virtual spaces could start to emerge as a result of some 
Hayekian type of spontaneous order. Alternatively, deliberative spaces, say for the 
formulation of a public policy, could be deliberately engineered by enlightened 
political authorities and moderated by experts. Sponsored e-forums could be 
designed to maximise the plurality of viewpoints and might, in some near future, even 
be able to do so in ways that overcome certain linguistic barriers or a host of other 
functional barriers.  Furthermore, ICT-enabled deliberative spaces could be opened 
in many institutions of representation, such as parliaments and political parties as 
well as regulatory agencies, courts and so on. In short, ICT can be deployed to 
reform current political practices in ways that create opportunities for fostering 
deliberative interactions, ultimately improving the quality of political participation. 
 
Is there an evidence base? 
So far, the discussion has been framed in the realm of possibility, but what is the 
actual evidence base for any claim of movement towards any of these models. The 
first point to note is that evidence of experimentation with a variety of the techniques 
mentioned above can probably be marshalled for most countries, including unlikely 
cases with either abysmally low ICT penetration rates or with authoritarian 
governments. To take some trivial top-down examples, e-voting technologies are the 
object of experimentation in a number of authoritarian regimes, many archeo-
democracies have trialled government sponsored e-forums, and some neo-
democracies have amongst the most sophisticated and interactive government 
websites. In fact, countless isolated examples of ICT-enabled experimentation 
promoting one (or a combination) of the normative strategies of each model can be 
found. But one cannot infer a change in forms of political organisation from an 
isolated example, or from many examples for that matter. This applies with particular 
force to models 2 (participation) and 3 (deliberative). Presently, if there is any 
evidence of effective ICT deployment that can be the basis for an aggregate style 
generalisation, then it is mostly in relation to the techniques connected to model 1 
(representation). Even the poorest nations on earth have government websites as do 
most of their parties where the latter exist in any meaningful way. On the other hand, 
we do not have evidence of transformation towards participatory or deliberative 
models of democracy. What we do have are examples of small scale 
experimentation using the techniques of models 2 and 3.  Sometimes the 
experimentation is on a relatively large scale, i.e. at the national level, but mostly it 
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occurs at the local level. We know, for instance, that there has been experimentation 
with participatory technologies such as e-voting across archeo and neo-democracies, 
and even in authoritarian regimes. We also know that, at this initial stage at least, the 
uptake of these technologies in terms of becoming a permanent, generalised mode 
of participation has been spectacularly unimpressive. Only a neo-democracy, 
Estonia, has thus far rolled out a generalised and binding system of e-voting for an 
entire electorate. Admittedly, this tells us little of the numerous examples of more 
informal and less binding experiments with ICT. Again, we can point to cases of 
experimentation with ICT-enabled forms of direct and participatory democracy across 
archeo and neo-democracies, which are primarily conducted at lower levels of 
political aggregation. Some of these are potentially very innovative such as the 
Brazilian ICT-enabled participatory budgeting (e-budgeting) which appears to be 
spreading to some archeo-democracies. Experiments with top-down e-referendums, 
e-consultations, or bottom-up e-petitions and electronically facilitated citizens' 
initiatives are still very much in their infancy. We know of a few (usually overly cited) 
examples from archeo-democracies that are considered successful. I would 
speculate, however, that at the aggregate level the mortality rate for most of this ICT 
experimentation is rather high. The same would most likely be true of government 
initiated e-forums, though at the level of civil society, and across our regime types, 
the situation is likely to be highly varied.   
In brief, I do not believe that at the present stage we can empirically sustain the 
thesis that ICT is transforming democracies in terms of movement towards any of the 
models. Even in the case of ICT techniques within the paradigm of model 1, we 
cannot say -at any meaningful aggregate level – that ICTs are making rulers more 
accountable or that the latter are, as a result, more responsive to citizens' 
preferences. We can probably confirm that model 1 type tools are the most frequently 
deployed.  None of this means that significant changes are not taking place in the 
way citizens, civil society organisations and political authorities interact using ICT. 
Indeed they are. What it does mean, however, is that it is too early to draw anything 
apart from anecdotal conjectures as to concrete trends towards any normative 
model. We are simply intervening in a process that is in its infancy.  Probably the 
best we can do in terms of proffering any medium term prognostication -with all the 
usual disclaimers that apply to such speculations – is to identify three basic scenarios 
based on diverging assumptions about the nature of change. This is done in the 
three conjectures below that diverge in terms of the purported effects of ICT on 
democracy. Those effects can be positive, negative or neutral.  
 
• The transformation thesis: The bare bones of this thesis have already been 
sketched out at length in the previous section. According to a strong variant of 
this thesis, ICT techniques from all three models could be deployed across all 
levels of political aggregation. The net effect would be a transformation of 
political practices. This thesis can even draw on a rich and well documented 
historical record for support. All previous information and communication 
revolutions, given a sufficient time frame, appear to have been accompanied 
by some significant reconfiguration of political organisation, from the 
emergence of papyrus in ancient Egypt, to the printing press in Reformation 
Europe and, in the previous century, the revolution in broadcasting. There is 
no reason to expect modern ICT to be any different. In its strong version, the 
major transformation would be a movement towards some combination of 
participatory and deliberative models of democracy. This would be the 
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normative Holy Grail for some theorists with ICT playing a significant role in 
combining the models. The key condition would be some form of ICT-enabled 
deliberative setting that fosters exposure to a plurality of viewpoints and 
rational argumentation. Technically, such a deliberative setting could induce 
consensus without the need for any explicit preference revealing mechanism. 
However, it is hard to escape the conclusion that in the final instance some 
mechanism for aggregating social preferences, such as voting, would be 
necessary for the formulation of public policies. And it is precisely on this point 
where the participatory ICT techniques of direct democracy would come into 
play. On the basis of prior deliberative interactions, ICT voting technologies 
would then provide the mechanisms for translating reasoned arguments into 
public policies. There is a potential snag however. The transformation thesis 
requires a considerable degree of institutional change. Present rulers, i.e. 
those who actually benefit from the existing rules, would need to change 
current practices in order to implement forms of direct democracy in any 
meaningful way. Crucially, this cannot be achieved by technology operating on 
its own. It is possible, however, that an incremental process of informal 
experimentation may over time generate formal institutional change. Given 
sufficient time, informal and non-binding practices could become institutionally 
embedded and lead to a formal change in rules. In the transformation model, 
the basic trend line is one in which citizens' preferences -whatever the pattern 
and sequence in which they are revealed, discussed, and transmitted– have a 
progressively greater impact on the direction of public policy.  
 
• The Dystopian thesis: Like the transformation thesis the dystopian view is also 
predicated on some fundamental shift in forms of political organisation. 
However, unlike the transformation thesis the prognostication is an explicitly 
negative one. There are many potential strands to the dystopian thesis, which 
include a rich literary pedigree, such as Orwell's 1984 and Huxley's Brave New 
World, and an imaginative genre of cinematic science-fiction. Many of the 
latter depict a new global order governed by unscrupulous corporations who 
stifle human freedom and are resisted by anarchic hacker movements. We 
need not speculate about such scenarios or the emergence of new social 
actors. In line with the framework set out in this essay our analytical focus is 
much narrower. If our working definition of democracy is a system of 
governance in which rulers are more accountable and responsive to citizens, 
then the dystopian thesis is an anti-democratic hypothesis. ICT, according to 
this conception, could reverse the purported arrow of causality providing rulers 
with new and unprecedented mechanisms for controlling citizens.  The facade 
of elections could well persist, but behind the scenes a sophisticated 
architecture of control is perfected, which regulates and penetrates an ever 
increasing sphere of human behaviour, and thereby erodes individual freedom 
and creativity. In this dystopian scenario, the impact of ICT on democracy 
would be tremendous.  
 
Is there any evidence of anti-democratic surveillance tendencies? Well, actually there 
is. Whilst ICT has many potentially liberating and decentralising features it is also 
undoubtedly a technology of control. Indeed, the control and monitoring potential of 
ICT is the current bête noire for many civil rights groups.  One could take as an 
example the yearly global surveys of Privacy International, a leading civil rights NGO, 
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according to which some of the classic archeo-democracies (mainly the US and the 
UK) are increasingly becoming surveillance societies on a par with some of the 
repressive/authoritarian regimes of North Korea, China and Malaysia. Admittedly, 
their analysis is mostly confined to the impact of ICT on privacy, though the latter is 
broadly understood to incorporate fundamental rights such as constitutional 
protections as well as capabilities for communications interception, visual 
surveillance, border surveillance, workplace monitoring etc. In short, there is 
evidence of the deployment of ICT in ways that enhance new forms of surveillance 
and control and which, in the post-9/11 context, is increasingly legitimated under the 
rubric of addressing a dangerous external threat. Should this trend persist and be 
amplified, the net effect would be to tilt control in favour of rulers rather than citizens. 
Hence, the anti-democratic nature of the dystopian hypothesis. It should be also be 
noted that one could apply a much weaker dystopian view to the ICT strategies of 
models 2 and 3. From this more sceptical viewpoint, the deployment of participatory 
ICT techniques would not foster direct democracy but, instead, lead to negatively 
loaded variants of push-button democracy or plebiscitary forms of democracy. 
Similarly, efforts to create ICT-enabled deliberative spaces are unlikely to generate 
Habermassian rational, enlightened deliberative interactions. Instead, through some 
law of group polarization, forums are more likely to consist of echo chambers that 
reinforce pre-existing prejudices rather than lead to deliberatively induced preference 
change.     
 
• The Lampedusa thesis: This thesis draws on an insight from Di Lampedusa's 
classic novel -Il Gatopardo (The Leopard) - that deals with change and 
continuity during Italy's unification. Lampedusa uses the imagery of the 
'leopard changing its spots in order to stay the same' as a metaphor for 
Sicilian life. Some centuries before him Machiavelli, a Florentine, made 
analogous observations about religious institutions.  More recently,  Robert 
Dahl, one of democracy's foremost scholars, is famous for articulating a 
similar view about democracy. He noticed that over the centuries democracy 
has had to change its practices in order to stay the same. Perhaps the same 
will be true of the present challenges and opportunities to democracy heralded 
by the proliferation and application of ICT to political practices. In other words, 
democratic practices are likely to be altered but democracy's underlying 
principles might stay the same. This is a comforting thought when juxtaposed 
against the dystopian thesis. 
 
How likely is the Lampedusa hypothesis? In the short term at least, it is rather likely. 
We do not have any solid evidence for the claim that democracy at some notional 
aggregate level, or even amongst the supposedly more advanced archeo 
democracies – is moving towards participatory or deliberative democratic models. Of 
course, we do know that some archeo-democracies, like Switzerland, possess 
features of the participatory model at all levels of political authority, including 
sophisticated mechanisms of direct democracy from the citizens' initiative to the 
facultative referendum and which, incidentally, have been established without the 
need for ICT. Switzerland is an obvious outlier case among archeo-democracies 
however. In the final analysis, though there appears to be greater experimentation 
with mechanisms of direct democracy across archeo and neo democracies in the last 
two decades (especially at local level), this does not constitute evidence of an 
emerging participatory model. We do have evidence of changing practices though. 
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For instance in the way people consume political information, in the way 
interest organisations operate, in the way new social movements spring up, and in 
the way in which political parties organise themselves and mobilise support, to name 
but a few. We also have evidence of a general decline in party membership and party 
identification, and a general dissatisfaction with political parties. This may be telling of 
a broader crisis of representation or, to be more precise, a malaise with particular 
channels of representation, such as political parties. The same is generally true of 
political participation, which appears to have dipped in democracies across the world 
since the 1990s, as measured by turnout in elections. All of this suggests that there is 
ample room for improvement and ICT could play an important role. We have already 
suggested ICT's role in improving the flow of information and the transparency of the 
political process. This could generate changes in forms of representation, for 
example, by tilting the balance towards a Maddisonian notion of representatives as 
'delegates' responsive to the preferences of their constituents, rather than the 
Burkean notion of representatives as 'trustees' who once elected are left to decide on 
the most appropriate course of action. ICT could also help reconfigure channels of 
representation, for instance, by empowering new political intermediaries such as 
social movements or fringe parties, rather than traditional 'mass' political parties. 
Other changes over the medium term could include a widening of the voting 
franchise to the significant numbers of foreign residents, or what is perhaps more 
likely and the subject of increasing experimentation, the use of ICT to try to 
incorporate so-called denizens more fully within the political process. In short, one 
could envisage the deployment of more participatory measures (say at the local 
level) and more ICT-enabled grass-roots democracy within political parties and other 
institutions of representation, and this could even entail more deliberative 
experimentation across various level of political authority. However, all of these 
changing practices operate at the margins of models 2 and 3 and firmly within the 
paradigm of model 1. From the Lampedusian perspective, therefore, none of these 
changing practices necessarily entail a regime transformation from the current model 
of liberal representative democracy to participatory or deliberative democracy. 
 
Between scenarios and conclusions  
Presently, there is evidence to support each of the three conjectures noted above. 
The literature is infused with hypotheses that adopt one or more combinations of the 
basic scenarios outlined above. The social sciences do not provide much help in 
adjudicating between scenarios, especially in the medium term, and are obviously 
even less reliable on any purported long term dynamics. What the social sciences 
can provide us with, however, is something akin to a rear view mirror that can be 
used to give us an idea of the possible road ahead. When looking through this rear 
view mirror what we notice is that from an historical perspective, democratic 
institutions are inherently fragile social institutions. In fact, so fragile are our 
democratic institutions that we do not know if in the medium term to long term we 
shall live in democracies, but we do know - at least with a greater degree of 
probability – that we will live in societies dominated by technology.  
Since we cannot adjudicate between the scenarios we might want to apply 
some conceptual tools in order to explore their underlying assumptions. One 
important distinction is between the transformation and the dystopian thesis on the 
one hand, and the Lampedusa scenario on the other.  Both the transformation and 
the dystopian thesis share the implicit assumption that the quantitative increase in 
the availability ICT will produce a qualitative shift in forms of political organisation. 
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But, there is no a priori logical reason for warranting such a belief. This brings us 
back to the Lampedusa thesis which tends to be more neutral with regard to 
wholesale type qualitative transformations. ICT's effects could simply be ambivalent, 
in some cases reinforcing existing power structures or undermining them in others – 
all depending on the particular context. This brings us to another potentially important 
dimension: that of convergence. Both the transformation and the dystopian theses, 
taken to their logical conclusion, are convergence type theses. Over the longer term, 
countries would converge on a particular model. The Lampedusian perspective tends 
to be more agnostic on this front. As a result of ICT deployment, it is probable that 
the present normatively dominant Western archeo model of democracy may 
reconfigure some of its channels of representation and may even introduce more 
participatory and deliberative experimentation at the margins. But this would not lead 
to regime transformation or regime convergence. For instance, some neo-
democracies (e.g. former communist countries within the EU orbit) might converge 
on archeo practices, including how ICT is deployed in the political realm. Others 
might remain neo-democracies or hybrid democracies (e.g. successor states to the 
former Soviet Union that are within the Russia orbit). The same would apply to 
authoritarian regimes - some might transform themselves, though most regimes 
would probably simply adapt to ICT and use it to their advantage as appears to be 
presently the case. My own view is that the transformation thesis is normatively the 
most appealing although some variant of the Lampedusa scenario is, on balance, 
probably the most likely outcome. Evidently, the dystopian thesis is to be avoided – a 
point which suggests the need for a greater public scrutiny of the disturbing 
implementation of dubious surveillance measures across many democratic regimes.  
There is one transformation that has been conspicuously absent from the 
analysis and, at this stage, is simply mentioned en passant. It relates to the possible 
transformation of the nation state. It is one of the dominant themes in the 
globalization literature but has been beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, our 
analytical concern has been directed at the interactions between citizens and rulers 
broadly understood rather than potential reconfigurations of political boundaries. The 
logic of the analysis - the three models, as well as the three scenarios - could of 
course be extended to supranational and international forms of governance. I leave 
such speculations as further food for thought to the reader. By way of conclusion, I 
will instead turn to the question in the title of this essay. Is ICT likely to be a possible 
source of democratic innovation or will it instead be nothing more than a digital 
illusion? At the aggregate level we cannot say much apart from the obvious 
observation that it will depend heavily on the particular context. I would expect to see 
innovative and illusory elements in various combinations across the regime types we 
have mentioned.  A convergence on some Western archeo model of democracy 
seems to me unlikely. Instead, I would expect to see greater differentiation and 
alternative ways of applying ICT to democratic practices across the globe. Perhaps 
the greatest potential for democratic innovation is in some of the neo-democracies as 
opposed to some of the more sclerotic archeo democracies. The former should 
certainly be given more attention by the research community interested in democratic 
innovation. One thing remains certain however. Whether ICT will have an innovative 
or illusory impact on democracy will be the result of specific human choices and a 
whole host of other broader social practices rather than technology.  
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xxv. A Real New Deal: Progressive Global  
   Governance and Democratization 
By Zita Schellekens211 
 
 
The next generation will be a key element to delivering real change. 
‘The Future is Now’, a 1955 short film by Larry O’Reilly shows the audience an 
insight into the future.  It offers a tour through some of the finest American 
laboratories and centres of technology.  In the film young scientists show us 
automated kitchens, video telephones and solar powered batteries.  Mind you, the 
film was made in 1955.  Who now wants to claim that young peoples' imagination is 
‘just their imagination'? Much has changed in the last decades. We need to work with 
those changes and use them to our best interests. These changes are part of the 
solution. 
I would like in this article to share my reflections on current events, solutions 
and future possibilities. As a representative of the Union for Socialist Youth (IUSY), I 
will choose an international perspective and will focus on the role of youth in getting 
progressive global governance and democratization back on top of the political 
agenda.  
In the years to come, we are facing some of the toughest challenges in our 
lifetime: amongst these the so-called credit crunch, severe recession, climate change 
and volatile commodity prices.  There is a need to create worldwide action plans that 
do not just offer quick fixes but concrete sustainable solutions.  Though logical for 
some, real sustainable solutions will have to come from truly working together. 
My plea is to not overlook the aspect of democratisation as a tool for binding 
people, plans and projects or the role of young people in this process.  I strongly 
believe that only by working with democratic countries and institutions, can we tackle 
world-wide problems and formulate sustainable solutions. I would like to support my 
argument by discussing the characteristics of the current generation of youth, the so 
called ‘Millennials’, and relate it to the question of whether there is still a future for 
intergovernmental and supra-national institutions like the European Union and the 
United Nations and if so, what their focus should be.  Also, the current possibilities 
offered to us by technological advances and opportunities should not be overlooked.  
Finally, I will reflect on the possible role that today's youth could play in these 
processes. 
 
Democratization 
Many countries, especially the developing and least developed countries, are 
hampered in their growth and development due to factors such as bad governance 
and soaring corruption.   If democracy is a vital ingredient to reaching sustainable 
growth and development, then we all have cause to worry.  There is a strong 
correlation between the level of development and good governance especially in the 
so-called third world countries.  Children in countries like Burma grow up having no 
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role model nor even the slightest idea of what makes a democracy, how it works and 
how they can find the means to change the current political climate.  This leads to the 
continuation of problems such as corruption and undemocratic processes, and 
hinders many positive changes, let alone possibilities. At the same time, this 
generation will be the next generation to lead these respective countries, and if 
nothing changes, they will make use of the same methods as their predecessors. 
Developing countries, of which many are also developing democracies, tend 
to have a pyramid youth 'bulge-like' population - a predominantly young population.  
Gunnar Heinsohn (2003) argues that a population excess, particularly in a young 
adult male population, predictably leads to social unrest, war and terrorism, given 
that the "third and fourth sons", who are unable to find prestigious positions in their 
existing societies, rationalise their impetus to compete by religion or political 
ideology.212  More basically; people tend to fight even when there is nothing to fight 
over. Heinsohn claims that most historical periods of social unrest lacking external 
triggers such as rapid climatic changes or other catastrophic changes of the 
environment, and most genocides can be readily explained as a result of a 'built-up 
youth bulge', including European colonialism, 20th-century fascism, ongoing conflicts 
such as that in Darfur and, of course, terrorism.  If we follow Heinsohn’s theory, 
'bulge-like' populations can present a serious threat to societies. 
Faced with this daunting pessimism, there are reasons to be optimistic. Youth 
can play a positive and vital role in politics. Based solely on democratic principles, 
the ideas and voices of such an important part of the population should be taken 
seriously.  Young people can play a significant role in the reformation and 
stabilization process that their countries are undergoing. Unfortunately, this is not 
always understood and often is not the case.  There are many countries that are led 
by malfunctioning governments which do not allow fair and free elections or any other 
form of civil participation, whilst not having to be accountable for any of their wrongful 
or brutal actions.    
Youngsters growing up in these countries do not just need to learn what a 
democratic system resembles but they also need to be able to expand and defend 
democracy.  They need to be able to use it to achieve their goals and bring about 
real change.  
There are several reasons to explain the importance of youth taking part in 
political processes. One of those is representation, where a just democracy makes its 
decision based upon the judgments of all groups within society, which is particularly 
important in countries with youth-bulge populations.  These societies should, 
therefore, include the interests and opinions of the youth.  This will only be the case if 
they become an active partner and actor in the political decision-making process, 
either through formal functions or through (political) activism.  Furthermore, when 
compared to adult politics and politicians, youngsters are usually less sensitive to the 
threat of corruption, nepotism, and electoral focuses.   They tend to have strong 
ideals focused on the future instead of only aiming for quick wins.   
However, as long as young people do not have the means, tools and 
experience to get actively involved in the political process, we end up in a deadlock.  
Therefore, youngsters need to learn and practice on their civil society and political 
                                                 
212 Gunnar Heinsohn (born 1943 in Gdynia, Poland) is a German university professor who has 
published more that 400 scholarly articles and books.  He has focused his research on the history and 
theory of civilization.  Since 1984, he has been a tenured professor at the University of Bremen, where 
he heads the Raphael-Lemkin-Institute for Comparative Genocide Research.   
The Nation Master Encyclopedia http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Gunnar-Heinsohn 
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skills.  Young people have to familiarise themselves with the forms of debate, 
presentation, organisation building, capacity building, recruiting and activating 
volunteers and so on.  As political and non-governmental movements, we have to 
invest in those processes.   
Participation in civil society and governmental framework phases out the need 
for violence to achieve change.  Young people need to learn how to effectively work 
without the use of violence, especially in fragile states.  An early participation thereby 
results in a more stable and structural democratic development.   
Stimulating the youth to participate in these developing countries will not be an 
easy task.  However, as soon as the youth starts to join hands and build alliances, it 
can be very successful.  There are many positive examples such as in the former 
Communist countries in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus.  Youth does make and, 
in the past, has made a difference.   
That is why we must invest in youth.  The idea is to work closely with young 
people and teach them how they can peacefully and democratically achieve results, 
even in a country that is far from democratic.  We should involve all young people 
who will be at the heart of current and future political activities.  Instead of working 
with guns and violence, they must learn how to work together with other groups in 
society in order to build a strong civil society.   
IUSY is a mechanism which endeavours to do so by exchanging knowledge 
and best practices, but also through the means of training programs.  Moreover, we 
have a two-year solidarity program in which we support a youth organisation to bring 
about change in the most difficult situations.  However, we can use all the help we 
can get.  Through the means of this article, I call upon all organisations to put the 
topic of democratisation and the role of youth high on the agenda and act upon it! 
 
Millennials & Internet 
I represent the so-called ‘Millennials’, also known as the Web 2.0 generation.  From 
the end of the Second World War and up until now, the world has known three 
generations.  The first are the ‘Baby boomers’, known for their strong sense of justice 
and equality.  As a group, they were the healthiest and wealthiest generation of that 
time, and amongst the first to grow up genuinely expecting the world to improve with 
time.213   The ‘baby boomers’ are now middle-aged and entering their senior years.  
Many of today’s political leaders belong to this generation, but at the same time, a lot 
of ‘baby boomers’ are retiring and leaving the workforce.  Their children are known as 
the Generation X and are quite different.  They are known for a cynical and low key 
attitude when it comes to politics.  Generation X values espouse community, 
relationships, altruism and entrepreneurship.  They witnessed the end of the cold war 
and saw the fall of the Berlin wall.  This generation saw the inception of the home 
computer and later the internet, as a tool for economic purposes.  Generation Y, 
Millennials or Web 2.0, born between 1976 and 2000214, grew up with the internet 
and often perceive themselves as world citizens.  This generation is considered 
individualistic, diverse, possessing a broad field of knowledge.  It is said that 
Millennials are optimistic and politically interested215, which is perfectly characterised 
                                                 
213 Jones, Landon (1980), Great Expectations: America and the Baby Boom Generation, New York: 
Coward, McCann and Geoghegan 
214 The definition differs, some say the Millennials generation is between 1982 and 2000. 
215 Before generation Y was typed to be seeking for wealth and a disinterest in politics, however new 
research shows a high interest in politics.  For the sake of the article, we use this definition, the future 
might prove otherwise. 
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by the ‘change-politics’ of the President of the United States, Barack Obama.  
Millennials believe change is possible which often clashes with the more ‘real-
political’ and cynic attitude of Generation X.   
When we look at the recent elections in the United States, research has 
proven that if the 18-29 age-groups would have been the only group of voters, the 
outcome would have been 455 constituencies for Obama and only 57 for McCain.  216 
For the record: the actual outcome of the elections in November 2008 was 365 
constituencies or votes for Obama and 173 for McCain.  It was not just the message 
of change Obama used to gain popularity with young Americans; it was also his 
presence on and use of the internet.  Obama has his own Facebook 217 site with over 
5.412.601 friends and fans.  A group of youngsters organised themselves as 
‘students for Obama’ and within one year there were more than 700 branches all 
over the country actively campaigning for Obama.  At one point the organisation 
became an important part of the Obama campaign.   
The term "Web 2.0" describes the changing trends in the use of World Wide 
Web technology and web design that aim to enhance creativity, communications, 
secure information sharing, collaboration and functionality of the web.  Nowadays 
there are many aspects of the internet and new media, such as social network sites 
(Facebook), Twitter, blogs and video channels (Youtube).  The idea is that anyone 
can post anything on the internet and the information can travel all around the world.  
This has led to a greater democratisation of information. 
One of the biggest drivers of globalisation is the internet.  Moreover, the 
number of households owning a computer and internet connection are continually 
growing.  There are around 1,574,313,184 internet users218 worldwide, which is 
around 23.5% of the world's population.  Despite ongoing poverty, illiteracy and 
hunger, the growth rate of Internet users in Africa is high.  According to International 
World Statistics, the number of Internet users on the African continent increased by 
1100% during 2000-2008.219 The penetration of internet usage is by far the highest 
in Oceania/Australia with 59.9%, followed by the European continent with 48.5%.  
Needless to say, youngsters are the most active internet users.   
Internet based activities are also used to spread and distribute news, 
especially in countries where journalists are restricted in their activities, for example 
during wars or in repressive dictatorships. Internet-based communication has, 
therefore, started to play a bigger role.  A good example can be found in Burma 
where journalists are not allowed into the country and general footage is filmed at 
random.  A group of thirty Burmese anonymous video reporters is trying to change 
that by secretly shooting materials of the ongoing abuses and violent acts in the 
country.  During the demonstrations in September 2007 and Hurricane Nargis in 
October 2008, journalists and most NGO workers who were present were simply 
thrown out of the country.  Thanks to those very courageous Burmese video 
reporters, information was diffused via the internet and the world was able see 
                                                 
216 Research done by: the outcomes of the other 26 constituencies are still unknown 
217 Facebook is a social utility (website) that connects people with friends and others who work, study 
and live around them.  A Facebook member has its own profile page, like a small website.  Friends 
can go to your page and leave a message, but you can also join causes and groups.   
218 Statistics of December 2008 by Internet World Statistics.  Every year there is approximately one 
percent growth in the number of Internet users.   
219 International World Statistics : http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm 
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footage of the real situation; a peaceful demonstration of Buddhist monks being 
brutalised by the military army.220 
Some politicians are already using these different forms of communication.  
For instance, the Dutch Minister for Foreign Affair, Maxime Verhagen, is an active 
Twitter221 user.  Twenty times a day, he posts small items on his meetings and 
travels and is followed by about 5000 Twitter users.   
We can, therefore, conclude that the internet is an ideal tool for 
democratization as a whole.  It allows any individual to participate in politics and to 
set the political agenda.  Internet also brakes down barriers between different 
countries, situations and citizens.  Internet allows news to travel faster and gives 
everyone access to that news.  It also adds to build a bridge between politics and 
citizens.  Political parties, think tanks and intergovernmental institutions should use 
the possibilities the internet offers.  It is an excellent way to include and inform people 
as well as a means to increase political participation of youth. 
Even more importantly, internet can be a tool for the democratization process.  News 
has never travelled faster or reached so many people world-wide.   
 
Global Governance  
Here I will be frank and straightforward.   When it comes to global governance, we 
are currently doing a very bad job given situations such as those in Burma, Belarus, 
North Korea, the Middle East, Afghanistan or Darfur.  We are not even close to 
finding solutions. 
It is absolutely unacceptable that a Nobel Prize laureate, Aung San Suu Kyi 
has been living under house arrest for more than 13 years and she is not allowed to 
participate in the so-called ‘free elections’ planned to take place in 2010.  There are 
many reasons for such situations.  There seems to be a general lack of interest for 
these ‘forgotten nations’ and the countries that do care are often on their own.  These 
issues can be addressed on an international level but rarely are there any concrete 
proposals.  There is also no official body that focuses on the implementation or 
‘follow-up’ on resolutions that have been adopted.    
However, thanks to the internet and youth pressure groups the attention is 
often raised on exactly such issues.  A good example of an excellent youth campaign 
on a forgotten nation is the Students Take Action for Darfur (STAND)222 in the United 
States.  STAND, is the student-led division of the Genocide Intervention Network, 
and envisages a world in which the international community protects civilians from 
genocidal violence.  Their mission is to empower individuals and communities with 
the tools to prevent and stop genocide. 
To do so, STAND’s Leadership Team recruits, trains, organizes and mobilizes 
students around the world by providing materials, educational information, online 
resources, policy expertise, and a network of concerned and active peers.  Every 
day, STAND chapters are initiated by students in schools around the world.  As key 
actors in the fight to build political will for putting a stop to genocide, students in 
STAND chapters organise and educate their peers and communities, advocate to 
                                                 
220 The Movie ‘VJ Burma’ shows their footage and is highly recommended.  The movie is also 
promoted by the Amnesty International program ‘Movies that Matter’.   
221 Twitter is a social networking and micro-blogging service that allows its users to send and read 
other users' updates (otherwise known as tweets), which are text-based posts of up to 140 characters 
in length.  A user basically tells others what they are doing or thinking at that specific moment.  Other 
followers (who read your tweets) can respond to your actions or thoughts.   
222 http://www.standnow.org/ 
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their elected officials for substantial legislative action, and fundraise for civilian 
protection. 
It has been called the fastest-growing student movement in the world today.  
Since the first chapter was formed in 2004, STAND has grown into an international 
network of more than 850 chapters in schools around the globe.   As an international 
network of students, STAND has endowments and pension funds of more than 25 
states and 8 universities from business companies in Sudan has advocated for the 
successful passage of federal legislation, including the Sudan Accountability and 
Divestment Act (SADA) and the Genocide Accountability Act (GAA) and hundreds of 
millions of dollars in peacekeeping  and relief funds in the United States; fundraised 
more than $650,000 for the Genocide Intervention Network’s Civilian Protection 
Programme in Darfur; organized large-scale demonstrations in more than 25 major 
cities around the world, including New York, London, Los Angeles, Paris, 
Philadelphia, Chicago, San Francisco, Fort Wayne, Los Angeles, Miami, Washington 
D.C., Austin, Atlanta, Boston, and Denver; established more than 850 chapters in 
more than 25 countries worldwide; sponsored and organized, over a two year period, 
13 conferences on genocide attended by more than 2,300 students in total.  Here 
again, the internet played a vital role in this successful ongoing project. 
This example greatly emphasizes the will of youngsters today to fight for 
justice and to bring to the attention of the world the forgotten nations and conflicts.  
We really want change and we want to raise our voices for those people who are 
unable to do so.   
But, what is the situation we are in right now?  Do we really need to fight this hard to 
change the international global framework? What is the current global governance 
framework?   
Human Rights; the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) 
established in March 2006.  This inter-governmental body succeeded the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights and acts a subsidiary body of the UN General 
Assembly.  Its main task, and only official authority, is to make recommendations to 
the General Assembly on Human Rights violations.  In return, the General 
Assembly’s only authority is to advise the UN Security Council.  It is the UN Security 
Council that votes resolutions dealing with the Human Rights violations.  Needless to 
say, most Human Rights resolutions are blocked as the Human Rights Council has 
47 seats and members such as China and Russia.   We can, therefore, conclude that 
the Human Rights Council has no real power.  The General Assembly of the United 
Nations does, however, adopt some of the discarded resolutions.  The United 
Nations now has the responsibility to protect but is unable to actually put this into 
practice, Darfur being a prime example.  In terms of democracy within the UN 
framework, there are many legitimate complaints; on the composition of the Security 
Council, on the role of the developing countries and so on.   
Likewise, other well known international institutions are far from democratic, 
especially when it comes to developing countries.  The IMF and World Bank have a 
long-term western centralised programme, similar to the Washington Consensus, 
requesting demands from the poorer countries that they are unable to provide within 
their own countries.  There is little room for discussion and those who either do not 
listen or are not keen on implementation are simply left to their own devices.  Take 
decisions and reaching any agreements for the poor are long and tiresome 
processes, such as the Doha rounds for example.   
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This all sounds pretty discouraging.  The great international institutions like the 
United Nations, the IMF and the World Bank are ineffective and unable to save and 
improve human lives! While nobody has all the answers to these great problems, we 
have to believe that it is not too late; we can and must continue to work to ensure 
change to improve this world and safeguard Human Rights.  It is the young 
generation that has to push this agenda forward.   But, they need to work together 
with political leaders and other important decision-makers! Together they can make 
history and change the global situation.   
 
Role of the European Union in global governance  
The European Union has an important and strong role to play within the international 
framework.  Whilst international politics are very complicated and agreements cannot 
always been reached, there are still many issues that can be agreed upon, especially 
when it comes down to basic Human Rights.  We have to combine our efforts and 
forces to combat dictatorships, genocide, environmental crisis, the food crisis more 
recently the credit and economical crisis. 
You might be wondering why I am addressing such these issues in this 
publication: "Dilemmas in Globalization".  Firstly, a democratic Europe can play a 
strong role on democratizing the global framework.  Secondly, a democratic Europe 
can play an important role on the international scene.  Where there are many global 
problems such as HIV and Climate Change, the question remains as to whether 
Europe alone can solve these serious problems.  The answer is no, a more 
democratic Europe with one voice cannot take the sole responsibility to change the 
current situation.  It also has to rely on other key actors such as the United States of 
America, China, Russia, etc.  But, the EU can serve as a good example to be 
pursued by others.  The EU can be the guide, and it could become the leader of the 
"new world"  
There are themes on which Europe especially can make a difference.  A 
united Europe can, and within a short time-frame, make a difference on topics such 
as democracy and Human Rights, international diplomacy and the financial market 
and world trade.   
With the new Lisbon Treaty, which will hopefully soon be ratified by all 
Member States, there is a strong focus on a common international foreign agenda.  
With the Special High Representative of Foreign Affairs also becoming Vice-chair of 
the European Commission, this is a strong sign to the international community and 
definitely a step in the right direction. 
However, one problem will remain, even with the acceptance of the Lisbon 
Treaty. The European Union has a very long decision-making process.  This may 
entail the High Representative spending more time on the decision-making process 
behind closed doors rather than in the international arena.  The democratisation of 
Europe can only contribute to global governance if it speeds up the decision-making 
process.  Global players such as China, Russia and the United States move faster 
and are able to respond quickly to sudden crisis or situations.  The European Union 
is in this respect at a disadvantage.   
Secondly, the democratic reform of Europe will only work if it is in conjunction 
with the democratization within the UN.  As long as all members of the Security 
Council have a veto, there is no sense for Europe to claim a seat.  Only when a fair 
and democratic voting system is in place, can the European Union Member States 
consider voting within the Council of the UN.  The European Union should speak with 
244 
one voice in the UN and work jointly with other continental frameworks such as the 
African Union and the Americas.   
To conclude, there are many positive sides to the new Lisbon Treaty and we 
should remain optimistic.  There are, however, still issues to be tackled before a 
more democratic Europe can make a real difference in the world. We need 
democratic countries, nations and institutions to tackle the challenges presented in 
this book.  Only by achieving democracy at all levels will solutions prove sustainable.   
It will clearly be a difficult and challenging process.  We will, however, be able to 
tackle whatever crisis or threat we are faced with in the future, if we have a strong 
political leadership and competent institutions.  In this process, we need to make 
maximum use of the internet to reach across continents and ensure stronger 
participation in the political process. 
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